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Abstract  
Since 2010 a policy network on urban agriculture (UA) has emerged in Bangkok, 
incorporating policy actors from both governmental and non-governmental bodies. 
This  study  argues  that  multiple  forms  of  social  capital  –  including  shared  rules, 
reputation, trust, reciprocity, moral obligation, shared norms and shared knowledge 
among various actors – have shaped the functioning of this policy network since its 
emergence. In addition, the study argues that these forms of social capital support the 
capacity of the policy network to enhance cooperation and handle conflicts.  
The role of social capital in governing the UA policy network is examined in relation 
to  the  floods  experienced  in  Bangkok  between  late  2011  and  early  2012.  The 
analytical  framework  adopted  is  based  on  two  contrasting  theories:  Ostrom’s 
institutional  rational  choice  (IRC)  and  Habermas’  communicative  action  theory 
(CAT). Both are applied to link social capital and policy network studies. Following 
these two perspectives, this study conceptualises social capital by considering both 
rational and normative commitments. By focusing on IRC and CAT perspectives on 
power, this study analyses how instrumental, communicative and structural power 
relates  to  social  capital.  Findings  reveal  that  the  aforementioned  forms  of  social 
capital influenced the emergence of the policy network by determining the status of 
the  network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups  and  their  power  relations. 
Members of organisations and groups that shared forms of knowledge agreed that 
the reason for cooperation was epistemic, while reciprocity and moral obligation 
supported their decision to cooperate. The study also found that the reputable and 
trusted  organisational  leader  within  the  network,  who  shared  rules,  norms  and 
knowledge with others, played a key role in facilitating a deliberative process while 
handling conflicts. The analysis aims to bridge social capital and policy network 
studies, and reveals the benefits of articulating IRC and CAT to understand policy 
network governance. 
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Introduction 
Between mid-November 2011 and early January 2012, Bangkok, the capital city of 
Thailand,  faced  the  most  dramatic  flood  in  approximately  70  years.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  disaster,  the  city  and  its  inhabitants  faced  a  series  of 
complications,  including  the  disruption  of  food  supply.  The  food  shortages 
experienced during the flooding period translated into short-term food insecurity. 
The chains of production and transportation monopolised by food corporations that 
were centralised in Bangkok, were severely affected by the floods. Their factories 
and the main roads that they usually used for the transportation of their products 
were under water, disrupting access to markets by city habitants. Due to the changed 
balance between supply and demand of food products, prices increased 3 to 4 times 
on average both in modern trade and traditional local markets (Working Group on 
Food for Change, 2012). During that period, vegetables were rarely available, owing 
to the fact that the largest distributive vegetable market was affected by the flooding. 
When vegetables were available, their price was roughly ten times more expensive 
than  under  normal  circumstances  (ibid).  Roughly  41,500  households  of  the  total 
2,459,700 households (1.69%) in Bangkok Metropolis could not access sufficient 
supplies of food, while almost all inhabitants living in 36 out of 50 districts had 
limited  access  to  fresh  products  (Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration,  2011). 
Meanwhile, the mainstream food aid system managed by the central government in 
cooperation  with  private  and  international  organisations  provided  mainly  dry 
foodstuff, such as instant noodles and canned fish.  
The poor and marginalised in Bangkok, such as slum communities settled along the 
river,  were  affected  the  most  during  the  flooding.  Even  under  ordinary 
circumstances, more than half of their monthly income was spent on food (Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration, 2012). The dramatic increase of food prices made food 
unaffordable for the majority of them, while government distributed food aid with a 
one-size-fits-all  approach.  However,  during  this  period,  a  network  around  urban 
agriculture (UA) promoting multi-actor ‘umbrellas’ in Bangkok, worked intensively 
and collectively to address the aforementioned problems, particularly targeting their 
efforts towards the most vulnerable groups in the city. This network, formed in 2010 
and  led  by  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation,  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  
21 
Foundation, the Media Centre for Development, the Working Group on Food for 
Change, and the city farm association within the City Farm programme, in order to 
promote an alternative urban food system in the city.  
The City Farm programme was funded under the food and nutrition plan created by 
the Health Promotion Foundation, the Prime Minister’s Office, for 7 million Baht 
(USD0.2 million) per year since 2010. The programme was co-managed by many 
non-governmental  bodies,  as  previously  mentioned.  The  Bangkok  Metropolitan 
Administration and District Administration Offices, regional and local governments, 
also took part by promoting communities within their administrative boundary to 
participate by developing their community garden. They also supported training in 
farming practices by developing the city farm learning centre located in their office 
area. Other public organisations included research units of public universities that 
supported knowledge and information on food-growing. Their focus for urban food 
policy was rather more orientated towards linking food with health, local economy, 
environment,  social  welfare  and  education.  The  programme  managed  to  engage 
communities of urban poor and marginalised citizens such as the network of slum 
dwellers and the informal labour network. More details will be provided in Chapters 
1, 4 and 5.   
This  programme  therefore  brought  together  a  variety  of  related  autonomous  but 
interdependent  policy  actors,  including  central,  regional  and  local  government 
agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community based organisations 
(CBOs), social and green enterprises, and farming groups. Since 2010, the network 
developed  within  the  City  Farm  programme  has  supported  more  than  120 
community gardens scattered within the inner city. They also organised seventeen 
green  markets  and  community-supported  agricultural  systems.  As  the  network 
mobilised collective actions to instigate change in urban food problems, this study 
refers to it as the 'policy network on urban agriculture' in Bangkok. The notion of 
‘policy  network’  is  used  to  capture  a  variety  of  related  autonomous  but 
interdependent policy actors and actions active with the same agenda (Bevir and 
Richards, 2009, p.3; Compston, 2009, p.5; Marsh, 1998, p.8; Rhodes, 2007, p.1243).   
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During the floods, this policy network attempted to fill the gap of the mainstream 
one-size-fits-all  food  aid  system,  which  originated  from  a  fragmented  urban 
governance and dependence on food corporations with a monopoly in the market. 
The policy network did this by focusing on the most vulnerable and aiming towards 
enhancing the capacity of local food systems. Constituent organisations and groups 
within the policy network organised several meetings and focus group discussions to 
share  experiences,  mobilise  resources  and  promote  the  development  of  UA 
innovations  under  flood  conditions.  In  addition,  members  of  this  policy  network 
organised numerous field visits to provide food during the floods and distributed 
materials and know-how on food production to the flood victims. Furthermore, they 
supported mutual aid under the community-supported agricultural system by sharing 
seeds  after  the  flooding.  Last  but  not  least,  they  enhanced  awareness  of  food 
security, the right to food, and climate change adaptation by promoting these notions 
through  a  variety  of  information  channels.  Further  details  will  be  provided  in 
Chapter 1. 
The UA policy network in Bangkok was developed by a rich web of linkages among 
networking actors and their vertical and horizontal actions, and across and within 
central  (national),  regional  (metropolitan  Bangkok)  and  local  community  levels 
(within  Bangkok).  The  initial  review  of  relevant  documents  and  observations 
conducted during the preliminary fieldwork revealed that many members worked on 
UA and with each other prior to the endorsement of the City Farm Programme. 
Close preceding relations based on different commitments (such as, shared rules, 
trust,  shared  norms  etc.),  captured  here  under  the  term  of  ‘social  capital’,  may 
therefore  play  a  significant  role  in  facilitating  the  emergence  of  the  UA  policy 
network. This claim is well supported by Lowndes and Pratchett (2010, p.677-707), 
who argue that social capital is central to the policy network literature as it could 
explain how a policy network emerges and functions subsequently. Lin (2010, p.58) 
adds that social capital is a resource embedded in networks. He mentions that it is 
the glue that holds actors together as a network. However, the role of social capital 
still needs to be clearly identified by questioning how the social capital of plural 
organisations and groups can facilitate the emergence and characterisation of the 
policy network.  
23 
This study also investigates the role of social capital in facilitating cooperation and 
conflict resolution during and after an extreme climate event to understand relations 
between social capital and key challenges of policy network governance (handling 
cooperation and conflicts). The literature review conducted at the beginning of this 
study indicated that two contesting theories on collaborative network governance – 
Ostromian  institutional  rational  choice  (IRC)  and  Habermasian  communicative 
action theory (CAT)
1 can guide an understanding of this issue. In short, IRC focuses 
on  rational  commitments  (based  on  predictable  and  concrete  strings  attached 
relationships such as shared rules and reputation for trustworthiness) and indicates 
that  incentives  and  agreed  rules  are  required  for  cooperation  enhancement  and 
conflict resolution, while CAT is more sensitive to normative commitments (based 
on unpredictable and abstract strings attached relationships such as shared norms, 
trust and moral obligation) and indicates that consensus and mutual understanding as 
a  result  of  communication  become  key  to  enhancing  cooperation  and  resolving 
conflicts. While the main assumptions underpinning each of these theories will be 
discussed  in  Chapter  2,  it  should  be  noted  that  each  theory  is  often  applied  in 
isolation  from  the  other.  Therefore,  there  is  value  in  contrasting  these  two 
perspectives and bringing them in dialogue with each other in order to gain a deeper 
understanding  of  social  capital  and  policy  network  governance,  in  light  of  real 
situations during primary research conducted in Bangkok. It is also interesting to 
examine these debates in the context of disaster governance, where there is still a 
significant gap of knowledge. This thesis provides an original contribution to the 
current  understanding  of  how  social  capital  facilitates  the  emergence  and 
characterisations of a policy network, and supports a policy network to deal with 
collective  action  problems  –  both  insufficient  cooperation  and  conflicts.  In  the 
context of Bangkok, the thesis will explore the role of social capital in handling 
cooperation  and conflicts emerging through efforts to  enhance food  security, the 
right  to  food,  and  climate  change  adaptive  capacity  during  and  shortly  after  a 
disaster.  
                                                 
1‘Communicative action theory’ is called by Habermas himself, while many Habermasians 
call the theory in different ways such as ‘communicative planning theory’ (Healey, 2006) 
and ‘deliberative (democracy/ governance) theory’ (Dryzek, 2012; Wagenaar, 2011).  
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In summary, while previous studies pay attention to the success of social capital in 
gluing  networks  and  overcoming  collective  actions  problems  by  analysing  cases 
through  either  IRC  or  CAT,  this  thesis  aims  to  reveal  'the  secret  of  its  success' 
through different lenses – articulating IRC and CAT - and to do so by examining the 
role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of a policy 
network as well as to examine its role in dealing with collective action problems in 
the context of disasters.  
I Objectives of the research 
Following the previous discussion, the research informing this thesis was guided by 
the following objectives: 
I.I.  To  explore  the  role  of  social  capital  in  facilitating  the  emergence  and 
characterisation of the UA policy network  
I.II. To examine how social capital affects the way in which the policy network 
enhances cooperation and solves conflicts in relation to enhancing food security, 
right  to  food  and  climate  change  adaptive  capacity  during  and  shortly  after  the 
disaster. 
A clarification of the first objective should start with a clear definition of the term 
‘social  capital’,  particularly  because  it  is  conceptualised  differently  by  different 
schools of thought. The existence of close relations is commonly used as a minimal 
standard (Field, 2003; Harriss, 2001). Close relations can be based on many possible 
commitments, which explain why there are many forms of social capital. Aside from 
examining social capital by degrees of closeness, this study also explores the role of 
different  forms  of  social  capital  including  shared  rules,  a  reputation  for 
trustworthiness, trust, reciprocity, moral obligations, shared norms, and shared forms 
of knowledge.  
Firstly,  shared  rules  refer  to  very  formal  commitments.  For  example,  public 
organisations share rules to create, implement and evaluate their strategic plan. They 
also need to be strict on fiscal management rules such as rules on fiscal expenditure  
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and  auditing.  In  the  case  of  rules  shared  between  public  and  non-public 
organisations, they are usually in the form of conditions stated in their contract. As 
for non-public organisations, they share some unwritten rules such as ‘first come, 
first serve’, which means they would cooperate, support and help who demand from 
them before others as they have limited resources (money and staffs). Such rules are 
a basic reference for living and working together.  
Secondly,  a  reputation  for  trustworthiness  refers  to  the  way  organisations  are 
perceived  by  others,  which  related  to  the  degree  of  creditability  they  receive. 
Trustworthiness is usually understood in comparative reference to trust. According 
to Hardin (2002), trusting is what we do ourselves; trustworthiness is what others do. 
For example, training centres that have provided services for a long period of time 
may have harnessed the trust of others over their ability to train. University research 
centres  can  develop  their  reputation  for  being  trustworthy  from  their  expertise 
through  their  publicised  research  projects,  the  profiles  of  their  researchers  and 
recognition received from the media.    
Thirdly,  trust  is  more  internal  than  trustworthiness.  It  refers  to  a  belief  that  the 
trustee will be truth-telling, promise-keeping and fair. Generally, a reputation for 
trustworthiness supports trust, otherwise called predictive trust. In this form, it is a 
probabilistic expectation. Internal trust can, however, also arise even if two parties 
do  not  know  one  another  by  reputation.  This  is  called  altruistic  trust,  which  is 
morally praiseworthy and derives from deserving approval, or admiration. Therefore, 
trust takes different forms, both rational and moral (Warren, 1999, pp.85, 290-309).        
Fourthly, the notion of shared norms refers to sharing the same beliefs, values and 
even cultures which affect the way we interpret the world, judge what is good and 
bad, and even determine lifestyles. For example, almost all constituent organisations 
and groups of the policy network shared an environmental concern and were devoted 
to healthy self-produced food in the hope of increasing self-reliance. In short, these 
norms affect their negative point of view on modernisation, chemical use, mono-
cropping, agri-business, and even their broader understanding of capitalism. Such 
norms also shape the lifestyles of many who are influenced by the so-called ‘green  
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culture’, which supports green restaurants and markets, and calls for sensitivity to 
reducing carbon footprints, reuse and recycle. 
Fifthly, shared forms of knowledge refer to a shared understanding of a subject. For 
example,  public  organisations  exchange  some  technical  knowledge  such  as  the 
designing of plans to develop indicators and to use specific terms. Many farming 
groups also share local knowledge about agricultural practices such as how to make 
and use an effective microorganism by using local materials and household waste.  
Lastly, reciprocity and moral obligation refer to specific norms in which the related 
organisations  and  groups  would  like  to  support  each  other  or  help  one  another. 
Reciprocity is based on an expectation of mutual benefit, while moral obligation is 
based mainly on an altruistic mindset in which a decision is not made by trade-off 
between gains and losses. Chapter 3 presents how these forms of social capital are 
operationalised in my research. 
We depart from defining the facets of social capital, to identifying the UA policy 
network and the policy actors and actions engaged in the City Farm programme. As 
mentioned earlier, the programme developed a clear UA policy network by formally 
structuring the existing loose network of organisations and groups working on UA. It 
encouraged them to work closer together through a great number of meetings and 
collective actions. There were four co-ordinators of the City Farm programme. The 
first one took care of farming groups that had been granted from the programme, 
while the second one linked training centres which were mostly social enterprises. 
The third worked on media and public relations, while the last one was responsible 
for financial matters. Not every organisation and group engaged with the City Farm 
programme received funding. Some of them, particularly public organisations, did 
not get financial support from the programme but instead they were supported by 
resource provision (e.g. free lunch boxes for trainers and trainees in the training day 
organised by public organisations) or incentivised by having a wider connection and 
a chance to exchange knowledge and information.  
The policy network’s constituent organisations and groups can be divided into four 
different types: (1) public organisations that are a part of central, regional or local  
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governments, and public universities, (2)  NGOs and CBOs,  (3) social and  green 
enterprises  including  green  restaurants,  markets  and  training  centres  (which  also 
played a role as think tanks), and (4) farming groups including neighbourhood-based 
groups, workplace-based groups, and non-area based groups (including an online 
group). Each actor was assumed to have different degrees of closeness and links to 
others through many forms of social capital, which will be examined as our point to 
understand how network was emerged and shaped its characters.  
Moving on, the second objective of the thesis is to seek to unravel how social capital 
works in dealing with collective action problems, including cooperation problems 
and conflicts in a disaster context. Issues in methods for cooperation are understood 
here as obstacles to the mobilising of plural actors for constructive action within the 
policy  network.  Conflicts  on  the  other  hand  can  derive  from  both  unsatisfied 
distributive interests (conflicts related to someone’s gains and losses) and perception 
clashes (conflicts related to different ways of thinking and ideas on how to work 
together). The thesis aims to explain whether and how social capital played a role in 
handling such problems of collective action during and shortly after the Bangkok 
flooding.  
The  second  objective  highlights  collective  actions  in  relation  to  enhancing  food 
security, the right to food and climate change adaptive capacity. To enhance food 
security  means  to  improve  its  availability,  accessibility,  stability  and  utility 
(Ziervogel  and  Ericksen,  2010).  Enhancing  the  right  to  food  implies  a  broader 
objective  often  connected  to  campaigns  for  food  sovereignty  or,  in  other  words, 
people’s right to control their own food systems (Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe, 
2010; Pimbert, 2009). As argued by Yap (2013) the right to food understands food as 
an aspect of a set of human rights, and therefore usually advocates for the rights of 
vulnerable and marginalised groups in society. He points out that to fight for the 
right to food is a key strategy for food sovereignty in addition to the pursuit of 
structural changes such as land reform and democratic control. This study does not 
engage  with  the  concept  of  food  sovereignty  because  Thai  laypeople  were  not 
familiar to this concept, while the concept of right to food was translated to Thai 
word called 'Sitti-Tang-Aharn' and means right of people to 'get' enough food to eat - 
not in the radical sense of the demand for the right to control the food system.  The  
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aspects of land reform and democratic control are therefore not examined in this case 
study.  Enhancing  climate  change  adaptive  capacity  can  be  achieved  at  different 
scales, from the household level to the level of the entire city. Increasing the capacity 
of city dwellers to grow their own food is a way to enhance their capacity to adapt to 
harsh circumstances. Many cases illustrate that UA can be a buffer or safety net for 
the city to feed its people during periods of disasters (UA Magazine, Vol. 25, 2011, 
Vol. 27, 2014; Zeeuw, Van Veenhuizen and Dubbeling, 2011).  
II Focus and scope 
Focus  and  scope  of  this  study  relate  to  my  personal  motivation.  To  reveal  my 
motivation, I should link to my background. I studied Political Science and Public 
Administration  from  mainstream  approach  including  Ostromians'  institutional 
rational choice. In the same time, I was interested in the alternative policy analysis 
and planning especially in interpretive/ deliberative/ argumentative turn in policy 
analysis  and  planning  inspiredby  Fischer  and  Forester  (1993)  and  Hajer  and 
Wagennaar  (2003).  These  two  approaches  talk  about  many  same  things  but  in 
different ways including about collaborative and network governance. As they rarely 
talk to each other, this project starts from putting them aside to talk to one another. 
The project thus begins with the idea of articulating these different approaches by 
recognising  their  ontological  and  epistemological  differences.  (This  will  be 
discussed later in this section and the Chapter 2).  
In doing so, to articulate by recognising their different views on social capital and 
policy  network  governance  are  focused.  By  engaging  with  the  notion  of  social 
capital, I starts with my personal confidence that social capital is really alive and 
functions in my country in particular the case study of the UA policy network in 
Bangkok. The study of social capital in Thailand had been focused in the last decade 
after this notion (Tun-Tang-Sungkom) was emerged in the Thai Constitution 1997. 
Key  social  capital  scholars  like  Putnam  and  Ostrom  have  also  developed  their 
networks in Thai political studies. Many Thai scholars including me assume that 
they might seek to extend the implication of their idea in the Global South or, in 
contrast, we assume that they might realise that social capital does not really exist in 
the North and might exist somewhere else. During such period, there was a massive  
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research funding to explore social capital in the country. I have personally started 
engaging  with  the  concept  since  2006  by  conducting  a  research  funded  by  Thai 
National  Research  Council  (TNRC)  entitle  'Social  Capital  in  the  North-East 
Thailand: Comparative Studies of the Rural and Urban Areas'. I have linked it to 
study policy, planning and governance and developed my academic life from this 
area. For more than 5 years engaging in this concept, I have begun being skeptical to 
the analysis of social capital as compounded concepts measured by scoring each 
index and counting them together. This skepticism affects this project to frame each 
form of social capital as powerful resource in itself which does not always support 
and  integrate  with  others.  This  project  is  also  developed  from  the  question  on 
limitations of causal relations and the rational commitment framing social capital by 
mainstream scholars including Ostromians. So, the notion of social capital in critical 
views proposed by Habermasians are reviewed to seek for alternative way to capture 
this concept. The review then helps to conceptualise social capital from normative 
commitments such as altruist trust, moral obligation and shared norms (details will 
be provided in Chapter 2). 
As  a  consequence,  this  study  conceptualises  social  capital  by  focusing  on  both 
rational  and  normative  commitments.  As  previously  mentioned,  rational 
commitments are based on predictable and concrete strings attached relationships, 
while  normative  commitments  are  opposite.  Shared  rules  and  a  reputation  for 
trustworthiness are considered as forms of social capital in this study in order to 
highlight the role of rational commitments in governing policy network. This study 
assumes that to work together policy network's constituent organisations and groups 
might  be  obliged  by  both  formal  rules  and  informal  ones,  while  reputation  for 
trustworthiness of organisations and groups might affect the likelihood that of others 
will to work with them. On the other hand, altruistic trust and shared norms are also 
the  focus  of  this  study,  because  these  normative  commitments  are  assumed  to 
facilitate the way in which the network was shaped and worked. For example, the 
inclusion of groups of low-income inhabitants in the network might be a result of 
altruistic trust by other members, though they might not receive predictive trust from 
reflecting on their past actions. Additionally, shared norms may guide methods for 
cooperation, in particular when  there are no rules.  Apart from that, shared local 
knowledge is conceptualised as a form of social capital for this study. This study  
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aims to demonstrate that shared local knowledge as cultural rationality might also 
influence  collective  decisions  and  actions.  Lastly  moral  obligation  embedded  in 
Buddhist  principle  is  an  additional  form  of  social  capital  beyond  reciprocate 
relations. Buddhist culture is still a major cultural and influence on the inhabitants of 
Bangkok.  Buddhist  moral  expectations  are  mirrored  onto  principles  for  social 
conduct (details will be discussed in Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, democratisation and the growth of civil society in developing countries 
such  as  Thailand  are  still  under  the  shadow  of  the  monarchy  and  traditional 
centralised government structures and culture (Cook, 1993; McCargo, 2005; Riggs, 
1966).  Therefore,  any  network  structures  tend  to  be  centralised  in  Thailand.  To 
examine this assumption, this study focuses on whether the UA policy network was 
centralised  or  decentralised,  which  requires  an  analysis  of  power.  In  order  to 
understand  the  role  of  social  capital  in  facilitating  the  emergence  and 
characterisation  of  policy  networks,  the  role  of  social  capital  in  shaping  power 
relations must be examined, for it affects the structure of networks, the extent to 
which there is devolution of power. 
Two theories on collaborative network governance are employed to scope and frame 
this  study  as  aforementioned.  When  referring  to  IRC  scholars,  this  study  makes 
reference to the work of Ostrom and her followers, particularly those who engage in 
the Bloomington School of Policy Analysis. On the other hand, CAT scholars refer 
to Habermas and his followers particularly those who engage in the Interpretative 
and Deliberative (Argumentative) Policy Analysis school of thought, which began 
organising annual conferences in Europe from 2006. This study acknowledges that 
to identify CAT scholars is debatable as many of them mix Habermas approach with 
many  other  post-positivist  epistemological  approaches,  which  focus  discourse, 
deliberation,  social  constructivism,  and  interpretative  methods  (Fischer  and 
Gottweis, 2012, p.1). Some of them depart from Habermas but later move so far 
from him. They share something in the common that is to focus language and to 
interpret its meaning (ibid). As argued by Wagenaar (2011), there are three broad 
families  of  scholars  adopting  interpretive  policy  analysis  classified  by  different 
approaches to understand meaning in studying policy and planning (he calls three 
faces of meaning) including hermeneutic, discursive and dialogical meanings. This  
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study refers to CAT scholars by identifying their works which highlight dialogical 
meaning.  In  particular,  main  CAT  scholars  for  this  study,  apart  from  Habermas 
himself,  are  the  contributors  of  three  classic  works  in  the  field  including 
‘Argumentative  Turn  in  Policy  Analysis  and  Planning’  edited  by  Fischer  and 
Forester  (1993),  ‘Deliberative  Policy  Analysis’  edited  by  Hajer  and  Wagenaar 
(2003), and ‘Argumentative Turn Revisited’ edited by Fischer and Gottweis (2012). 
These three works become the starting point to map CAT scholars, who at least take 
Habermas idea as one of their fundamental ideas, and then this study follows their 
works elsewhere apart from one that is put in these three books.  
Although  apart  from  IRC  and  CAT  many  other  theories  can  also  explain  how 
networks could be governed collaboratively, Chapter 2 will discuss that these two 
theories shed light on the case study. In brief, the reason for choosing these two 
theories is, firstly, to understand that cooperation and conflict resolution are a central 
concern of both IRC and CAT. Secondly, by adopting these two theories both utility 
maximisers and moral agents are not be ignored. To recognise these two types of 
agency  support  an  analysis  of  the  complex  urban  societies  (including  Bangkok), 
where people have different expectations for life (both interest-account and beyond). 
Someone might aim to do something mostly for themselves, while some others aim 
to  do  the  same  thing  for  other  people  in  different  situations.  Lastly,  these  two 
theories mention the importance of communication, which this study aims to look at, 
although their focuses are different as will be mentioned in Chapter 2. By adopting 
the  two  theories,  different  rationalities  including  instrumental  and  cultural 
rationalities are taken into account to analyse communicative forums. In relation to 
that the aforementioned, this study assumes that different modes of rationality are 
brought  by  each  organisation  and  group  to  contest  in  claiming  (rational  and 
normative)  validity  of  their  arguments  for  convincing  the  others  through 
communication. 
By adopting these two theories, this study can scope the study of social capital and 
policy network governance. To begin with, different forms of social capital can be 
positioned on a sliding scale between rational and normative commitments; from 
concrete to abstract sense. According to Warren (1999), IRC and CAT each raise an 
important  feature  of  various  forms  of  social  capital  but  highlight  each  one  
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differently. While IRC focuses more on rational commitment such as shared rules, 
reputation for trustworthiness and reciprocity, CAT emphasises more on normative 
commitment  such  as  moral  obligation  and  shared  norms.  Figure  Intro-1  shows 
Warren's classification of different forms of social capital framed by differentiating 
rational commitment from normative one. 
  Figure Intro-1: Institutional rational choice, communicative action 
theory and social capital 
 
Source: Interpretation from Warren's argument (1999) 
Through  the  use  of  IRC  and  CAT,  this  study  is  guided  by  dual  tracks  of 
understanding collaborative policy network governance.  IRC suggests that policy 
networks  are  governed  by  instrumental  power,  such  as  the  power  of  rules  and 
incentives, while CAT emphasises the power of communication, such as persuasion 
and negotiation. At the same time, CAT recognises that power embedded in social 
and  political  structures  shapes distorted communication, whereby some  dominate 
conversations and debate in relation to others can interrupt the communication. The 
two theories help to scope this study by exploring instrumental, communicative and  
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structural powers in governing the policy network, including shaping the network 
structure and driving the policy network by dealing with collective action problems.  
From the discussion above, it can be noticed that the engagement with the analysis of 
power, communication, cooperation and conflicts make this project relate to social 
capital studies and beyond that. It is a consequence of the boundaries of the concept 
of social capital set by this study and the intention to link social capital studies to 
policy network studies. On the one hand, the analysis of social capital through both 
rational and normative commitments mentioned previously makes this study engage 
with plural forms of social capital. These forms are either complementary or contrast 
to each other. They also require a deeper analysis than quantitative measurement. So, 
social capital  for this study  is  not analysed by  scoring degree of each  form and 
counting them together to identify the score of social capital as single entity. Instead, 
this study treats the concept by realising that each form has its own spirit. In other 
words, various forms of social capital could function in various ways and in different 
entry points either to support the function of each other or to constrain (more details 
will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Conclusion). As a consequence, the analysis of 
social  capital  is  not  coherent  (as  its  nature  is  in  that  way).  Different  forms  are 
discussed in different sections throughout the report. They also relate differently to 
power, communication, cooperation and conflicts, which make the boundaries of the 
analysis of social capital for this study involve with other boundaries of the analysis 
of other concepts. Although the boundaries of social capital analysis could not be 
separated clearly from other boundaries beyond them, this study can specify that the 
social network analysis both computing-based and narrative-based analysis is mainly 
used to analyse social capital particular in analysing the 'existence' of different forms 
(discussed in Chapter 3 and 4).  
On  the  other  hand,  the  analysis  of  social  capital  crosses  over  other  boundaries 
because this study links social capital studies to policy network studies by focusing 
the  'function'  of  social  capital  in  handling  'cooperation'  and  'conflicts'  of  policy 
networks. In doing so, this study requires the analysis of the role of social capital in 
'interactions' among policy network's constituent organisations and groups. So, the 
study focuses analysing the role of social capital in 'communicative process', which 
in turn this study needed to engage with other analyses (apart from social capital  
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analysis itself) including power analysis, rhetorical analysis and the analysis of the 
logic of policy deliberation (details will be discussed in section 2.4). By focusing this 
area, the analysis of social capital extends to examine how social capital activates 
power exercised by core actors to bond different actors as a policy network. The 
analysis also extends to explore how social capital supports effective communication 
through the support of the role of cooperative facilitators and conflicting mediators. 
As mentioned earlier, these linkages of social capital analysis and policy network 
governance analysis are scoped (set boundaries) by adopting the two meta-theories: 
IRC and CAT. 
Regarding  the  focus  on  urban  agriculture,  it  relates  to  my  personal  background. 
Before doing a PhD, my works were related to 'agricultural policy' and 'local food 
system'. I know some policy actors engaging in the City Farm programme well, 
especially when joining the previous programme namely 'Food Security' programme 
since  2008.  Urban  agriculture  arrived  at  my  attention  after  the  end  of  this 
programme. The programme concludes that food insecurity in Thai society is a risk 
of  urban  area  where  urban  dwellers  depend  highly  on  food  transportation  from 
remote  rural  area  without  their  own  local  food  system.  This  programme's 
recommendation led to the endorsement of the City Farm programme in mid-2010, 
which was a few months prior to my PhD journey. Like other PhD students, I seek 
for researching the topic that was relevant to my previous experiences and situated in 
the  stage  that  I  could  collect  and  analyse  information  which  was  capable  to 
contribute to knowledge. The promotion of urban agriculture in Bangkok by plural 
actors  can  be  also  characterised  well  with  the  concepts  of  policy  networks  and 
collaborative governance that I am focusing. Besides, I could notice the existence 
and  active  functions  of  social  capital  among  UA  policy  network's  constituent 
organisations and groups. So, I decided to walk with the programme by exchanging 
knowledge and information with them during I was based in London particular from 
DPU  Urban  Agriculture  module  and  experiences  of  the  London  Capital  Growth 
(details  of  our  exchanges will be provided in 3.3.1 where  I  will reveal my  own 
positionality in doing this project). As a consequence, the journey of my PhD was 
nearly at the same time of the journey of this programme which makes this project 
lively.   
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Moreover, by studying the period of flooding, this study aims to understand social 
capital and policy network governance in a context of disasters. It should be noted 
here that the flooding is a surprise of this project. The impact of the disaster on this 
project is, firstly, that certain interactions were intensified. Collective actions were 
organised every day in the time of crisis, while collective actions were organised 4-5 
times a month during preliminary fieldwork conducted in the time of pre-disaster 
(considering the frequency). Apart from that, the number of participants in the time 
of  disaster  was  80-120  which  were  roughly  1.5-2  times  higher  than  in  the  pre-
disaster period. 
Secondly, some actors became more prominent. Powerful organisations (the analysis 
will  be  made  in  Chapter  4)  did  not  lead  every  collective  event.  Some  others 
organisations and groups could initiate and play a leading role (supported or backed 
up  by  the  powerful  organisations)  in  such  turbulent  period  such  as  the  more 
prominent role of the online group  called 'City Farm City Friends' in  organising 
volunteers  and  the  role  of  the  Media  Centre  for  Development  in  mediating  the 
conflict related to organic matters in the time of crisis (this issue will be discussed in 
Chapter 7).  
Thirdly, traditional power structures were altered during such period. The formal 
governmental mechanism (structural power embedded in political and bureaucratic 
systems) faced with a legitimacy crisis (distrust) as a consequence of the failures in 
prediction of risk, flood control and food aids (details will be provided in Chapter 1). 
In relation to that, the civil society could challenge that traditional power structure, 
and their outstanding role in food aiding promoted their power in leading the flood 
management in many aspects (this issue will be discussed in Chapter 6). However, 
the power structure embedded in the culture made more influence in the time of 
crisis such as the power of the King speech on self-sufficiency and the Buddhist idea 
on self-reliance (this analysis will be addressed in Chapter 6 and 7).  
Lastly, there was a more intensive communication among policy actors during the 
disaster than during the pre-disaster (observed during the preliminary fieldwork) as a 
consequence of the distrust in the central governmental information sources. This 
distrust in turn open the door for bringing alternative information sources to discuss  
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in  communicative  forums.  These  sources  were  developed  by  people  themselves 
including that based on local knowledge (see the analysis in Chapter 6).  
The  initial  review  indicates  that  IRC  and  CAT  scholars  do  not  pay  sufficient 
attention to risk and uncertain governance. Debates do not address times when crisis 
is experienced. So, this study will explore an area that is not yet fully understood in 
existing  studies  and  brings  together  existing  debates  between  IRC  and  CAT  to 
discuss disaster governance, which has become a global concern and there are still 
gaps in current knowledge (Pelling, 2011; Renn, 2008). The suggestion from many 
commentators of this project gaining from various forums is that I should conduct 
comparative studies between the situations with and without crisis. In doing so, I will 
make a strong theoretical reflection. I would respond that the comparison could not 
be conducted because after disaster crisis Bangkok faced another crisis known as a 
political  crisis.  As  a  consequence,  it  is  hard  to  make  a  comparative  study  in  a 
changing context from one crisis to another crisis. So, the study in the time of crisis 
becomes both the scope and limitation of this study. 
III Main arguments and an overview of methods 
In  order  to  understand  relations  between  social  capital  and  the  emergence  and 
characterisation  of  the  policy  network  in  relation  to  the  first  objective  requires 
network and power analysis. This study argues that different forms of social capital 
(that could not identify specifically at this stage) influence the emergence of a policy 
network by determining the status of the network’s constituent actors and power 
relations between them. In the context of highly centralised regime such as Thailand, 
there could be an imbalance in power relations between the network’s constituent 
actors, which could bring about a centralised network in which a handful of powerful 
organisations play a hegemonic role, and maintain a hold strong social capital with 
many other actors as well. Furthermore, this study argues that social capital activates 
power relations in characterising the policy network by determining who is included 
and excluded. Considering that shared rules and norms are forms of social capital, 
this study argues that exclusion from the policy network can be a result of biased 
rules and norms shared by those that are included in policy network's constituent 
organisations and groups.   
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Regarding the second objective, this study argues that insufficient cooperation and 
conflicts  could  be  developed  from  both  self-interest  accounts  of  network’s 
constituent  actors  and  beyond.  Besides,  cooperation  enhancement  and  conflict 
resolution may stem from an agreement and mutual understanding. Reciprocity and 
moral  obligation  as  forms  of  social  capital  can  link  an  agreement  and  mutual 
understanding to a decision to cooperate and handle conflicts. An ability of core 
organisations and groups (as cooperative facilitators) to propose a practical reason 
and making a better argument could support their success in building agreement and 
mutual  understanding.  When  communication  takes  place,  each  actor  attribute 
(including power), its logic and emotional expression affects their ability to persuade 
and  convince  to  reach  an  agreement  and  a  mutual  understanding.  This  study 
therefore argues that reasoning based on instrumental and cultural rationalities affect 
the different stages of the claim-making process. Shared norms and shared forms of 
knowledge, which can be both technical and local knowledge, as forms of social 
capital, affect the ways in which actors justify their reasoning. They refer to norms 
and knowledge in order to differentiate between right and wrong. More specifically 
in the case of conflict resolution, this study argues that the role of mediators, who 
have outstanding social capital with many others, might be important in enabling 
agreement and mutual understanding.   
In short, the main argument is that social capital activates power exercised by core 
actors which in turn shapes the policy network (this will be discussed in Chapter 4) 
and affects its characterisation (this will be discussed in Chapter 5). Besides, social 
capital supports the role of core actors (as facilitators) in making agreement on the 
reason  to  cooperate  through  communicative  process  (this  will  be  discussed  in 
Chapter  6).  It  also  supports  the  role  of  mediator(s)  in  making  agreement  and 
developing mutual understanding for handling conflicts (this will be discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
The  methods  used  to  examine  these  arguments  are  mostly  qualitative.  Only  the 
degree  of  closeness,  understood  as  a  basic  tool  to  capture  social  capital  used  a 
quantitative survey and computing-based network analysis. This analysis is useful as 
a starting point before digging deeper into understanding each form of social capital 
through qualitative methods, including interviews and observation. The qualitative  
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data is also used for analysing narrative-based networks as an alternative analysis to 
the aforementioned computing-based network. The background information of the 
interviewees was examined through structured interviews, but they were coded using 
quantitative analysis software. Apart from the above, basic qualitative data collection 
and analysis were applied. To begin with, the research mainly gained information 
through  observations  of  collective  action,  conducting  interviews,  focus  group 
discussions and in-depth sub-case studies. Some information was gained from the 
review of relevant grey literature, including the analysis of legal frameworks, policy 
documents,  project  proposals,  organisational  and  group  profiles,  meeting  reports, 
progress reports, data bases, websites, and Facebook pages. Regarding methods to 
analyse  the  data,  the  research  mainly  used  content  analysis  by  deciphering 
documents and wordings from interviewees and participants of the focus groups and 
observed  collective actions  under the relevant theoretical perspectives,  which are 
developed in the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2. This study attempts to 
establish  the  middle-ground  by  avoiding  the  extremely  contrasting  approaches 
proposed by the two theories: both the IRC’s methodological individualism (such as 
game analysis) and CAT’s interpretive approach (such as abductive cognition). A 
more detailed account of the methodology adopted for this study will be presented in 
the methodological chapter (Chapter 3). 
IV Structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains seven chapters. The first chapter provides relevant background 
information  about  the  Thai  food  regime,  the  Bangkok  food  system,  Bangkok’s 
flooding, the UA policy network and collective actions of the policy network. This 
chapter  provides  an  overview  of  what  happened  in  Bangkok  before,  during  and 
shortly  after  the  flooding  starting  in  mid-November  2011  and  ending  in  early-
January 2012. The chapter begins by explaining the food regime in Thailand and 
how  it  shapes  the  Bangkok  food  systems  and  food  culture  in  the  capital  city. 
Following this, problems of food shortages during Bangkok’s flooding are described 
as the chapter examines the problems of mainstream food aid during the disaster, 
which is particularly significant due to the centralisation of food distribution by food 
corporations that hold monopoly in the market and the one-size-fits-all approach of 
the government. The discussion focuses on the lack of access to food by the most  
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vulnerable groups affected by the flood, such as slum communities settled along the 
river and peri-urban farmers. The discussion then looks at an alternative system for 
responding to gaps in the mainstream food system: the consolidation of the policy 
network on UA. In looking at the latter, the analysis then explores how actions to 
promote the alternative urban food system by multiple actors were governed between 
late  2010  (when  the  City  Farm  programme  was  endorsed  and  began  to  create  a 
network of organisations and groups working related to UA by creating collective 
actions among them) and early 2012 (shortly after the flooding). The chapter ends by 
raising a number of concerns related to the emergence and characterisation of the 
policy network before the disaster took place and lessons that should be learned from 
achievements to mobilise collective actions of the policy network in dealing with the 
food agenda during and shortly after the flooding. 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background that informs the analytical framework. 
The  discussion  starts  with  a  review  of  the  policy  network  approach  by  drawing 
attention to criticism by scholars who claim that this approach is a metaphor rather 
than  a  theory  as  it  has  limited  explanatory  power.  Then  the  chapter  points  the 
contributions  of  IRC  and  CAT  to  enhance  the  power  of  explanation  of  policy 
network governance. Next, section 2.2 explores the notion of social capital within a 
policy  network  by  recognising  that  the  discussion  around  social  capital  in  the 
existing literature is extensive and has generated contrasting conceptualisations. In 
relation to this, the chapter expands on the benefits of using IRC and CAT to capture 
social capital. It then reviews how IRC and CAT help to understand the role of social 
capital in facilitating the emergence, characterisation and functioning of the network 
in  overcoming  collective  action  problems.  The  chapter  ends  with  the  analytical 
framework, which is developed from applying existing frameworks that recognise 
IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital, power, rationality and collective action 
problems in network governance. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology. This chapter brings in the analytical framework 
to frame the methods adopted for this study. The chapter begins by describing the 
research approach in which qualitative methods were used and supported by some 
quantitative methods. Following the operational definition of each key notion, the 
chapter  presents  the  methods  for  examining  the  arguments  mentioned  in  the  
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Introduction for both collecting and analysing data. This chapter pays attention to 
some  specific  methods,  including  those  for  collecting  relational  data,  developing 
policy network diagrams, analysing network structures by adopting power relations 
analysis, and understanding the communicative process through rhetorical analysis 
and by analysing the logic of deliberation. The chapter, then, presents a description 
of profiles of selected organisations and groups.  
The following four chapters are devoted to the discussion of the findings. Chapter 4 
presents an analysis of the role played by social capital in facilitating the emergence 
of  the  UA  policy  network  in  Bangkok.  It  provides  a  story  of  policy  network's 
emergence,  maps  closeness  among  the  policy  network’s  constituent  actors,  and 
examines different forms of social capital of these actors’ rational and normative 
commitments. Shared forms of knowledge are also analysed as  a facet of  social 
capital.  The  last  section  of  the  chapter  analyses  power  relations  to  draw  a 
relationship  between  each  form  of  social  capital  and  the  policy  network’s 
emergence. The chapter claims that each form of social capital can activate power, 
which in turn glues plural organisations and groups together as the policy network’s 
constituent actors. This chapter highlights the role of powerful organisations, who 
held social capital with other members of the policy network and could exercise their 
power to influence others' decision making the most. The discussion is also touches 
upon  the  way  powerful  organisations  played  a  hegemonic  role  over  other 
organisations  and  groups,  and  how  they  exercised  their  power,  including 
instrumental power (based on rules, incentives and punishments), communicative 
power  (based  on persuasion  and negotiation)  and structural  power (embedded  in 
socio-cultural and political-bureaucratic structures).  
Departing from the previous analysis, Chapter 5 examines how other organisations 
and groups exercised their power in the face of powerful organisations mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The focus is on relations between the social capital holding 
within each policy community operating within the policy network and the way they 
exercise power. This chapter discusses how non-powerful organisations could also 
play a role in characterising the policy network. The chapter also discusses how an 
imbalance in power relations between powerful organisations and other members 
was related to unequal social capital. Then, the discussion goes on to unravelling  
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power struggles between certain organisations and groups that safeguard a degree of 
centralisation by keeping powerful organisations that influence the policy network in 
check. Furthermore, the chapter analyses how the power of relationships can lead to 
the exclusion of some organisations and groups. In doing so, shared rules and norms 
as forms of social capital are emphasised as they can determine who is included and 
excluded, depending on their acceptability on rules of engagement and norms shared 
by the majority. 
Moving  on,  chapter  6  discusses  how  social  capital  played  a  role  in  enhancing 
cooperation in the crisis. The chapter begins by giving details about cooperation 
between the policy actors during and shortly after flooding in Bangkok. A case of 
mobilising support in making and using effective microorganism balls is used to 
analyse remarkably successful cooperation enhancement among the policy network’s 
constituent organisations and groups. Then the chapter analyses how cooperation 
enhancement  is  a  consequence  of  an  agreement  derived  from  finding  a  more 
convincing  argument  and  reaching  a  practical  reason  that  are  a  result  of 
communicative processes in which different forms of social capital are at play.  
After paying attention to the potential of social capital in cooperation enhancement, 
chapter 7 examines how social capital played a role in dealing with conflicts in the 
crisis.  The  chapter  begins  by  presenting  conflicts  among  the  policy  network’s 
constituent organisations and groups that were found during and shortly after the 
flooding.  The  highlighted  conflicts  include  conflicts  developed  from  different 
expectations; conflicts related to contrasts between scientific and local knowledge; 
conflicts developed from scaling down the national political conflict; and conflicts 
based on different degrees of acceptable practices defined as organic. The last one is 
brought  to  analyse  how  the  conflicts  were  handled  by  emphasising  the 
communicative  process  in  which  an  agreement  and  mutual  understanding  were 
made. The chapter argues that the reputable and trusted organisational leader, who 
shared rules, norms and knowledge with the conflicting stakeholders, could play an 
important role in mediating conflicts through communicative process. 
Finally, the concluding chapter wraps up multi-arena of the role of social capital, 
moving from how it facilitates the policy network’s emergence, shaping the network  
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characteristics, to helping to enhance cooperation and support conflict resolution. 
Then, this last chapter points to the advantages and disadvantages of the articulation 
of IRC and CAT by recognising their contrasting assumptions in three domains. The 
first one is to combine both rational and normative commitments in conceptualising 
both concrete and abstract forms of social capital. The second one is to understand 
cooperation and conflicts within policy networks by considering both self-interest 
account and beyond. The discussion then moves onto the last one that is to analyse 
the role of social capital in governing policy networks through an analysis of power 
relations.  In  the  end,  the  thesis  presents  the  limitations  of  this  research  and 
orientations for future research based on the aforementioned limitations.  43 
 
Chapter 1 
The Thai food regime, the Bangkok food system, flooding in 
Bangkok, and urban agriculture’s policy network  
 
Introduction  
This chapter provides necessary background information about the case study. The 
discussion begins with the problems faced by Bangkok's food system in relation to 
the Thai food regime. To highlight these issues the analysis focuses on the food 
shortages experienced during Bangkok’s flooding between mid-November 2011 and 
early-January 2012. In this chapter, it is argued that such problems originated from 
the  existing  food  system  in  Bangkok,  which  was  shaped  by  monopolistic  food 
corporations  and  centralised  food  distribution.  These  problems  were  aggravated 
when the existing governance system led by the central government adopted a one-
size-fit-all approach. This affected food accessibility during the floods for the most 
vulnerable groups who required special support. The chapter then shifts to examine 
the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) and its roles during and shortly after 
the floods. It includes an explanation of the fact that although the policy network 
could not function as an alternative food system because of its small scale, it was 
able to fill the gap in the mainstream system in many ways. Finally, the chapter 
discusses  a number of  concerns  about the emergence  and characterisation of the 
policy network, and its collective action in dealing with the food agenda in a disaster 
context. These concerns in turn provide further reasons why the project is important 
and suggest the types of theories that are needed to frame the study which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
1.1. The food regime in Thailand and how it shapes the food system and culture 
in Bangkok 
The Green Revolution has affected the Thai food regime since 1961 when the first 
Thai development plan included it as a strategy for development. The government 
changed the way people grow food to increase productivity by supporting research 
on agricultural science and technology and promoting chemical fertilisers sold by 
food industries. However, the report of CropWatch Research Institute (2009, p.149) 44 
 
shows  that productivity  had  increased by a  mere 30%  over  40  years while Thai 
farmers spent 30% more on farm investment. They used chemical products imported 
from abroad, roughly 3.867 million tonnes per year, with a value of roughly 45,000 
million Baht per year (US$15,000 million). In 2009, the EU found that Thai fruits 
and vegetables were the most contaminated by chemicals in comparison to other 
sources exported to EU and it also was found that 72% of farmers in the region owed 
debt of 40,000 Baht (US$1,330) per household. Moreover, since 2007 the energy 
crisis  resulting  from  peak  oil  has  clearly  affected  the  Thai  economy.  Indeed, 
Thailand is the most heavily dependent country on oil in Asia (about 40% of GDP), 
particularly in the agricultural sector, partly as a result of development promoted for 
the  Green  Revolution  (CropWatch,  2009,  pp.149-150;  Office  of  Agricultural 
Economics, 2011). Consequently, there was an emphasis on growing energy plants 
rather than food, which in turn has become a challenge for the future of food security 
of the country.   
The effect of the Green Revolution on the Thai food regime also contributed to an 
unjust food system, monopolised by a few food corporations. The main corporations 
that have influenced Thai agricultural sectors since 1961 until now, are CP, Betagro 
and  Saha  Farm.  These  are  owned  by  Thai  investors.  The  largest  one  is  CP,  a 
company that has been in business in Thailand since 1921. The market value of CP 
is no less than 125,000 million Baht (US$4,170 million). Since 1997, the company 
has entered the top 5 of world chicken producers and exporters. There are roughly 
200,000 staff (half of them are Thai)
1 and 200 sub-companies in 30 countries. CPF is 
the main food company under the CP group. There are 7,000 Thai farmers working 
under their farming contact and many of their food products are found in the modern 
trade market. 
Large food corporations are part of the same network which they collaborate rather 
than compete with one another, and they have close links with the government by 
supporting political parties. They therefore benefitted from public policy throughout 
modern  Thai  history  (they  have  had  a  visible  role  since  the  1960s).  These  food 
corporations shape the modern trade system. They own discount and convenience 
                                                 
1 In mid-2014, worldwide media reported that the CP has also involved with slavery and 
human trafficking (e.g. the Guardian and New York Times published in June 13, 2014).    45 
 
stores, which can be found everywhere, particularly in the modernised city, and also 
attempt to develop their own brands. These food stores control food production, food 
distribution and also shape consumer food culture and partly affect the reduction of 
local food variety. They have forced farmers to sell their products to them under the 
contract farming system (until now) by which 90% of the total farming costs is spent 
buying their products such as seeds, fertilizers and agricultural equipment - a system 
that government policy has always supported (Leaunjumroon et al., 2011).  
These corporations control a large portion of household spending on foods – which 
on average is 32% of the total income (BioThai, 2013) – and for the urban poor the 
figure is even higher. Farmers too depend on the corporations’ food business. 70% of 
farmers still need to buy food from food markets, which are mostly controlled by 
monopolistic corporations (Food Security Programme, 2010). Merely 30% of them 
can depend on food from their own farm and natural food sources without the need 
to buy food. These farmers live in the rural area, where accessibility to markets is 
limited and natural food is still available, such as food from the community forest 
and natural lake (ibid). Moreover, the corporations with a monopoly in the market 
also control hybrid seeds globally valued at 1,659 million Baht per year (roughly 55 
million US dollars) (97%); the rest was only 3% and valued merely 57 million Baht 
(roughly  2  million  US  dollars)  (Thai  Seed  Trading  Association,  2011).  CP 
(Thailand), Monsanto (US), Syngenta (Switzerland), Pacific Seed (Thailand), East-
West Seeds, and Pioneer Hybrid (Thailand) are the corporations that invest in and 
earn from seed control. For the largest proportion of market values on vegetable 
seeds,  the  joint-venture  between  Monsanto  Cargill  (US)  and  CP  Cargill  Seed  is 
dominant.  
A research project focused on the largest food corporation in Thailand namely CP, 
conducted by CorpWatch, confirms the above trends (CorpWatch-Thailand, 2009). 
CorpWatch mentioned that the impacts of large food corporations on the Thai food 
regime are more significant than what they found when focusing on one corporation. 
However, the outcome of their research on the largest case shows how the largest 
food corporation has an impact on the design and control of the food regime. After 
the  spread  of  H5B1  disease  (avian  influenza  viruses  in  chickens),  open  chicken 
farms owned by small-scale farmers and low-cost food corporations were banned 46 
 
and no longer received support from the Thai central government. As a result, CP, 
which  invests  highly  in  environmental  control  systems  (close  systems),  now 
monopolises  the  chicken  market.  Between  2005  and  2009,  their  products  in  the 
market consisted of roughly 2,000 tonnes each year surveyed and its value was 390-
520  million  Baht  per  year  (US$13-17  million)  (ibid,  p.16).  The  well-known 
convenience stores that are part of the ‘7-11’ franchise system, found at every street 
corner and open 24 hours, are also owned by CP. Besides, the company has had 
close links with the government and bureaucracy, particularly since 1988, when the 
corporation offered Prem Tinnasoolanon, the ex-prime minister, to be the president 
of the advisory board (ibid, p.34). Many ex-ministers of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives and former army chiefs were also offered to be the member of the 
advisory board by the company, such as General Sujinda Crapayun (since 1992) and 
General  Sonthi  Bunyaratkarin  (since  2006)  (ibid).  Apart  from  that,  the  company 
usually offers high level retired civil servants consultancy jobs to secure links to the 
government  bureaucracy.  CP  also  pushes  its  people  to  high  political  positions, 
including the ministerial level in many government departments. For example, Arch 
Toulanon, the president of the one of the CP-affiliated corporations, was proposed to 
be the vice-minister of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 1992 and the 
vice-minister of the Ministry of Industry in 1998 (ibid, p.35). The daughter and niece 
of the CP president were also married to powerful national politicians (Veerachai 
Veerameteegoon and Wattana Maungsook respectively) (ibid, p.33).  
How does the Thai food regime shape the food system and food culture in Bangkok? 
Food mapping in Bangkok undertaken by the Working Group on Food for Change 
(2012) and the study of Leaunjumroon and his team (2011) indicate that large food 
corporations control inputs to grow food, and convenience stores to sell and buy 
food  products.  Within  Bangkok  alone  there  were  232  discount  and  convenience 
stores as surveyed in 2012 by the Thai Climate Justice. The top 25 largest stores 
were built on total land area of 2,926 rai (1,157 acres), which is more than the total 
land used to build the 25 largest public parks in Bangkok of roughly 400 rai (158 
acres) (Thai Climate Justice, 2012). Their package and marketing also shape the way 
people consume food, while their innovations also shape changes in food culture, 
such as promoting fast food, microwaveable and frozen food. Large monopoly food 
corporations influence and have a key role in controlling the country’s food system, 47 
 
and influence the food culture in large, modernised cities such as Bangkok. At the 
same  time,  the  growth  and  expansion  of  the  system  that  is  monopolised  and 
controlled by large food corporations, partly facilitated by the support of political 
and bureaucratic systems, have gradually destroyed small and medium enterprises as 
well as the local food system within the city. Such trends ultimately affect people’s 
food choices. As a consequence, ordinary citizens have gradually been forced to buy 
products from hegemonic food corporations in the modern trade market, such as 
discount and  convenience  stores, which  can be accessed easily  from everywhere 
throughout the city. 
Does Bangkok have its own local food system apart from the mainstream modern 
trade system monopolised by food corporations? There are still many full-time peri-
urban farmers in Bangkok as a result of the ‘City Planning Act 1975’, which controls 
land use in order to maintain peri-urban farming areas as a green belt. Under the 
‘Land Development Act 1982’ the government attempted to preserve the peri-urban 
farm area as an agriculturally valuable area by developing agricultural infrastructure, 
particularly irrigation systems. Recently, the government announced that some of 
these areas will be used for water storage and will also be a floodway to protect from 
flooding in the inner city. The area is therefore not appropriate for the development 
of  the  industrial  and  commercial  sectors  over  farming.  In  2011,  a  survey  of  the 
Office of Policy and Planning Division found that the number of full-time farming 
households  working  in  Bangkok’s  peri-urban  fringe  was  13,774  from  a  total 
Bangkok population of 5,702,883 (Policy and Planning Division, 2012, p.6). They 
cultivate in the peri-urban areas of 180,305 rai (71,287 acres) (ibid, p.4). Though the 
survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 2007 shows that 59.73% 
of Thai farmers worked on lease land and that the number of working on lease land 
was as high as 70% in the middle region of Thailand, the land in peri-urban Bangkok 
is mostly owned by farmers (87.4%, 74.5%, 77.3%, and 51.6% for a survey of four 
main farming districts located in the North West, North East, South West and South 
East (peri-urban fringe) as shown in figure 1.1). While these numbers may indicate 
that the food system in Bangkok is self-reliant, peri-urban agriculture in Bangkok 
cannot sustain a self-reliant local food system for three reasons. Firstly, the Green 
Revolution shaped farming in peri-urban Bangkok into an intensive mono-cropping 
and market-oriented food production system, which is not dissimilar from farming 48 
 
practices in the majority of Thai rural areas. Peri-urban agriculture in Bangkok is 
therefore merged with the national agriculture system rather than representing a local 
one.  Bangkok  peri-urban  farmers  still  depend  on  external  inputs  that  are 
monopolised  by  a few  food  corporations, such as fertilisers, pesticides  and even 
seeds. In other words, peri-urban agriculture in Bangkok does not have an identity 
and does not challenge but is part of the mainstream food system.  
Figure  1.1.  Bangkok  land-use  plan  by  which  farming  lands  in  peri-
urban fringe are conserved 
 
  Source: Department of City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (2552) 
Secondly, peri-urban farming cannot build a sustainable local food system as peri-
urban farm land areas are decreasing gradually by 0.5-3% each year as many farmers 
decided not to invest in farming and left their land vacant or sold it to neighbours for 
construction  (Bangkok  Agricultural  Extension  Office,  2011).  Many  became 
employees in local shops and restaurants, street vendors, day-by-day paid labourers 
in industrial and commercial sectors (e.g. construction, care for the elderly, babies 
and disable persons, etc.) (Fieldwork interview with Sudhep Kulsri, a  peri-urban 
farmer, 4/02/2012). The reason for these changes is that the average income from the 49 
 
agricultural  sector  is  roughly  six  times  lower  than  in  other  sectors,  and  many 
Bangkok farmers cannot cope with seasonal flooding (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, 2007).  The process of leaving land vacant and building houses on 
what was previously farm land, has intensified since the extension of overground and 
underground transportation systems starting in 1999, although the Department of 
City Planning still attempts to protect the peri-urban green belt by does not allow the 
use of farm land for other purposes. However, in practice, officers often lightly in 
implement the regulation and turn a blind eye to the building of individual houses on 
farm land.  
The  third  reason  why  food  produced  in  peri-urban  land  around  Bangkok  cannot 
contribute  to  a  local  food  system  is  that  the  products  would  not  necessarily  be 
consumed  by  Bangkok  habitants.  For  example,  though  rice  production  within 
Bangkok and on peri-urban land might be adequate to feed Bangkok dwellers, they 
do not always consume rice produced locally when they resort to buying from a 
nearby market. This can be explained by the implementation of a centralised and 
monopolised system of rice trading shaped by the national rice policy. This policy 
called ‘rice subsidy scheme’ is widely criticised for being a populist policy aiming to 
gain the political support from rice farmers, who constitute the majority of Thai 
citizens. Under rice policy and politics, the government offers to buy rice from the 
farmers by paying a higher price than the market value to subsidise them. As  a 
consequence,  the  government  holds  large  rice  stocks  from  all  over  the  country, 
including from Bangkok’s peri-urban areas, as the rice farmers can make greater 
gain by selling rice to the government than selling on the market. The government 
has therefore become a monopoly rice trader which holds almost all rice and has 
centralised rice trading in the country. Hence, rice from everywhere in the country is 
mixed in government storage (both belonging to the government and rented from the 
private sector). Subsequently, the government organises the procurement process by 
providing quotas to other governments and private rice traders after reserving some 
in the rice bank to secure domestic demands in times of crisis or humanitarian aid for 
other  countries.  In  the  case  of  private  rice  traders,  large,  monopolised  food 
corporations always win in the procurement process as they can offer the highest 
price. After getting a quota, each corporation packs the rice and sells some in the 
modern  trade  market  while  what  remains  is  exported  under  the  government 50 
 
agreement, which attempts to guarantee rice supply within the domestic market at a 
capped price.  
Based on this process, it can be noticed that rice stocks are mixed by the government 
before allocating them to the population and traders, which causes problems with 
defining rice origins. Rice produced in peri-urban lands around Bangkok might be 
eaten  by  people  elsewhere  or  even  exported,  while  rice  consumed  by  Bangkok 
dwellers might come from rural Thailand. Under the centralised and monopolised 
system no one knows where the rice comes from, not even the traders. As a result, 
this process does not support local food systems as it is an obstacle to defining local 
food and  identifying  food  miles. The  population of Bangkok  buys rice from the 
supermarket without knowing where the rice comes from, despite there being rice 
fields nearby.
2  
As  for  vegetables,  although  many  kinds  of  them  are  produced  within  the  city, 
inhabitants consume vegetables transported from all around the country and many 
parts  of  the  world.  A  survey  in  2011  exploring  the  impacts  of  food  miles  on 
Bangkok’s  ecological  footprints  by  Suteethorn  (2012)  found  that  city  dwellers 
consume 240 grams of vegetables on average per day. Merely 30% of all vegetables 
consumed in Bangkok are produced within the parameter of 100 kilometres. In the 
largest central market, Talat Thai, 50% of vegetables are produced more than 200 
kilometres  away.  Roughly  721,438  Baht  (US$24,048)  is  spent  on  vegetable 
transportation by trucks from rural Thailand to the central city markets in Bangkok 
every day. Suteethorn (ibid) argues that if Bangkok dwellers consume vegetables 
from within 50 kilometres, which includes the peri-urban farming areas, 263,324,870 
Baht (US$8,777,495) would be saved per year.  
While inhabitants of the city consume vegetables from many different origins, some 
vegetables produced in Bangkok are consumed elsewhere. This is a consequence of 
the supply chains of vegetables in Thailand that transport vegetables to the central 
                                                 
2 Some Provincial Administration Offices attempt to branding local rice produced in the 
specific origin, such as Roi Ed and Supanburee jasmine rice. However, the information 
provided by Roi Ed Provincial Administration Office (2014) shows that during 2010 to 2013 
this province could make a package for branding their provincial rice only 5-10% of the total 
product. The rest (and majority) was sold under the aforementioned system.   51 
 
markets,  particularly  Talat  Thai  and  See  Mum  Moung  located  on  the  fringes  of 
Bangkok. The vegetables produced within Bangkok are also mixed with vegetables 
from elsewhere when sold on central markets. Retailers from all around the country 
buy the products from markets and sell them in supermarkets and local stores around 
the country. Vegetables produced in Bangkok can be transported by retailers to sell 
in  the  North  or  even  the  South  of  the  country.  Retailers  in  Bangkok  transport 
vegetables from the central markets to sell at the super and local markets in the inner 
city and some sell vegetables directly at the customers’ houses by carrying food on 
trucks, which creates a mobile market. Some food corporations also buy vegetables 
from the central markets as retailers before packing and selling the products under 
their brand to the modern trade markets, which are owned and controlled by food 
corporations, without information about the origin of the vegetables. Similar to the 
supply of rice, vegetable supply in Bangkok does not support the local food system 
but rather, is merged with the national mainstream food system.  
Aside from the unclear role of peri-urban agriculture in feeding city dwellers, the 
majority of vegetables  produced on the fringes of  Bangkok  are an output of the 
Green Revolution method of production and exhibit high chemical use, so they are 
not different from vegetables produced elsewhere in the country. Although it was 
found that some farmers produced organic vegetables in and near Bangkok, and send 
their products directly to corporations under strict farming contract to sell in super 
markets  in  Bangkok,  such  products  were  recently  tested  to  find  chemical 
contamination  in  food  sold  in  many  supermarkets  around  Bangkok  (Thailand 
Foundation for Consumers, 2012). The reason for this is that the contract stipulates 
that  farmers  need  to  send  their  organic  products  to  the  corporation  in  specific 
amounts and on a regular basis. If they cannot supply sufficient amounts and fail to 
send their products on time in agreed quantities, they are penalised by paying three 
times  the  product  value  lost  by  the  supermarket  to  the  corporation.  During  an 
informal interview with a vegetable farmer under contract farming it was found that 
when he cannot produce organic products on time and in the required quantity, he 
avoided the penalty by sending some non-organic products mixed with organic ones 
to the supermarkets (Fieldwork interview with a farmer, 4/02/2012). The tests that 
found  chemical  contamination  in  vegetables,  claimed  to  be  organic,  received 
attention by the media as it was presented in newspapers and discussed in television 52 
 
programmes.  Bangkok  dwellers  have  lost  trust  in  organic  food  products  sold  in 
modern supermarkets within Bangkok, even for famous brands. Besides, the organic 
shops that can be trusted are few and not located in the inner city (such as Lemon 
Farm, Golden Place, Rangsit Farm, and Rai Ploog Rak). Therefore customers require 
information, time and dedicated efforts to access organic vegetables in Bangkok, and 
it seems that just a few customers can afford them.  
However, as farming is part of a cultural identity of Thailand, many Thai people who 
are not full-time farmers, including many inhabitants of inner-city Bangkok, attempt 
to grow their own food in their backyard and in collective gardens. In other words, 
apart from large-scale peri-urban farming, small-scale inner city farming by part-
time farmers takes place mainly for subsistence purposes. Even though inner city 
farming is small-scale and only contributes to a minor extent to an alternative food 
system, in many respects it is able to play an important role specifically for the urban 
poor,  such  as  slum  dwellers  and  informal  labourers  who  need  to  reduce  food 
spending to exercise their right to food and to live in the city. It is also significant for 
vulnerable  groups,  such  as  hospital  patients  and  school  children,  who  require  a 
secure intake of food. Inner-city farming has also become a choice for other city 
dwellers who want to escape from the injustice and irresponsible mainstream food 
system, particularly members of middle and upper classes. They distrust food from 
the markets and realise that healthy food must be either home-grown or grown by 
producers they know. Mainly, they produce for their own consumption, while some 
grow food to sell to niche green markets or green restaurants.  
Food growing in inner-city Bangkok has been supported by many organisations and 
citizen groups, particularly since the City Farm programme was endorsed by the 
government in 2010. The actions by various organisations and groups converge and 
are integrated way under the umbrella of the City Farm programme, defined here as 
the policy network on UA. The details of this policy network will be provided in 
section 1.3 as a central unit of the analysis for this research. The next section will 
discuss the context in which the  food issue  became  a serious issue  in Bangkok, 
which happened as a result of the food shortages during the floods.  
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1.2. Food shortages during the flooding in Bangkok  
Between mid-November 2011 and early-January 2012, many areas within the city 
faced  the  most  disastrous  flooding  reported  in  roughly  70  years  (Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration, 2012). Even though flooding is expected in some areas 
of the city, during that period more than half of the city was flooded, affecting 36 
districts out of a total of 50 as shown in figure 1.2. In some of these districts, water 
levels were higher than two meters (ibid). This caused many disruptions, including 
in relation to the food supply, even though Thailand is known as a farming country 
and the world’s kitchen for its export of various agricultural products. However, the 
magnitude of the issue of food shortage can be explained by the fact that Bangkok 
dwellers,  particularly  those  who  live  in  the  inner  city,  mainly  depend  on  food 
transportation  from  peri-urban  areas  and  outside  the  city  controlled  by  a  few 
monopoly  food  corporations.  These  food  corporations  have  centralised  food 
distribution by transporting foods to supermarkets and convenience stores around the 
country from a few or even one distributive units (Phoorisumboon, 2012). This in 
turn meant that risk was centralised, particularly when the centralised distributive 
unit was damaged and all food chains had collapsed. This was not only a risk for the 
corporations but also for customers who were dependent on food distributed by the 
corporations. When the floods became so severe that the main road was effectively a 
river,  transportation  was seriously interrupted.  Many food industries with market 
monopoly were also flooded, so they could not produce or transport their products to 
supermarkets and convenience stores within the city, where food consisted of 67% of 
their products (ibid). The quantity of food provided by this distribution system was 
not enough to meet the demands of the consumers. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
some shops were closed, while food prices in the available shops were roughly 3-4 
times higher than usual. In the case of fresh vegetables, shortage was not due only to 
the  government  allowing  commercial  farmers’  gardens  to  flood;  the  central 
vegetable markets were also affected. See Mum Moung market was flooded in late 
October while the availability of fresh vegetables in Talat Thai market was reduced 
by  approximately  50%  (Wongaree  and  Sirichai,  2012).  Vegetable  prices  from 
available food markets and stores were found to be ten times higher (Working Group 
on Food for Change, 2012).  54 
 
As a consequence of the floods, food shortages occurred in the capital of a country 
that always considered itself as a land where food is abundant. The food shortages 
became  apparent  after  the  third  week  of  the  crisis  as  a  survey  by  the  Bangkok 
Metropolitan  Administration  in  15  October  2011  found  that  roughly  41,500 
households (1.69% of the total 2,459,700 households) could not access enough food, 
while  almost  all  people  living  in  36  districts  of  50  had  limited  access  to  fresh 
products. 
Figure 1.2.  Flooding in Bangkok in late-2011 
 
Source: The Nation [Available at: http://www.travelfish.org/blogs/thailand/2011/ 11/04/ bangkok-
flood-update-november-4-2011/] [Accessed 15/01/2015]. 55 
 
 
Source:  Post  graphics  team  [http://nuttpo.wordpress.com/2011/10/28/แผนที่น ้ำท่วม-
2554/] [Last accessed: 20/08/2014].  
The diet of many households was poor, due to the fact that inhabitants consumed the 
same dry food for many days, lacking fresh products particularly vegetables and that 
many resolved to eating rotten food. There were nevertheless other sources from 
which Bangkok citizens could expect to buy food, including the local markets, small 
local  shops,  mobile  markets  (selling  food  from  trucks)  and  street  vendors.  Not 
having access to food in the modern supermarkets and convenience stores led to a 
food shock, because people were already used to buying food in the modern trade 
sector while other sources of food were uncertain and unpredictable. For example, 
mobile food markets changed their targets quite often, while traders in local markets 
would be present anytime they wanted, which was hard to predict. Phoorisumboon’s 
study (2012) points out that the number of traders in local markets decreased every 
year and some local shops and markets were closed after supermarkets were built 
nearby  as  they  could  not  compete  with  the  marketing  undertaken  by  the 
supermarkets  as  well  as  their  convenience  and  promotion  of  modern  lifestyles. 
Therefore, city dwellers became more dependent on monopolistic food corporations 
and  their  food  chains,  which  made  them  insecure  when  food  corporations  were 
affected by the floods (See the example from photo 1.1). It can therefore be argued 56 
 
that the reduction in the variety of food distribution and the higher dependency on 
monopolised modern trade were the main cause of food shortages during the floods.  
Photo 1.1.  Flooding the supermarket and convenience store 
 
Source:  AP  [http://www.oknation.net/blog/print.php?id=760606]  and  Rishukung 
Multiply [http://rishukung.multiply.com] [Last accessed: 20/08/2014]. 
Not only did food shortages exacerbated food insecurity, but the city dwellers’ right 
to  food  was  also  constrained,  particularly  the  rights  of  marginalised  groups, 
including slum dwellers living in informal settlements along the river and peri-urban 
farmers.  Slum  dwellers  were  not  protected  from  the  flooding  and  were  blamed 
because their houses obstructed the flow of the water in the river, which allegedly 
caused delays in the flood waters draining to the sea through the main rivers. While 
the increase of food prices affected their efforts to buy food from the markets, the 
negative attitude of the public sector to them made their struggle for subsistence 
harder to bare. They did not receive special attention from the mainstream food aid 
programmes provided by the central government, even though these areas included 
some  of  the  most  vulnerable  groups.  Their  relations  with  government  agencies 
further deteriorated when members of these communities attempted to destroy the 
government water block systems that affected them. 
As for the peri-urban farmers, the government decided to abandon food areas and 
turn them into a floodway to protect the industrial and commercial sectors within the 
inner city. Approximately 120 thousands rai (47,455 acres) of rice fields and about 3 
thousands rai (1,186 acres) of horticultural lands were flooded. Aquaculture also 
suffered  a  loss,  roughly  20  thousands  rai  (7,907  acres)  of  snakefish  farms  were 
affected and shrimp farms lost roughly 15 thousands rai (5,930 acres) (Policy and 57 
 
Planning Division, 2012). The total losses are estimated at 51 billion Baht (US$1.7 
billions):  that  of  rice  production  was  43  billion  Baht  (US$1.4  billions)  while 
horticultural  products  lost  about  10  billion  Baht  (US$0.3  billion)  (Office  of 
Agricultural  Economics,  2011).  This  increased  the  vulnerability  not  only  of  the 
farmers,  but  of  consumers  also,  who  depended  on  their  production  to  feed 
themselves. Nevertheless, farmers became particularly vulnerable as they lost their 
properties, their houses and their farming equipment. Most importantly, because they 
could not earn from their products, they were forced to buy food from the market, 
like all other urban citizens. In other words, they lost their food which was their main 
source of income while at the same time, they needed more money to buy food. 
Although later on the government compensated them for the losses with 2,222 Baht 
(US$74) per rai, this compensation was a generalised estimate and it was too little, 
too late. Different products had different values of loss. Wonganannon (2012), a 
think  tank working for the Research and Information Devision, critiques that the 
government paid the market price by adjusting a number that looked ‘beautiful’ and 
to be seen as a ‘lucky number’, which was generally low, by which some household 
planned to sell their product later when the price would be higher. Apart from that, 
the victims needed to wait for 3-4 months to receive compensation. 
Regarding  food  aid  as  a  response  to  food  shortages,  the  mainstream  aid  system 
provided  by  the  existing  urban  formal  governance  system  of  Bangkok  received 
support from many corporations and international organisations. The existing urban 
governance system shaped the mainstream food aid governance into multiple and 
fragmented  layers.  The  first  layer  was  the  role  of  the  central  government.  Even 
though Bangkok is a semi-autonomous entity, its administration appears to be under 
another body in which the central government wants to have a role because the city 
is  the  largest  political  strategic  area  in  the  country.  There  are  roughly  2,000 
communities within 50 districts of 1,500 square kilometres (Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration, 2011). As Bangkok is the primate city, the  central government’s 
stability also depends on its response to demands from its citizens. They are usually 
able  to  mobilise  to  challenge  the  corrupt  government.  Maintaining  a  level  of 
contentment among its inhabitants is key to maintaining political stability. 58 
 
Moving to the regional government, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is a one-
tier  system.  The  governor  is  elected  by  inhabitants  and  is  usually  backed  by  a 
national political party. The political party that can win the election and forms the 
central government usually sends their representative to compete in the elections for 
the Bangkok governor. If they fail to win the elections, they are usually co-opted by 
the  governor to take their side. In case the governor is the  representative of the 
opposition party in parliament, the government will attempt to compete with the 
Bangkok governor in projects for the development of the city. During the floods, the 
Bangkok  governor  was  a  representative  of  the  opposition  party  in  the  central 
government.  Considering  the  system  of  formal  and  mainstream  governance  in 
dealing with the flooding, the central government competed rather than cooperated 
with the Bangkok governor (Orathai, 2012). 
Within this urban governance structure, food aid consisted mainly of dry food such 
as instant noodles and canned fish. Some agencies also provided freshly cooked food 
packaged in plastic boxes. The government agencies set up a unit and contacted each 
community leader to go to the central unit and return the food packages to their 
neighbourhoods to be allocated to the community. However, the main problem was 
that of accessibility due to the centralised food aid system, which was designed for 
equal food allocation to city dwellers. There was a lack of improved food aid for the 
most vulnerable people, particularly slum dwellers and peri-urban farmers. In this 
sense, the UA policy network was not supported by peri-urban farmers, but instead 
needed to support them.  
A further issue associated with the mainstream food aid system was its one-size-fits-
all approach, by which the victims received the same kind of food (mostly dry food) 
while many households already had adequate stocks and what they wanted were 
vegetables,  which  the  public  sector  could  not  provide.  Informal  chats  with  the 
victims reflect that there were many households eating the same kind of food for 
more than two weeks (Fieldwork interviews with members of Clonghog and Saladin 
communities, 25, 27/02/2012). Even though boxes of freshly-cooked food were also 
provided by some agencies, the organisation of the centralised food allocation unit 
meant that the leaders of communities located far from the unit took many hours to 
collect the food and return it before it rot.  59 
 
Apart from government food aid, city dwellers also relied on mutual aid aimed at 
enhancing food security, people’s right to food and climate change adaptive capacity 
in this period. There were many collective actions set up by organisations and groups 
to support this mutual aid system and to fill the gaps created by government food 
aid. The next section provides an overview of these many actions by multi-actors 
defined here as the policy network on UA. 
1.3.  The  policy  network  on  UA:  actions  by  multi-actors  to  promote  an 
alternative urban food system 
As mentioned in section 1.1, many people grow small-scale vegetables in the inner 
city of Bangkok, both individually and collectively. Most of them do so for their 
own consumption but some also grow vegetables for restaurant customers. Others 
sell surplus products in local markets or to their neighbours, or even join a vegetable 
box delivery scheme (under the community supported agricultural system) supported 
by the Green Market Network since 2008. As for farming capacity, lack of water is 
not a general problem as people can at least use water from the 1,165 rivers that gave 
Bangkok the name ‘River City' (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2010). Inner 
city  farming  practices  are  different  from  the  mainstream  food  system  as  such 
practices are mostly not based on mono-cropping and chemical use. Therefore inner 
city farming can promote an alternative food system for the city.  
The  recognition  of  UA  in  Bangkok  has  been  recorded  in  terms  of  policy  and 
planning since 1949. Inner city farms were promoted a few years after the end of the 
Second World War, when Thailand faced an economic crisis. The Prime Minister at 
that  time,  Plag  Piboonsongkram,  established  a  campaign  to  encourage  urban 
dwellers to grow vegetables in their houses in response to the crisis. Over the years, 
the campaign faded away and terminated after the country recovered from the crisis 
in  1954,  when  the  economic  system  became  highly  dependent  on  international 
investment in the commercial and industrial sectors. The government, instead, began 
to encourage city inhabitants to consume (to spend their money including for food-
consumption) in an attempt to boost economic growth. Therefore, city dwellers had 
not  been  encouraged  to  grow  their  own  food  for  over  four  decades,  which  was 
broken by the remarkable promotion of inner city farming at a local level in 1994. At 
that time, bio-organic consumption had become a trend. This was in high demand 60 
 
amongst  middle  and  upper  class  inhabitants  of  Bangkok.  Many  bio-organic 
restaurants appeared around this time as well as alternative food production around 
the  country,  including  Bangkok,  to  supply  good-quality  produce  for  niche 
restaurants.  The  Thai  government  began  supporting  the  organic  movement  by 
certifying organic products and shops. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
also helped to promote organic consumption through their 1995 campaign called 
‘Let's be organic consumers’ (Fieldwork interview with Narong Litkumron, head of 
farmer  support  and  development  unit,  Bangkok  Agricultural  Extension  Office, 
14/03/2012). While the role of the public sector was largely passive, as mentioned, 
some private organisations were active; for example, private organisations such as 
Golden Place dedicated a large section of land in Praram Kaou in central Bangkok 
for rent to undertake organic farming. They opened organic shops such as Lemon 
Farm in 1995 to sell organic products and twelve Lemon Farm shops can now be 
found  in  Bangkok.  These  shops  are  the  main  choice  for  organic  producers  and 
customers in Bangkok apart from green markets.  
Government  policy  makers  again  encouraged  inner  city  farming  in  1997  when 
Thailand faced a dramatic economic crisis known as the ‘Tom Yum Kung’ crisis. On 
4 December 1997, the King, who the people respect as the father of the country, 
gave a speech about growing food in limited areas using low-input methods and for 
self-reliance. This became known as the King’s ‘New Approach of Farming’. The 
rationale  for  his  idea  was  that  the  economic  crisis  was  a  result  of  being  highly 
dependent on outsiders (international sectors, particularly external investments). To 
respond to the crisis, Thai people should increase their self-reliance while sharing 
with each other. This nationalistic ideology offers the scenario that the Thai people 
should associate their cultural roots with agriculture. They should recall that their 
ancestors survived by farming. The second message behind the King’s discourse was 
that  Thai  people  should  be  resilient  by  trying  to  adapt  to  changes,  including  by 
attempting to feed themselves by growing food in limited areas and using their own 
resources. In a nutshell, the King’s suggestion encouraged Thai people to grow food 
everywhere, beyond limitations of scale and space. Learning centres were developed 
through the King’s own projects; the most famous of which was Jitrutda Garden, 
located in central Bangkok. The government adopted his speech in order to respond 
to  the  economic  crisis  by  proposing  campaigns  called  ‘following  the  King’s 61 
 
footpath’ and allocated public spending to food growing everywhere in the country 
including Bangkok. Even though the economic crisis period (roughly from 1997 to 
1999) was not  the beginning  of the  story of support for inner city farming, this 
period is a clear starting point for the current food policy agenda. Building upon the 
King’s  ideas,  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration  launched  a  variety  of 
programmes to support UA in the city implemented by 50 District Administration 
Offices,  such  as  the  establishment  of  UA  learning  centres.  Some  District 
Administration  Offices  also  created  their  own  initiatives,  such  as  to  develop  a 
rooftop garden and to organise UA training courses (Laksi District Administration 
Office, 2012, pp.1-3). Some non-governmental and international organisations also 
played a role in supporting the issue. Most significant is the cooperation between the 
Thai  Environment  Institution  (an  NGO),  the  International  Centre  for  Sustainable 
Cities (Canada) and the Canadian International Development Agency in promoting 
community  vegetable  gardens  in  inner-city  Bangkok  during  2000-2001  (Fraser, 
2002).  
However, the most up-to-date forms of support for UA in Bangkok and the most 
collaborative ones, which have created the largest network so far in the history of the 
city,  are  the  multi-actions  by  multi-actors  under  the  umbrella  of  the  City  Farm 
programme, which began in 2010. The programme was funded under the food and 
nutrition  programme  of  the  National  Health  Promotion  Foundation,  the  Prime 
Minister’s  Office,  and  managed  by  many  non-governmental  bodies  led  by  the 
Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation,  the  Media  Centre  for  Development,  the 
Working Group on Food for Change, and the city farm association. The programme 
later combined many projects under its umbrella and is supported by many other 
organisations and groups framed here by the term ‘policy network’, which is used to 
capture a variety of related autonomous but interdependent policy actors and actions 
active  with the  same  agenda  as stated earlier. Between 2010 and 2012,  this UA 
policy  network  was  driven  by  collective  gardens  which  were  almost  all  located 
within the inner city of Bangkok (as shown in figure 1.3), green markets and the 
community-supported  agricultural  system.  The  survey  by  the  City  Farm 
programme’s coordinator of 27 community garden projects (50%) in the first nine 
months of the programme found that these projects can create edible green spaces in 62 
 
an average space of 2,202 square metres and reuse city waste by composting roughly 
4,179.5 kilogrammes (City Farm Programme Progress Report, 2011). 
The UA policy network was driven by the collective action of both governmental 
and non-governmental players. Such policy network governance can be understood 
by  adopting  a  collaborative  governance  approach.  When  the  notion  of  policy 
network is used, it is usually linked to a governance approach (deLeon and Varda, 
2009; Rhodes, 2006, 1997). Most scholars refer to an approach that emphasises the 
collaboration of cross-sectoral multi-actors or multi-stakeholders, both governmental 
and  non-governmental  bodies  (see  Ansell  and  Gash,  2007;  Armitage,  2008; 
Chhotray  and  Stoker,  2010;  deLeon  and  Varda,  2009;  Donahue,  2004;  Huxham, 
2000; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). As Ansell and Gash (2007) argue, the approach 
is  usually  adopted  for  sector-specific  governance  issues  and  regularly  at  a  small 
scale,  such  as  watershed  councils,  community  health  partnerships,  and  natural 
resource co-management. This study takes this collaborative governance approach to 
understanding the specific issues associated with the functioning of the UA policy 
network. The common conditions of collaborative governance through the policy 
network synthesised from the existing literature are highlighted here based on the 
two  different  approaches  of  IRC  and  CAT,  which  will  be  explained  in  the  next 
chapter.  This  research  argues  that  the  potential  of  the  UA  policy  network  in 
responding to urban food problems was to enhance an alternative governance system 
to fill the gap in the formal governance system. The collaborative governance of the 
policy network was formulated by merging the potential cooperation of each actor 
regarding the food agenda, which was a common agenda for all, even if some actors 
advocated for different targets and supported different political camps (details will 
be provided in Chapter 7). The next section explores the remarkable collaborative 
collective actions of the policy network during the disaster, while Chapters 4 to 7 
discuss how different policy actors could take action collaboratively.  
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  Figure  1.3.  Mapping  collective  vegetable  gardens  within  Bangkok 
supported by the City Farm programme in 2010-2012 
 
 
Source:  Providing  addresses  by  the  City  Farm  programme's  coordinator  and 
mapping by Noppanit Charassinvichai  64 
 
1.4. Collective actions of the policy network in dealing with the food agenda 
during and after the floods  
This  study  found  that  many  collective  actions  were  organised  by  constituent 
organisations and groups of the UA policy network to fill the gaps within the main 
food aid system provided by the existing formal urban governance structure. The 
following  section  presents  how  the  City  Farm  programme’s  UA  policy  network 
responded to the food shortages during the crisis by developing alternative food aid, 
which focused on vulnerable people by mobilising actor networks and utilising the 
capacity of the local food system. The section focuses on understanding the actions 
of the policy network and its contributions during and shortly after the flooding.  
1.4.1. To provide food for the most vulnerable people during the disaster  
While the most vulnerable inhabitants did not receive special attention by the main 
governmental food aid system, the UA policy network focused on helping precisely 
these  group,  including  slum  dwellers  living  along  the  river  and  the  peri-urban 
farmers. Food aid distributed by the policy network was primarily directed towards 
these most vulnerable urban dwellers mobilised from roughly 90 collective gardens 
of the City Farm programme’s members from around the city, mainly the inner city 
as  shown  in  figure  1.3.
3 While  vegetables  were  rare  and  very  expensive  in  the 
market, the food which had been allocated by the policy network mainly consisted of 
vegetables. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Working Group on Food for 
Change,  the  Media  Centre  for  Development  and  the  Green  Market  Network 
mobilised and distributed food in cooperation with farmer groups who donated their 
vegetables collected from their collective gardens. They built four food-aid centres 
in  different  zones  and  allocated  responsibility  to  different  actors  to  collect  and 
distribute  food  by  area.  Other  organisations  and  groups  also  supported  them  by 
volunteering  to  quicken the  food-collection and  allocation process. Organisations 
such  as  ‘Health-me  Organic  Delivery’  helped  by  transforming  the  collected 
vegetables to freshly cooked foods to provide for the victims who could not cook for 
themselves as illustrated in photo 1.2. In total, vegetables and freshly cooked foods 
were allocated to roughly 100 vulnerable groups, including slum dwellers and peri-
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urban famers who were affected by the floods (Fieldwork interview with Nardsiri 
Komonpan, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). 
Photo 1.2.  Fresh cooked food provision for flood victims 
   
  Source: Photo use authorised by Health-me Organic Delivery 
1.4.2.  Providing  materials  and  know-how  for  the  production  of 
emergency food 
The proverb ‘to enhance the ability to fish is better than to give fish’ became the 
development  approach  of  the  UA  policy  network  during  the  floods  (Fieldwork 
interview  with  Nardsiri  Komonpan,  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm  programme, 
21/03/2012). The main idea is that teaching people to grow food is more sustainable 
than to give them food. Apart from food allocation, the policy network therefore 
provided a  set  of  materials called ‘Green  Life  Bag’ and know-how on  easy  and 
short-term  food  production,  such  as  sprouts  and  mushrooms,  to  flood  victims. 
Mobile training was organised to enhance the capacity for self-reliance of the flood 
victims. The programme emphasised sharing knowledge on vegetables that are easy 
to grow (see photo 1.3), menus, and cooking methods. The City Farm programme’s 
training  centres  played  a  significant  role  in  this  mission,  particularly  the  Media 
Centre for Development. It provided basic growing materials to help people survive 
for  one  to  three  months.  These  included  a  sprout  growing  bucket,  which  could 
produce three kilogrammes of sprouts every three days. The mushroom growing set 
included  20  chunks  of  mushrooms  and  each  chunk  could  produce  one  kilo  of 
mushrooms.  Each  household  could  therefore  produce  twenty  kilogrammes  of 
mushrooms from the twenty chunks handed over to them (Hutapate, 2011, pp.5-7).  66 
 
Photo 1.3.  Mobile training for flood victims on growing easy and short-
term food  
   
  Sources: Photo use authorised by the City Farm programme’s coordinator and the 
staff of the Media Centre for Development 
The training centres worked in cooperation with the Health Promotion Foundation 
and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation both to promote vertical farming and 
hanging gardens as methods for growing, and to recommend on the product that 
could be easily home-grown, such as growing morning glory, cabbage, watercress, 
chilli, holy basil and mint. In order to make sure that water was clean enough for 
growing food, they used a strainer. It could not guarantee drinking water quality but 
it was good enough for growing sprouts, mushrooms and general vegetables (Ibid, 
2011, pp.5-7). Some training was organised for flood victims by the Media Centre 
for  Development,  one  of  the  core  training  centres,  where  teaching  provided 
knowledge and materials about energy self-reliance. The energy sets, for example, 
included a sun-powered rice cooking box in which flood victims could cook rice 
without electricity (Fieldwork interview with Kornrachanok Hutapate, coordinator of 
the Media Centre for Development, 14/01/2012).  
1.4.3. Developing food innovations for living with water  
After it was forecasted that the floods would take longer than it was original thought, 
the main actors of the policy network attended a meeting to share experiences and 
develop food innovations for how to live submerged in water. They attempted to 
learn and share food innovations adapted to the circumstances, as illustrated in photo 67 
 
1.4.  The  key  actors  leading  the  movement  were  from  the  training  centres,  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change, the 
Green  Market  Network,  many  farming  groups  who  anticipated  the  City  Farm 
programme, and volunteers. During the flooding, I found that websites and Facebook 
pages were exchanging knowledge and innovations about food-growing.  
Innovative practices were sprouting everywhere: a rooftop garden, vertical garden 
and food growing in containers are just some of the practices that were promoted. 
These  new  methods  were  developed  by  the  City  Farm  programme  since  2010, 
though some key actors practised them before. During the flooding, the practices 
developed by these groups were shown and shared. Some training centres engaged in 
the City Farm programme, particularly the ‘Veggie Price’ training centre, attempted 
to develop a model of floating gardens that was compatible with Bangkok’s urban 
environments  by  learning  from  experiments  elsewhere,  such  as  learning  from 
floating gardens developed in the countryside of Thailand (namely Rathchathanee 
Asoke, located in Warinchumrab, Ubonrathathanee). Some international experiences 
also inspired city farming training centres, such as the floating gardens in Inle lake, 
Burma and Gaibandha, Bangladesh.  
Photo 1.4.  Promoting food innovations for living with water  
   
Source: Photos owned by the researcher  
It is clear that the online social networks were used to transfer these experiences. 
Roughly  5,000  people  became  friends  of  the  City  Farm  programme's  Facebook 68 
 
page
4, and each organisation and group within the UA policy network also has its 
own Facebook and fan-pages. In order to inspire city dwellers to develop floating 
gardens, the city farm trainers cooperated with farming groups engaged with the City 
Farm programme and volunteers built pilot floating gardens for the slum community 
settled along the river, which demonstrated how floating gardens worked (see photo 
1.5 in the left hand). Even after the flooding disaster, floating gardens are still being 
promoted  in  anticipation  of  future  risks,  and  are  becoming  more  popular.  The 
designs for floating gardens were diverse as each locality attempted to use local 
materials which were available to them. Plastic cans were used instead of weeds, 
because they were easier to find in the city, such as banana trees and mango leaves. 
Some communities were funded by the City Farm programme when they were able 
to  show  their  capacity  to  build  a  floating  garden.  For  example,  the  Saladin 
community  received  financial  support  after  the  community  leaders  proposed  the 
development of floating gardens along the river (see photo 1.5 in the right hand). 
The  community  succeeded  in  growing  and  providing  basil,  Thai  aubergine, 
cucumber and hot chilli to its members. The City Farm programme also provided 
funding  to a  training  centre  to experiment with the development of floating rice 
fields. The experiment has not yet come to fruition at the time of this study.  
  Photo 1.5. Pilot floating gardens  
     
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher 
One  particular  innovation  that  inspired  many  was  the  application  of  traditional 
farming techniques, namely an effective microorganism (EM) ball, to improve soil 
                                                 
4This number was checked in February 2012. The recheck in October found that the number 
had increased to roughly 26,100.     69 
 
quality  for  producing  short-term  vegetables  and  to  reduce  polluted  water.  The 
campaign  was  strengthened  by  the  city  farming  training  centres,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation,  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change,  and  farming 
groups.  There  were  five  main  nodes  and  many  sub-nodes  that  mobilised  human 
labour, including volunteers who made EM balls. Roughly 75,000 EM balls were 
built and distributed to city dwellers by every node every day, and roughly 1,000 
people  joined  every  day  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Potip  Pechporee,  an  event 
organiser of Green Market Network, former of Organic Way and owner of Health-
me  Organic  Delivery,  17/02/2012).  The  media  was  also  interested  in  EM  ball 
promotion by broadcasting and reporting relevant events. Many celebrities, such as 
singers,  television  drama  actors  and  actresses,  and  teenage  idols  joined  EM  ball 
related events. These phenomena illustrates the influence of the UA policy network 
on society in terms of their ability to raise attention, mobilise social support and train 
people on how to deal with short-term food shortages and environmental problems. 
(More details will be given in Chapter 6.)  
However, the conviction that the EM balls can improve soil quality and polluted 
water was challenged by university environmental scientists and certain actors of the 
UA policy network, including the funder, the Health Promotion Foundation. They 
argued  that  in  theory,  the  time-span  over  which  land  was  flooded  was  not  long 
enough to truly enhance soil quality. They claimed that it did not necessarily reduce 
the amount of polluted water, and could actually increase pollution. Actors of the 
policy network advocating in favour of EM balls responded by using evidence from 
their practices. Nevertheless, debate between practical local knowledge and scientific 
knowledge on the functions and conditions of using EM balls endured. It will be 
expanded on in Chapter 6 and 7 as it relates to both the discussions on cooperation 
enhancement and conflict resolution.  
1.4.4. Supporting the mutual aids during flooding 
More  than  a  hundred  collective  gardens  were  developed  by  city  farming  groups 
engaged with the City Farm programme. During the flooding, the policy network not 
only  enhanced  food  self-reliance  of  such  groups  (including  communities)  and 
provided food to vulnerable people but also supported mutual aid among self-reliant 
groups, other members of the City Farm programme and their neighbours, who had 70 
 
also been affected by flooding. For example, the policy network supported mutual 
aid  between  city  farm  producers  and  customers  who  joined  the  community-
supported agriculture (CSA) system initiated under the umbrella structure of the City 
Farm programme, and facilitated by the Green Market Network and the Working 
Group on Food for Change.  
Peri-urban farmers who were members of the CSA had been affected by flooding 
and became more vulnerable. Their customers, who were members of the CSA led 
by the green restaurant ‘Health-me Organic Delivery’ in cooperation with the Green 
Market Network and the Working Group on Food for Change, decided to help the 
CSA peri-urban farmers by providing them with daily food. They established free 
cafeterias  near  the  flooded  areas.  They  played  a  key  role  in  providing  cooking 
materials, including vegetables reserved for their restaurants and produced by their 
own labour, while the flood victims organised themselves to cook and provide food. 
The cafeteria became a daily space to cook and eat for local farming households who 
faced the effects of flooding. Health-me Organic Delivery provided information that 
these cafeterias could feed roughly 2,100 victims from five different areas located in 
peri-urban Bangkok (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, owner of 'Health 
Me'  restaurant,  17/02/2012).  This  case  shows  a  reciprocal  relationship:  while 
customers including green restaurants depended on food transported from peri-urban 
farmers  by being  members  of the CSA system  in  a normal  situation, during the 
flooding they did the opposite by providing food to the farmers.  
1.4.5. Recovering city farms shortly after the flooding 
Shortly after the flooding, the UA policy network’s constituent organisations and 
groups continued to play a role in responding to the urban food agenda. Collective 
actions  to  recover  city  farms  were  an  outstanding  example.  For  example,  the 
community garden of Poonshup community, Saymai, which was granted by the City 
Farm programme, had recovered after facing large-scale flooding (see photo 1.6 in 
the  left  hand).  The  key  actors  of  the  policy  network,  including  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation, the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group 
on  Food  for  Change,  were  present  when  the  slum  dwellers’  network  played  an 
outstanding  role  in  organising  an  event  by  preparing  food  for  participants  and 
mobilising donations. An interview with the community leader found that there were 71 
 
roughly 80 volunteers and roughly 15,000 Baht (US$500) were donated to recover 
the community garden after spending just 2,000 Bath (about US$70). The leader said 
that the community kept 1,500 Baht (US$30) to maintain the garden and donated the 
remaining funds to four other slum communities towards recovering and developing 
their  garden  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Vimon  Thavilpong,  leader  of  Poonshup 
community, 22/03/2012).  
In nursing homes for children and women facing physical or mental violence, city 
farms also played a vital role. Four apartments had been built since 1980 by the 
government to provide for children and women who faced difficulties integrating 
society,  such  as  rape  victims,  HIV  patients,  pregnant  teenagers  and those facing 
domestic violence. Roughly 150-200 children and women lived there and required 
mental therapy. They created a vegetable garden in the communal space covering 1.5 
rai (around 0.6 acres) in 2008 and used it to cook for members until it was flooded in 
2011. Every weekend from 12th March to 30th April 2012, the common farm in the 
area of the departments had been recovered collectively by many organisations and 
groups engaged in the policy network (see photo 1.6 in the right hand). The main 
actors  were  the  training  centres  of  the  City  Farm  programme,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change, and some groups 
of people engaged with the City Farm programme. Such collective actions were also 
supported by volunteers and donors, who were called upon through the online group 
‘City Farms, City Friends’ funded by the City Farm programme.   
  Photo 1.6.  Recovering city farms after the flooding  
   
Source: Photo use authorised by the City Farm programme’s coordinator 72 
 
1.4.6. Sharing seeds shortly after the flooding 
Seed sharing, or Pa-pa Maletpun, is a traditional agricultural culture in Thailand. 
However, it had never been part of the culture of UA. The UA policy network first 
introduced it for city farming. Seed sharing had begun by collecting seeds which 
were distributed to those who needed them. The tradition is based on the kindness of 
the givers and the belief that ‘seed is life’: to give a seed is to give a life. After the 
flooding, many city farmers, including peri-urban farmers, needed to begin their life 
again,  for  which  a  seed  was  the  basic,  fundamental  requirement,  especially  for 
farmers. Seed sharing was not only a way to provide help to reduce the costs of 
farming but also encouraged farmers following their drastic loss, to begin anew. By 
the same token, by avoiding the purchase of seeds, this tradition was also a way to 
boycott  the  mainstream  food  system  in  which  everything,  even  a  seed,  is 
monopolised by large food corporations.  
  Photo 1.7. Seed sharing after flooding  
   
Source: Photos owned by the researcher 
There  were  many  seed-sharing  events  organised  by  the  key  actors  of  the  policy 
network (see the example of seed sharing at Keha Tung Songhong from photo 1.7); 
the  main  actors  were  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation, the Green Market Network, and training centres. The events 
involved exchanges from farmers who did not suffer the impact of flooding to those 
who did and from rural farmers to urban growers. The actors who did not have seeds 
could also join the events by donating money to the organisers to buy local seeds 73 
 
from alternative sources. Seeds bought from the monopolised corporations were not 
accepted. The events for seed-provision were organised in appointment places where 
an  exhibition  and  seminars  took place to share  and learn  from each other  about 
experiences with food problems during the flooding.  
1.4.7.  Raising  awareness  on  urban  food  security,  right  to  food,  and 
adaptation to climate change    
After the flooding, the policy network played a role in enhancing awareness of urban 
food security, the right to food, and adaptation to climate change through campaigns 
such as the campaign for food growing in the city, protecting city farming area and 
improving  farmers'  quality  of  life,  developing  a  greener  city,  and  building  more 
flexible food  systems to  increase adaptive capacity  to  respond to  future  extreme 
climate events. The website and Facebook page of the City Farm programme have 
become important channels to create and organise campaigns, while other websites 
and Facebook pages were used to support by tagging and sharing.  
Campaigns by the policy network also adapted to the situation at hand. For example, 
there were tonnes of household waste to dispose of after the flooding. Many actors of 
the policy network collaborated to campaign for the fermentation of the waste to 
make manure, which would then be used to fertilise soils for gardening. While the 
central  government  formulated  the  Water  Management  Plan,  many  actors  of  the 
policy network joined the meeting and announced their opinion and they did not 
agree  with  the  plan  and  its  process.  They  criticised  that  the  plan  had  poor 
participation  and  merely  emphasised  the  protection  of  commercial  and  industrial 
sectors. Many local governments that engaged in the policy network also played a 
role as critics. They demanded more concern for the protection of city farming areas 
to guarantee the right of city dwellers to food, and to protect vulnerable groups. 
Moreover,  the  plan  was  also  critiqued  because  it  did  not  recognise  the  city’s 
environmental  dimensions.  The  policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and 
groups campaigned for an opposite approach to dealing with future floods, which is 
to strengthen the development of UA, including edible city forestry, to cope with 
massive floods.  
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Conclusions  
During  Bangkok’s  flooding,  the  government  sought  to  protect  industrial  and 
commercial sectors first. The peri-UA around the city green belt was affected by 
flooding as such areas became a space for water storage and floodways to drain 
masses of water into the sea. The response to the urban food agenda during the 
flooding  by  the  existing  main  governance  system  mainly  depended  on  the  food 
industries that provided on a large scale and employed a one-size-fits-all approach. 
The formal system therefore functioned ineffectively during the crisis for it provided 
limited choices of dry food and responded to the food shortages too slowly, to the 
point that food was perishing before reaching the consumers. Slum dwellers living 
along  the  river  and  peri-urban  farmers  were  marginalised  by  this  formal  urban 
governance and they did not receive any special treatment.  
In this context, an alternative governance system emerged that responded to food 
shortages and other relevant food problems driven by the UA policy network in 
Bangkok. The discussion in this chapter demonstrates how far the policy network 
could fill the gap of the mainstream system in relation to the food agenda. At the 
same time, this chapter illustrates  the  possibility  of UA  to  enhance the adaptive 
capacity of the city to respond to the urban food agenda during an extreme climate 
event through a case-study of the country that has always considered itself abundant 
in food. However, UA had never been taken seriously by the governments and the 
formal urban governance.    
It must be recognised that the UA policy network in Bangkok can only contribute at 
a  small  scale,  mainly  as  a  result  of  the  contradictory  roles  of  the  national  and 
regional governments in supporting the policy network. For example, while they 
agreed with the development of food innovations, such as floating gardens, they do 
not allow anything that obstructs the water flow in the river. The policy network was 
also  challenged  by  obstacles  such  as  access  to  land  for  farming  in  the  city  and 
securing land rights for many city farms, because UA in the eyes of governmental 
agencies was considered to be limited to household and community gardening in 
available areas. The public sector, which has power in land reform policy, still did 
not respond to the demands of the NGOs and CBOs to provide and secure land for 
city farming. These challenges mean that there is a challenge to ensuring sufficient 75 
 
land  to  produce  food  within  the  city  in  quantities  that  would  allow  to feed  city 
dwellers.  It  becomes even harder when  peri-urban  farm land  areas were used  to 
protect industrial and commercial areas by acting as floodways to drain the water. 
The policy network was not able to respond to such challenges alone as this would 
require a transformation of the land ownership structure and the biased priorities of 
the government. A positive contribution of the policy network, however, is that city 
dwellers in a largely agricultural country have become more aware of the issue of 
food insecurity, the right to food and  climate change adaptation. The number of 
demands for city farming training is increasing and the UA policy network is also 
expanding, as many new organisations and groups become engaged.  
Although UA promotion in Bangkok might be not as remarkable as in many other 
cities around the world, the case-study has value for other cities to learn from the 
experience of Bangkok’s UA policy network governance during a disaster. Other 
cities also risk facing  an extreme climatic event and should begin to prepare by 
learning from other cities that faced disasters such as Bangkok. This study examines 
the governance of the UA policy network in Bangkok during the disaster by focusing 
on how the policy network enhanced cooperation and resolved conflicts. The central 
concern is the role of multiple forms of social capital in determining the quality of 
the policy network. This study argues that they acted as the glue to connect the plural 
and diverse constituent organisations and groups of the policy network. Before this, 
the study looks back at the way the policy network emerged and was characterised, 
including who were included and excluded, and who had an influence over others.    
Working through a network, to understand the policy network governance requires a 
review  of  literature  to  provide  analytical  perspectives  on  the  governance  system 
which  moves  beyond  governance  controlled  by  either  the  state  or  the  market, 
particularly the literature on collaborative, network, and polycentric governance. To 
focus on the power of relationships, the literature on social capital studies and power 
relations  analysis  are  also  explored.  Chapter  2  will  provide  the  boundary  and 
connectedness of the existing literature in relation to this study. The next chapter will 
also show how this literature helps to frame the analysis in this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
Institutional rational choice, communicative action theory,  
policy network approach and social capital 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theoretical background of the key concepts that inform this 
study.  In  particular,  the  chapter  examines  debates  between  institutional  rational 
choice (IRC) and communicative action theory (CAT) concerning the role of social 
capital in governing policy networks. The chapter is structured into four sections. 
The first section reviews the policy network approach by analysing the contributions 
of  IRC  and  CAT  to  increasing  the  power  of  explanation  of  this  approach.  The 
discussion then moves on to examine how the two theories can help to capture the 
concept  of  social  capital.  The  next  section  of  the  chapter  changes  the  focus  to 
examine how the two theories might help to create a better understanding of the role 
of social capital in facilitating policy network emergence and characterisation, and in 
overcoming  the  collective  action  problems  of  a  policy  network.  This  chapter 
concludes by presenting the analytical framework adopted in this study. 
2.1. Understanding the policy network approach through institutional rational 
choice and communicative action theory 
2.1.1. The policy network approach and the limits of explanation  
What does the concept of ‘policy network’ refer to? What follows is an overview of 
the different viewpoints of scholars who have focused on this concept.  
Policy  networks  are  modes  of  cooperation  through  collective  action 
characterised and constituted through the mutual recognition of common or 
complementary  strategic  agendas.  Policy  networks  are  strategic  alliances 
forged around a common agenda (however contested, however dynamic) of 
mutual advantage through collective action (Hay  and Richards, 2000, p.12; 
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Policy  networks  are  formed  by  a  set  of  actors  who  engage  in  resource 
exchange  over  policy  as  a  consequence  of  their  resource  interdependencies 
(Compston, 2009, p.5). 
Policy  networks  involve  a  loose  structural  coupling;  interaction  within 
networks between autonomous actors produces a negotiated consensus which 
provides the basis for cooperation (Marsh, 1998, p.8). 
Issue (policy) networks can be viewed as co-ordinated policy actions through 
networks of separate, but interdependent, organisations in which the collective 
abilities of a number of participants are essential for problem-solving (Heclo, 
1978, p.87). 
Policy  networks  are  seen  as  clusters  of  relatively  autonomous  but 
interdependent actors that are incorporated into the process of public policy 
making (Schneider, 1992, p.109). 
Policy networks consist of governmental and societal actors whose interactions 
with one another give rise to policies. They are actors linked through informal 
practices  as  well  as  (or  even  instead  of)  formal  institutions  (Bevir  and 
Richards, 2009, p.3). 
Policy networks are sets of formal and informal institutional linkages between 
governmental  and  other  actors  structured  around  shared  interests  in  public 
policy  making  and  implementation.  These  institutions  are  interdependent. 
Policies emerge from the bargaining between the networks’ members (Rhodes, 
2007, p.1243). 
From this list of interpretations of what a policy network is, we can conclude that the 
concept refers to the policy approach in which there are a variety of related policy 
actors and policy actions active in the same policy agenda. The interaction within 
networks should be highlighted as many of the authors, particularly Marsh, point out. 
In Compston’s view, interaction among policy network actors takes place mainly in 
the form of resource exchange, while Schneider focuses on interaction by examining 78 
 
communication  between  actors  that  are  autonomous  but  interdependent.  Before 
discussing what IRC and CAT offer to the analysis of policy networks, the general 
background of the policy network approach is reviewed, followed by a consideration 
of why it is useful for this study. 
The policy network approach has been developed mainly in the European context, 
particularly by the Anglo-Governance School led by Rhodes and Marsh. In the US, a 
similar  approach  has  been  developed,  known  as  the  ‘Advocacy  Coalition 
Framework’ (ACF) proposed by Sabatier (2007, 1988). Fischer (2003, p.95) argues 
that the framework has its roots in the work on the policy network approach, while 
John (2012, p.155) and Colebatch (2009) mention that this framework has much in 
common with the policy network school.
1 The development of the policy network 
approach has a long history. The first scholar who proposed this approach was Heclo 
in his work on issue networks published in 1978 (Fischer, 2003, p.31). However, it 
seems clear that a strong starting point is the classic study of Rhodes and Marsh in 
1992.  Interest  in  this  approach  widened  after  Rhodes  published  ‘Understanding 
Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability’ in 1997, 
which  has  been  cited in  no fewer  than  520  articles in key international  journals 
(Kjaer, 2011, p.101).  
The policy network approach is useful for this study for the following reasons. First 
of all, as explained in Chapter 1, this study seeks to understand the various collective 
actions developed by plural actors, both state and non-state organisations and groups, 
which  go  beyond  ‘policy  hierarchies’  and  ‘policy  markets’.  The  concept  of  the 
policy  network  can  capture  these  policy  characters.  As  suggested  by  Schneider 
(1992, p.109), the policy network approach is an alternative to traditional rationalist 
policy approaches which are state- and market-centred. The word ‘beyond’ seems 
ambiguous because we cannot specify where the policy network approach is located. 
                                                 
1 This  study  does  not  engage  much  with  ACF  because  (1)  while  this  study  focuses  on 
understanding  cooperation,  this  framework  highlights  competition;  (2)  social  capital 
between different sub-sectoral networks (coalitions) is not emphasised by ACF as it focuses 
an analysis of core beliefs of each coalition (to analyse its uniqueness rather than links with 
others); and (3) the policy network selected as the case study for this study emerged just for 
few years while the ACF was developed for the study of long-term change (lasting a decade 
or more). 79 
 
Powell (1990; cited in Schneider, ibid) contends that networks are configurations 
located between markets and hierarchies. However, Rhodes (2006, 1997) argues that 
the policy network approach merges state-centred and market-centred approaches 
while at the same time challenging the conventional state-market dichotomy. Jones, 
Hesterly and Borgatti (1997, pp.911-45) add that the policy network approach has 
advantages  over  both  hierarchy  and  market  solutions  in  terms  of  adapting, 
coordinating and exchanging. This study endorses the views of Rhodes, Jones and 
his colleagues because it seems clear that the policy network on urban agriculture 
(UA)  in  Bangkok  is  driven  by  both  the  existing  state  structure  and  the  market 
mechanism as discussed in Chapter 1. While the state structure affected financial 
control  and  bureaucratic  procedures,  the  market  mechanism  affected  decision-
making of social enterprises, including training centres, green restaurants and green 
markets.   
In addition, this analysis draws on the classic differentiation between types of policy 
networks  in  the  literature  established  between  issue  networks  and  policy 
communities,  as  developed  by  Rhodes  and  Marsh  (1992,  p.251).  According  to 
Rhodes and Marsh, policy networks can be categorised by establishing a continuum 
running from issue networks at one end to policy communities at the other. The 
former represents the loosest relations among a largely fluctuating group of policy 
actors,  the  most  open  but  limited  interaction,  the  highest  conflicting  policy 
preferences,  and  extremely  unequal  power  relations,  while  the  latter  has  polar 
opposite characteristics. The different types of policy networks are placed along the 
continuum  depending  on  the  degree  of  indicators  ranging  from  large,  diverse, 
unequal and fluctuating issue networks to smaller, cohesive, equilibrated and stable 
policy communities. Marsh and his colleagues (2009) also argued that there might be 
policy communities within any issue network and that within any policy community 
there could be policy networks. This idea helps to frame the point that whole actor-
constellations  and  their  collective  actions  on  UA  can  be  understood  as  an  issue 
network, while sub-sectoral networks within the entire UA policy network can be 
understood as policy communities. 
The policy network approach helps to frame this study by proposing the idea of 
intermediary  and  subordinate  organisations  (Schneider,  1992,  pp.109-29).  Within 80 
 
any  policy  networks,  there  usually  are  intermediary  organisations  that  play  an 
important  role  in  the  network  above  subordinate  organisations  and  groups. 
Intermediary  organisations  usually  hold  more  resources  than  others  including 
political, economic and social capital. They play the role of coordinator to facilitate 
cooperation  and  of  mediator  to  handle  conflicts.  Such  idea  can  also  help  an 
understanding  of  actor-constellations  related  to  UA  policy  in  Bangkok  and  their 
patterns of interaction. There were intermediary and subordinated organisations and 
groups in a system of imbalanced power relations within the UA policy network, 
which this study calls the intermediary organisations as powerful organisations. 
However, to further understand how a policy network is governed requires more 
explanation, which this approach alone could not provide effectively as it still needs 
to be framed its various focuses proposed by different scholars as mentioned in the 
beginning of this section. As argued by Dowding (1995, pp.145–46), the approach 
itself seems to be a metaphor rather than an explanatory theory. He argues that the 
policy network approach does not provide details on ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. His 
main point is that the analysis of interactions within a policy network is undeveloped 
and  even  confused  as  it  pays  most  attention  to  describing  typologies  of  policy 
networks,  their  characteristics,  and  their  effects  on  policy  outcomes  or  policy 
changes. Although this approach mentions resource interdependence as a reason for 
interaction,  details  of  why  and  how  resources  are  exchanged  are  not  clear.  This 
argument is supported by Walker (2004, p.8) who suggests that if policy network 
analysis is to move beyond descriptive boundaries, there is a need to ‘marry’ it with 
theory. This study therefore requires theories that can both frame various approaches 
and provide more powerful explanations of policy network governance.  
2.1.2.  The  contribution  of  institutional  rational  choice  to  the  policy 
network approach 
The review found that the contributions of IRC to the policy network approach can 
be a useful way to understand how policy networks are governed. Dowding (1995, 
pp.150-8)  does  not  only  critique  the  approach  but  also  proposes  that  the  policy 
network approach should adopt rational choice theory to analyse interactions. He 
refers to a ‘rational actor model’ which calls for rules of resource exchanges and 81 
 
incentives. Unfortunately, as mentioned later by Marsh and Smith (2000), Dowding 
pays much more attention to criticism without providing clear suggestions on how to 
address such limitations. To review the literature in the relevant fields, Ostromian 
IRC  can provide  a  clearer  explanation in relation to  Dowding’s  suggestion.  IRC 
developed  from  micro-level  analysis  of  rational  individual  choice  to  scale  up  to 
analyse  rule-governed  interactions  in  collective  actions  (Ostrom,  2010,  1999b; 
Scharpf,  1998,  1994).  Although  IRC  has  as  its  first  aim  the  understanding  of 
institutional arrangements of polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2010), it also applies 
collaborative network governance because both polycentric and network governance 
aim to challenge either state or market governance (Bogason, 2006). Sabatier (1988), 
who  developed  the  policy  network  approach  in  the  American  context,  called 
advocacy coalition framework, mentions that IRC is a well-developed theory, which 
proposes  a  clear  chain  of  causal  relations  to  signal  clear  factors  influencing 
interactions among networks of organisations and groups in multi-layers.  
The first basic assumption of IRC is to realise that individuals are rational beings in 
the  pursuit  of  self-interest  by  means  of  a  logic  of  consequentiality;  to  capture 
potential benefits and avoid or minimise costs,  self-interested individuals always 
attempt to maximise short-term self-benefits or achieve net benefits for themselves 
(Marsh and Olsen, 1989;Toye, 1999). Their behaviour is also guided by external 
forces that shape how this theory judges the nature of being (ontological stance of 
the theory) (Guba, 1990). This position contributes to an understanding of policy 
network governance in the way suggested by Hansen (1997): that policy networks 
are  the  result  of  conscious  choices  made  by  fairly  rational  actors  interested  in 
benefiting from cooperation. On the other hand, cooperation problems such as free-
riding  are  explained  as  the  result  of  ineffective  incentives  and  rules  (including 
sanctions).This study agrees with this IRC logic and uses it to examine the case 
study. However, this study realises that there are other factors over and beyond self-
interest that affect decision-making and the shape and form of policy networks. The 
IRC assumption along is not sufficient to frame an understanding of collective action 
problems of policy networks.  
For the second basic assumption, IRC recognises that a reason for taking decisions is 
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individuals  make  a  decision  by  trading  off  the  different  choices  by  rationally 
calculating their interests to maximise their utility (Hill, 2009; John, 2012), whilst 
also being influenced by (empirically-based) objective fact that can be demonstrated 
by anyone (Griggs, 2007, pp. 173-85). They also believe in the causal relations of 
the  phenomenon.  Thus,  if  effective  incentives  are  provided,  individuals  will 
cooperate in collective action. This assumption guides how this theory legitimises 
the validity of knowledge claims (epistemological stand) (Guba, ibid). It contributes 
to an analysis of policy network governance in which collaboration of plural actors is 
possible when each self-interested network constituent organisation and group can 
expect benefits  from investing time and  effort in cooperating  with the collective 
actions of a policy network. The policy networks are driven by a rational process, 
which  requires  technical  expertise  based  on  economic  and  scientific  knowledge, 
specialisation in policy issues and policy tools for finding out the most effective way 
to  achieve  policy  goals.  Apart  from  that,  driving  policy  networks  also  needs  to 
develop incentive structures and effective rules to enhance cooperation and handle 
conflicts.  This  study  also  agrees  with  the  second  assumption  and  realises  the 
importance of examining this assumption by the case study. However, it also further 
enquires  about  the  influence  of  other  modes  of  rationality,  particularly  cultural 
rationality  (e.g.  traditional  knowledge,  sacred  or  secular  knowledge  that  rest  on 
normative foundations and faith).   
The above assumptions of IRC are shared with rational choice theory. However, IRC 
adds another dimension to rational choice theory. Bogason (2006), Lawndes and 
Roberts  (2013)  and  Peters  (1999)  argues  that  IRC  is  one  stream  of  new 
institutionalism,  which  is  one  of  the  fundamental  theories  informing  the  policy 
network approach. According to Bogason (2006, pp.97-114), IRC contributes to the 
policy  network  approach  by  understanding  that  policy  actors  are  not  necessary 
identified by formal institutions, nor are they simply part of a government body, 
which means that there is a need to recognise alternative forms of institutions, such 
as  networks,  shared  norm  groups  and  self-governing  collective  action.  Non-
governmental  actors  including  non-governmental  organisations,  citizen  groups, 
corporations, and social networks are also recognised as policy actors. In addition, 
Ostrom  (1990,  pp.51-2)  defines  institutions  as  sets  of  working  rules  applied  to 
collective action, which may or may not resemble formal laws. The rules are about 83 
 
forbidding,  permitting,  or  requiring  some  action  or  outcome,  and  they  are  used, 
monitored and enforced on a regular basis by members of the institution. IRC has 
therefore made room for understanding the flexible institutional arrangements based 
on  informal  rules,  where  the  policy  network  approach  could  also  enter.  As 
mentioned by Hansen (1997, p.690), it is possible to treat policy networks as sets of 
rules governing interactions. He claims that rules operating within them are typically 
informal in nature. Similar to Hansen, Scharpf (1998, p.195; 1994, p.27) argues that 
policy  networks  are  systems  of  rules  that  structure  the  opportunities  for  actors, 
organisations  and  groups  to  realise  their  preferences.  Policy  arises  from  the 
interactions of rational actors whose beliefs and desires  are shaped by rules that 
govern their  interactions. This focus  of  IRC  in  addition to focuses of traditional 
rational choice theory becomes a reason why this study engages with IRC. 
Furthermore, Ostrom’s IRC goes beyond rational choice theory in seeking to explain 
choices  under  the  constraints  of  each  organisation  and  group,  socioeconomic 
structures  and  the  preferences  of  other  organisations  and  groups  (John,  2012). 
Ostrom (2010) argues that ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies are not effective because an 
effective  policy  needs  to  fit  to  a  specific  social-ecological  setting.  Another 
contribution of IRC to the policy network approach is therefore to recognise the 
limits of resources of each network’s constituent organisation and group, including a 
limit to using reason, or ‘bounded rationality’ (one reason for cooperation). They do 
not aim for universal pretensions as traditional rational choice does, but seek the 
most effective way to be able to determine what drives collective actions in specific 
contexts. This IRC tenant reminds this study to have concern for and acknowledge 
specific contexts of the case study.  
Apart from these contributions of IRC to the policy network approach, IRC mentions 
the role of communication in driving collective actions. For example, Ostrom (2010, 
pp.14-5; 1991) and Ostrom and Walker (2003, 1991) mention that there is a large 
number of studies on the impact of face-to-face communication on the capacity of 
plural actors to solve a variety of collective action problems. However, in their view, 
plural actors communicate with each actor just to gain information before returning 
to make their own private decisions based on their net returns. Ostrom (1995) also 
mentions  that  face-to-face  repeated  communication  is  a  bargaining  process,  by 84 
 
ignoring the philosophical background of communication, which goes further than 
bargaining  to  achieve  individual  self-interest.  As  mentioned  by  Forester  (1999, 
p.111), negotiations are not just to find ways to move from zero-sum to mutual gain 
outcomes, but to more politically and morally sophisticated public and democratic 
deliberation. The discussion on this issue will be continued in the next section. 
2.1.3.  The  contribution  of  communicative  action  theory  to  the  policy 
network approach 
Rhodes (2011), who is the main proponent of the policy network approach, accepts 
that  there  are  irreconcilable  differences  of  epistemology,  theory  and  method  in 
studying policy networks. Thatcher (1998 cited in Albrechts and Mandelbaum, 2005, 
p.293) also critiques that policy network approach faces the problem of theoretical 
and methodological inconsistency. Contributions of CAT to the approach function in 
different ways from IRC and reflect that claim. While IRC assumes that individuals 
are  self-interested,  the  first  basic  assumption  of  CAT  is  that  people’s  moral 
consciousness  is  influenced  by  a  socially  constructed  impersonal  collective  will 
rather than driven by their self-interest (Habermas, 1990). Forester (1999, pp.223-4), 
a  Habermasian,  supports  this  assumption  by  arguing  that  there  are  moral  and 
aesthetic concerns in our daily practice such as fairness and the distributive character 
of outcomes. He also mentions that such concerns are meta-interests, which mean 
that they require ethical judgement instead of benefit calculations. This assumption 
contributes  to  an  understanding  of  policy  network  governance  because  network 
constituent organisations and groups do not engage with policy networks only to 
maximise their self-interests, but also to achieve their collective will. This study sees 
a debate between this point of view and the aforementioned IRC assumption, which 
needs to be taken to discuss through the case study. 
For the second assumption, CAT mentions that it is hard to claim objectivity in the 
real  world.  Instead,  a  decision  is  made  from  inter-subjectivity  through  the 
communicative process such as an agreement of all. In relation to that, CAT refers to 
the  concept  of  communicative  rationality,  by  which  each  actor  could  refer  to 
different logics or modes of rationality. This kind of rationality is concerned with 
collective and democratic decision-making, defined as public reasoning as a result of 85 
 
collective  deliberation  (Habermas,  1987;  Dryzek,  1990).  The  strength  of 
communicative rationality is that it does not deny the importance of scientific and 
economic knowledge, but claims that other kinds of knowledge, particularly local 
knowledge,  also  need  to  be  considered.  Because  local  knowledge  reflects  the 
perceptions  of  local  people  in  a  specific  setting,  it  is  a  validity  claim  based  on 
cultural  rationality  (Fischer,  2000).  This  assumption  contributes  to  a  better 
understanding  of  policy  networks,  for  they  can  be  driven  by  communicative 
interactions  among  interdependent  policy  actors  through  a  deliberative  process. 
Rhodes (2007, pp.1243-1264) recognises this point by arguing that policy networks 
are less reliant on a command operating code and more reliant on diplomacy and 
management  by  negotiation.  He  notes  that  communication  lies  at  the  heart  of 
steering  networks.  His  work  since  2007  seems  to  give  more  recognition  to  the 
interpretive approach, which is at the root of CAT.
2 He also cites many works by 
Habermasians such as Fischer, Forester, Hajer, Wagenaar, Yanow and Dryzek. It 
should  be  noted  that  by  referring  to  communication,  CAT  scholars  go  beyond 
interest-based  bargaining  to  create  public  spaces  and  transform  awareness  and 
recognition  (Forester,  1999).  The  network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups 
make collective decisions by bringing various modes of rationality in contestation of 
one another, and seek for better arguments and practical reasons rather than the most 
effective  solution  (Fischer,  2003;  Habermas,  1987;  Healey,  2006;  Rydin,  2003, 
pp.107-10). This study also sees another debate between CAT and IRC, which must 
be discussed through the case study as well.  
2.2. Understanding social capital within policy networks through institutional 
rational choice and communicative action theory   
2.2.1. Social capital and the problem of conceptualisation  
Differently  from  the  concept  of  policy  network  which  could  lead  to  a  united 
definition, the discussion about the concept of social capital in the existing literature 
                                                 
2 He became a prominent representative of the interpretive approach of the UK Political 
Studies  Association  (PSA).  He  gave  many  public  talks  on  this  approach such  as  at the 
conference on Policy and Politics 2012 (organised in Bristol). He also chaired many panels 
in relation to the interpretive analysis such as at the PSA conference 2013 (organised in 
Cardiff) and praising Wagenaar’s‘Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy 
Analysis’ (2011). 86 
 
is extensive and has generated contrasting conceptualisations, as illustrated by the 
various understandings of the scholars quoted below.  
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked  to  possession  of  a  durable  network  of  more  or  less  institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu, 1997, p.46). 
Social capital is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities which 
consist  of  some  aspect  of  social  structure  and  facilitate  certain  actions  of 
individuals who are within the structure.... Social capital represents close and 
direct interpersonal ties (Coleman, 1990, p. 302). 
Social  capital  can  be  defined  simply  as  the  existence  of  a  certain  set  of 
informal  values  or  norms  shared  among  members  of  a  group  that  permit 
cooperation among them (Fukuyama, 1995, p.11). 
Social capital is not social network, but resources embedded in social networks 
which can be accessed or mobilised through ties in the networks (Lin, 2010, 
p.50). 
Social  capital  is  an  attribute  of  individuals  and  of  their  relationships  that 
enhances their ability to solve collective action problems (Ostrom and Ahn, 
2003, p.4). 
Social capital is a feature of social organisation such as networks, norms, and 
social  trust  that  facilitate  coordination  and  cooperation  for  mutual  benefit 
(Putnam, 2000, p. 67). 
Social capital is the density of connections between members of a group and 
also  the  way  that  these  relationships  are  imbued  with  norms  of  trust, 
reciprocity and mutuality (Rydin, 2013, p.184). 
Social capital is the strength of ties between individuals, and the networks and 
the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness built upon these ties (Woolcock, 
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Social  capital  is  relationships  among  actors  (individuals,  groups  and/or 
organisations) that create a capacity to act for mutual benefit or a common 
purpose (Spellerberg, 2001, p.9 cited in Gallent and Robinson, 2013, p.71). 
Based  on  these  different  conceptualisations  of  social  capital,  we  should  start  by 
finding  common understandings about this  concept.  By using the word ‘capital’, 
social capital is assumed to be a resource, which can be invested in and can be 
expected to lead to a return in similar ways as financial and physical capital. Two 
core scholars, Bourdieu (1997) and Lin (2010), explicitly agree with this argument 
as they clearly recognise social capital as a resource. If this is so, what does this kind 
of resource look like? In response to this question, Lin (ibid) and Woolcock (1998) 
explain that a strong tie that brings together plural actors is an embedded resource. 
Coleman (1990) also argues that social  capital is constituted by  close  and direct 
interpersonal ties. In a similar way, Putnam (1993, 2000, 2002) argues that such ties 
might be constituted by ‘bond’ and ‘bridge’ relations. While bonding refers to ties 
among  homogeneous  members,  bridging  represents  ties  among  heterogeneous 
members, for instance across communities, across cultural or ethnical groups and 
across  social  class.  This  study  realises  the  importance  of  his  idea  by  using  the 
concept of bonding social capital to capture tie relations among organisations and 
groups  in  the  same  policy  community  (sub-sectoral  network/actors  constellation) 
within the policy network. Using bridging social capital allows the identification of 
bridge  relationships across  policy  communities between the  centralities of policy 
communities (stars of each actor’s constellation). Bourdieu (1986, p.243) and Rydin 
(2013, pp.184) also refer to ties by using the word ‘connection’. A tie relation is 
therefore a minimal standard referring to the existence of social capital agreed by 
many authors contributing to this concept.  
The next enquiry regards what can be captured as forms of social capital which glue 
plural  actors  together.  The  existing  literature  demonstrates  that  there  are  many 
possible forms that should be taken into account. Common forms of social capital 
mentioned by scholars are shared rules, trust, reputation for trustworthiness, shared 
norms, moral obligation and reciprocity. Pennington and Rydin (1999, p.234) count 
shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital. This form is significant in the 
context of developing countries, where people hold different forms of knowledge. 88 
 
They  become  closer  by  knowledge  sharing  and  use  their  shared  indigenous 
knowledge as a resource for development. All these forms of social capital were 
examined for their existence in the case study.   
The challenges are not only that there are many forms but also that each form is 
understood  differently  by  different  scholars.  This  study  agrees  with  Gallent  and 
Robinson  (2012)  and  Rydin  (2013)  that  scoping  theories  and  fields  of  study  is 
necessary for a study of social capital. This study captures different forms of social 
capital by adopting IRC and CAT because the two theories can map different forms 
by distinguishing between rational and normative commitments. Besides, to adopt 
the  two  theories  also  helps  to  connect  an  understanding  of  social  capital  to  an 
understanding of the policy networks mentioned earlier as they are framed by the 
same theories. To capture different forms of social capital through IRC and CAT 
lenses,  Warren  (1999,  pp.85)  proposes  that  while  IRC  emphasises  rational 
commitment such as shared rules, reputation for trustworthiness and predictive trust, 
CAT focuses more on normative commitment such as shared norms and altruistic 
trust.  
2.2.2. Capturing social capital by institutional rational choice  
To  start  with  Ostrom’s  works,  social  capital  is  defined  in  her  1994  work  as 
connectedness created by individuals in the past, referring to social capital as a form 
of shared rules (Ostrom, 1994, pp.211, 530-31). She emphasises both formal and 
informal rules in self-organising collective action, making clear that such rules are 
made and shared by internal agents. She also attempts to understand how shared 
rules  can  be  an  engine  driving  behavioural  change  to  support  collective  actions. 
Later, in 2002 and 2003, Ostrom worked with Ahn to conceptualise social capital in 
a more comprehensive way. Reputation for trustworthiness and existing networks are 
raised as three basic forms of social capital as well as working rules or crafting 
institutions (Ahn and Ostrom, 2010, 2002; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003, p.26). It can be 
noted  that  Ostromians  try  to  conceptualise  social  capital  in  a  concrete  sense  to 
identify and measure existing rules, reputation and networks.   89 
 
Ostromians also mention forms of social capital in a more abstract sense. Ostrom 
herself mentions trust, shared norms, reciprocity and moral obligation, but avoids 
framing them as social capital and includes them in her causal model that provides a 
more concrete concept through which to understand them. For example, Ostrom and 
Ahn (2002, p.7) claim that trust is affected by the three basic forms of social capital 
mentioned  above.  Trust  can  be  understood  by  considering  crafting  institutions, 
reputation  for  trustworthiness  and  networks  as  primary  reasons  affecting  trust. 
Ostrom’s clearly developed causal model framing relations of certain forms of social 
capital  appeared  in  her  2003  study,  as  shown  in  figure  2.1.  She  explains  that  a 
reputation  for  trustworthiness  is  a  basic  cause  affecting  trust.  Trust  then  affects 
reciprocity, which is also affected by shared norms. Reciprocity in her view is a 
causal link to enhance cooperation. As Ostromians’ IRC develops causal relations of 
different forms of social capital, this study agrees with Warren (1999, p.291) that 
IRC scholars conceptualise social capital as a rational commitment while intrinsic 
motivations to develop relationships are not clearly mentioned. 
Figure 2.1.  Causal relations of some forms of social capital developed 
byOstrom 
 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom, 1998, p.15  
Concerning IRC’s arguments about trust, in particular, Ostrom argues that trust is the 
confidence of the truster in the trustee. She adds that it is an expectation of certain 
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and Walker, 2003, p.23; Walker and Ostrom, 2007) so it is not an altruistic trust or 
trust built by trusters themselves. It is rather a probabilistic expectation, referred to 
as  predictive  trust  by  Jane  Mansbridge  (Warren,  1999,  p.290),  which  can  be 
predicted from analysing the causal model. For example, if information about past 
actions of an organisation is positive and that organisation has a good reputation, it 
can  be  expected  that  the  organisation  can  be  trusted.  Apart  from  that,  it  can  be 
noticed  that  while  Ostrom  mentions  trust,  she  pays  more  attention  to  incentive 
provision, monitoring and sanctions based on distrust. Warren (1999, p.54) explains 
that trust from the IRC perspective can be an irrational decision because to trust 
someone is to take a risk of non-monitoring the trustee’s behaviour. As developed 
from rational choice theory, IRC assumes that individuals tend to be free riders or 
opportunists as they are self-interested. It is hard to trust that they will cooperate 
unless there are effective incentives, monitoring and sanctions. Beyond recognising 
predictive  trust,  this  study  is  therefore  informed  by  the  IRC  perspective  that 
encourages an awareness of risks and the vulnerability of trust. 
Mentioning shared norms makes Ostromians’ IRC go further than rational choice 
theory for considering norms is to consider specific contexts. However, even Ostrom 
herself does not clarify her position on studying norms. Shared norms are themselves 
beyond  an  aggregation  of  individual  interests,  which  is  an  important  basic 
assumption of the theory that IRC departs from. Ostrom (2009) defines shared norms 
as  shared  common  sets  of  values,  and  mentions  the  benefit  of  shared  norms  in 
developing  a  common  understanding.  According  to  figure  2.1.,  shared  norms 
facilitate reciprocity in the  same way as trust, and they derive  from face-to-face 
communication. On the other hand, Ostrom develops causal links from symmetrical 
interests and resources to establish the cost of arriving at an agreement about the 
development of shared norms (Ostrom and Walker, 2003; Ostrom, 1998, p.15). Her 
perspective implies that she highlights shared trade-off norms, which can help judge 
to what extent stakeholders can be agreeable to loss and gain.       
Moral obligation and reciprocity function similarly by pushing plural actors to work 
together. Moral obligation is a moral force to cooperate and self-fulfilling normative 
incentives and expectation, while reciprocity is a rational exchange or an exchange 
for  mutual  benefits  or  reciprocal  interests  (Warren,  1999,  pp.219,  349).  IRC 91 
 
mentions both of them but pays more attention to reciprocity, which requires an 
account of expected gain and loss among rational actors. As mentioned by Coleman 
(1990, p.99), plural actors will work together if they can expect reciprocal interests, 
which  would  be  expected  depending  on  the  outcome  of  a  ratio  calculating  the 
likelihood of gaining against the likelihood of losing. Ostrom includes reciprocity in 
her  causal  model  mentioned  in  figure  2.1.,  including  reciprocity  at  the  heart  of 
enhancing cooperation by linking it with predictive trust built on past actions and 
shared trade-off norms.  
Lastly, to focus on shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital from the 
IRC  perspective  requires an analysis  of  IRC epistemology. Modes of rationality, 
which are recognised by  IRC,  are mainly an economic way  of thinking. To pay 
attention to the development of causal models shows that IRC is also grounded in 
scientific rationality so it can be claimed that IRC recognised forms of knowledge 
that are scientific and economic. This does not mean that IRC scholars are blind to 
the existence of local knowledge based on cultural rationality. As mentioned by John 
(2012),  Ostromians  recognise  local  and  limited  forms  of  knowledge  based  on 
context. This study argues instead that while IRC scholars mention local knowledge, 
they still measure its validity though economic and scientific knowledge. In other 
words, economic and scientific knowledge appears to be dominant in IRC’s way of 
thinking  even  when  they  are  assessing  local  knowledge.  The  next  section  on 
capturing social capital through CAT will develop analysis on the debates related to 
this topic.  
To sum up, this study agrees with IRC's claim that rational aspects of social capital 
should  not  be  overlooked.  It  therefore  considers  shared  rules,  reputation  for 
trustworthiness, predictive trust and reciprocity, which are highlighted by IRC, in 
conceptualising  social  capital.  However,  it  also  realises  that  IRC  provides  an 
insufficient  analysis  of  normative  commitment,  including  altruistic  trust,  shared 
norms other than trade-off norms, moral obligation and even local knowledge.  
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2.2.3. Capturing social capital by communicative action theory   
Although Habermas does not mention the concept of social capital as explicitly as 
Ostrom does, this study agrees with Bolton (2005) that Habermas’s readers can see 
possible connections with the concept of social capital when reading between the 
lines of analysis on various related topics. In fact, Habermas (1987, p.286) mentions 
briefly that CAT was necessarily identified with the accumulation of social capital. 
Innes and Booher (2010, pp.97-9) mention that social capital is rooted in Habermas’s 
ideal speech conditions, which include accuracy, comprehensibility, sincerity and 
legitimacy. For example, they explain that social capital makes it more difficult for 
stakeholders to behave insincerely because social capital can be a key to transparent 
negotiations. When social capital exists, informal interaction is built and people are 
more likely to acknowledge their real concerns.  
In  contrast  to  IRC  scholars,  CAT  scholars  emphasise  normative  commitments, 
particularly altruistic trust, shared norms, and moral obligations. To begin with trust, 
many  Habermasians  discuss  its  importance,  for  it  is  developed  and  used  in 
deliberative processes. Habermas (1987) himself expressed that a speaker must be 
trusted to say what he/she consider to be true, sincere, or normatively right; it is a 
condition of communication. He also mentions that trust is necessary in order to 
reach an agreement. Trust is therefore referred to as a basis for bringing different 
actors  to  talk  to  each  other  and  allowing  them  to  express  themselves  without 
wariness  and  concerns  derived  from  a  sense  of  a  lack  of  safety  (Dryzek,  2012; 
Healey, 2006; Innes and Booher, 2003). Healey (2006, pp.141-2) refers to trust as a 
root in what she calls ‘relational richness’, and suggests that it is essential to build 
collaborative relationships. Warren (1999, p.114, 290), a Habermasian, mentions that 
trust is inter-subjectively created, and that it can be produced, even if trusters and 
trustees have never met and do not know one another by reputation. Warren (ibid, 
p.290) also mentions that it is a moral resource, pointing out that it is ethical in 
nature. The ethics of trust are truth-telling, promise-keeping, fairness and solidarity. 
Trust  is  therefore  based  on  moral  rather  than  rational  choices,  which  is  called 
altruistic trust (ibid, p.25). 93 
 
Regarding  shared  norms,  Habermasians  pay  particular  attention  to  them,  as  they 
inspired critical theory, which challenges empiricism such as rational choice theory, 
that  tends to  neglect norms.  Habermas (1990, 1998a) mentions shared  norms by 
referring to the concept of shared ‘lifeworlds’, which can be understood as shared 
norms. Thomassen (2010, p.69) interprets that shared norms are taken as given in the 
lifeworld.  Habermas  (1998a,  p.241)  explains  that  a  shared  lifeworld  is  a  shared 
conviction or strong belief, which functions as a background consensus. He also 
emphasises the influence of lifeworlds in deliberative processes by pointing out that 
common norms by participants are presuppositions of communicative action because 
mutual  lifeworlds  are  moral  principles,  which  are  a  cognitive  claim  to  validity, 
which  is  moral  reasoning  and  judgement  (Habermas,  1998a,  pp.ixx-xxv).  The 
concept of shared norms can also be captured by another Habermasian’s term of 
‘discourse  coalition’  (Hajer,  1995).  This  term  is  used  to  explain  a  tie  relation 
between actors who have a similar view on a given topic. Hajer (ibid) explains that a 
discourse coalition commonly hold the same set of beliefs. Some narrative story 
lines are held together and they affect the interpretation of events or course of action 
in a specific context. Both shared lifeworlds and discourse coalitions are mentioned 
in the way in which they are important conditions supporting collaboration among 
plural actors, particularly through communication. To link shared norms and trust, 
Warren (1999, p.336) argues that trust is primarily cultural in nature and is inherited 
from  pre-existing collective  norms so, in this sense, shared  (moral) norms could 
build (altruistic) trust. This claim is not made by Ostromians as shown in figure 2-1 
so (predictive) trust instead derives from reputation and past actions. 
The notion of moral obligation is promoted by CAT scholars as a means to nourish 
an ethics of multicultural citizenship, commanding both solidarity and equal respect 
(Mendieta and Vanantwerpen, 2011, p.19). Moral obligation establishes what each 
individual is obliged to do and what they can expect from one another. As mentioned 
in section 2.2.2, this concept is similar to reciprocity, as highlighted by IRC, but it is 
guided  by  moral  consciousness.  As  influenced  by  Kant’s  moral  philosophy, 
Habermas  mentions  the  importance  of  ethics  of  duty  or  obligation  (he  calls 
‘deontology’)  in  guiding  what  we  are  obliged  to  do  (Thomassen,  2010,  p.86). 
Habermas (1998a, p.xxix) also agrees with Communitarian principles, including that 
people have moral commitments as a result of the socialisation process and devote 94 
 
collective good for long-term collective benefits rather than short-term self-interests. 
In this sense, apart from self-interested individuals, there are moral beings who are 
obliged  to  others  by  committing  themselves  to  a  course  of  action  (incurring  an 
obligation).
3 Habermas  (ibid,  pp.21-24)  also  explains  that  moral  obligation  is  a 
collectively regulated interaction which has left behind the egocentric perspective of 
rational choice because it is a moral recognition which cannot be justified by an 
appeal to each individual’s interests. In other words, moral obligation is a force of 
principle based on normative expectations (Warren, 1999, p.349). To link this to the 
previous discussion concerning shared norms, Habermas (1998a, p.4-7) mentions 
that obligation presupposes the intersubjective recognition of moral norms. We can 
therefore identify some indications that moral obligation can contribute to shared 
norms, which in turn develops trust.    
However, this does not mean that CAT scholars do not pay any attention to shared 
rules.  They  do  refer  to  this  concept,  but  in  a  different  way  from  Ostromians. 
Habermas focuses  on the process of  establishing rules as well as the  process of 
making a judgement based on them. He mentions that rules (or law) and morality 
exist in a complementary relation. Punishment by externally imposed sanctions (by 
rule) is not more effective than punishment by internalised sanctions, such as our 
own  feelings  of  guilt  or  shame.  Such  moral  judgement  is  a  normative  order  of 
internalised feelings of disapprobation and moral feelings of sympathy and rejection 
(Habermas, 1998a, pp.15-6). In his work entitled ‘Between Facts and Norms’, he 
argues  that rules  (or laws) are a category of social mediation between facts and 
norms (Habermas, 1996, p.430). He also raises a crisis of the constitutional state, 
which  neglects  social  moral  norms  and  instead  suggests  a  self-organising  legal 
community.  This  idea  is  similar  to  the  idea  of  shared  rules  for  self-organising 
collective actions mentioned by Ostrom, but rules are shaped by moral norms in 
Habermas’s sense. All in all, this study interprets Habermas’s point, as highlighting 
norms of rules (legal norms) rather than rules per se, prioritises morality over rules. 
                                                 
3 In 2011, Habermas gave a special lecture at Georgetown University on the topic ‘Myth and 
Ritual’ by raising his hope on the role of religion to recall moral obligation of people in the 
globalizing world, where there will be an increase of a morality crisis.    95 
 
CAT scholars also explore shared forms of knowledge, which this study interprets as 
a form of social capital. At first, CAT scholars recognise the importance of ideas 
over facts as different ideas can derive from different forms of knowledge claims. 
They also depart from the epistemological assumption that knowledge is socially 
constructed, multiple and constituted in the form of claims, open to contestation and 
recognition (Rydin, 2007, pp.52-68). In contrast to IRC, which emphasises mainly 
economic and scientific (technical and empirical) knowledge, CAT opens the door to 
different forms of knowledge. To highlight local knowledge, for example, while IRC 
touches superficially on local knowledge, CAT pays more attention to this form of 
knowledge. The reason is that while IRC pays attention to the rational justification 
for  the  exclusion  of  some  forms  of  local  knowledge  (they  cannot  be  proven  as 
rational), CAT recognises different forms of knowledge used in the communicative 
process that are both rational and normative justifications. As argued by Habermas 
(1991, p.25), CAT is based on the principles of honesty, sincerity and openness to 
people’s views and to available knowledge. He provides more details in his work 
entitled ‘Knowledge and Human Interests’ by arguing that apart from professional 
and reliable knowledge (including natural-scientific or empirical knowledge), we can 
also  distinguish  hermeneutic  knowledge,  practically  effective,  pragmatic  and 
everyday  knowledge  (Habermas,  2007),  which  can  be  referred  to  as  ‘local 
knowledge’ in more general terms. Later, Habermas and the others (2010, pp.15-23) 
expands on this by discussing the role of sacred knowledge or secular knowledge, 
which rest on normative foundations and faith seeking understanding, in deliberative 
process. He mentions that ‘mythos’ and ‘logos’ should not be ignored in seeking for 
a  practical  reason.  A  naïve  faith  in  science  on  its  monopolised  production  of 
knowledge is many times misleading, while recognition of secular reason makes us 
sensitive  to  cultural  differences  and  prevents  us  from  over-generalising  context-
dependent judgments (Habermas et. al., 2010, pp.17, 23). 
The concept of ‘policy epistemic’ is used to capture a group (a network or even a 
community) in which its members share knowledge of specialisation (expertise) and 
become knowledge partnerships (Fischer, 2003, pp.230-2). While IRC focuses on 
knowledge for individual decision-making, CAT emphasises the role of knowledge 
in the communicative process. Different claims of different policy epistemics can 
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communication  implies  the  exchange  of  knowledge,  which  can  deliver 
transformative learning and develops an emancipatory knowledge. Fischer claims 
that knowledge exchange can also deliver practical knowledge, which is required for 
collective decision-making and action.  
To sum up, although IRC and CAT each mention key forms of social capital, the 
former  highlights  rational  commitment  while  the  latter  focuses  on  normative 
commitment. By adopting the two theories, this study benefits from balancing the 
conceptualisation  of  social  capital  between  rational  and  normative  commitments. 
This study proposes that to adopt only one theory would leave out other aspects that 
are emphasised by the other theory. As a result, the study of social capital will be not 
balanced  –  it  would  focus  more  on  either  rational  or  normative  commitments. 
Considering  both  IRC  and  CAT  perspectives  on  social  capital  is  also  useful  in 
researching  the  context  of  developing  countries.  There  is  a  mix  of  liberal  and 
communitarian assumptions in such contexts from which IRC and CAT depart. On 
the one hand, people in developing countries, particularly in urban areas, experience 
individualisation  through  liberalism,  which  goes  along  well  with  the  IRC 
perspective. On the other hand, in many parts of the developing world, people are 
still rooted in communitarian assumptions, which align with CAT. However, this 
study will not try to merge the two conceptualisations of social capital but rather 
bring together their main debates to discuss: (1) predictive and altruistic trust; (2) 
shared trade-offs and moral norms; (3) reciprocity based on the exchange of interests 
and moral obligation based on achieving collective goods; and (4) different forms of 
knowledge based on rational versus normative justification (contesting within the 
communicative process to achieve practical knowledge). 
2.3.  Framing  the  role  of  social  capital  in  governing  policy  networks  by 
institutional rational choice and communicative action theory  
The discussion now turns to debates on the role of social capital in governing policy 
networks. The debates include how social capital facilitates the emergence of policy 
networks  and  how  it  affects  policy  network  characterisation.  This  section  also 
introduces the discussion on the role of social capital in supporting the quality of 
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the  heart  of  understanding  collaborative  network  governance.  Among  many 
approaches, IRC and CAT also address this topic with IRC focusing on governance 
through  rule-driven  self-governing  collective  actions,  while  CAT  highlights 
governance through communication-driven actions.   
2.3.1. Social capital, power relations, and policy network emergence and 
characterisation 
Many  scholars  such  as  Lin  (2010)  and  Rhodes  (2007,  p.1246)  agree  that  social 
capital acts as a glue that holds complex sets of relationships together as a network. 
To  understand  how  this  glue  works  requires  an  understanding  of  power  of  the 
relationships to shape power relations which in turn form a network. To begin with, 
social  capital  and  the  power  of  its  relationships  can  be  framed  by  concepts  of 
instrumental and communicative powers. This study argues that different forms of 
social  capital  influence  the  emergence  of  a  policy  network  by  exercising  both 
instrumental and communicative powers that determine the status of the network’s 
constituent actors and power relations among them. This argument is supported by 
IRC and CAT. On the one hand, IRC helps to understand instrumental power, such 
as the power of rules (including incentives), reputation and technical knowledge. 
IRC scholars do not make this claim explicitly, but we can imply from their basic 
assumption that individuals are rational beings and seek to maximise their interests. 
Their behaviour can be guided by an effective rule (particularly the rule that is made 
and  agreed  by  them  or  self-regulation);  the  suggestion  of  well-known  and 
trustworthy persons or organisations; and an analysis based on specific knowledge, 
which is a form of social capital.  
On the other hand, CAT scholars mention communicative power such as the power 
of persuasion, of building agreement and negotiation. Fischer, Dryzek, Forester, and 
Healey, for example, recognise that power plays a role in interactions. Dryzek (1990, 
2000) agrees with Foucault that power is not static but fluid and transformable. A 
public sphere in which communication is taken place is the arena for each actor to 
exercise power. He refers to the power of the better argument in which everyone 
claims reason as a way to claim power. Buchstein and Jorke (2012, p.271) add that 
there can never be a give-and-take of arguments free from power relations. Fischer 98 
 
(2003, p.35) claims that Habermas recognises power in terms of the positive and 
productive ability of communication to organise and coordinate action. These ideas 
benefit this study by helping to frame an argument that trust, norms and knowledge 
as forms of social capital can motivate communicative power as they affect a claim 
for persuasion, agreement, or negotiation to realise the benefits of working together 
by engaging in a policy network.  
Apart  from  instrumental  power  and  communicative  power,  we  cannot  deny  that 
formal and informal structural power also affects the emergence of a policy network 
at  the macro-level,  such as political  regimes, formal governmental arrangements, 
legal systems, political and policy cultures, and hegemonic ideologies (as dominant 
discourses). Although IRC scholars do not clearly mention this kind of power, CAT 
scholars recognise power embedded in the structure, beyond communicative power. 
Many  Habermasians,  especially  from  the  school  of  interpretive  and  deliberative 
policy analysis, challenge the criticism that their perspective is power neutrality in 
analysing  political  and  policy  structures.  Healey  (2003,  p.113),  for  example, 
mentions that the critique of neutralised power begins with a criticism of Habermas’s 
works. But this is an old claim, since both in her own work and in that of many other 
Habermasians, there is a concern that power structures are a pervasive influence. 
Dryzek (1997) also recognises that it is possible that forums are shaped by powerful 
actors  who  can  force  others  to  agree  through  their  special  status  constructed  by 
power  structures.  Some  Habermasians  realise  that  power  structures  affect 
interactions among the policy network’s constituent actors and that the ideal speech 
conditions  proposed  by  Habermas  are  hardly  met.  Besides,  over  the  last  decade 
Habermas himself also focuses more on power structures. For example, he mentions 
power of religion or mythical power, which is a structural power, in communicative 
processes  (Habermas  et  al.,  2010,  pp.15-23;  Mendieta  and  Vanantwerpen,  2011, 
pp.15-33).  This  review  helps  to  frame  the  argument  that  apart  from  analysing 
instrumental and communicative powers, an analysis of how power structures affect 
the emergence of the policy network is also required. 
After  explaining  the  possible  role  of  power  of  social  capital  (the  power  of 
relationships) in determining the status of the network’s constituent actors and their 
power  relations,  this  study  seeks  to  understand  how  power  relations  in  turn 99 
 
characterise  a  policy  network.  It  will  focus  on  debates  around  ‘power  and 
centralisation’ and ‘power and exclusion’. As mentioned in the introduction, these 
aspects need highlighting in order to study the context of a developing country such 
as Thailand. Understanding power relations and network centralisation is important 
for  the  characterisation  of  the  policy  network.  Centralised  networks  can  be 
interpreted by considering the centralisation of instrumental power in the hands of 
few actors as emphasised by IRC, such as power in making and legitimising rules; 
power  in  making  a  final  decision;  and  power  to  organise  and  allocate  policy 
resources. The literature on social network analysis also focuses on this aspect. Scott 
(2000) and Freeman (2008), for example, mention that a network is centralised when 
few  actors  can  control  the  use  of  resources  and  policy  decisions.  However,  the 
centralisation of networks can also be considered by identifying outstanding actors 
who have strong communicative power over others, as highlighted by CAT. In this 
sense, power is centralised by a monopoly made up of a small number of actors who 
make  stronger  arguments and raise practical reasons. Power  embedded  in social, 
economic  and  political  structures  can  also  affect  the  centralisation  of  networks 
(recognised by some CAT scholars such as Forester, Fischer and Dryzek). These 
power structures can shape the privilege of the social, economic and political status 
of some actors. Actors with a high status can in turn influence others in the networks, 
which  can  also  lead  to  a  centralised  network.  Based  on  these  claims,  this  study 
argues that imbalanced power relations bring about centralised networks in which 
powerful actors play a hegemonic role. It is hard to distinguish the sources of power 
which can centralise networks, so this study considers them as a complement of 
others. For instance, power structures can support communicative power and they 
can  together  create  an  opportunity  for  some  actors  to  control  others  through 
instrumental power.  
Furthermore, the review found that IRC and CAT both argue that power relations 
bring about inclusion and exclusion, but each provides different explanations. IRC 
on the one hand proposes that the exclusion of some organisations and groups is a 
result of the bias of rules that regulate a policy network. This argument is made from 
IRC assumption that instrumental power such as rules (including incentives) can 
guide the behaviour of  each  actor. Within  imbalanced power  relations, however, 
some  actors  have  more  power  in  making  rules.  Biased  rules  (including  biased 100 
 
incentives) are possible and can exclude someone who either does not fit within the 
rules or expects benefits from engaging with the policy network.  
On the other hand, CAT argues that the exclusion of some organisations and groups 
is caused by prejudice norms, which lead to distorted communication, as issues that 
do not conform to the norms cannot be raised. For example, in a context in which 
people share a norm of self-reliance or even do-it-yourself, the issue of how to do 
good business or to invest for maximised returns might be not raised. Hence, some 
organisations and groups who have different norms cannot get their voices heard and 
are often excluded from engaging in a policy network. This argument is developed 
from the assumption that policy actors are engaged with a policy network if they 
have something in common with each other. Habermas calls a sharing of the same 
common norms a shared lifeworld (Habermas, 1990, 1998a) as discussed in 2.2.3. 
This  assumption  moves  beyond  the  assumption  that  plural  actors  engage  in  any 
policy networks to seek resource exchanges based on their self-interest. Instead, it 
assumes that a reason for engaging in a policy network is to share and learn within 
the same lifeworlds or common norms that become a basic condition for developing 
a mutual understanding and even a consensus (Dryzek, 2012, pp.126-30). Therefore, 
organisations and groups that do not recognise those norms will either be excluded 
by core members of the policy network or exclude themselves from engaging in the 
policy  network.  When  they  raise  their  voice  it  is  to  a  deaf  audience.  Instead  of 
recognising one explanation and ignoring another, this study brings the two sets of 
explanations together to examine the evidence collected from the case study.  
2.3.2. The role of social capital in overcoming collective action problems 
of policy networks  
Social  capital  is  recognised  as  being  able  to  help  overcome  collective  action 
problems, particularly a lack of cooperation and conflicts. Putnam (1993) argues that 
social  capital  is  a  decisive  element  in  effective  participation,  which  can  lead  to 
enhancing cooperation. He also points out that social capital ensures that the voices 
of  marginalised  groups  are  heard, which  can  reduce the  conditions for conflicts. 
Similarly,  Rhodes  (2007,  p.1246),  an  important  scholar  of  the  policy  network 
approach, argues that social capital (focusing on trust and shared norms) is essential 
for cooperative behaviour and therefore the existence of policy networks. However, 101 
 
social capital and policy network scholars cannot provide a clear analytical lens to 
understand how social capital can do so. Instead, this study found that the IRC and 
CAT perspectives are particularly useful in framing this topic.  
To begin with, IRC scholars emphasise the role of social capital in dealing with 
collective  action  problems.  Ostrom  and  Ahn  (2003)  found  that  social  capital 
(focused on shared informal rules and a reputation for trustworthiness) can play this 
role  as  it  helps  reduce  transaction  costs  such  as  travel  costs  and  the  costs  of 
organising  a  formal  meeting,  which  constrain  cooperation,  as  the  actors  cannot 
expect  a  satisfactory  return  from  their  investment.  Pretty  (2003)  also  found  that 
social capital can protect from free riding and rent seeking behaviours, which bring 
about  a  lack  of  cooperation  and  of  conflicts.  Ostrom  (1994,  1995)  explains  that 
social  capital  can  help  develop  effective  incentive  structures  to  encourage  self-
interested actors to cooperate, and to develop effective regulation to handle conflicts.  
As IRC scholars had already conducted a lot of research to verify claims in relation 
to the role of social capital in overcoming collective action problems (e.g. Ostrom, 
1994,  1995;  Ostrom  and  Ahn,  2003;  Pennington  and  Rydin,  1999),  one  of  their 
challenges  is  to  consider  the  role  of  social  capital  through  the  communicative 
process. According to Renn (2008, p.201), communication is at heart a way to cope 
with risks, including disaster (the setting of this study), for existing systems cannot 
run properly as long as everyone seeks information and ideas about changes and 
solutions. While Ostromian IRC highlights incentives in enhancing cooperation and 
regulation to deal with conflicts, this perspective does not deny the importance of 
communication.  Instead  of  repeating  the  study  of  the  causal  relations  of  social 
capital, incentives, regulation and overcoming collective action problems in general, 
this study examines these relations in the communicative process where incentives 
and regulations are analysed as a claim among many other possible claims raised 
during communication.   
IRC  scholars  mention  communication  as  a  strategy  to  bargain  for  maximising 
individuals’ self-interests, also referred to as interest-based and zero-sum bargaining 
(Innes  and  Booher,  2010,  p.89;  Forester,  1999,  p.177).  The  critique  from  CAT 
scholars is that IRC pays less attention to negotiation for mutual gain. Habermas 102 
 
believes that public sphere can generate public opinion and a sense of collectiveness, 
and it does so both through the aggregation of interests and through the discovery of 
a common identity (Thomassen, 2010, p.119). Forester (1999, pp.179-81) adds that 
our public world is a community of mutual concern, where everyone is a citizen in a 
political  community.  Communication  can  go  beyond  interest-based  bargaining  to 
lead to persuading, convincing, negotiating and learning to transform awareness and 
recognition. He adds that communication can be a way to achieve meta-interests, 
which are moral and aesthetic concerns. By adopting the two perspectives, this study 
bears in mind that communication can be both a strategy to achieve self-interests and 
a way to reach mutual gains. Although IRC and CAT analyse communication in 
different ways, both of them can offer the possibility to argue that communication is 
a way to enhance cooperation and to resolve conflicts by carrying out strategies to 
either meet a self-interest or to reach a mutual gain.  
Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution can be a consequence of agreement 
and mutual understanding. Agreement can be a consensus or the successful building 
of a position based on divergent perspectives (Rydin, 2003, pp.67, 69). IRC focuses 
agreement in term of agreed rules created by stakeholders (Ostrom, 1995, 1994), 
while CAT seeks for agreement in the form of consensus built by deal making and 
promise giving (Dryzek, 2012, 2000). Mutual understanding, mostly mentioned by 
CAT scholars, refers to a greater willingness among actors to accept and live with 
expressed different points of view (Warren, 2002, p.182). Wagenaar (2011, p.301) 
adds that mutual understanding is above all of act of appreciation, of recognising and 
acknowledging the other, even, or especially, when the other holds beliefs or has 
interests that widely differ from us or that we consider threatening to our worldview 
or lifestyle. CAT scholars propose that agreement and mutual understanding derive 
from either finding better arguments or reaching a practical reason (rather than the 
single best way and the best reason), which is a result of communicative processes 
(Fischer,  1995,  2003;  Forester,  1999,  p.39;  Healey,  2006;  Dryzek,  2012,  p.121). 
They demand high-quality communication called deliberation, which moves beyond 
talking in order to create a dialogue or argumentation.   
Various forms of social capital play a role at different entry points. At this stage, 
reciprocity  and  moral  obligation  as  forms  of  social  capital  can  link  mutual 103 
 
understanding and agreement to decisions to cooperate and handle conflicts. IRC 
scholars address the role of reciprocity based on exchanging individual interests, 
while  CAT  scholars  provide  room  for  considering  moral  obligation  based  on 
awareness  and  willingness  to  collaborate  in  achieving  common  interests.  Both 
reciprocity  and  moral  obligation  are  a  decision-making  and  action-taking  force. 
Without these factors policy actors might not cooperate and deal with conflicts even 
if they already understand and agree. To cooperate and handle conflicts from the 
IRC perspective is to keep a balance between the interdependence of interests to 
satisfy  self-interests.  CAT  explains  that  there  are  moral  reasons  and  judgements 
which aim to return to the public interest encouraged by public spiritedness (Fischer, 
2009,  p.77-80).  In  relation  to  these  different  points  of  view,  this  study  aims  to 
examine the existence of both interest and altruistic decisions and action.  
When communication takes place, each actor attribute (ethos, including power as 
discussed  previously),  emotional  expression  (pathos)  and  its  logic  (logos)  affect 
his/her ability to persuade and convince in order to reach mutual understanding and 
agreement.  These  three  aspects  of  communication  form  the  rhetorical  approach 
(Gottweis, 2006, 2007; Fischer, 2003, 2009, p.275; Martin, 2014; Rydin, 2003, p.7). 
This approach is mentioned by Aristotle in his work namely 'On Rhetoric' (Aristotle, 
2007) and also recognised and  adopted by many Habermasians as mentioned by 
Dryzek  (2012,  pp.66-84;  2010,  pp.319-39)  and  Young  (2000)  so  that  rhetorical 
communication  now  belongs  to  the  deliberative  approach  (here  called  CAT).  To 
start, attributes of actors including their power (which is partly shaped by social 
capital as discussed in 2.3.1) determine how loud their voice is. Actors with a higher 
status and power to control rules, reputation, to be trusted and to share various forms 
of knowledge with different actors, can raise their voice to be heard compared to 
actors  with  a  lower  status  and  power.  Fischer  (2009,  p.254)  provides  a  telling 
example of this: when we trust in experts, we give them credit to communicate in 
such a way that we can agree. They can thereafter play an outstanding role by using 
their  ‘louder  voice’  in  developing  mutual  understanding  and  agreement.  Martin 
(2014,  p.63)  supports  Fischer  by  pointing  out  that  trust  in  speaker  supports 
confidence of the audiences that whatever is said is worth hearing. So, the audiences 
might not try to prove the validity of every sentence. This study will closely examine 104 
 
this argument by going beyond solely analysing the role of trust to analysing other 
forms of social capital as well.  
Emotional  expressions  and  passion  are  based  on  empathy,  sympathy,  and 
sensibilities  (Gottweis,  2006,  pp.461-80).  Martin  (2014,  pp.64-5)  mentions  that 
emotional expression plays a role in shaping the feelings rather than the thoughts of 
the audience. An example of the role of emotions is to express the suffering of the 
marginalised, concern, fear, anger, disgust, excitement, and jealousy. Fischer (2009, 
pp.272-94) mentions that emotional expression is a part of storytelling commonly 
found in the communicative process. It is a performative aspect of communication, 
which  is  often  neglected  in  the  context  of  modernity.  The  emotional  aspect  of 
communication  includes  feeling  comfortable  to  talk,  e.g.  to  feel  relieved  when 
raising concerns, using informal patterns of communication, and to act freely by 
using  body  language.  Habermas  (1998a,  xxix)  called  expression  an  emotionally 
charged language. Fischer (2009, pp.282-3) explains that emotional expression is the 
basic to interpersonal relations, and social and cultural dimensions are grounded in 
deeper  emotional  commitments.  He  further  explains  that  social  and  cultural 
dimensions affect emotional intelligence, which is an ability to monitor our own, and 
others’ feelings and emotions. Good interpersonal relationships can support us in 
managing feelings and stress as we know when and how to express emotion. We can 
see a link to social capital which also plays a role here. Bogason (2000) argues that 
social capital (highlighting trust and shared norms) can develop feelings of being 
comfortable to talk. He points out that holding social capital with others helps us to 
feel safe, not to fear strangers and to feel that we will receive support. This study 
agrees with Bogason but assumes that other forms of social capital possibly develop 
comfortable  feelings  as  well.  This  study  introduces  all  forms  of  social  capital 
mentioned earlier in the analysis.   
To communicate is to give and take a reason (Blaug, 1996, p.72). Logic behind 
reasons can be created from different modes of rationality. IRC claims that a good 
reason is created on the basis of instrumental rationality. According to Fischer (1995, 
p.197), instrumental rationality is a mind-set that puts faith in empirical evidence (a 
clear  fact)  and  scientific  method  (empirical  proof),  appeals  to  experts  justify 
decisions,  logical  consistency  and  universality  of  findings.  CAT  proposes 105 
 
communicative  rationality,  which  seeks  practical  reason  derived  from  the 
communicative  process.  CAT  scholars  critique  instrumental  rationality  for  being 
inadequate and limited in its understanding of the better argument, which influences 
decision-making in the real world, which is itself also affected by cultural rationality. 
Fischer (2003, p.136) explains that cultural rationality tends to emphasise (or at least 
give  equal  weight  to)  the  opinions  of  traditional  and  peer  groups  over  those  of 
experts.  This  approach  focuses  on  personal  and  familiar  experiences  rather  than 
depersonalised calculations, holding unanticipated consequences to be fully relevant 
to near-term decision-making, and trusts process rather than evidence.  
Shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital play a role in the reasoning 
process  because  they  propose  different  modes  of  rationality.  Shared  technical 
knowledge,  such  as  scientific  and  economic  explanations,  is  developed  from 
technical control over objectified processes and generated within the framework of 
instrumental rationality which takes on an external existence as a productive force 
(Habermas,  2007,  p.36).  Shared  local  knowledge  is  usually  based  on  cultural 
rationality as it is embedded in a cultural system which becomes common sense for 
people who share a communal sensibility (Geertz, 1983, pp.12-14). Yanow (2003, 
pp.234-245) explains that local knowledge is context-specific, and a knowledge in 
sense  making.  It  is  a spirit  of passionate humility which combines  the  logics of 
description and prescription. This knowledge was commonly described in the past as 
traditional  or  indigenous  knowledge  in  particular  contexts.  It  remains  inherently 
associated with, and interpreted within, the specific culture in which it is produced 
(Fischer, 2000, p.195). This study agrees that decision-making happens by using 
practical reason. This study adopts IRC and CAT to examine the possibility of both 
technical and local knowledge, which are contested in the communicative process, 
being practically effective knowledge. This study also recognises that different forms 
of knowledge can be merged as a result of transformative learning derived from 
dialogue as mentioned by Fischer (1995, 2003), Fischer and Mandell (2012) and 
Forester (1999).  
Apart from shared  forms  of  knowledge,  shared  norms as  another form of  social 
capital also affect reasoning. Norms can frame the way we think and shared norm 
can be a collective reason. Fischer (2003, p.32) argues that a shared norm is a moral 106 
 
reason, and explains that it can motivate the movement that attempted to achieve it. 
He  gives  an  example  of  environmental  protection  in  which  participants  aim  to 
respond to their shared norms about a better world and a more liveable place, which 
become  a  reason  for  their  decisions  and  action.  Local  knowledge  is  therefore 
sensitive to shared norms as they are developed from intersubjective concerns and 
normative understandings. This study therefore puts them aside when making an 
analysis. 
This  discussion  illustrates  how  different  forms  of  social  capital  play  a  role  in 
different entry points in cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution through the 
communicative process. Specifically, cooperation enhancement is a consequence of 
an agreement derived from reaching practical reason or finding a better argument 
influenced by various forms of social capital. This study also argues that the role of 
mediators, who hold outstanding social capital, is important specifically to conflict 
resolution. This argument is supported by Wagenaar (2011, p.233) who mentions 
that social (and institutional) capital informs the work on policy mediation, which is 
required  in  the  situation  that  dialogue  does  not  happen  spontaneously.  Forester 
(1999, p.175) also supports this, arguing that mediators can create spaces in which 
conflicting  parties  speak  and  listen,  recollect  their  experiences  and  express  their 
needs, articulate their interests, and invoke their commitments. In addition, Fischer 
(1995,  2003)  mentions  that  mediators  can  facilitate  deliberative  processes  and 
function as diplomatic recognition, while Gallent and Robinson (2013, p.121) add 
that they can be intermediaries who bring together different actors by acting as go-
betweens or gate keepers, also controlling flows of information.  
All in all, this study brings together arguments from both IRC and CAT to examine 
how social capital based on both rational and normative commitments are required. 
This  study  also  acknowledges  rule-driven  and  communication-driven  collective 
actions emphasised by the different perspectives.  
2.4. Analytical framework   
This  project  develops  an  analytical  framework  by  articulating  IRC  and  CAT 
perspectives on social capital, power, and policy network governance. The analytical 107 
 
framework also aims to reflect contested assumptions of the two theories and to 
facilitate  a  debate  between  the  two  approaches.  The  analytical  framework  is 
developed in two stages. The first one is devoted to analysing the emergence and 
characterisation  of  the  UA  policy  network  influenced  by  social  capital  (the  first 
objective), while the second stage is dedicated to analyse how social capital affects 
the way in which the policy network enhances cooperation and solves conflicts (the 
second objective). 
2.4.1.  Analysing  the  emergence  and  characterisation  of  urban 
agriculture’s policy network influenced by social capital 
This study argues that social capital activates power exercised by core actors which 
in  turn  shapes  the  policy  network  (discussed  in  Chapter  4)  and  affects  its 
characterisation (discussed in Chapter 5). So, power relations analysis is required to 
analyse  how  social  capital  plays  a  role  in  facilitating  the  emergence  and 
characterisation of policy networks (the first objective) because power is a central 
concern for understanding the link between social capital among policy actors and 
policy network emergence and characterisation, as discussed in section 2.3.1. Three 
types of power, including instrumental, communicative and structural power, are put 
in the analytical framework as they link to IRC and CAT perspectives discussed 
earlier. To consider power relations allows an analysis of links between social capital 
and power in a way that differentiates how forms of social capital influence the 
emergence and characterisation of policy networks by determining the status of the 
network’s constituent actors and their power relations.  
This analytical framework will help not only to understand the exercise of power in 
three  different  ways,  but  also  to  examine  the  debate  between  IRC  and  CAT  on 
different focuses on power. Instrumental power highlighted by IRC is observable by 
focusing  on  the  behaviour  in  the  decision-  making  process  on  specific  issues, 
focusing  on  potential  and  actual  power.  The  exercise  of  power  is  based  on  the 
objectivity of  interests.  On the other  hand,  communicative  power highlighted by 
CAT  is  a  power  that  creates  or  reinforce  values  and  practices  by  persuading, 
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controlling.  As  for  structural  power  recognised  by  CAT  (as  discussed  in  2.3.1), 
power  cannot  be  simply  conceptualised  in  terms  of  individual  decisions  or 
behaviour. In other words, power is socially constructed and becomes the culturally 
patterned  behaviour  of  a  group  and  practices  of  institutions  so  that  power  is  a 
function  of  collective  forces  and  social  arrangements.  It  controls  thoughts  and 
desires, and shapes preferences both consciously and unconsciously.  
Structural power seems to be the most significant, which does not imply that the 
others should be ignored. This study agrees with Steven Lukes (2005) that different 
types of power should be observed as different dimensional views (different 'faces'), 
which does not ranks forms of power in order of significance. As Dowding (2006) 
supports Lukes, the other two dimensions show that people can have autonomy to 
exercise power – not only to dominate or be dominated. Hence, considering the other 
two  types  is  useful  and  helps  to  avoid  the  trap  of  merely  analysing  power  as 
domination. Thus, this study realises that power has different faces, and each face of 
power has different influences. This analytical framework will not assess which type 
of power is more powerful than others. Instead, the analysis aims to understand in 
what way each face of power is exercised by recognising that they can also support 
each other. 
This study will analyse three types of power to understand the status of the policy 
network’s constituent actors and their power relations, which in turn shape policy 
networks. The focus is on power exercised by powerful actors (who influence many 
others in the way that they need to depend on) and how social capital facilitates the 
way  in  which  they  can  exercise  the  different  types  of  power  over  other  actors 
(discussed in section 4.4). Before analysing such power, this study will visualise 
'computing-based'  policy  network  diagram  (shown  in  section  4.2)  and  develop 
'narrative-based' diagrams (discussed in sections 4.1/4.3 and shown in section 5.1) to 
define  core  actors  (powerful  actors  and  centralities  of  each  policy  community). 
Chapter 3 will describe how to do these (data analysis methods). Besides, various 
forms of social capital held by network constituent policy actors will be explored at 
this stage (discussed in section 4.3) before analysing the links between social capital 
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This  study  will  also  analyse  instrumental,  communicative  and  structural  powers 
exercised  by  other  core  actors  (centralities)  and  how  social  capital  activates  the 
exercise of their powers in struggling for decentralising power (discussed in section 
5.2)  and  being  included  (discussed  in  sections  5.3-4).  To  analyse  inclusion  and 
exclusion, the debates within IRC and CAT will be brought to examine the reason 
behind this process. While IRC clearly indicates that exclusion is a result of biased 
rules controlled by powerful actors (discussed in section 5.3), CAT is more sensitive 
to the effect of prejudicial norms leading to the exclusion of some (discussed in 
section 5.4). Key elements of the above analysis and where the analysis will be made 
in empirical chapters can be found in figure 2.2.  
Figure  2.2.  Social  capital,  IRC,  CAT  and  power  relations  among  the 
policy network’s constituent actors: Analytical framework for Objective 1 
 
2.4.2.  How social capital affects the way in which  the policy network 
enhances cooperation and resolves conflicts 
As mentioned earlier, this study aims to understand collaborative policy network 
governance through the role of the policy network in enhancing cooperation and 
solving conflicts. In relation to that aim, this study considers the role of social capital 110 
 
in affecting the quality of the policy network through the communicative process. In 
other  words,  this  study  develops  the  arguments  from  theoretical  assumption  that 
social capital functions through interactions. So, to examine the role of social capital 
in communicative process should be focused. The main argument that is relevant to 
this  point  is  that  social  capital  supports  the  role  of  core  actors  (as  cooperative 
facilitators) in making agreement on the reason to cooperate through communicative 
process (discussed in Chapter 6). In the similar way, social capital supports the role 
of conflicting mediators in making agreement and developing mutual understanding 
for handling conflicts (discussed in Chapter 7). 
Section 2.3 argues that both IRC and CAT emphasise communication in governing 
networks such as communication to exchange material resources, information and 
ideas. However, as a consequence of different ontological assumptions, IRC and 
CAT recognise the importance of communication in different ways; as interest-based 
bargaining versus the transformation of awareness and recognition (Forester, 1999, 
p.177-81).  As  a  result  of  different  epistemological  assumptions,  IRC  and  CAT 
recognise different modes of rationality when claiming a good reason; instrumental 
versus communicative rationalities. To respond to these concerns, this study adopts 
Frank  Fischer’s  model,  the  ‘logic  of  policy  deliberation’.  According  to  Fischer 
(1995,  p.231),  the  model  tests  the  reasons  given  for  technical  efficiency,  its 
relevance to the circumstances of a situation, its instrumental implications for the 
social system as a whole, and its relationship to the ideological principles that justify 
the  societal  system.  In  the  first  place,  Fischer  (1995)  proposes  this  model  to 
comprehensively  evaluate policy.
4 However, he later also  refers to this  model in 
other ways, e.g. as a way to consider a good reason, the force of a better argument 
and the legitimacy of a decision (Fischer, 2003, pp.189-98, 202).
5 He also argues 
that  the  model  helps  to  analyse  practical  reasons,  which  are  the  result  of  the 
integration of empirical and normative arguments (Fischer, 2007, pp.223-36). As 
Fischer's  model  recognises  different  modes  of  rationality  in  claiming  practical 
reasons, this model is helpful to analyse reasoning in communicative processes and 
                                                 
4 He  does  this  by  considering  programme  verification,  situational  validation,  societal 
vindication, and social choice. 
5 This model is adopted by other scholars in various ways as well merging it with other 
models, such as in Fairclough’s (2013) recent work. 111 
 
to  examine  the  contributions  of  IRC  and  CAT  perspectives  on  rationality 
(instrumental VS communicative modes). Fischer’s model also supports the analysis 
of different forms of knowledge developed from different modes of rationality as 
well as the role of norms shared by a constellation of policy actors, as forms of social 
capital, in the process of claiming reason (discussed in section 6.4). 
However, Fischer’s model is a good starting point as reasoning is not the only force 
to enhance cooperation and solve conflicts through communicative processes. The 
power of core actors (who propose reasons and play a role as cooperative facilitators 
or conflicting mediators) and how they express their emotions also contributes to this 
study’s analysis. By using Aristotle’s term and his idea about rhetorical analysis, 
Fischer’s model creates a comprehensive understanding of ‘logos’, but we still need 
to  understand  ‘ethos’  and  ‘pathos’,  through  which  the  rhetorical  approach  can 
provide an analytical framework to explore such areas (discussed in sections 6.3 and 
7.2-3). As a consequence, this study merges Fischer’s logic of policy deliberation in 
rhetorical analysis, which is further developed by Gottweis (2006, 2007) and Martin 
(2014). The appeal to ethos and pathos is not an alternative to the appeal to reason 
but typically  accompanies it (Martin, 2014, p.63). As discussed in  section 2.3.2, 
ethos refers to the quality of speakers, which this study uses to connect ethos to the 
status of the policy network’s constituent actors and their power. On the other hand, 
pathos  refers  to  passion,  which  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  includes  feeling 
comfortable to talk. Gottweis (2007, p.245) argues that rhetorical communicative 
strategies,  which  he  calls  argumentative  strategies,  might  be  logo-centric,  etho-
centric, or patho-centric. They might also be mixed between these three dimensions, 
such  as  etho-logical,  etho-pathetic,  or  logo-pathetic  strategies.  Gottweis  (2012, 
pp.211-35) adds that scenographies are also important for the analysis of rhetoric. 
Scenographies refer to a place, moment, a given use of language, a speaker and an 
address. To consider scenographies is to consider the proliferation of sites which 
affect the  way  in which logos and  pathos are expressed, and ethos is presented. 
However, the concept of scenographies is close to the second level of Fischer’s logic 
of policy deliberation, which concerns the particular context. Therefore, this thesis 
introduces the analysis of scenographies as part of analysing logos as proposed by 
Fischer.  112 
 
This framework supports the analysis of better arguments and practical reasons as a 
result  of  the  communicative  process,  which  delivers  agreement  and  mutual 
understanding. The question remains whether moral obligation and reciprocity as 
forms of social capital can connect to mutual understanding and agreement, and in 
turn to decisions to cooperate (discussed in section 6.2). There is a need to analyse 
the role of different forms of knowledge and shared norms in the communicative 
process, particularly when core actors claim practical reasons. Specifically, special 
attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  the  role  of  cooperative  facilitators  and  conflicting 
mediators and the social capital that they hold with others. All above elements of the 
analysis and where the analysis will be made in empirical chapters are put in figure 
2.3. 
Figure 2.3.Rhetorical analysis and an analysis of the logic of policy 
deliberation: Analytical framework for Objective 2 
 
From figures 2.2 and 2.3, chains of analytical perspectives will move from policy 
network emergence and characterisation to an analysis of cooperation enhancement 
and  conflict  resolution among  the policy network’s constituent  organisations and 
groups. By considering the connection between these two figures, rhetorical analysis 113 
 
becomes  the  core  framework  in  which  three  communicative  strategies  are 
considered, including ethos, pathos and logos. Ethos represents the attributes of the 
policy  network’s  constituent  organisation  and  groups  as  well  as  their  power 
relations. Thus network and power analysis is required to analyse ethos. To analyse 
instrumental, communicative and structural power provides a place for both IRC and 
CAT perspectives on power as discussed in 2.4.1. Ethos helps to understand how 
plural actors are glued together in a network, and how that network is characterised 
by the relationships among those actors. Supplementing the  analysis of ethos by 
analysing  logos  and  pathos  can  develop  an  understanding  of  how  policy  actors 
approach  the  communicative  process.  Fischer’s  logic  of  policy  deliberation  is 
adopted  to  support  the  analysis  of  logos  by  assuming  that  different  actors  are 
engaged in the communicative process and attempt to propose a better argument, 
while the entire policy network seeks practical reasons. The analytical framework is 
based on the assumption that the role of ethos, pathos and logos in a communicative 
process  can  deliver  cooperation  enhancement  and  conflict  resolution  through  the 
building of agreement and mutual understanding. The framework also indicates that 
multiple forms of social capital can play a role in different entry points, and debates 
between  IRC  and  CAT  are  embedded  throughout  these  chains  of  analytical 
perspectives.  So,  the  analytical  framework  will  not  only  support  the  analysis  of 
phenomena, but also propose an analytical insight that derives from the articulation 
of two different theories by recognising their differences as summarised in table 2.1. 
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Table  2.1  Institutional  Rational  Choice  VS  Communicative  Action 
Theory: Articulating by recognising their differences 
 
From table 2.1, the articulation of IRC and CAT could be productive in the way that 
both rational and normative commitments are brought to consider in capturing the 
notion of social capital. They could either compliment or challenge each other, but 
that  makes  this  project  different  from  other  social  capital  studies.  To  articulate 
computing-based  and  narrative-based  network  analysis  could  also  benefit  for 
understanding policy network emergence and characterisation, although these two 
analyses might not be necessary come along well with one another. Instrumental 
power highlighted by IRC might not be sufficient to understand power exercised in 
the real world, unless communicative and structural powers highlighted by CAT are 
counted. These three types of power, however, do not always support each other and 
whether they are exercised is worth examining. Furthermore, the rhetorical analysis 
that analyses not only logos but also pathos and ethos as being sensitive by CAT 
might help us to make a better understanding of the debate of IRC and CAT on the 
influence of reasons, personalities and emotions in decision making process. Finally, 
by considering a reason given, articulating IRC and CAT might help us to analyse 
carefully  how  instrumental  rationality  (emphasised  empirical  evidences  and 
contextual relevance) could work and in which way communicative rationality (been 
sensitive to social norms and a sense of good society) could take place. It is worth 115 
 
learning the debate on these different modes of rationality made by IRC and CAT. 
The further analysis will be addressed in the end of this study (in Conclusion). The 
theories  and  relevant  concepts  discussed  in  this  chapter  will  be  taken  on  an 
adventurous  journey  to  Bangkok  in the turbulent context of  a  disaster.  The  next 
chapter will address the methodology to take off on this journey. 116 
 
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This  chapter  uses  the  analytical  framework  presented  in  the  previous  chapter  to 
frame the methodological approach and methods of this study, adopting a case study 
approach and mixed methods. The research is designed to begin with a deductive 
approach (from theory to field-study) and ends inductively (from field-study back to 
theory). This chapter begins by providing the research approach which is mainly 
based on qualitative methods supported by some quantitative data. The chapter then 
operationalises relevant theoretical concepts before presenting the methods used to 
examine the arguments both in terms of data collection and analysis. The research 
instruments are designed to collect both primary and secondary data such as reviews 
of the grey literature, semi-structured interviews and observation check-lists for three 
periods  of  fieldwork.
1Specific  methods  are  applied  to  analyse  data,  including 
methods  for  collecting  relational  data,  developing  policy  network  diagrams  and 
analysing the network structure through a power relations analysis. This chapter ends 
by presenting profiles of selected organisations and groups.  
3.1. The research approach 
The  fact  that  two  theories  are  used  in  this  study  raise  the  problem  of  multiple 
ontologies. They have their own methodological approach, as institutional rational 
choice (IRC) is based on ‘methodological individualism’, which analyses individual 
decision-making based on the assumption that everyone will choose the best option 
for  him/herself.  Game  theory,  cost-benefit  analysis  and  conducting  ‘laboratory’ 
studies are used with a methodological individualism approach (adopted widely by 
Ostrom and her followers, e.g. Dalsak and Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 2009; Poteete and 
Ostrom, 2004; Vollan  and Ostrom, 2010).Although methodological individualism 
approach recognises both quantitative and qualitative research methods, it mainly 
                                                 
1 These fieldworks are not included an informal visit followed the follow-up visit while 
writing the first draft of the report which added some valuable information. 117 
 
accepts scientific methods to develop a causal framework to guide the analysis. The 
validity and reliability of the data are measured before testing the hypotheses.  
While IRC is sensitive to the positivist tradition as mentioned above, communicative 
action  theory  (CAT)  challenges  this  by  arguing  that  interest-based  accounts  of 
individual choice are  limited for  a full understanding of some phenomena. CAT 
scholars use the interpretative approach, which seeks to understand ‘meaning’ rather 
than ‘fact’ and does not require objectivity (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012; Wagenaar, 
2011).  The  role  of  the  subject  and  its  values  is  recognised  in  this  approach 
(Schawartz-Shea  and  Yanow,  2012)  so  CAT  scholars  refer  to  the  concept  of 
intersubjectivity, which means that conclusions are drawn from interactions. Instead 
of finding existing facts using a valid method, the CAT method is to understand 
meaning by entering into a dialogue and interpreting it.   
As Schawartz-Shea and Yanow (ibid) argue, merging different methods is possible. 
However, some caution must be taken in doing this, as it would be inappropriate to 
do this for certain methodologies, especially those derived from different ontologies. 
This study therefore does not merge the different theories nor does it merge their 
methodological approaches. By balancing the methodological approaches adopted by 
each theory, it is possible to understand their explanatory power in the given setting 
of each theory rather than to judge which one is right or wrong. This balance is 
found using a moderate approach based on a compromise between IRC and CAT. 
Focusing  on  the  middle  ground,  one  can  avoid  the  extremes  of  the  two 
methodological approaches. On the one hand, although Ostromian arguments are 
interesting, it is difficult to accept their view that a wholly objective world exists. 
This  research  project  rejects  a  ‘scientific  and  economic  objectivity’-oriented 
approach, including game theory and laboratory studies used by many Ostromians. It 
also,  however,  rejects  a  fully  interpretive  approach  adopted  by  many 
Habermasians.This  study  still prefers to  begin  with a deductive approach, which 
raises hypotheses in the form of arguments developed from existing theories – not an 
abductive approach, as proposed by interpretive scholars that uses surprise as the 
entry  point  (Yanow  and  Schwartz-Shea,  2006).  To  set  up  the  dialogue  between 
theory and data is what this study aims to do. Although this study does not attempt to 
discover grounded theories as suggested by Wagenaar (2011, pp.260-1), this study 118 
 
agrees with him that interpretation without any initial idea about the subject of the 
research  is  not  conceivable.  Meaning  can  be  recognised  in  the  data  only  in  the 
context of an existent theoretical framework. He also mentions that preliminary or 
priori theories tell us what is relevant in the data. We should not be afraid too much 
that theories could impose our preconceptions on our data, because theories we bring 
to our study are always inadequate to the data. The rich and trick descriptions of the 
data that we obtain are more varied and differentiated than any theory we hold about 
them.  Data,  therefore,  always  suggest  new  conceptual  insights  that  we  had  not 
considered  before,  and  provide  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  theories  we  adopt 
(Wagenaar,  2011,  pp.265-6).  To  sum  up,  this  research  design  takes  the  key 
arguments of IRC and CAT to develop a compromise which does not take sides 
between methodological individualism (to test causal relations based on individual 
choices) and the extreme interpretive approach (to learn from surprise without priori 
theories).  Rather,  it  adopts  shared  methods  among  them  (and  other  qualitative 
research approaches) such as interviews, observations, and focus groups. However, 
these methods must deliver both objective and subjective evidence where needed. In 
Goertz and Manoney’s (2012) words, this study establishes a middle range of a tale 
of two cultures by keeping in mind epistemological pluralism.  
As discussed in Section 2.4, the analytical framework of this study focuses on both 
rational and normative commitments to understand social capital, and emphasises the 
communicative  process  in  dealing  with  collective  action  problems,  where 
instrumental and communicative powers and modes of rationality are both present. 
Although  some  quantitative  analysis  is  used,  such  as  network  analysis,  the 
framework requires qualitative rather than quantitative methods as they are more 
sensitive  to  an  understanding  of  interactions  when  reviewing  grey  literature, 
observing conversations, interviewing, and organising focus groups. These methods 
are commonly used in qualitative research and recognised by both Ostromians and 
Habermasians. They also support the moderate methodological approach mentioned 
earlier because they are not applied only on the basis of either the methodological 
individualism or the interpretive approach.   
This study adopts a ‘case study’ approach, which according to Yin (2009) can be 
applied to all types of research. The main purposes, which are all relevant to this 
research,  are:  (1)  to  answer  the  questions  how  or/and  why;  (2)  to  study  a 119 
 
phenomenon that does not require the control of behavioural events; and (3) to focus 
on contemporary events occurring in a given context. Yin argues that case-study 
research does not mean that the findings cannot be shared with other cases, referring 
to the benefits of ‘cross-case’ analysis. This approach can challenge and contribute 
to existing knowledge if the selected case is not too specific or unique. This study 
contributes  to  debates  developed  in  the  North  on  the  role  of  social  capital  in 
governing  networks  by  using  a  case  study  from  the  South  to  consider  how  this 
knowledge  works  in  different  settings.  Selecting  a  disaster  setting  allows  us  to 
address  the  explanatory  power  of  different  arguments  in  the  context  of  risk  and 
uncertainty. Studies in this area are still rare, so a case study approach contributes to 
filling this gap. 
3.2. Operationalising the key concepts  
This section operationalises the key concepts of the analytical framework to link the 
theories  to  the  case  study,  including  forms  of  social  capital,  collective  action 
problems, and the key concepts of IRC and CAT. By focusing on the social capital 
of the policy network’s constituent organisations and groups, these collective entities 
are the units of analysis of this study – not individuals. The following concepts are 
therefore applied to organisations and groups. The information provided by each 
organisation and group’s leader serves as collective information for that organisation 
or  group.  To  cope  with  the  limitation  of  representing  collective  entity  with  its 
leaders, two and more representatives were interviewed for each organisation and 
group  to  recheck  each  collective  profile.  Some  personal  information  about  the 
leaders was also collected as they act in the name of their organisation or group, and 
their image also represents the organisation or group.  
  3.2.1. Social capital 
Social capital for the purposes of this study is an umbrella concept combining many 
related concepts. This study starts from its minimum definition, which is a close 
relationship.  To  indicate  whether  a  relationship  is  close  or  not,  the  degree  of 
closeness will be quantified with four rating scales, from knowing each other (e.g. 
ever met, or spoken) and to contacting each other (e.g. develop and keep connection 
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working with each other sometimes (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, but 
seldom coordinated with each other or less than once a month), and the closest is to 
work  closely  with  each  other  (e.g.  ever  joined  or  joining  the  same  project,  and 
coordinated with each other on a regular basis, once a month or more). Bonding 
social capital  refers to close or tie relations  among members of the same policy 
community within the policy network. In contrast, bridging social capital refers to 
close or tie relations across policy communities. In particular, bridging social capital 
is a close or tie relation among the centralities of policy communities and powerful 
organisations within the entire policy network. This study departs from this basic 
operationalization  of  social  capital  by  recognising  that  there  are  many  forms  of 
social capital, including ones which can be captured from stories about relations told 
by  interviewees  and  noticed  during  the  study.  The  following  section  will 
operationalise  each  form  of  social  capital,  which  is  also  conceptualised  in  the 
Introduction (section I pages 24-6).  
  1) Shared rules 
Shared rules include both written and unwritten ones while written rules are formal 
and strict with specific enforcement, usually appearing as the law or conditions of a 
contract. They are usually upheld by public organisations and between public and 
non-public organisations. In contrast, unwritten rules are often flexible and upheld 
by non-public organisations. These rules are usually enforced by social mechanisms 
such as social privilege and sanctions, rather than specific promotions and sanctions 
by law and order. This study captures these forms of rules by assessing pre-existing 
agreements about rules of engagement, which arrange relations between colleagues, 
particularly those who live and work together.  
2) Reputation for trustworthiness and trust 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a close link between having a reputation for 
trustworthiness and being trusted. This study identifies the reputation of the policy 
network’s  constituent organisations  and  groups  by  identifying recognition by  the 
other members. In other words, the interviews capture the reputation of well-known 
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by others. This is close to the concept of predictive trust, which develops from past 
actions but predictive trust is more internal than reputation. For example, reputation 
for trustworthiness in relation to food-growing skills could be developed from the 
media but predictive trust is developed from performance in the past with which the 
truster has a direct experience. Another form is altruistic trust, which may not be 
related to past actions. As mentioned in the introduction, this form of trust is morally 
praiseworthy and derives from approval and admiration. This study identifies this 
kind of trust by capturing stories in which someone is trusted who did not have a 
trustable performance in the past. For example, some slum communities are trusted 
even  if  they  had  previously  failed to mobilise collective  action to  deliver public 
programmes. 
  3) Shared norms 
This study considers norms in comparison with rules so shared norms are shared 
beliefs, values and cultures, which not just determine shared identity, but also affect 
the way we interpret the world and judge what is good and bad. In this study, shared 
norms  are  identified  through  the  perspectives  of  leaders  of  the  policy  network’s 
constituent  organisations  and  groups  and  their  interpretations  and  judgements  of 
what is good and bad in relation to urban agriculture (UA) promotion. For example, 
the interviews show how organisational and group leaders interpret the role of UA in 
contributing to the promotion of green cities and how they understand sustainable 
agriculture. Their perspectives reflect both their lifestyle and their opinions about 
what they can and cannot agree with. These perspectives reflect their norms, which 
can also affect their sensibility to issues such as self-reliance, reuse and recycling, or 
to chemical use, mono-cropping and the agri-business.  
  4) Reciprocity and moral obligation  
This study defines reciprocity as being similar to moral obligation. They are specific 
norms, which make the policy network’s constituent organisations and groups intend 
to support one another. As argued in the introduction, the difference is that while 
reciprocity is developed from mutual gains between reciprocated organisations and 
groups and can be expected from their relationships, moral obligation is developed 122 
 
from the will to act for others without expecting specific returns. These two concepts 
are compared to analyse reasons for taking action, whether based on expected returns 
for mutual gain or not. For example, social enterprises can have reciprocal relations 
if they share benefits from resource exchange and by helping each other to promote 
events.  Many  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  supported  flood  victims 
without any clear benefits mainly because they felt morally obliged to do so.   
  5) Shared forms of knowledge 
Different forms of knowledge shared by different organisations and groups become 
knowledge  partnerships  (or  ‘policy  epistemics’),  which  are  identified  through  an 
exploration of shared reasons for the support of specific knowledge, such as shared 
technical  knowledge  about  managerial  tools  to  analyse  policy  and  planning,  and 
shared  local  knowledge  on  traditional  farming  practices.  By  linking  these 
epistemological debates, this study does not limit the definition of knowledge to the 
outcome  of  a  scientific  process  of  understanding.  Knowledge  is  not  necessarily 
derived from instrumental rationality. Local knowledge, for example, is recognised 
here  even  though  it  might  not  be  based  on  scientific  inquiry  such  as  objective 
observation  and valid  experiments or testing.  In contrast, local  knowledge might 
involve superficial beliefs, unprovable legends, traditional practices, ceremony and 
myth. It might also have developed from common sense without causal empiricism. 
In addition, this form of knowledge is often not written down as it is preserved in 
oral traditions rather than texts.  
  3.2.2. Characteristics of the policy network  
The framework of this study uses six key concepts to analyse the policy network, 
including  powerful  organisations,  centralities,  decentralisation,  exclusion,  policy 
communities  within  the  policy  network,  and  policy  epistemics.  To  begin  with, 
powerful  organisations  are  identified  by  considering  their  influence  on  the  other 
policy network’s constituent organisations and groups. Their power is determined 
not only by their instrumental power to control or guide the direction of the whole 
network, but also their advantageous status within the network’s structures and their 
communicative power to convince and persuade others.  123 
 
Power within the policy network is not always monopolised by hegemonic powerful 
organisations  but  there  are  organisations  and  groups  that  have  more  power  than 
others within the network. These are referred to as ‘centralities’ as they are at the 
centre (or star) of the sub-sectoral network called ‘policy community’. They may not 
need  a  formal  position  as  the  coordinator  of  their  policy  community  but  they 
coordinate other members by becoming nodes for information flows and resource 
exchange. By  calling the policy  community is a result of the close relationships 
among its members compared to relationships across policy communities within the 
policy network. The concept of ‘core policy actors’ refers to powerful organisations 
(plus their colleagues or partners) and the centralities.   
This study also analyses the ‘decentralisation’ of the policy network. The power 
relations between powerful organisations and centralities are emphasised to examine 
the degree of decentralisation. Although powerful organisations have the power to 
govern the network, they decentralise this power to the centralities so each centrality 
can exercise their power in their policy community. A focus on the exercise of and 
struggle  for  power  between  the  policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and 
groups  as  well  as  outsiders  allows  an  understanding  of  inclusion  and  exclusion 
within the development of the policy network.  
Lastly, similar to the concept of policy community, this study identifies knowledge 
partnerships  as  ‘policy  epistemics’.  Each  policy  epistemic  includes  members  of 
many  policy  communities,  and  these  members  also  belong  to  many  policy 
epistemics.  For  example,  members of the District Administration Offices’ policy 
community belong to the policy epistemic that recognises scientific, technical and 
managerial knowledge, while the social enterprises’ policy community and the slum 
dwellers network’s policy community belong to the policy epistemic that respects 
local knowledge.  
  3.2.3. Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution  
The concept of ‘cooperation enhancement’ explains the ability of core policy actors 
to mobilise plural actors into cooperative action by providing resources, joining an 
event and making the actions of some actors benefit the whole network. The number 124 
 
of  participants  and  resources  that  can  be  mobilised  is  the  basic  indicator  of  the 
success of cooperation enhancement. These numbers are supported by the number of 
deliberative forums and intensive discussion among participants. The active role of 
some organisations and groups is also observed and compared with their roles in the 
past (before the flooding) to identify their higher quality of cooperation.   
Regarding  conflict  resolution,  this  study  emphasises  the  ambition  to  handle 
unsatisfied distributive interests and perception clashes. Dealing with conflicts does 
not always mean to solve them, but rather, to avoid violence. To study conflicts, 
different  interests  and  perceptions  between  the  policy  network’s  constituent 
organisations  and  groups  are  explored  on  the  basis  of  the  interviews.  Their 
perspectives on others are also examined to see who they define as the opposition or 
common  enemies  and  why.  For  some  of  the  more  explicit  conflicts,  this  study 
defines  coalitions,  which  are  on  different  sides,  such  as  ‘PRO’-  effective 
microorganism  balls  and  ‘CON’-  effective  microorganism  balls,  and  support 
different national political camps as will be discussed in Chapter 7.   
  3.2.4. Instrumental and communicative modes of rationality  
Instrumental rationality is classified in two different ways: scientific and economic 
reasoning.  The  classification  will  be  determined  using  specific  managerial  and 
technical tools, such as policy and planning tools adopted in bureaucratic systems. 
The concept also links to specific areas of expertise and training provided by the 
formal  education  system  such  as  experiments  and  by  citing  academic  articles 
published in international journals. Communicative rationality refers to claims made 
through discussion. Instead of concerns about validity and reliability, this mode of 
rationality  emphasises  the  conclusions  of  the  communicative  process,  such  as 
agreement,  consensus,  mutual  understanding  and  recognition  of  differences. 
Communicative  rationality  recognises  the  reasons  derived  from  inter-subjectivity 
rather than objectivity. By referring to communicative rationality, this study includes 
the role of attributes of speakers and emotional expression in making a claim apart 
from  the  logic  used.  While  instrumental  rationality  claims  the  best  reason, 
communicative rationality proposes practical reasons and better arguments.  125 
 
The purpose of this study is to interpret the role of different modes of rationality in 
claim-making  during  the  communicative process.  For example, in the process of 
claim  making  about  the  risks  of  food  shortages,  the  Bangkok  Metropolitan 
Administration (BMA), led by its instrumental rationality pointed to food prices and 
food  availability  surveyed  during  the  flooding.  The  BMA  generalised  that  food 
prices were still under control and there was enough food for the people. That claim 
was challenged by many non-public organisations that discussed that claim widely 
on  online  social  media  or  at  public  hearings.  Some  of  them  mentioned  that  the 
analysis of the BMA was based on food prices and availability on a market, which 
they claimed had not been severely affected by the flooding. However, this was far 
from the reality for people buying food from the market near their home. Hence, the 
issue  of  food  shortages  was  raised  by  critics  who  saw  this  as  an  issue  for 
marginalised communities by listening to people’s stories, rather than illustrating it 
in general numbers. This qualitative way of understanding the situation led to the 
conclusion that there was a risk of severe food shortages in many areas of the city, 
while  such  concerns  were  not  raised  by  the  BMA.  What  derives  from  the 
communicative process is an example of communicative rationality. The discussion 
on the role of different modes of rationality in the communicative process in more 
complicate cases will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
  3.2.5. Instrumental, communicative and structural power 
Instrumental power refers to the power of rules and regulation, which this study 
explores as rule-making and rule-driving processes by researching organisations or 
groups  that  influence  these  processes.  As  with  communicative  power,  this  study 
refers  to  the  capacity  of  organisations  or  groups  in  convincing,  persuading  and 
creating  mutual  understanding  about  specific  issues  through  communication.  It 
captures communicative power by observing discussion among the policy network’s 
constituent organisations and groups in communicative forums. This power is also 
examined in the story of the policy network’s emergence and characterisation, and 
the story of overcoming collective action problems. Structural power is understood 
as power embedded in both political-bureaucratic and socio-cultural structures. The 
political-bureaucratic structural power refers to the hegemonic power of the state, 
such as the constitution, democracy (as a discourse to enhance legitimacy) and the 126 
 
bureaucratic system. Socio-cultural structural power is the power of social traditions 
and cultural beliefs such as religious principles and the speeches of social, spiritual 
or  charismatic  leaders  who  are  respected  by  many  in  society.  To  capture  this 
interpretation of structural power, this study focuses on direct and indirect influences 
from outside the policy network. For example, the Buddhist principle of self-reliance 
had a direct influence on shaping the policy network’s promotion of subsistence-
oriented  UA,  while  the  King’s  speech  had  an  indirect  influence  on  the  policy 
network when it was referred to by network members, as Thai people in general tend 
to agree with his speeches as a result of state propaganda to promote him and his 
ideas throughout more than a half century (see Handley, 2006; McCargo, 2005). 
3.3. Data collection and analysis 
3.3.1. Data collection methods 
The study uses multiple methods to triangulate and support each other. First of all, 
(A) this study developed a secondary review of relevant grey literature, including the 
legal  framework,  policy  documents,  project  proposals,  organisational  and  group 
profiles, meeting reports, progress reports, databases, websites, and Facebook pages. 
The review was also based on YouTube clips, such as panel debates on effective 
microorganism  ball.  Secondly,  (B)  this  study  included  observations  of  collective 
actions (the details of  what activities were observed are shown in Appendix A). 
During  the  observations,  the  researcher  took  field  notes  and  undertook  informal 
interviews  with organisation and  group leaders  who had organised the  collective 
events. Thirdly, (C) semi-structured interviews were conducted and recorded with all 
actors  who  had  ever  worked  in  relation  to  the  City  Farm  programme,  including 
thirteen  public  organisations,  five  NGOs,  and  six  social  enterprises  (a  list  of 
questions and names are provided in Appendix B and D). Fourthly, (D) this study 
organised focus groups with core actors, including NGOs and social enterprises (a 
list  of  names  and  set  of  questions  are  provided  in  Appendix  C).  Fifthly,  (E)  it 
included observations of farming practices (farm visits) and interviews with farming 
groups. Out of the total number of groups, 50% were selected (41 out of 80 groups). 
The  selection  process  began  by  categorising  them  into  three  different  types  and 
found that they were composed of 43 neighbourhood-based groups, 30 workplace-
based groups and 7 non-area based groups. This study set a quota of 6:4:1 for each 127 
 
type  for  the  sample  in  proportion  to  the  total population.  To  choose  half  of  the 
groups, 22 neighbourhood-based groups, 15 workplace-based groups, and 4 non-area 
based  groups  were  selected  through  a  simple  random  sampling  method.  Ten 
particularly remarkable groups were intentionally selected based on their past actions 
and  the  recommendation  of  the  coordinators  of  the  City  Farm  programme  (the 
questions and a list of organisations and groups are provided in Appendix B and D). 
A sixth method (F) consisted of observations of activities of four selected groups 
(from E) and re-interviewing their representatives to achieve a more in-depth, inside 
and intensive discussion. The observed activities are different from B in the way that 
they were organised by and within policy communities (sub-sectoral networks) and 
details of the activities that were observed are shown in Appendix A. The interviews 
were informal (unstructured and open) and in-depth. The main selection criterion 
was the agreement of other groups in the same policy community that these groups 
were  centralities  of  the  policy  communities.  In  other  words,  they  had  a  good 
connection  with  many  other  groups  as  hubs  for  information  flows  and  resource 
exchange. As a seventh method, (G) the study included interviews with two selected 
farming groups who did not engage with the City Farm programme (the outsiders). 
The selection criteria were that they had tried to engage with the policy network but 
were excluded (the questions and a list of names are provided in Appendix B and D). 
The project also used a specific tool (H) to collect relational data about tie relations 
among  the  policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups  as  a  minimum 
requirement  for  social  capital  as  discussed  in  2.2.  This  is  a  quantitative  method 
which requires the key informants to rank their relations with other actors by scoring 
the degree of closeness from (1) knowing each other; (2) contacting each other; (3) 
working with each other sometime; and (4) working closely with each other. If a 
couple rates a different score, the lower one is counted. For example, in case ‘A’ 
rates its closeness to ‘B’ as 3 and ‘B’ rates 2, the score 2 is counted. A special 
requirement for key informants was to question the roots of their relations with the 
top five strongest actors in order to capture forms of social capital, including shared 
rules,  reputation,  trust,  shared  norms,  reciprocity,  moral  obligation  and  shared 
knowledge as operationalised in Section 3.2.  
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Table 3.1.  Methods for data collection in relation to research sub-objectives 
Sub-objectives  Collecting data 
methods 
1. To explore the role of social capital of key different actors 
in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of the 
policy network 
 
1.1. To define closeness of one actor to another (a minimum 
requirement for social capital) 
(H) 
1.2. To define roots of relations (to capture different forms of 
social capital) 
(A), (B), (C), (E), (H) 
1.3. To find a clear link between social capital and policy 
network emergence 
(A), (C), (D), (H) 
1.4. To find a clear link between social capital and policy 
network characterisation 
(A), (B), (C), (D), 
(E), (F), (G), (H) 
2. To examine how social capital supports cooperation 
enhancement and conflict resolution 
 
2.1.  To  examine  the  role  of  social  capital  in  enhancing 
cooperation 
(A), (B), (C), (D), (E) 
2.2. To examine the role of social capital in handling conflicts  (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) 
 
To give an overview of the fieldwork, I would like to start by reflecting on my own 
positionality. My PhD journey started in late September 2010, a few months after the 
beginning of the journey of the City Farm programme, which was endorsed in July 
2010. Like many PhD students, I attempted to work on a topic that is relevant to past 
experiences. Before the City Farm programme was endorsed, my colleagues and I 129 
 
had the chance to assess the possibilities of the programme during October 2009 to 
March 2010, as well as being recognised as a university scholar who had worked on 
relevant topics of UA before, researching the promotion of sustainable and fair local 
food systems. When the programme began to focus on UA, I also began to learn 
about this area. Although both the programme and I was familiar with local food 
systems at that time, this was the first step towards UA promotion. As we wanted to 
know  more  about  UA  and  learn  from  each  other,  we  developed  a  reciprocal 
relationship. While I asked for updates and inside information about the programme 
from  the  programme  coordinators,  the  coordinators  needed  my  international 
experiences with UA. Therefore, we did not walk separately but together. I became a 
columnist for the City Farm programme’s website on international experiences with 
UA in December 2010.  
After the programme had emerged and developed for a year, preliminary fieldwork 
was conducted between 1July and 30 August 2011. The fieldwork aimed to establish 
an overview of what the programme had achieved so far, who engaged with the 
programme, how, why and in what way. The two months of fieldwork also assessed 
the  general  progress  of  the  programme  and  its  direction  after  a  year.  The  main 
benefit was to identify the boundaries of the programme and to sketch the UA policy 
network as well as identifying active organisations and groups. Many assumptions 
could be established after my return, including the way the mapping of relations 
tended  to  look,  the  forms  of  social  capital  that  were  present,  who  the  powerful 
organisations were, the number of policy communities that existed within the policy 
network, and who the centralities of those policy communities were. 
In  late  2011,  the  disaster  was  a  shock  and  a  challenge  for  both  the  City  Farm 
programme and for myself. Working with disaster was new to us as it did not appear 
in  the  City  Farm  programme’s  plan  and  not  even  in  my  proposal  for  a  PhD 
upgrading. As a result, I began to review the literature on UA promotion during 
extreme climate events to share with the City Farm programme, who clearly wanted 
to  know  about  this  topic  at  that  time.  In  order  to  share  and  learn  from  the 
programme, I reframed the research design in the context of the disaster. As the 
disaster came without warning, I went to the field for the main fieldwork period 
between  19  December  2011  to  8  April  2012  with  both  planned  and  unplanned 130 
 
questions, which led to many surprises and challenges. By learning from the policy 
network’s constituent organisations and groups while also being expected to help, 
the fieldwork became participatory action research forced by the situation. 
From 25 May to 25 June 2012, I went back to the field for a follow-up visit,
2 during 
which at least three key events had been planned. Firstly, there was an academic 
seminar on UA organised by the City Farm programme on 8-9 June 2012 in which I 
was invited as one of the key speakers. At the event, I published the first UA book in 
Thai written published by the City Farm programme (Boossabong, 2012). This book 
collects articles I wrote while being a columnist. Secondly, I reciprocated by meeting 
many relevant actors working under the umbrella of the City Farm programme and 
shared the results of data analysis with them and received their feedback on the 15
th 
of June. In doing so, this study demonstrated the importance of social capital in 
supporting collective actions and raised concerns about the deliberative process to 
enhance  cooperation  and  deal  with  conflicts.  Their  comments  referred  to  their 
limitations  in  organising  events  and  to  the  communicative  forums.  Some  also 
mentioned cultural constraints. For example, older participants usually had a louder 
voice than younger ones, and civil servants usually thought they knew more than 
laypeople. These comments affected the way in which this study handled the cultural 
aspect, particularly as an effect of Buddhism and Thai traditions. This study then 
included  cultural  constraints in Habermas’ concept of ‘distorted communication’, 
which makes his ‘ideal speech conditions’ difficult to reach. Thirdly, on the 23
rd of 
June,  a  workshop  was  held  to  share  experiences  and  opinions  among  the 
organisations and groups working under the umbrella of the City Farm programme 
dedicated to the future of the programme, in which I was invited to join and give an 
opinion. Apart from participating in these events, the follow-up period also became a 
chance for me to fill some gaps from the previous fieldwork, to update and re-check 
some information.  
In relation to the above, it is hard to say that I was an outsider in the case study. It 
might be better to say that I was a subject of the study, for I adopted an active 
                                                 
2 I realises that to do research is a learning process. The main fieldwork plan showed a high 
degree  of  confidence  that  every  aspect  would  be  explored.  But  in  the  end  follow-up 
fieldwork  was  needed  when  some  essential  information  was  missing  while  a  lot  of 
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observation approach not just as an outsider but instead by providing opinions. Many 
inside and outside the policy network recognised me as an insider of the programme. 
A more active role had been played after the beginning of 2013, when it exceeded 
the time frame of this study more than a year after the flooding. I was offered a role 
as a consultant of the programme after 19 April 2013. I also played many roles, such 
as  giving a public lecture on UA, organised by the City Farm programme for a 
general  audience,  to  give  a  special  lecture  to  City  Farm  programme  staff  on 
international experiences with UA promotion, and to partake in a media interview on 
UA promotion between the 19
th of April and the 28
th of June 2013. Moreover, I 
formed  the  team  to  monitor  and  evaluate  the  programme.  Although  I  could  not 
dedicate the time to undertake an intensive role and let other team members lead the 
monitoring and evaluation process, I gained a lot of beneficial additional information 
from  this  project  by  learning  from  the  monitoring  and  evaluation  report  while 
commenting on and proofreading ahead of the team.
3 
During this period, my positionality led to many organisational and group leaders to 
informally discuss their thoughts and to share their experiences. Although this visit 
was outside the initial plan, informal chats brought about unexpected data and many 
surprises, particularly concerning the perspective of the middle class compared to the 
poor, and stories behind conflicts and exclusion. Such positionality also facilitated 
access to inside information by being offered a chance to join exclusive meetings 
among core policy actors. On the other hand, it also had a negative impact as the 
ideas, perspectives and ways to interpret the position of the subjects of this study and 
my own were difficult to separate. In other words, we were assimilated through our 
sharing and shaped each other's viewpoints. For example, the definition of UA given 
by Mougeot (2000, p.3)
4 was proposed by me and it became the point of reference 
for the core policy actors. In contrast, the negative mindset of many organisations 
and groups about the concept of ‘sovereignty’ affected the way I framed the analysis 
                                                 
3 Actually, my role in practice was close to the role of an advisor rather than the head of the 
team which is a formal position.   
4 "Urban agriculture is an industry located within (intra-urban) or on the fringe (peri-urban) 
of a town, an urban centre, a city or metropolis, which grows or raises, processes and 
distributes a diversity of food and non-food products, reusing mainly human and material 
resources, products and services found in and around that urban area, and in turn supplying 
human and material resources, products and services largely to that urban area". 132 
 
by trying to avoid the concept of food sovereignty. On the field in Thailand, the term 
sovereignty was linked to the army, violence and even war. Their mindset shaped the 
way  that  I  compromised  with  the  theoretical  concept  by  capturing  their  actions 
instead using the concept of the right to food (as only one aspect of the concept of 
food sovereignty).   
With regards to ethical considerations, all people who provided information to me 
during the main fieldwork period from 19 December 2011 to 8 April 2012 were 
asked for their consent before beginning the interview. They were asked to allow the 
use  of  their  data,  references  to  them,  sound  recordings,  photos,  and  notes.  All 
participants  allowed  note-taking  and  photos,  while  some  public  servants  did  not 
allow sound recording. The information gained from the main fieldwork serves as 
additional information from the same people who had given their consent before. 
The researcher  also  gave  key informants information concerning their  rights and 
safety,  and  any  mention  of  them  breaking  the  law  would  not  be  reported.  The 
researcher  also  gave  the  key  informants  general  information  about  the  research 
project and its aims, followed by a confirmation that all data collected from them 
would only be used for academic purposes. The recommendation report to improve 
the relevant policy will be developed separately from the research report in the Thai 
language. Because of the use information derived from informal chats, this study is 
careful with this source of information and does not provide names.   
In addition, I had two assistants supporting data collection who both had previous 
research experience. The first worked as a photographer while the other helped with 
taking  notes  and  they  both  transcribed  the  sound  recordings.  In  cases  when  the 
interviewees  did  not  allow  sound  recording,  both  of  them  also  assisted  in 
remembering what the interviewees had said. The research team had dinner together 
after finishing the day’s task to discuss, identify results, and plan ahead. However, I 
was responsible for designing research methods and procedures for data collection, 
analysis, and interpreting any information and observed events. 
3.3.2. Data analysis methods 
As mentioned in 2.4, the analytical framework of this study is developed from many 
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examine the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation 
of the policy network. To analyse this role, the study began by visualising the policy 
network diagram to view basic relationships among the policy network’s constituent 
organisations and groups based on their degree of closeness, which is the minimum 
requirement of social capital. To design the policy network diagram, it adopted the 
drawing  technique  of  computing-based  social  network  analysis  which  begins  by 
building an adjacency matrix using the data collected by (H) mentioned in section 
3.3.1.  These  data  sets provided a clear image of policy actors (points)  and their 
connection (lines) depending on the degree of closeness. The adjacency matrix was 
subsequently coded and the policy network diagram can be visualised by applying 
open source graph visualisation software ‘Gephi’, which supports the analysis and 
visualisation  of  relational  data  (see  Brandes  et.  al.,  2008;  Scott,  2000;  Freeman, 
2008). 
The diagram, which will be shown in Chapter 4 (figure 4.2), also distinguishes actor 
constellations,  which  helps  to  identify  policy  communities  within  the  policy 
network. Furthermore, it helps to identify whether initially, the policy network was 
centralised or not and the ‘stars’ within the entire policy network and each policy 
community,  or  in  other  words  powerful  organisations  and  centralities,  as 
operationalised in section 3.2. However, Walker (2004) argues, although mapping 
through computing-based network analysis can show the structure of connections to 
identify social capital, qualitative analysis is also needed to expand on the story of 
these  relations.  Therefore,  this  project  developed  this  'objective  policy  network 
diagram' to be the starting point for further analysis.  
The first form of additional analysis was to capture different forms of social capital 
from interview transcriptions, including shared rules, reputation, trust, shared norms, 
reciprocity,  moral  obligation  and  shared  forms  of  knowledge.  These  forms  are 
operationalised in section 3.2 and they are classified by two different perspectives 
guided by IRC and CAT, which are rational and normative commitments. In doing 
so, the study contextualises the degree of closeness to understand social capital more 
comprehensively by exploring the reason for closeness and analysing the different 
contributions  of  IRC  and  CAT  to  social  capital  studies.  The  alternative  policy 
network  diagrams  are  also  developed  by  adopting  narrative  network  analysis 134 
 
(Lejano, Ingram and Ingram, 2013). While the previous objective policy network 
diagram (presented in Chapter 4)represents the official viewpoint and was developed 
by  quantitative  social  network  analysis  mentioned  above,  other  four  diagrams 
(presented in Chapter 5) are 'subjective policy network diagrams' that represent other 
viewpoints derived from storytelling of each centrality of policy communities. These 
alternative diagrams were made by hand drawing of relations instead of computing 
visualisation.  
Furthermore, by examining the role of social capital identified previously in policy 
network  emergence  and  characterisation,  one  cannot  overlook  power  relations 
between  the  policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups.  This  study 
considers  IRC  and  CAT  perspectives  on  power  to  include  instrumental, 
communicative and structural power, as discussed in 2.4. The analysis focuses on the 
ways in which different forms of social capital activate different types of power in 
shaping the policy network, particularly by determining the powerful organisations 
and centralities of policy communities within the policy network. It also focuses on 
how  instrumental,  communicative  and  structural  powers  shape  network 
decentralisation and exclusion by bringing key aspects of each type of power into the 
analysis, as operationalised in section 3.2.  
The second objective is to analyse how social capital affects the way in which the 
policy network enhances cooperation and resolves conflicts. The data was analysed 
by adopting rhetorical analysis, including the analysis of the effects of ethos, logos 
and pathos in the communicative process, with the aim to enhance cooperation and 
solve conflicts. The analysis of ethos is linked to the analysis of power of the policy 
network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups,  as  discussed  previously,  because 
power determines the identities of the speakers, such as social status, creditability 
and self-confidence. The analysis of logos is framed by Fischer’s logic of policy 
deliberation,  which  identifies  four  ways  of  giving  reasons,  moving  from  the 
empirical to the normative, as discussed in section 2.4. The analysis emphasises the 
role of different forms of social capital with various entry points embedded in this 
framework by allowing the stories to reveal themselves. At the same time, the thesis 
also  examines  the  impact  of  IRC’s  instrumental  and  CAT’s  communicative  and 
structural  powers  and  modes  of  rationality  in  the  claim  making  process  by 135 
 
introducing their key aspects as operationalised in section 3.2. Finally, to understand 
the  role  of  pathos,  this  study  interprets  and  compares  the  impact  of  different 
emotional  expressions  of  core  actors  in  observed  communicative  fora.  The  data 
required for this analysis was collected from observations of communicative forums 
both  by  taking  part  in  them  directly,  by  watching  video  clips  recorded  by  the 
coordinators of the City Farm programme and even clips uploaded on YouTube.  
The focus of the analysis of cooperation enhancement is on the ability of powerful 
organisations and centralities of policy communities to make an agreement about the 
reason to cooperate by convincing and persuading other organisations and groups to 
agree with their arguments and their claims about practical reasons. Another focus is 
on the interrelations of their social capital, power (including social status), emotional 
expression, and reason (either technical information or normative claims). However, 
the analysis of conflict resolution highlights the role of mediators and recognises 
them  as  deliberative  facilitators  or  interpreters  of  different  understandings.  The 
analysis is based on stories about the role of reputation and trust given by conflicting 
stakeholders in supporting the mediator’s ethos, and the role of shared rules, norms 
and knowledge in supporting the mediator’s logos and pathos. It also considers the 
role of the mediator in stimulating and allowing stakeholders to talk, and seeking for 
the compromise solution.  
All in all, as mentioned briefly in the introduction of this chapter, the research starts 
from  deductive  approach  where  theories  guide  analytical  framework.  But,  the 
theories still have a gap to provide specific explanation such as which form of social 
capital helps to handle cooperation and conflicts and how. The framework, thus, left 
some details to be explored. Then, empirical evidences from the study could give 
such  details  and  reflect  to  the  existing  theories.  So,  the  analysis  started  from 
deduction  and  moved  to  induction.  This  approach  is  also  called  ‘retroductive’ 
approach.  
3.4. Profiles of organisations and groups chosen for this study  
As  collective  entities  are  the  unit  of  analysis,  information  is  needed  about  each 
organisation  and  group,  obtained  through  their  leaders.  The  research  involved 
interviews with 23 organisation leaders from all the public organisations engaged in 136 
 
the  UA  policy  network  during  the  period  of  study.  The  organisations  included 
central, regional and local governmental agencies. The central government bodies 
were  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Bangkok  Agricultural  Extension 
Office.  The  former  funds,  guides,  and  monitors  the  City  Farm  programme  as 
discussed in Chapter 1, while the latter supports knowledge on farming practices and 
information such as databases about total farmland, number of farmers, types of food 
growing,  productivity  and  market  prices,  particularly  for  Bangkok’s  peri-urban 
agriculture.  As  for  organisations  under  the  regional  government  (the  Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration), the Department of City Planning collects data about 
land use and available vacant land to develop community gardens. The Department 
of the Environment helps to promote edible green space and supports the protection 
of peri-urban farmland to become a greenbelt, while the Food Sanitation Division of 
the Department of Health promotes good nutrition, including organic and fresh foods 
connected to support for organic food growing, the reduction of food miles and local 
food systems. The Food Sanitation Division also provides services such as chemical 
contamination tests to identify whether food is safe or not. Key local government 
bodies  at  the  time  of  this  study  are  the  Laksi,  Klongteuy  and  Prawaet  District 
Administration  Offices.  All  of  these  developed  rooftop  gardens  in  their  office 
building and opened up to be an UA learning centre. They cooperated by being the 
UA training centres of the City Farm programme. They also agreed to support the 
City Farm programme by promoting farming groups to develop their community 
gardens  and  proposing  to  join  the  programme.  Furthermore,  they  recommended 
outstanding groups (in their view) to be considered by the coordinator of the City 
Farm programme.  
Apart from the public organisations, interviews were also conducted with scholars 
who  work  for  public  universities  and  engaged  with  the  City  Farm  programme. 
Scholars from the Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University, supported the edible 
green building by designing and creating a model on a campus building. A team of 
scholars registered a patent to claim their ownership of the lighting soil container, 
which was suitable for developing vertical and rooftop gardens. A team of scholars 
from the Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidon University, also 
provided  academic  services  to  measure  the  heat  emitted  by  the  building  by 
comparing buildings with and without rooftop gardens, and the situation before and 137 
 
after  designing  a  green  building.  A  research  team  from  the  Nutrition  Institute, 
Mahidon  University,  joined  the  Food  Security  programme  with  the  Health 
Promotion  Foundation,  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  and  the  Working 
Group on Food for Change. This team influenced the promotion of food safety as 
part of promoting food security in Thailand and played a remarkable role for more 
than a decade towards promoting food safety as well as promoting food security in 
an urban context, particularly by contributing information and knowledge from their 
research results. The landscape architect team from the Faculty of Architecture and 
Urban  Planning,  Thammasart  University,  has  an  active  role  in  UA  promotion 
through their participatory action research and academic position to facilitate the 
community planning process of many communities in peri-urban areas that are still 
engaged  in  farming.  The  team  attempted  to  push  the  communities  to  keep  their 
farmland  as  a  way  to conserve  farming  areas  in the  city  and to  protect  farming 
culture which is a significant community identity. Lastly, the consultant team of the 
Policy  and  Planning  Programme,  Mahasarakham  University,  assessed  the 
possibilities  of  the  programme.  The  team  had  a  good  profile  in  researching 
sustainable local food systems and worked closely with the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation and its network more than a decade before the endorsement of the City 
Farm programme. The team also became the external programme monitoring and 
evaluation team in 2013. I was also an active part of this team between 2007 and 
2010,  assessing  the  possibilities  of  the  City  Farm  programme.  In  the  process  of 
monitoring and evaluating the programme, I supported the team by giving advice 
and comments.  
Leaders of public organisations were not the only ones to be interviewed. 21 leaders 
of NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and social enterprises active in 
the  Bangkok’s  UA  policy  network  were  also  questioned.  The  director  of  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and coordinators of the City Farm programme 
from  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  were  interviewed.  The  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation plays a major role in governing the City Farm programme as 
the programme manager (part of the profile of these organisations is presented in the 
Introduction  and  Chapter  1).  The  organisation  has  24  members  of  staff  and  has 
developed  the  network  of  organisations  and  groups  working  on  sustainable 
development around the country. The number of organisations and groups engaged 138 
 
in the sustainable development network is roughly 50-70 (not stable). Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation works closely with the Media Centre for Development and 
the Working Group on Food for Change as they usually organise events and manage 
development  projects  together.  Leaders  of  these  two  organisations  were  also 
interviewed, including the director of the Media Centre for Development and the 
head  of  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change.  The  Media  Centre  for 
Development  plays  an  important  role  in  collecting  and  publishing  sustainable 
farming knowledge and practices through the Natural Agriculture Magazine. The 
Media Centre for Development also has developed a self-reliant house including 
backyard farming. This house was opened as a learning centre for the public and has 
become a place to organise the UA training programme. The organisation formed the 
city farm association, which is engaged by many social enterprises organising UA 
training programmes. The Working Group on Food for Change promotes sustainable 
food consumption particularly through a slow food campaign while also promoting 
organic food production by formulating an organic consumer network to identify 
demands  for  organic  food,  which  benefits  organic  food  producers  looking  for 
organic customers.   
The researcher also interviewed leaders of the Green Market Network, including the 
coordinator of the network, the director of the ‘Soun Ngeaun Mema’ and leader of 
‘Health-me  Organic  Delivery’  as  the  organisers  of  the  network.  The  network 
promotes  local  organic  food  systems  by  linking  organic  customers  to  organic 
producers  and  organising  seventeen  weekly  green  markets  around  Bangkok  and 
‘Green Fairs’ annually. It also adopts the community-supported agriculture system 
by facilitating the direct sale of organic products with a pre-paid system and farm-to-
table  delivery.  To  screen  green  producers,  the  network  adopts  the  participatory 
guarantee system through which the production process is monitored by customer 
representatives. Besides, the network organises monthly farm visits to develop better 
relationships among producers and customers.  
Moreover, the leaders of the Human Settlement Foundation and the Foundation for 
Labour and Employment Promotion were included in this study. While the Human 
Settlement  Foundation  supports  the  slum  dwellers’  movement  network,  the 
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labour network. They appear to be the formal coordinators of the two networks but 
this study concludes that in practice they did not work in this way, as discussed in 
section  5.1.3.  As  with  social  enterprises,  I  interviewed  leaders  of  all  active 
enterprises  engaged  in  the  city  farm  association  (led  by  the  Media  Centre  for 
Development),  including  the  Veggie  Prince  City  Farm  training  centre,  the 
Suwannabhumi City Farm training centre, the ‘Slow Life’ hotel’s training centre, 
and the ‘Sai Jai’ training centre. They developed a city vegetable garden and earned 
money from their main and related business, such as selling food, opening a green 
restaurant to use their self-grown food as the main source for cooking, and providing 
home stay and room service for customers who want to live closer to nature. At the 
same time, they are concerned with returning benefits to society by opening their 
vegetable garden for the public and organise a food production training programme 
by collecting a small training fee (not-for-profit). 
As for the farming groups as mentioned in 3.3, this study selected half of them (41 
out  of  80)  with  attention  to  the  proportion  of  three  different  types,  which  are 
neighbourhood-based  groups  followed  by  workplace-based  groups  and  non-area 
based  groups  respectively.  Hence,  neighbourhood-based  groups  represented  the 
highest number (22 groups) while 15 workplace-based groups and 4 non-area based 
groups were chosen. The selection is based on simple random sampling from the 
quota of each type after some groups were picked based on their significant role. 
Overall, 117 leaders of 41 farming groups were interviewed and the number of key 
informants was higher than expected. This study aimed to interview two leaders per 
group (a total of 82), but in practice more than two leaders of some groups wanted to 
join the interview (a list of names of the groups and key informants are provided in 
Appendix D). Table 3.2 shows the number and percentage of farming groups and 
key informants in comparison to the number and percentage of other sectors. The 
table shows that although only half of the farming groups were selected, they are still 
the  majority.  These  numbers,  however,  could  not  determine  the  level  of  their 
influence on policy network governance in each sector (an analysis of their influence 
will be provided in Chapters 4 and 5).   
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  Table 3.2.  Selected organisations and groups classified by their sector  
  Number of 
organisations
/ groups 
Percentage of 
organisations/ 
groups 
Number of 
key 
informants 
Percentage 
of key 
informants 
Public organisation  13  20.3  23  14.3 
NGOs and CBOs  6  9.4  13  8.1 
Social enterprises  4  6.3  8  5.0 
Neighbour based group  22  34.4  64  39.8 
Workplace based 
group 
15  23.4  42  26.1 
Non area based group  4  6.3  11  6.8 
Total  64  100.0  161  100.0 
 
Considering the profiles of the selected groups in the overview
5, almost all their 
collective gardens are located in the inner city as shown in figure 3.1. This sample 
therefore  represents  the  whole  population  as  almost  all  farming  groups  also 
developed their gardens in the inner city. This was also the reason why the City 
Farm programme could mobilise fresh vegetables during the flooding when water 
blocked access to the inner city. One third (7 of 22) of neighbourhood-based groups 
chosen in the sample are based in slum communities and they all engaged in the 
slum dwellers network. Roughly 50% of the total sample of workplace-based groups 
(7  of  15)  developed  their  garden  in  and  around  their  office  in  flats  and 
condominiums, which represent the working conditions of modern city work life 
commonly found in Bangkok where workplaces tend to have a limited area. Only 13 
                                                 
5 The story of how these groups became engaged in the City Farm programme will be 
explored in section 5.2. 141 
 
of a total of 41 developed their collective garden on a large piece of land (larger than 
2 rai or 0.8 acres)   
Figure 3.1. Farming groups chosen as the sample for this study  
 
  Source: Mapping by Noppanit Charassinvichai 
Moreover, it was found that 90.2% of the sample developed their collective garden 
on one piece of land or the common rooftop. Such spaces are owned either publicly 
or privately. In case of private ownership, it usually belonged to the group’s leader 
(either  the  head  of  the  community  or  the  boss  of  the  company),  who  sacrificed 
his/her  vacant  space  for  collective  purposes.  The  rest  (9.8%)  grew  food  in  each 
member’s  household  backyard  because  they  could  not  find  a  common  place. 
Members therefore  garden in their own space and often allow other members to 
access it to share responsibility and the benefits of their garden. A private backyard 
then becomes redefined as a collective space.  
 142 
 
Conclusions 
By  moving  from  theories to methods, this  study  faces the  challenge of different 
methodological approaches proposed by the different theories adopted for this study. 
To respond to these challenges, it avoids any extreme methods derived from IRC’s 
methodological individualism or CAT’s interpretive approach, such as game theory 
analysis  and  the  abductive  method (seeking  for a surprise).  This study finds the 
middle  ground  and  a  compromise  approach  by  beginning  with  a  deductive 
proposition as many IRC scholars do and end by revisiting theories as advocated by 
CAT scholars. When conducting fieldwork, my positionality is revealed as I took on 
the role of an active observer. This positionality provided many chances to access in-
depth  information  and  to  join  exclusive  meetings.  However,  this  positionality 
affected the interpretation of the data as my perspectives and the key informants 
were often assimilated, which is one of the limitations of this study (more details will 
be discussed in the concluding chapter).  
The remaining questions concern how the chosen organisations and groups were 
positioned in  the  UA policy network; why they  were included in the City  Farm 
programme  and  why  not  others;  how  they  related  to  each  other;  and  how  they 
cooperated in collective action in response to the disaster. These questions will be 
discussed in Chapters 4 to 7. 143 
 
Chapter 4 
Social capital, power and the emergence of 
the policy network 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses research findings about the role of social capital in facilitating 
the emergence of the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) in Bangkok. Figure 
4.1 shows main argument and how the analysis of this chapter is framed. To put it 
briefly,  this  chapter  argues  that  social  capital  activates  power  exercised  by  core 
actors which in turn shapes the policy network. In relation to that, computing-based 
and  narrative-based  network  analysis  are  employed  to  analyse  social  capital  and 
define core actors. Then, three faces of power are analysed to understand how social 
capital activates power that is exercised by policy actors as discussed in 2.4. The 
chapter begins by exploring the story of the emergence of the UA policy network 
followed by mapping relationships of the policy network’s constituent organisations 
and groups through their different degrees of closeness as a starting point to analyse 
their social capital. Moving on, this chapter analyses each form of social capital with 
reference to both rational and normative commitments, including shared rules and 
norms, reputation for trustworthiness, trust, reciprocity, moral obligation and shared 
forms of knowledge. To draw a relation between each form of social capital and the 
policy  network’s  emergence,  power  relations  are  analysed.  Instrumental, 
communicative and structural powers are analysed by focusing on how the powerful 
actors exercised their power. The chapter also illustrates how each form of social 
capital can activate power, which stimulated the emergence of the policy network.  
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Figure 4.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 4 
 
4.1. How does the urban agriculture’s policy network emerge?  
The story of the emergence of the UA policy network in Bangkok starts with the 
intention of both public and non-public sectors to support Bangkok dwellers to grow 
their  own  food.  While  some  District  Administration  Offices  have  promoted 
household  vegetable  gardening  since  the  economic  crisis  in  1997,  many  non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) led by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 
the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group on Food for Change
1 
have  promoted  local  food  systems  and  organic  food  production  in  and  around 
Bangkok since 1998. In 1997, the District Administration Offices promoted UA in 
Bangkok  as  a  way  to  implement  government  and  Bangkok  Metropolitan 
Administration policies on self-reliance to respond to the crisis. A year later, the 
Media  Centre  for  Development,  in  cooperation  with  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation and the Working Group on Food for Change published the first volume 
                                                 
1 At the time, the Working Group on Food for Change was working under the NGO called 
the Thai Network on Community Rights and Biodiversity.   145 
 
of the Natural Agriculture Magazine. It was the first place to include stories about 
UA. During 1997-2001, the sustainable agriculture discourse was also addressed in 
the  8th  Thai  National  Development  Plan,  which  relevant  public  organisations, 
including  the  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration  and  District  Administration 
Offices were made to deliver. Subsequently, many NGOs agreed to push this agenda. 
The principle of UA, which fits in with the sustainable agriculture discourse, was 
therefore promoted in parallel by both public and non-public organisations. 
Since  2004,  the  benefits  of  UA  have  been  more  seriously  considered.  Many 
inhabitants of Bangkok became concerned about food insecurity due to the curfew 
experiences that derived from political crisis. At the time, there was a food panic 
among Bangkok dwellers, regardless of the political camps that they supported. The 
demand for training on food growing increased and many enterprises opened training 
centres to respond to such demands. The leading enterprise was formed by the Media 
Centre for Development, namely the ‘Grandfather Veggie Garden’ training centre 
(Fieldwork interview with Korch-Chanok Hutapate, coordinator of the Media Centre 
for  Development,  14/01/2012).  Later  on,  the  Veggie  Prince  and  Suwannabhumi 
training centres also became famous and gained media attention. Still today, these 
enterprises not only organise training programmes, but they also sell their products, 
such  as  vegetables,  handbooks,  and  farming  instruments.  These  enterprises  also 
formed  a network  called  the City  Farm Association with the aim  of exchanging 
knowledge  and  resources  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Nardsiri  Komonpan, 
coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012).  
Beyond  the  role  of  the  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration,  District 
Administration Offices, NGOs and the enterprises, UA has also been practised by 
laypeople and recognised by community-based organisations (CBOs). Many slum 
communities  have  practised  UA  ever  since  their  communities  were  established, 
including the On-nut Sibsee Rai, On-nut Hoksibhok, and Poonshup communities. 
They were engaged in the slum dwellers network, which was formed in 1998. The 
network is coordinated by the Human Settlement Foundation (a CBO) that organises 
a  monthly  meeting,  a  saving  group,  a  foundation,  and  welfare  for  the  members. 
Similarly, many groups of informal workers also practised UA as a form  of welfare 
for their members, such as the working at home labour groups in the Keha-Tung 146 
 
Songhong and Clonghog communities, the Solidarity group the Bangbon district, 
and the Buffalo Horn Carving group in Bangcare district. They joined the informal 
labour  network,  coordinated  by  the  Foundation  for  Labour  and  Employment 
Promotion (a CBO), which works on many issues including that of food, such as 
developing worker skills, and promoting legal rights for informal workers.  
The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has worked with and for slum communities 
and groups of informal workers for a decade and the director of the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation has clarified that her organisation aims to work for these 
target groups (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation,  21/03/2012).  A  network  between  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation and these poor and marginalised groups has developed since 
1998  on  the  side  of  an  existing  network  between  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation and other NGOs and CBOs. The network of the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation  and  several  public  organisations  was  created  roughly  between  2007-
2009,  when  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  joined  the  Food  Security 
programme  engaging  many  public  organisations,  including  public  universities. 
During that period, the relationship between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
and  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  (a  public  organisation  under  the  Prime 
Minister’s Office) was also enhanced as they worked with each other. Before the end 
of the Food Security programme in 2009, the directors of the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation and  the Health Promotion  Foundation  had the  chance to  discuss and 
agreed that to enhance food security in the context of Thailand they could pay more 
attention  to  UA. The coordinator  of  the Health Promotion Foundation during an 
interview defended that the Health Promotion Foundation kept this agreement in 
mind, but had still not given a word to formulate the City Farm programme using 
tax-funded money. As a public organisation, the Health Promotion Foundation prefer 
not  to  allow  NGOs  to  manage  public  programmes  (Fieldwork  interview  with 
Veerapong  Kreungsinyod,  coordinator  of  City  Farm  programme  from  the  Health 
Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011). 
In 2009, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation produced a report on the situation of 
food  security  in  Thailand  after  1997  (Yaimaung,  2012;  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation,  2009).  The  report  mentioned  food  insecurity  in  the  city  and 147 
 
recommended the importance of supporting UA, particularly in a large city such as 
Bangkok. During late 2009, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, in cooperation 
with  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change  and  the  Media  Centre  for 
Development,  aimed  to  know  the  possibilities  to  promote  UA,  by  exploring  the 
interest of city dwellers in growing food in the city and by announcing the first UA 
competition in Bangkok, namely ‘City Vegetable Garden Award’. This event shows 
that many Bangkok dwellers in different places and backgrounds practised UA. At 
the same time, the Green Market Network was formed by green enterprises, working 
on  the  customer  side.  The  Green  Market  Network  was  motivated  by  the  same 
realisation  as  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  and  Health  Promotion 
Foundation: there is demand from city dwellers food from the city.  
Later,  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  asked  university  scholars  to  study  the 
possibility  of  supporting the City  Farm  programme before deciding mid-2010  to 
fund the  programme.  The  Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was chosen as  the 
main  manager  of  the  programme  in  cooperation  with  the  Bangkok  Metropolitan 
Administration,  District  Administration  Offices,  public  universities,  other  NGOs, 
CBOs, and enterprises. The City Farm programme not only aims to support citizen 
groups, including communities, to develop their collective gardens; but also aims to 
collaborate with these groups to develop UA together with the core organisations, 
groups and networks from the public and non-public sectors. This programme, then, 
linked various actors to work together as policy alliances after they fragmented in 
terms  of  activities,  goals and scales.  The  programme  also  created various policy 
initiatives  and  collective  actions.  From  above,  it  can  be  seen  that  after  many 
networks,  organisations  and  groups  of  city  dwellers  engaged  in  the  City  Farm 
programme,  the  UA  policy  network  in  Bangkok  clearly  emerged.  What  is  still 
missing from the story provided here is a mapping of the policy network as a whole, 
an analysis of the closeness among policy network's constituent organisations and 
groups, forms of social capital held by them, the definition of powerful actors (who 
held power over others) and an understanding of their power relations, as discussed 
in the next three sections. 
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  Photo 4.1.  Logo of the City Farm programme 
 
  Source: The website of the City Farm programme [www.thaicityfarm.com] [Last 
accessed: 22/08/2014]  
4.2.  The  policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups  and  their 
closeness 
In  order  to  identify  the  policy  network’s  constituent  actors,  this  study  began  by 
developing a list of organisations and groups engaged in the City Farm programme, 
which derived from the observation of their engagement in collective actions during 
the  preliminary  fieldwork  complemented  by  a  review  of  their  participation  in 
activities organised  by  the  City  Farm  programme as shown  in policy  documents 
(Progress Report of City Farm Programme, 2011; Monitoring and Evaluation Report 
of City Farm Programme, 2011; Annual Report of City Farm Programme, 2011). 
Some were included because they were referred to by others (snowball technique). 
Apart from creating a list of names, this study draws out the relations between the 
organisations and groups by asking them to rate the degree of closeness with other 
entities. This method allowed me to identify the policy network’s constituent actors 
and visualise their relationships, which is a basic component of social capital. Figure 
4.2  shows  the  policy  network  diagram  developed  from  the  degree  of  closeness 
among the policy network’s constituent actors followed by a list of names, as shown 
in Table 4.1. The names of some organisations and groups do not appear here as they 
are grouped with the names of actor constellations but all full names are presented in 
Appendix D.  
According to figure 4.2 together with Table 4.1, the thickness of links represents the 
degree of closeness and the size of points reflects how well they are connected. The 149 
 
alphabets  represent  the  different  policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and 
groups under analysis. It should be noted that their close relations are frozen at the 
time of the survey (during 19 December 2011 to 8 April 2012). The purpose was to 
understand their relations in the specific period in the same way with taking a photo 
to  capture  the  moment.  However,  the  relations  are  by  no  means  static  or  rigid. 
Dynamics of their relations will be also analysed in Chapter 6 and 7 to understand 
cooperation and conflicts.  
Figure  4.2  illustrates  that  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  and  Health 
Promotion Foundation have close links with many other organisations and groups. 
While the former worked as the programme manager of the City Farm programme, 
the  latter  provided  funding  support  and  monitors  the  programme.  These  two 
organisations  also  influenced  other  organisations  and  groups  the  most.  Close 
relations with many others and influences over others are related, and this will be 
discussed in 4.4. The figure also shows that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
works closely with two other non-governmental organisations, the Working Group 
on Food for Change and the Media Centre for Development. These all work directly 
on the food agenda.  
Moreover,  figure  4.2  points  that  the  policy  network  also  has  many  sub-sectoral 
networks.  Each  of  them  is  an  actor  constellation,  which  can  organise  its  own 
collective actions. For example, the Green Market Network organised food aid by 
joining  a  group  of  organic  food  restaurants  with  the  community  supported 
agriculture (CSA) system so that fresh food was cooked for peri-urban farmers (CSA 
producers)  who  were  affected  by  the  flooding.  This  study  captures  sub-sectoral 
networks by the concept of policy communities, as discussed in Chapter 2. Figure 
4.2  shows  that  such  policy  communities  within  the  policy  network  include  the 
following: local governments (the network of District Administration Offices), the 
slum dwellers network, the informal labour network, the Green Market Network and 
social  enterprises’  policy  community.  A  group  of  enterprises  forming  the  Green 
Markets Network (F) is a bit different from a group of social enterprises (the ‘H’ 
set). The primer is led by the ‘Soun-Ngeaun-Meema’ corporation, investing in green-
themed book publishing and organising green markets. The Green Markets Network 
works by using a business approach, though they respect and promote the local food 150 
 
systems.  The  group  of  social  enterprises  sells  self-grown  food,  maintains  green 
restaurants, and organises a training programme on food growing. Their activities 
aim  to  achieve  both  social  and  commercial  purposes.  They  also  formed  an 
association known as the City Farm Association.  
The  figure  also  shows  that  some  groups  did  not  engage  in  any  specific  policy 
communities at the time of the survey. Rather, they had a direct link to either the 
Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  or  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation.  These 
groups applied to join the City Farm programme independently after seeing an open 
call for joining proposal publicised by the programme's coordinator (without any 
leaders pushing for any specific policy communities). Some other groups are not the 
recipients  of  the  City  Farm  programme.  They  engage  in  many  of  its  collective 
actions, depending on their interests. Some of them avoid funding as they want to 
work interdependently (to only join activities that they are interested in). Others do 
not match the funding conditions of the programme. For instance, some grow food to 
sell it afterwards rather than for self-consumption, but still want to engage in the 
collective actions of the programme in order to build connections for sharing and 
learning.  
The  next  section  will  move  from  mapping  the  UA  policy  network  through  an 
analysis of close relations among constituent organisations and groups to delving 
deeper into the roots of their relations, which refers here to different forms of social 
capital.  
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Figure  4.2.  Bangkok’s  UA  policy  network  diagram  developed  from 
degrees of closeness  
 
Table 4-1: policy actors of the policy network  
A  is  part  of  the  central 
government 
A1  =  National  Health  Promotion  Foundation,  the  Prime 
Minister' s Office 
A2 = Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office 
B is part of the regional 
government (Bangkok 
Metropolitan 
Administration) 
B1 = Department of Environment 
B2 = Department of City Planning 
B3 = Food Sanitation Division 152 
 
C  represents  a  local 
government entity 
C1 = Laksi District Administration Office 
C2 = Clongteuy District Administration Office 
C3 = Praweat District Administration Office 
C4 = Jatujak District Administration Office 
D is a public university  D1 = Nutrition Institute, Mahidon University 
D2 = Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidon 
University 
D3 = Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University 
D4 = Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Thammasat 
University 
D5  =  Policy  and  Planning  Programme,  Mahasarakham 
University 
E is an non-governmental 
organisation 
E1 = Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
E2 = Working Group on Food for Change  
E3 = Media Centre for Development 
F is a group of enterprises  F1 = Green Markets Network 
G  is  a  community-based 
organisation 
G1  =  Slum  Dwellers  Network  (coordinated  by  Human 
Settlement Foundation) 
G2 = Informal Labour Network (coordinated by Foundation for 
Labour and Employment Promotion) 
H is a social enterprise  H1 = Organic way learning centre 
H2 = Slow life hotel training centre 
H3 = Suwannabhumi training centre 
H4 = Prince city farm training centre 
I  is  a  people’s  group  that 
receives funding 
I1-1 = Neighbourhood-based + proposed to join the CFP by 
Slum Dwellers Network 
I1-2 = Neighbourhood-based + proposed to join the CFP by 
local government 
I1-3 = Neighbourhood-based + proposed to join the CFP by 
Green Market Network 
I1-4  =  Neighbourhood-based  +  applied  to  join  the  CFP  by 
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I2-1  =  Workplace-based  +  proposed  to  join  the  CFP  by 
Informal Labour Network 
I2-2 = Workplace-based + proposed to join the CFP by Green 
Market Network 
I2-3  =  Workplace-based  +  applied  to  join  the  CFP  by 
themselves 
I3 = A non-area based group (including an online group) 
J is a non-funded group  J1 = Sunti Asoke community 
J2 = Group of soldiers from the Din Daeng Army Camp 
 
4.3. Forms of social capital: rational and normative commitments 
After each organisation and group was asked to rate their degree of closeness, they 
were given the opportunity to tell stories about their relations with other entities. 
Information  gathered  through  the  interviews  helped  to  identify  six  different  but 
related forms of social capital held between the nodes of the UA policy network 
depicted  in  the  previous  section,  including  shared  rules,  reputation  for 
trustworthiness, trust, shared norms, reciprocity and moral obligation, and shared 
forms of knowledge. 
  4.3.1. Shared rules 
The analysis reveals that many organisations and groups became close to others by 
sharing certain rules, particularly among members of each policy community. To 
begin with, the policy community of local governments share more formalised rules 
than other policy communities. The basic requirement is that they need to join a 
monthly meeting. They also share working procedural rules, which include five main 
areas.  
They first need to join missions together as they are integrated in implementing the 
same  policies  and  strategies  (formulated  by  national  and  regional  levels).  Many 
members of staff of the District Administration Offices during interviews reflected 
on  the  fact  that  each  District  Administration  Office  is  forced  by  the  Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration to work to achieve strategic goals and indicators set by 
them. They are also forced to contribute to central government policies.  154 
 
Secondly, they need to develop their own plan in the same way by addressing their 
goals, visions, missions, strategies, projects, and indicators. In doing so, they need to 
adopt  the  same  analytical  tools,  such  as  SWOT  (strength-weakness-opportunity-
threat)  analysis  and  using  the  same  strict  formal  language.  By  analysing  policy 
documents  from  four  District  Administration  Offices  within  Bangkok,  this  study 
found that the strategic plans of these District Administration Offices have similar 
formats and contents. For example, three of them, including Laksi, Clongteuy and 
Sapansoong District Administration Offices, put city farming training as a project 
under  the  same  green  city  development  strategy,  and  put  an  increase  of  city 
vegetable gardens as one of the indicators of the success of green city development. 
Thirdly, they need to produce the same pattern of paperwork so that the same rules 
are applied to general public organisations. For example, they are regulated to create 
a strict format of project proposal, progress and evaluation reports. They also need to 
be concerned about bill collection to claim the transparency of their expenditure.  
Fourthly, they need to conform to the same regulations on personnel management. 
For example, they are regulated by the same rules of managing salary and other 
personnel benefits (including welfare). There are also rules about personnel training, 
rotation, assessment for career progress, and knowledge management.  
Finally, each District Administration Office needs to refer to the same regulations on 
fiscal  management.  They  are  forced  to  do  possibility  assessments,  cost-benefit 
analysis, and risk assessment before spending money on running public programmes. 
They are constrained by standard prices for procurement and the reference to cost 
per unit. They are also required to do accounting and allow external auditing.   
Although shared rules among local governments are a tool for command and control 
under the bureaucratic system, this study includes this type of rules as social capital 
held by public organisations because it is a form of social capital created by the 
bureaucratic structure. More specifically, these shared formal rules can create a form 
of relationships that starts from formality to a transformation of relations into more 
informal ones through a process of informalisation. These formal rules can develop 
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and  limitations,  as  pointed  out  by  a  staff  member  of  the  Laksi  District 
Administration Office:  
Without  saying  anything,  sometimes  I  can  understand  how  other  District 
Administration Offices feel and want as we work under the same regulations 
and limitations. In many cases, it is not about what we want to do, but it is 
about what  we  need  to do  and what  we can do (Fieldwork  interview  with 
Jintana  Tongpud,  UA  trainer,  Laksi  District  Administration  Office, 
23/03/2012).  
The shared rules among non-state actors include joining a monthly meeting, which is 
commonly shared among members of every policy community. To be required to 
join a meeting is a starting point to develop personal relations among representatives 
of  each  organisation  and  group,  which  can  represent  relationships  among  their 
organisations and groups as well. Apart from the meeting, some policy communities 
such as the slum dwellers network and the informal labour network also have a rule 
that each member needs to join the monthly savings group to develop the foundation 
to  support  the  network’s  activities.  They  also  create  shared  rules  on  the  basic 
principles and conditions to get benefits from their foundation, such as welfare for 
newborn  babies,  illness,  and  funerals.  Among  members  of  the  informal  labour 
network, there are rules to work together to produce some products, such as a t-shirt, 
dress, umbrella etc. The rules are set by the Foundation for Labour and Employment 
Promotion for controlling product quality and making a sense of fairness (related to 
benefits distribution), such as the rule to assess product standards monthly by the 
committee  (its  members  are  selected  from  members  of  each  group),  the  rule  to 
allocate  a  certain  number  of  jobs  to  each  member  (providing  quota/  amount  of 
products/ pieces of works) by considering intention expressed by members and their 
readiness  assessed  by  the  aforementioned  committee,  and  the  rule  determining 
agreed deadline (setting time-frame) (Fieldwork interview with Khun Maem, staff of 
the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion, 11/02/12). These rules are 
not written down but recognised by each organisation and group engaged in the 
network. 
Regarding shared rules between members of the Green Market Network’s policy 
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supported  agriculture  system’s  rules.  The  market  regulations  are  set  by 
representatives of the members for quality standard control of both the products of 
green  enterprises  and  hygiene.  In  the  case  of  community  supported  agriculture 
system’s rules, members who are producers are required by the committee, formed 
by  the  ‘Soun-Ngeaun-Meema’  corporation  (that  organises  the  Green  Market 
Network), to pass the participatory guarantee system, while customers are required 
to participate in the participatory guarantee system process as either a committee 
member  or  an  observer.  All  members  are  also  expected  to  join  an  event  called 
‘customers  meet  producers’  to  discuss  problems  and  give  feedback.  The  Green 
Market Network regulates delivery methods and appropriate meeting points. Last but 
not least, a rule stipulates that each producer must welcome other members on a farm 
visit.  
Although the above rules shared among non-state actors are not equally strict as the 
rules  shared  by  local  governments,  they  can  influence  relations  between 
organisations  and  groups  who  share  them.  They  create  common  spheres  of 
interaction for various organisations and groups to meet, share, and learn from each 
other. This study found that the requirement to join meetings is a basic rule that is 
found  in  both  rules  among  state  and  non-state  actors,  and  this  rule  effectively 
contributes to develop closer relationships, particularly among members of the same 
policy community, as raised by a leader of an informal labour group: 
“I do not only have a chance to raise a problem and concerns of my group 
during the monthly meeting, but I also have a chance to learn from others and 
realise that not only me (and my colleagues) are struggling. It’s good to have a 
connection  with  other  informal  workers  to  support  each  other  and  to  fight 
together for our better life. I believe that to be together is better. It’s a reason 
that I’ve never missed any meetings. Every time that I join a meeting, I know 
someone better. That makes me feel good. I’m not alone” (Fieldwork interview 
with Koraporn Krugtongkum, a leader of Clong Hog community, 19/02/2012). 
Furthermore, after launching the City Farm programme, rules of engagement in the 
programme obliged each organisation and group across policy communities to share. 
These  rules  of  engagement  will  be  the  focus  of  this  study,  as  they  affected  the 
governance of the policy network as a whole. These rules appeared clearly in the 157 
 
application form for joining the programme and include, firstly, that the members 
need to join activities organised by the programme to share with and learn from each 
other. Secondly, fund recipients (almost all organisations and groups) need to make 
progress and project conclusion reports that show their transparency and efficiency 
in  using  public  fund.  Thirdly,  members  of  the  programme  must  promote  non-
chemical food production and local food system.  For example, training centres must 
train  how  to  do  small  scale  organic  farming,  and  farming  groups  must  practice 
organic food growing. As for green markets and restaurants, they must support fresh 
food  products  produced  within  the  city.  Fourthly,  farming  groups  must  aim  to 
enhance  their  self-reliant  capacity  by  producing  food  for  self-consumption  and 
sharing  with  their  neighbourhood.  The  surplus  products  can  be  sold,  but  not  in 
modern trade markets (City Farm programme, 2010). A last rule is that demands by 
members for any support will be responded on a first come, first serve basis.  
Specific to training centres, rules stipulate that they need to provide free training 
courses for the poor at least once a month without exceeding 50 trainees per course. 
Trainers must also share the gardening handbook (developed together by trainers). 
They can design training courses by themselves, but the basic standards must be 
agreed by all trainers before the course starts. Beyond this, mobile training for the 
poor communities is promoted and is allocated special funding support (Fieldwork 
interview  with  Nardsiri  Komonpan,  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm  programme, 
21/03/2012). The effects of those shared rules in governing the policy network will 
be  discussed  in  Chapter  6  and  7  by  highlighting  how  they  influenced  decision 
making of each actor to cooperate and became the point of references to negotiate 
conflicts. 
4.3.2. Reputation for trustworthiness 
Interviews  with  many  representatives  of  the  organisations  and  groups  analysed 
reflect that recognition by the public is also a reason why some organisations and 
groups are linked with others. This study concludes that there are three interrelated 
sources of reputation for trustworthiness. Firstly, positive reputation can derive from 
having  outstanding  past  performances.  For  example,  there  were  50  District 
Administration Offices (local government) in Bangkok, but 4 District Administration 
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performances in promoting UA. Laksi District Administration Office, for instance, 
had developed its rooftop vegetable garden to be an UA learning centre since 1998 
(Laksi  District  Administration  Office,  2012).  The  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation was also put forward by many others to lead the City Farm programme, 
as it played an outstanding role in promoting food security, local food systems and 
organic food production in the past decade, which were considered by others as the 
founding principles for promoting UA. Before managing the City Farm programme, 
the  Sustainable  Agriculture Foundation  involved related programmes  such as  the 
Food  Security  programme  and  the  Local  Food  Mapping  programme.  The 
organisation also published many books to UA related themes, such as 'Self-Reliance 
in Practice' (Rotjanapriwong, 2008) and  'Recovering Our  Land: A  Revolution  of 
Community,  Agriculture  and  Self-sufficiency  Economy'  (Working  Group  on 
Recovering Our Land, 2007).  
Secondly,  in  relation  to  past  actions,  reputation  can  derive  from  gaining  media 
attention.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  for  social  enterprises  such  as  the 
Suwannabhumi and Prince city farm training centres, that developed a close relation 
with other organisations and groups (as seen from H3 and H4 in Figure 4.1.) as a 
result gaining visibility in the media. The interviews found that between January 
2009 and July 2011, the Prince city farm training centre had appeared in the media 
roughly 25 times, including in a television programme, newspapers, magazines, and 
online media (Fieldwork interview with Nakorn Limpacuptathavon, farming trainer, 
15/07/2011). Together with the third source of reputation, these social enterprises are 
also well-known for their good connections. They are recognised by many farming 
group members who received training by them. They often also play the role of think 
tanks and advise on farming problems for city dwellers. The chance to connect with 
other people, organisations and groups allowed them to prove their skills in farming 
acknowledged by the public. Apart from these social enterprises, the Green Market 
Network is also well-known, mainly through this source of reputation. The Green 
Market Network has worked with many organisations and groups as either producers 
or customers, and its wide connections support its positive reputation. The number of 
green  enterprises  joining  the  17  green  markets  organised  by  the  Green  Market 
Network in July 2011 was 786, while the estimated number of customers coming to 
each green market was roughly 5,000. The numbers of producers and customers who 159 
 
joined community supported agriculture led by Green Market Network in March 
2012  were  637  and  3,755  respectively  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Woranut 
Shooreaungsuk, coordinator of Green Market Network, 12/03/2012). This number 
would be many times higher if the numbers on the Facebook fan page are counted.   
4.3.3. Trust 
The  research  found  that  trust  exists  between  the  policy  network’s  constituent 
organisations and groups. Predictive trust is more externalised than altruistic trust, as 
it was given by others in relation to past actions that can guide future behaviour. This 
study found that a reputation for trustworthiness relates to predictive trust as raised 
by Ostrom and discussed in Section 2.2.2 (Chapter 2). For example, Suwannabhumi 
and Prince city farm training centres, which are famous as a result of their skill in 
farming in the city, were trusted by many organisations and groups because they 
would help if these organisations and groups faced any problems with city farming. 
An interview with a Prince city farm trainer reflects that he receives 5-10 messages 
on  average  every  day  about  farming  issues  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Nakorn 
Limpacuptathavon,  farming  trainer,  15/07/2011).  Representatives  of  other 
organisations  working  at  training  centres  for  the  City  Farm  programme  also 
mentioned that they had invited trainers from Suwannabhumi and Prince city farm 
training centres to help their centres. They also consulted with these two centres 
about the training programme and specific farming techniques and practices as they 
believed in their skill, and trusted that the suggestions from these two organisations 
would benefit them as well as their previous suggestions. 
Altruistic  trust  can  be  illustrated  by  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation,  the 
Health Promotion Foundation, the Media Centre for Development, and the Working 
Group  on  Food  for  Change’s  trust  in  slum  communities.  These  organisations 
consider grant proposals from farming groups that they will cooperate with although 
some of them did not have a positive reputation (little credibility). For example, it is 
well-known that there were many drug dealers and gangsters living in the On-nut 
Hoksibhok slum community, but the proposal of the leaders of this community was 
approved by the City Farm programme. Soun-oy slum community also received a 
grant  from  the  City  Farm  programme,  although  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation  has  on  record  that  this  community  had  failed  to  deliver  evidence  of 160 
 
spending  the  money  effectively  when  joining  the  previous  Food  Security 
programme. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation still trusted that the community 
would be concerned with food self-reliance to reduce the cost of living. The director 
of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture Foundation said that  this community was  given a 
second  chance  and  that  she  believed  the  community  would  not  make  the  same 
mistake again (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011).  
It was noticed that, while predictive trust depends on past actions of the trustees, this 
altruistic trust depended on trusters rather than trustees. In the same case, while the 
Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  trusted  many  slum  communities,  some  other 
organisations  and  groups  such  as  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  Media 
Centre  for  Development  distrusted  these  communities.  The  staff  at  the  Health 
Promotion Foundation mentioned that at the start of the City Farm programme (the 
consideration process of fund provision), the organisation was worried about the 
responsibility  to  manage  public  fund  of  some  farming  groups,  particularly  slum 
communities  because  it  was  thought  that  they  would  not  be  able  to  organise 
collective actions themselves or to develop and take care of their community gardens 
by  using  public  fund.  She  also  pointed  out  that  each  member  of  the  slum 
communities needed to struggle for their own life and that they had a weak sense of 
belonging to their community. She therefore thought that it was difficult to expect 
them  to  cooperate  to  achieve  common  interests  of  the  community  (Fieldwork 
interview with Khun Ple, staff of the Health Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011). 
4.3.4. Shared norms 
This study also found that there were shared norms between the policy network’s 
constituent organisations and groups, which were both norms shared by almost all 
actors and among different social and economic backgrounds. To begin with, an 
outstanding norm shared by the majority of constituent organisations and groups was 
to  judge  that  UA  can  contribute  to  a  better  life  without  requiring  empirical 
evidences. It can be extracted from the interviews that almost all organisations and 
groups mentioned the importance of UA in enhancing livelihoods by reducing the 
cost of living, improving nutrition and increasing the capacity for food self-reliance. 
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network  were  more  sensitive  to  norms that  judge  that  small-scale  and  low-input 
farming could enhance their self-reliance on food. For example, the leader of the 
Poonshup slum community mentioned that the community vegetable garden was an 
essential factor for her community, together with housing, clothes and medicine. She 
said that members of her community did not need to pay to buy vegetables. They 
were just asked to donate some funds to sustain the garden. To increase the quantity 
of food products, her community attempted to use every unit of vacant land. She 
encouraged every household to grow vegetables on the land they had available. To 
reduce costs, she said that community resources were reused, particularly household 
waste.  She  expected  that  joining  the  City  Farm  programme  would  allow  her 
community  to  develop  aquaculture,  which  would  increase  community  food  self-
reliance  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Vimon  Thavilpong,  leader  of  Poonshup 
community, 22/03/2012).  
Groups from wealthier social and economic backgrounds, such as the Green Market 
Network, social enterprises and some farming groups, were more sensitive to norms 
that judge that UA could provide healthy food and reduce environmental footprints 
by reducing food miles and energy use. For example, a staff member of the Green 
Market Network mentioned that UA provides hope for producing organic food in 
Thailand. She commented that it is hard to change rural mono-cropping to organic 
farming, while green producers within the city can make a difference as they can 
control food production in their small-scale spaces and find their niche market- green 
consumers who live in a large city. She also mentioned that from her experience with 
green markets, she  found that  green  producers  and  consumers in the city would 
create a beautiful and sustainable city, creating real organic food, fair food chains 
and  a  greener  city  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Woranut  Shooreaungsuk,  a  staff 
member of the Green Market Network, 12/03/2012). 
NGOs and CBOs engaging with the City Farm programme shared a specific norm, 
which  can  be  called  the  pro-poor  norm.  NGOs  and  CBOs  judged  that  poor  and 
marginalised groups should be supported first and they advocated for these target 
groups since they were established. Today, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 
holds a strong belief that a better city can be built by providing opportunities to slum 
communities and groups of informal workers to strengthen their right to the city. The 162 
 
director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation also reflected on the fact that the 
poor and marginalised groups have the ability to organise developmental projects by 
themselves. She believed that if the opportunity is given to a poor and marginalised 
group, it will be able to organise in order to ‘capitalise’ on the opportunity and 
enhance the quality of life. Therefore, low-income communities should be provided 
with a chance to self-organise rather than to be the ‘receiver’ of development from 
an  external  agency  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Supa  Yaimaung,  director  of  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). This norm is agreed on between 
other NGOs and CBOs. For example, the leader of the Working Group on Food for 
Change mentioned that she believed that the poor (and marginalised groups) can 
learn to change themselves, requiring support rather than an intervention (Fieldwork 
interview with Kingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayuthaya, leader of Working Group on 
Food for Change, 18/03/2012). 
Lastly, it can also be deducted from interviews that the norm that stipulates that ‘to 
promote UA is to promote social cohesion’ is shared among public organisations, 
such as the Health Promotion Foundation, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
and  the  District  Administration  Offices.  Many  representatives  of  public 
organisations paid less attention to the role of UA in enhancing urban food security 
and creating sustainable agriculture than to its role as a tool to create joint activities 
for  community  members  to  enhance  their  cohesion.  The  review  of  District 
Administration Offices’ policy documents in relation to the support for UA found 
that they aimed to support community gardens to enhance community self-reliance 
(on food) followed by improving relationships between community members. They 
also mentioned the impact of relaxation for elderly people and child learning, but 
they ignored the potential contribution of UA to creating local food systems and 
alternative  food  chains.  To  sum  up,  norms  about  the  extent  to  which  UA  could 
contribute to a better city were shared differently by groups from different social and 
economic backgrounds and between non-state and state actors.  
Aside from these norms, other norms shared among the policy network’s constituent 
organisations and groups will be discussed in other parts of this thesis. These norms 
are not included here because although they affected policy network governance, 
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political conflicts (for allowing policy actors engaging in different political camps to 
work together) will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
4.3.5. Reciprocity and moral obligation 
Before the City Farm programme was endorsed, there were reciprocal exchanges 
among many  organisations and groups.  These exchanges can be characterised as 
interest-based  sharing  in  which  givers  could  expect  a  return  from  takers.  For 
example,  this  study  found  reciprocal  exchanges  among  social  enterprises.  They 
helped others to publicise each other’s events, such as city farming training days, 
kids’ learning in the garden and eco-therapy. They also helped each other to sell 
products,  such  as  gardening  and  cook  books,  quality  soil,  instant  manure,  and 
gardening instruments, including containers, watering cans, spades, etc. It was also 
found that they tried to divide market shares rather than compete with one another, in 
order to achieve a mutual benefit. For instance, they shared markets by organising 
their events either in different areas or for different targets. To organise a training 
programme, they tried to set different dates or times. Some social enterprises also 
shared members of staff when they organised training to be able to take care of more 
trainees. 
Sharing  also  happened  between  organisations  and  groups  beyond  interest-based 
exchanges. With this type of exchanges, the giver did not expect an equal return 
from the taker, or, in some cases, the giver did not want any return from the taker. 
They believed that there was a moral reason to give. These cases are therefore better 
referred to as moral obligation. For example, during the past decade, the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation has worked for slum communities and informal workers but 
did  not  expect  to  receive  any  return  from  them.  The  director  of  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  thought  that  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  had 
always prioritised the poor and marginalised groups in order to enhance their quality 
of life, which is the organisation’s task. It can be argued that to advocate for the poor 
and  marginalised  groups  becomes  a  moral  obligation  for  some  organisations, 
particularly NGOs and CBOs.  
Moral obligation can also be expected from other organisations and groups engaged 
in  the  City  Farm  programme  in  general;  in  other  words,  it  is  a  Thai  social 164 
 
expectation.  To  delve  deeper  into  moral  obligation  in  Thai  society  requires  a 
consideration  of  Buddhist  culture  shared  by  all  the  actors.  One  of  the  Buddhist 
principles is the ethic of giving. Buddhism mentions that the constraints of morality 
are greed (Lobha), hatred (Dosa) and ignorance (Moha). The essence of the Buddhist 
tradition is to overcome selfishness and transform greed into generosity, hatred into 
loving kindness, and ignorance into wisdom (Sivaraksa, 2011, p.92). To give with an 
altruistic mind is one way to do so. Although this principle is not a shared rule or 
even a shared norm in modern city life in Bangkok, it has become an expectation 
without  any  punishment  or  social  sanctions.  To  adhere  to  morality  by  giving  is 
considered a generous gesture, but if one does not give, this is not reflect negatively 
on the person.  
4.3.6. Shared forms of knowledge  
Knowledge is often defined as human capital in the literature, but shared forms of 
knowledge  within  a  group  of  people  is  hardly  considered  as  such.  However,  by 
highlighting the benefits of this form of social capital, this study hope to contribute 
to the a deeper understanding of a general theory of social capital, for the role of 
shared knowledge in facilitating collective actions was remarkable in this case study. 
To  begin with, this  study  found that there were policy  epistemics or  knowledge 
partnerships overlapping and crossing policy communities, as discussed in Chapter 
2. Two policy epistemics can be distinguished here. The first comes from university 
scholars, particularly scientists, who propose knowledge developed from scientific 
and economic modes of rationality. They usually refer to academic research results, 
experiments and international experiences to claim the validity of their knowledge. 
In  other words,  they hold  shared  technical knowledge, particularly scientific and 
economic knowledge. This policy epistemic mainly includes agricultural economists 
and agricultural scientists. They are supported by traditional city planners and policy 
analysts  working  for  the  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration  and  District 
Administration Offices, who are strict on scientific and economic (and mechanical) 
tools in the name of the managerialism of bureaucratic governance. 
This technical knowledge comes along with a technical language, such as formal, 
academic, and expert language (specialist language), including strategic language, 
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familiar  to  ordinary  people.  Words  such  as  input,  process,  output,  outcome, 
performance,  indicators,  efficiency,  effectiveness,  etc  are  outside  their  everyday 
vocabulary. An NGO member, who calls these languages ‘bureaucrat languages’, 
gave an anecdotal story to illustrate his frustration. He talked to a member of staff of 
a District Administration Office about his problem and asked for help. The staff 
member was typing while chatting with him. She looked like she understood him 
well and then she showed him a formal letter. She asked him to read it to consider 
whether the statements in the letter covered his requirements or not. He laughed and 
said  that  her  written  statements  did  not  contain  any  words  said  by  him.  She 
confirmed that the statements mentioned what he said, but in a different language, 
and his words could not be put in this letter (Fieldwork interview with Komsun 
Hutapate,  the  director  of  the  Media  Centre  for  Development,  14/01/2012).  The 
privilege of bureaucrat language reflects an effect of political-bureaucratic power in 
governing public programme, including the City Farm programme. Such privilege 
also excludes some farming groups who do not want to do paper works that requires 
heavy bureaucratic language. More details will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
The second policy epistemic consists of city  farming trainers working  for social 
enterprises. They are practitioners who have learned from experience and by doing. 
Not only are they open to learn from scientific and economic knowledge but they 
also propose local knowledge based on cultural rationality, such as Thai traditional 
farming techniques and ceremony, which are not always recognised by agricultural 
scientists. For example, they have knowledge about how to do a ceremony to pay 
respect to the soil before growing food as a sign of good luck. They can predict 
changing climate and productivity by noticing signs of nature. This policy epistemic 
also captures knowledge developed from the practice of everyday life of laypeople. 
For example, they proposed knowledge on reusing household resources, including 
the  making  and  using  of  locally-made  effective  microorganism  products  for 
household  waste  water  treatment  and  soil  quality  improvement,  which  will  be 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
This knowledge of ordinary culture comes along with the use of ordinary language 
(everyday language) and as embedded in Thai culture, this form of knowledge also 
derived  from  Buddhist  ideas.  This  study  found  that  many  representatives  of 166 
 
organisations and groups mentioned both implicitly and explicitly that they believed 
that  Buddhism  is  the  wisdom  of  sustainability.  From  participating  in  training 
programmes organised by 4 social enterprises, this study concludes that three main 
Buddhist ideas affected the way in which this policy epistemic thinks. First of all, 
they did not only propose technical farming knowledge, but they also emphasised the 
importance of respecting nature. Buddhism encourages a life in harmony with the 
Earth  (Sivaraksa,  2011,  p.92).  A  trainer  of  a  social  enterprise  who  organised  a 
training programme said that we should take care of the plant as if it was a woman 
who requires a tender touch and special concern when she is pregnant. Secondly, 
they emphasised the importance of learning by doing by giving the example of the 
Buddha,  who found truth from practising. A trainer mentioned similarly that the 
most important  knowledge  is knowledge  about  ourselves. We  need to  know our 
desires and constraints, and awaken our willingness to learn to explore ourselves. 
We  also  need  to  be  patient  to  practise  until  we  succeed.  Lastly,  trainers  also 
mentioned knowledge based on a sense of the sacred, such as paying respect to 
water, soil, place and plants through ceremonies. A trainer said that there may be a 
reason why our ancestors did these ceremonies, which are good feelings rather than 
expected  results.  In  other  words,  it  is  knowledge  to  feel  good,  secure  and  even 
happy.  
4.4.  Who  has power over others and how does social capital activate  power 
relations?  
This study analyses powerful organisations and groups that influence others through 
the history of the UA policy network, starting from June 2010 until June 2012. The 
analysis focuses on defining actors which had played significant roles during the 
period  of  this  study  in  shaping  and  controlling  rules,  making  orders,  organising 
collective action, enhancing cooperation, and mediating conflicts. The study found 
that the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
were not only close to other policy network's constitute organisations and groups as 
analysed in Section 4.2, these two organisations were also the most powerful actors. 
They held different types/faces of power over many others, including instrumental, 
communicative and structural power.  
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  4.4.1. Instrumental power of powerful actors and their social capital  
The  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation 
exercised the power to control rule and order through grant management. Although 
the Health Promotion Foundation was the funder legitimised by law to manage its 
own money, the Health Promotion Foundation could not monopolise this power. The 
reason is that, although it was trusted by public organisations, it was not trusted by 
many non-public organisations and groups. In other words, if the Health Promotion 
Foundation had controlled everything itself, it would not have been able to gain wide 
cooperation from the non-state sector. As the programme aimed to engage various 
non-state  organisations  and  farming  groups,  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation 
realised that to pick an NGO as programme manager to share power over rules and 
order  could  allow  them  to  meet  that  aim.  The  following  is  the  opinion  of  the 
coordinator of the City Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation 
about this issue: 
“Originally,  we  (the  Health  Promotion  Foundation’s  committees)  thought 
about  proposing  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  manage  the  (City  Farm) 
programme. But, the problem is that the Ministry of Health had not engaged 
with city farm much, and the ministry might not be able to ask for a wide 
range of participation. So we thought about NGOs as they have worked on 
this issue, and have already developed city farm networks which could make 
this  programme  work  better”  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Veerapong 
Kreungsinyod,  coordinator  of  City  Farm  programme  from  the  Health 
Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011). 
Among many possible NGOs, this study concludes that the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation  was  chosen  for  three  reasons.  Firstly,  considering  past  actions,  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was the most significant actor in supporting UA 
from  the  perspective  of  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  (and  many  other 
organisations and groups). The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had developed a 
reputation for trustworthiness regarding UA promotion. The director of the Media 
Centre  for  Development  mentioned  that  there  was  no  doubt  that  the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation would lead the City Farm programme as it had worked on 
this  issue  for  a  decade,  and  the  Media  Centre  for  Development  was  pleased  to 168 
 
cooperate (Fieldwork interview with Komsun Hutapate, the director of Media Centre 
for  Development,  14/01/2012).  The  second  reason  is  that  the  reputation  of  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could develop into predictive trust given by the 
Health  Promotion  Foundation.  The  interview  with  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation’s  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm  programme  reflects  at  least  that  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was trusted the most as it had much experience 
and could be asked for a wide range of participation among non-public organisations 
and groups. Finally, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was expected to connect 
many NGOs, CBOs and farming groups working and practising UA as they shared 
norms, particularly the pro-poor norm, which guided them towards advocating for 
the poor and marginalised groups. The Health Promotion Foundation realised that it 
could not connect to the poor and marginalised groups as well as the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation could, so to allow the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to 
manage the programme would extend the possibility to include various organisations 
and groups in the programme. In conclusion, reputation, predictive trust, and shared 
norms  as forms  of social capital held  by  the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
supported its legitimacy to possess and exercise instrumental power. 
There  were  some  limitations  of  using  power  of  rules  and  order  by  the  Health 
Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  to  shape  the 
policy network developed by the City Farm programme in the way that these two 
organisations wanted to. First of all, the two powerful organisations could not force 
public organisations through their rules and order because public organisations, such 
as Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and the District Administration Offices did 
not receive funding from the programme. Each public organisation had their own 
budget to spend on food and green promotion derived from their specific hierarchy 
so they engaged with the City Farm programme as it was relevant to their mission 
and depending on how much cooperation was asked of them. The use of this power 
was also limited for some organisations and groups, that had joined the City Farm 
programme because they agreed with its objectives and were interested in activities 
rather  than  incentivised  by  grants  from  the  programme.  Thus,  apart  from 
instrumental power, other types/faces of power also functioned. 
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  4.4.2. Communicative power of powerful actors and their social capital  
Communicative  power  is  the  power  to  convince,  stimulate  learning  for  mutual 
understanding  and  to  make  an  agreement.  This  study  found  that  the  UA  policy 
network was also shaped by this face of power exercised by the Health Promotion 
Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation.  The  Health  Promotion 
Foundation exercised its communicative power through the coordinator, who spoke 
in the name of the Health Promotion Foundation. To analyse his characteristics, he 
was an old polite person who was respected by others. Throughout the period of this 
study, he communicated by using a bureaucratic style, which has a specific language. 
He also usually referred to constraints of the bureaucratic system to claim what was 
and was not possible. He attempted to ask others to be strict about rules rather than 
finding a flexible compromise. His main communicative strategy was to claim the 
necessity to achieve measurable indicators and quantitative performance.  
How did social capital activate the communicative power of the Health Promotion 
Foundation?  This  study  found  first  of  all  that  although  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation depended on different hierarchies from the other public organisations 
and could not create an order, the shared bureaucratic rules between them made it 
possible for the Health Promotion Foundation to persuade other public organisations 
to  join the  programme  through  its  communicative  power.  The  Health  Promotion 
Foundation coordinator mentioned that he asked for cooperation from the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration and District Administration Offices by pointing out that 
the City Farm programme could contribute to their strategic goals as he understood 
well that public organisations always look for ways to achieve their strategic goals. 
He communicated through meetings with the Bangkok governor and wrote formal 
bureaucratic  letters  to  the  directors  of  District  Administration  Offices.  These 
communications  reflect  that,  firstly,  shared  procedural  rules  on  bureaucratic 
administration support effective communication because these rules function as a 
basic mutual understanding, which makes further agreement possible. Secondly, the 
rules  concerning  cross-hierarchical  communication  make  it  easier  to  organise 
meetings  between  civil  servants  at  an  equal  level,  and  formal  letters  from  other 
public organisations become important and need attention. Although such shared 
rules cannot guarantee the success of communication, such as to make an agreement, 170 
 
these rules can make a difference by making it easier than non-public sectors to 
organise meetings with the Bangkok governor while their letters were also less likely 
to receive attention.        
In case of communication with the NGOs, this study found that the experiences of 
the Health Promotion Foundation in working with NGOs and creating some forms of 
social capital with them made a difference when they were communicated. First of 
all, while it is rare to see public organisations work closely with NGOs in Thailand, 
as public organisations in general blame NGOs for obstructing public investment in 
mega-projects, the Health Promotion Foundation has developed a reputation for its 
sincerity  and  respect  to  NGOs.  An  overview  of  a  random  100  different  public 
programmes endorsed by the Health Promotion Foundation between 2001 and 2010 
found that roughly  70 NGOs had been engaged in at least one programme. The 
Health Promotion Foundation maintained a reputation as a public organisation that 
NGOs can talk with. For example, the head of the Working Group on Food for 
Change  mentioned  that  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  was  the  only  public 
organisation  that  she  had  experience  contacting  without  frustration  (Fieldwork 
interview with Kingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayuthaya, leader of the Working Group on 
Food for Change, 18/03/2012).  
The predictive trust on the Health Promotion Foundation was another reason for 
some NGOs to consider what the Health Promotion Foundation’s reason for. The 
director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation mentioned that she thought the 
Health Promotion Foundation would be different from other public organisations 
because it worked seriously on the issue. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
director reflected her thoughts that general government agencies could not make a 
real change and have a hidden agenda. They also just want to claim that they do 
things,  so  government-led  programmes  in  her  view  would  not  lead  to  any  real 
changes and would be not sustainable. By working together in the Food Security 
programme  between  2005  and  2009,  she  trusted  that  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation would not act the same way as in the past as the organisation had shown 
its strong intention to make real changes (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, 
Director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). In promoting UA, 
the Health Promotion Foundation also developed a rooftop vegetable garden on its 171 
 
building  to  be  a  learning  centre  and  to  show  that  the  organisation  takes  UA 
promotion seriously by doing it itself before promoting it to others as shown in photo 
4.2. 
  Photo  4.2.  Rooftop  vegetable  garden  on  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation’s building 
 
  Source: Photo owned by the researcher  
The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation’s communicative power was exercised by 
four people. The first was the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 
who is an older, tough woman who formed the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
in 1998 and has worked as its director until now. She was born in Bangkok and 
graduated with a bachelor’s degree in political science from the second university in 
rankings in Thailand, but decided to work for the poor in rural areas through an 
NGO to promote sustainable agriculture. She had much experience abroad by joining 
exchange programmes and conferences, particularly in South America and South-
East Asia. The other three people were coordinators of the City Farm programme, 
who had worked as members of staff of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as 
well. A middle-aged woman had the responsibility for public campaigns through the 
media as well as public relations. Another was a young woman who facilitated social 
enterprises working at training centres. They had graduated with bachelor’s degrees 
in environmental and agricultural science respectively. The last one was a middle-172 
 
aged woman who was responsible for coordinating and monitoring farming groups 
that received grants from the programme. She graduated with a master’s degree in 
sociology and all three had graduated from universities located in Bangkok. Two of 
them were born and lived in Bangkok. They co-organised collective events in the 
name of the City Farm programme. To communicate, the four of them spoke in the 
name of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to adopt different approaches for 
different people whom they interacted with. They could both use formal language in 
communicating  with  public  organisations,  including  written  formal  bureaucratic 
letters,  and  ordinary  language  when  speaking  with  laypeople,  including 
representatives of other NGOs, CBOs and farming groups.    
Various  forms  of  social  capital  activated  the  communicative  power  of  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. First of all, although working on UA was new 
for the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the organisation was still recognised as 
one of the first to introduce UA in Thailand. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
highlights UA as a way to enhance food security at the community and household 
scales, particularly enhancing self-reliant capacity. UA is also expected to play a role 
in  securing  the  right  to  food  of  the  urban  poor.  The  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation thought that growing food in the city could challenge the mainstream 
food system controlled by a few large corporations and could produce organic food 
by using traditional knowledge, local materials and waste merged with the creativity 
of city dwellers in designing their gardens to fit in a limited space. By pushing UA, 
the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation started by encouraging city dwellers to grow 
their own food within their own spaces. The first relevant book published by the 
Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  is  about  gardening,  called  the  ‘Handbook  of 
Household  Gardening  for  City  Dwellers’  (Limpacuptathavon,  Goman  and 
Yaibumrung, 2010) followed by ‘City Dwellers’ Household Gardening: Growing 
Happiness in Your House’ (Limpacuptathavon and Sinprom, 2011). The Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  then  attempted  to  inspire  city  dwellers  to  grow  food  by 
organising competitions and rewarding the best household gardening. Stories about 
the  winners  were  then  included  in  a  book  entitled  ‘My  Vegetable  Garden’ 
(Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation,  2011).  Since  late  2011,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  has  pushed  this  agenda,  focusing  more  on  policy  and 
planning aspects. The organisation demanded more public land allocation, pushing 173 
 
this agenda to the top ranks of governmental development priorities and recognising 
it in the city plan.
 2  The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has also advocated the 
UA  as  a  climate  change  adaptive  strategy.  In  sum,  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation developed a reputation for trustworthiness in leading the promotion of 
UA, which in turn made its voice louder than others. 
The interviews with leaders of slum communities and groups of informal workers 
shared  the  opinion  that  while  poor  and  marginalised  groups  distrusted  external 
organisations in general, they trusted the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as it 
had worked for them since 1998. The general distrust by the slum communities of 
external organisations had developed from the fact that these external organisations 
had  attempted  to  force  them  out  of  the  area.  They  realised  that  it  was  rendered 
'illegal' to live on public land, leading to many conflicts with public organisations. 
For example, before establishing the 'On-nut' Sibsee Rai slum community, members 
lived under bridges in the inner city of Bangkok and survived by collecting garbage 
and selling it to recycling industries. They were forced by the police to move out and 
fought for their housing rights since the 1980s. The government then provided land 
for them to establish their community but demanded rent, which increased every 
year. As a consequence, they could not pay and therefore avoided doing so. Finally, 
the  government  attempted  to  force  them  to  leave.  Since  2004,  the  situation  has 
improved  after  the  government  in  cooperation  with  a  quasi-governmental  body 
called  the  Community  Organisations  Development  Institute  endorsed  the  public 
policy ‘Security house’ (Ban Mun Kong). However, only 361 communities in 50 
districts  within  Bangkok  were  engaged  with  the  programme  (Community 
Organisations Development Institute, 2008; Rapeepat, 2009), while there are still 
many slum communities left behind, including the communities engaged in the City 
Farm programme.  
                                                 
2The  director  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  consulted  with  me  many  times 
about international experiences on integrating UA in the policy and planning framework. I 
was  also  invited  to  give  a  public  lecture  in  which  many  Bangkok  Metropolitan 
Administration and District Administration Offices’ members of staff participated. The book 
entitled ‘Growing City for Growing Life: Theories and Practices to UA’ published by the 
City Farm programme and written by me emphasises policy and planning to support UA, 
which  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  has  also  communicated  to  many  relevant 
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Groups of informal workers have a long history of fighting both corporations and the 
government,  demanding  labour  rights  and  welfare.  For  example,  the  ‘Solidarity’ 
group leader told the story of how his group members were laid off from the same 
factory  that  closed  down  in  1992  without  any  pension  scheme.  They  started  by 
learning  about  labour  laws  and  demanded  their  right  to  get  a  pension  from  the 
factory  owner,  but  the  owner  refused  to  pay.  They  subsequently  demanded  the 
Minister of Labour to help them but were ignored. As a result, roughly 900 laid-off 
labours protested in front of the Ministry of Labour. The government, however, did 
not take any action and the owner of the factory went back to Texas. Subsequently, 
the  workers  formed  their  own  small  factory  to  sew  and  screen  T-shirts  without 
receiving any loans from public banks but were instead through support provided by 
NGOs.  As  they  could  not  provide  welfare  to  their  members,  they  developed  a 
collective vegetable garden around the factory in 2001 to produce food as welfare for 
workers  with  support  from  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  (Fieldwork 
interview  with  Manob  Gaewpaga,  leader  of  Solidarity  group,  2/02/  2012).  The 
group’s history provides an explanation for why it distrusted public organisations 
while it did trust the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. 
Predictive trust was therefore derived from past actions that made it easier for the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to persuade slum communities and groups of 
informal workers to join the City Farm programme through the slum dwellers and 
informal  labour  network.  Public  organisations,  including  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation, realised that it was hard for them to ask for cooperation from the slum 
communities and groups of informal workers, while it trusted that the Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  could  do  this  for  them.  The  trust  that  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  earned  from  slum  communities  and  groups  of  informal 
workers is reflected in the way the Foundation is spoken of by some leaders. They 
trusted  that  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  would  not  propose  a  fake 
development with little progress towards sustainable changes.  
The link between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and social enterprises and 
groups  with  wealthier  social  and  economic  backgrounds  is  rather  different.  The 
director accepted that she was initially a bit worried about working with these groups 
(she called them the middle and higher classes) in a large city, as the Sustainable 175 
 
Agriculture Foundation usually works with grassroots from rural, peri-urban areas 
and  small  cities.  The  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  never  had  a  chance  to 
develop  trust  among  these  groups.  In  this  context,  it  could  be  hypothesised  that 
shared  norms became a form of social  capital that  supported the  communicative 
power  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  in  persuading  these  targets.  As 
mentioned in Section 4.3.4, to agree that UA could contribute to making a healthier 
city is a norm shared by many organisations and groups and also facilitated their 
communication by shaping shared concerns and guiding the topics that should be 
raised.  The  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  could  take  advantage  from  this 
shared norm by raising key concerns shared by enterprises and middle and higher 
class groups while speaking to them about a topic that could be of interest to them as 
an entry point before persuading them to join. For example, a social entrepreneur and 
farming trainer explained that his enterprise and training centre had joined the City 
Farm programme because he believed that those who have similar norms, such as 
having a ‘green heart’, would be interested in similar projects and aims. He said 
green heart linked people from different corners to meet and influenced their desire 
to  know  more  about  each  other  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Nakorn 
Limpacuptathavon,  social  entrepreneur  and  farming  trainer,  15/07/2011).  His 
opinion  reflected  that  shared  norms  could  open  the  door  for  people  to  share 
(communicate)  with  others, which in turn opened a window of  opportunities  for 
them to work together to reproduce the importance of their norms. 
4.4.3. Structural power of powerful actors and their social capital 
The  power  of  domination  derived  from  political-bureaucratic  and  socio-cultural 
structures supported the status and role of powerful actors in shaping the UA policy 
network. To begin with, the Health Promotion Foundation took advantage from its 
dominant structural power constructed by the political regime and the bureaucratic 
system, which can be called the power of the Thai bureaucratic polity. Non-public 
sectors would try to avoid having a problem with the Health Promotion Foundation 
and other public organisations as they are protected by special laws. To sue public 
organisations is hard as it would be considered by a special judiciary procedure. 
Bureaucratic traditions are also powerful, as every Thai person experiences in their 
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commit  themselves  to  the  strong  traditions  of  the  bureaucratic  polity,  such  as 
contacting  them  by  sending  formal  letters,  and  implementing  strict  practices 
regarding the collection of receipts to confirm transparency and efficiency in using 
the public budget. Bureaucratic discourses in the name of principles are also hard to 
challenge.  
During  this  study,  Thai  bureaucratic  governance  was  driven  by  many  modern 
managerial tools from the West. For example, the discourse of ‘Good Governance’ 
legitimised the practices of the Health Promotion Foundation by claiming that being 
strict about rules and complicated procedures meant following the principle of good 
governance,  which  emphasises  transparency  and  accountability  when  governing 
public  programmes.  The  managerial  procedure  known  as  Strategic  Planning  and 
Management, which had become a requirement for any organisations and groups 
receiving  public  funds,  also  supporting  the  power  of  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation. Strategic planning and management had been adopted to govern public 
programmes in Thailand since 2001, when the government changed its budgeting 
system  from  Line-Item  to  the  Strategic  Planning  Budgeting  System  (SPBS).  Its 
power dominates the ways in which public programmes, including the City Farm 
programme, must be designed under rational, system and stages approaches. These 
approaches are based on the causal relations of each stage, starting by analysing the 
situation  through  SWOT  analysis  (analysing  strength,  weakness,  opportunity  and 
threat).  Then,  each  public  programme  clarifies  strategies,  goals  and  forecast, 
expected results, including reasonable outputs, outcomes and impacts. After this, 
indicators for measuring these results must be developed, before identifying required 
resources, called inputs, and a clear process for implementing the programme to 
achieve the expected results (Boossabong and Sreesutum, 2010; Sirisumpan, 2006). 
The strategic planning and management approach has allowed the Health Promotion 
Foundation to control grant recipients through planning and management processes, 
particularly regarding technical advice, monitoring and evaluation. 
In light of the previous analysis, it could be argued that social capital in the form of 
knowledge  shared  between  public  organisations  has  played  an  important  role  in 
exercising the power of the political-bureaucratic structure. As strategic planning and 
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programmes among civil servants until they shared such technical knowledge and 
developed a policy epistemic, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3). In the case 
of the City Farm programme, public organisations, particularly the Health Promotion 
Foundation,  intervened  in  non-public  organisations  and  groups  through  their 
expertise  in  strategic  planning  and  management,  by  giving  advice  and  judging 
whether each project was able to deliver strategic goals. The power of control was 
also part of their use of language. A review of policy documents found that the 
Health Promotion Foundation exercised control by using technical terms in project 
proposals, progress reports and project summaries proposed by organisations and 
groups that received funding support. This study therefore expands on the classical 
statement that knowledge is power
3 by finding that knowledge legitimates the power 
of  existing  structures.  In  other  words,  this  study  views  knowledge  as  backstage 
power which is overshadowed by dominant structures that exercise power through 
rationalisation.  
Regarding  power  structures  and  the  social  capital  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation,  this  organisation  did  not  take  benefit  from  the  help  of  political-
bureaucratic structures. In fact, it was constrained by the power exercised through 
the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  other  public  organisations,  including  the 
power  of  bureaucratic  traditions,  administrative  proverbs,  and  technocratic 
procedures.  However,  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  did  benefit  from 
snuggling  up  with  socio-cultural  structures.  Although  the  Thai  constitution 
guarantees equal rights of citizens, Thai people are not equal in terms of their social 
status, which is constructed by Thai socio-cultural structures. In general, Thai people 
strongly respect the elderly, for it is assumed that they have more knowledge and 
experiences. There is a Thai proverb that states that ‘if we walk follow the older, dog 
will not bite’ (it means that if we follow elder’s suggestion, we would be safe). The 
director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation is the oldest engaged in the City 
Farm  programme  among  leaders  of  public  organisations,  NGOs  and  CBOs.  She 
therefore takes advantage of the power of socio-cultural structures as it supports her 
                                                 
3As mentioned by Francis Bacon and by many Foucauldians. 178 
 
status which others’ respect; even when they do not agree, they still listen to her and 
approach her politely.
4 
The  power  embedded  in  Thai  socio-cultural  structures,  which  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  snuggled  up  to,  are  the  powerful  hegemonic  discourses 
called  the  ‘self-sufficiency  economy’  (Set-takit-popeaung)  and  the  ‘new  farming 
approach’ (Kaset-thessadee-mai, which is close to low-input farming) as proposed 
by the King, who influenced the way in which Thai people think and practise UA, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. His hegemonic ideas are not new, but his privileged status 
has developed for over more than half a century and supports his voice in the debate. 
At least for the previous two decades, his ideas have become sacred words, which 
Thai people in general, including the government, NGOs and CBOs, tend to agree 
with as they appear in many development policies, plans, programmes, projects and 
even activities pushed by both state and non-state actors. These ideas have gradually 
become  embedded  in  the  Thai  socio-cultural  structure  and  become  powerful 
discourses.  Fortunately,  the  King’s  ideas  go  well  with  UA  development  and  the 
Sustainable Agriculture  Foundation was clever in  using the  power of  the King’s 
discourses to mobilise support. By doing so, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
could engage many organisations and groups in the City Farm programme which 
agreed with the King. The study found that 74 of 100 project proposals submitted by 
farming groups refer to the King’s idea of the self-sufficiency economy as a reason 
why  they  would  like  to  develop  their  collective  vegetable  garden.
5 This  way  of 
exercising power by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation also reflects a link of 
power embedded in the structure above the policy network with the communicative 
power within the policy network. 
                                                 
4 The higher status of man over woman is not clear in modern Thai culture and in modern 
cities such as Bangkok and particularly in this case study. The country has a female prime 
minister, many female councillors, and leaders in many sectors and at many scales. The 
observation for this case tends to conclude the opposite that women play a significant role in 
the UA policy network. All coordinators of the City Farm programme from the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation are women and roughly 70% of group leaders are woman. 
5 The rest are almost all projects proposed by temples, which might agree with the King’s 
ideas but preferred to refer to the Buddha. Some projects were proposed by groups of blue-
collar workers, which highlighted UA as welfare and an activity to enhance relationships 
among workers.  179 
 
How does social capital play a role in activating this structural power? The analysis 
reveals  that  the  norm  of  self-reliance  or  ‘do-it-your-self’  is  shared  between  the 
policy network’s constituent organisation and group members and fits in well with 
the King’s ideas of the self-sufficient economy and low-input farming. For example, 
the proverb proposed by the King ‘to grow what you eat and to eat what you grow’ is 
a  basic  idea  about  self-reliant  practice.  It  is  hard  to  say  which  one  comes  first 
between the norm of self-reliance and the King’s ideas similar to the chicken and 
egg question. Nevertheless, the power of the King’s discourses would certainly not 
be effective if such norms did not exist. On the other hand, these norms might not 
have been developed and shared if the King had not proposed his ideas. However, it 
is the case that this shared norm as a form of social capital played a part in activating 
the power embedded in the socio-cultural structure as exercised by the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation.   
Conclusions 
This chapter addresses the interrelations of social capital, power relations and the 
policy network’s emergence. The chapter analyses how the power of certain actors 
was activated by their social capital. The analysis focuses on the two most powerful 
organisations,  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation  and  consider  the  role  of  instrumental,  communicative  and  structural 
powers.  However,  to  exercise  power  depends  strongly  on  the  setting,  including 
situations, issues, channels, constraints and who they interacted with. Chapters 6 and 
7 will discuss this by examining the exercise of power in the context of disasters. 
Although  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation played a significant role in shaping the UA policy network at the time of 
its emergence, other actors also played an important role in characterising the policy 
network. They struggled and attempted to exercise their power as well. The next 
chapter will discuss their power and social capital by linking them to the above 
discussion to draw a picture of the entire set of power relations and the role of social 
capital in the characterisation of the UA policy network. 180 
 
Chapter 5 
Unequal social capital, imbalanced power and  
policy network characterisation 
 
Introduction 
After paying attention to the potential of social capital in activating the power of 
powerful policy actors in formulating the policy network on urban agriculture (UA), 
this chapter analyses the power exercised by other policy actors. The relationship 
between  the  power  of  powerful  actors  and  the  power  of  the  others  reflects  the 
relation between unequal social capital and imbalanced power. The relation in turn 
affects the way in which a policy network is characterised. Figure 5.1 shows main 
argument and how the analysis of this chapter is framed. In short, this chapter argues 
that social capital activates power exercised by centralities of each policy community 
which  in  turn  affects  policy  network's  characterisation.  In  a  similar  way  as  the 
previous chapter, this study also analyse three faces of power, but the focus is on 
power that is exercised by centralities of each policy community. In the same time, 
the  chapter  analyses  how  social  capital  activates  the  exercise  of  their  powers  in 
struggling  for  decentralising  power  and  being  included  as  discussed  in  2.4.  The 
chapter begins with a discussion on how power exercised by the centralities could 
promote a certain degree of decentralisation of the UA policy network when there 
are imbalanced power relations. The first section analyses the ways in which unequal 
social capital affected the imbalances of power. The following section discusses how 
the policy network was characterised by the exclusion of some organisations and 
groups, by considering exclusion as a consequence of the exercise of instrumental 
power in shaping shared biased rules. Finally, the analysis focuses on how shared 
norms activate structural and communicative powers that were exercised by core 
policy  actors  (powerful  organisations  and  centralities  of  policy  communities)  to 
exclude some organisations and groups.  
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Figure 5.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 5 
 
5.1. Centralities of policy communities, multi-scales of social  capital and the 
hierarchy of power 
Other organisations and groups beyond the two most powerful actors also exercised 
their power to shape the UA policy network. They were by no means passive in 
processes  of  decision-making.  However,  their  power  was  limited  by  constraints 
created by the two more powerful actors in some aspects. For example, the power to 
propose  and  negotiate  the  rules  in  use  was  limited  by  the  scope  of  pre-existing 
agreed rules (rules of engagement) mentioned in 4.3.2. Overall, this study found that, 
aside  from  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation, there were five organisations and groups that play an important role in 
shaping the UA policy network. These five organisations and groups enjoy a position 
of  centrality  within  their  respective  policy  communities.  They  are:  the  District 
Administration  Offices,  UA  social  enterprises  (the  City  Farm  Association),  the 
Green Market Network, the slum dwellers network, and the informal labour network. 
The centralities are the Laksi District Administration Office, the Media Centre for 182 
 
Development,  theOrganic  Way,  the  ‘Keha-Tung  Songhong’  working  at  home 
community and the ‘On-Nut Sibsee Rai’ slum community.   
  5.1.1. The centrality of local governments engaged in the policy network 
The Laksi District Administration Office had a good connection with other District 
Administration Offices (DAOs) (the local  governments). The office was the first 
public organisation to support UA by developing the rooftop of its building as a city 
farm  learning  centre  since  1998  (Laksi  DAO,  2012)  as  shown  in  photo  5.1.  Its 
reputation supported the office’s public recognition. This DAO had also become a 
learning centre for other DAOs, particularly after they were required to implement 
the  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration  policy  ‘Edible  Fence’  that  aimed  to 
promote  household  vegetable  gardening  throughout  the  city  by  launching  a 
campaign  ‘to  grow  what  you  eat, and  to each  what  you  grow’.  This policy was 
included in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration strategic plan to develop a 
healthy and greener city (highlighting food and the environment) between 2004 and 
2008. Every DAO needed to support household gardening with knowledge transfers 
and providing some inputs (e.g. seeds and plant tonic). These missions brought them 
together across different hierarchies  to share  resources, including  knowledge and 
skills. The Laksi DAO became a leader in this area as a result of its past actions. 
Many DAOs came to visit and observed what the Laksi DAO was carrying out and 
learned from its best practices. The office thus took the role of coordinator, sharing 
information  and  knowledge  related  to  vegetable  gardening  among  DAOs.  The 
following is what a key member of the Laksi DAO said about the emergence of an 
informal network of DAOs of which the Laksi DAO became a coordinator:  
“We know each other well from joining the events about sharing knowledge, 
skills and experiences of farming. Even though we work for different people in 
different areas, the sharing is needed to enhance our services by learning from 
others to achieve the common aim. … I try to build and keep a network (of UA 
development among DAOs) by updating new techniques to learn and events in 
which  we  could  join  together”(Fieldwork  interview  with  Jintana  Tongpud, 
Manager of Laksi's rooftop garden and UA trainer, 23/03/2012). 
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  Photo 5.1.  Laksi DAO’s rooftop vegetable garden as learning centre 
   
  Sources: Photos publicised by Laksi District Administration Office (left) and owned 
by the researcher (right) 
To  develop  a  reputation  for  working  on  sustainable  agriculture,  the  Laksi  DAO 
developed  a  connection  with  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation.  They  also 
developed trust and shared knowledge, particularly on technical skills for sustainable 
farming  practices.  The  director  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation 
communicated that without the Laksi DAO, it might not have been possible to link to 
other DAOs (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation,  3/07/2011).  The  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation 
therefore used the Laksi DAO as a bridge to link to other DAOs. From the story 
above  it  can  be  concluded  that  there  were  two  scales  of  social  capital  held  by 
different  policy  actors.  On  the  one  hand,  there  was  social  capital  held  amongst 
DAOs, particularly in the form of sharing the same rules, reputation and predictive 
trust.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  social  capital  held  between  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation and the Laksi DAO at the upper scale, particularly in the 
form of reputation, predictive trust and shared knowledge. By holding social capital 
with  the  Laksi  DAO,  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  benefited  from 
connections to other DAOs through the Laksi DAO.  
To become the central entity of the DAOs’ policy community, the Laksi DAO had 
exercised its power in many ways. First of all, the study found that it had exercised 
its instrumental power through technical control. Other DAOs depended on the Laksi 
DAO as it was the first DAO that had succeeded in developing a rooftop garden on 184 
 
its  building.  Many  other  DAOs  needed  to  come  to  learn  how  to  do  that.  Civil 
servants  working  in  DAOs  generally  lacked  technical  knowledge  and  skills  in 
farming, which the Laksi DAO did have. The Laksi DAO focused on the technical 
aspect of UA, using both scientific and traditional roots from the beginning. The 
director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had criticised the Laksi DAO’s 
perspective, which she claimed was too much focused on gardening in the city. The 
office was not familiar with the right to food, and believed that food security could 
be built in each household garden. It did not see a link between UA and politics, so 
support was depoliticised and only the technical aspect was emphasised. The office 
became a training centre and provided technical support rather than driving policy. It 
encouraged city dwellers to grow their own food as much as they could, rather than 
being  concerned  with  reducing  the  structural  constraints  of  policy  and  planning 
tools. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation argued that it was hard 
for the City Farm programme to push public organisations to promote UA in terms 
of policy and planning, because even the most significant ones still ignored this. She 
also  mentioned  that  almost  all  public  organisations  spent  their  time  and  effort 
seeking farming techniques and knowledge transfer through training programmes 
(Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation, 3/07/2011). The criticism of the director of the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation reflects why the Laksi DAO became important for other DAOs sought 
after technical support, which it provided. 
Apart from exercising instrumental power through technical control, the Laksi DAO 
exercised  its  communicative  power  to  convince  and  persuade  other  constituent 
organisations and groups of the policy network, though the Laksi DAO could not 
command and order them in top-down manner as each organisation and group work 
independently  from  one  another  (no  one  works  under  its  hierarchy).  Rather,  the  
leader's communicative strategy was key to convincing and persuading others. She 
was a highly confident, middle-aged tough woman who usually expressed strong 
emotions. She spoke loudly with a serious face and expressed frank criticisms. But 
her audience knew that she was sincere and communicated through her actions rather 
than words. She was therefore respected by the others and she also attracted interest 
from the media. One coordinator of the City Farm programme said about her: "Khun 
Meam  (her  nickname)  talks  through  her  knowledge,  skills  and  experiences.  We 185 
 
(referring  to  all  coordinators)  respect  her  and  usually  invite  her  to  give  us  her 
opinions. She might not be sweet, but her opinions and the way she expresses them 
(e.g. loud voice) is always worth hearing and plausible" (Fieldwork interview with 
Pui Varangkanang, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). Thus, this 
study analyses the exercise of communicative power of the strategy of Laksi DAO's 
representative as similar to the 'logo-pathetic' strategy framed by Gottweis (2007, 
p.245), as discussed in 2.4.2. This type of communicative strategy focuses on the 
provision of reason (knowledge and experiences) and expression of emotions rather 
than characteristics of the speaker. Such strategy is different to strategies used by the 
directors  of  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation, who benefit from their personal qualities, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. But, the communicative strategy of the Laksi DAO's representative was also 
effective, at least in convincing the coordinators of the City Farm programme.    
As for structural power, the Laksi DAO benefited from the political-bureaucratic 
structure  to  achieve  government  and  the  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Administration 
(BMA)’s  policies  in  which  the  role  of  DAOs  as  implementers  is  essential.  A 
significant DAO will be supported by both national and regional governments, who 
usually claim their policy success through evidence from the performance of the 
implementers.  As  mentioned  by  a  BMA  member  of  staff,  the  BMA  could  not 
succeed in achieving development aims without the inclusion of the green agenda by 
the  DAOs  in  their  plans.  As  a  policy  unit,  the  BMA  needed  to  enhance  the 
participation of the DAOs so they were engaged in strategic planning formulation, 
and committed to implementing the strategies. The success of the BMA therefore 
derives  from  the  success  of  the  DAOs  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Unchalee 
Pattamasawan, director of the department of city planning, BMA, 27/03/2012). The 
case  of  the  Laksi  DAO’s  support  for  UA  allowed  it  to  be  the  ‘pride’  of  the 
government  and  the  BMA.  It  could  benefit  a  lot  from  this  status,  for  example 
receiving special grants from the BMA for garden maintenance. This status had also 
become a magnet attracting many organisations, groups, networks, media and even 
the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and Health Promotion Foundation to come to 
it. 
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5.1.2.  The  centralities  of  social  enterprises  and  the  Green  Market 
Network  
The Media Centre for Development (MCD) occupied a position of centrality among 
the  social  enterprises  that  engaged  in  the  city  farm  association.  It  started  with 
developing  a  magazine  on  alternative  agriculture  entitled  ‘Natural  Agriculture 
Magazine’ from 1998 onwards (see photo 5.2 on the left). The magazine collected a 
variety of knowledge on agricultural science from both scholars and practitioners. It 
was  recognised  as  the  agricultural  science  think  tank.  The  MCD  developed  a 
network  that  included  green  enterprises,  providing  stories  for  the  magazine  and 
avenues for sponsorship. The MCD had a good connection with many social green 
enterprises in Bangkok, particularly vegetable producers and trainers before playing 
a  key  role  in  creating  the  aforementioned  association.  The  members  of  the 
association shared norms that a good business should also be good for the world, and 
a better world could be created through green producers and a mode of production 
that is friendly to the earth. They also shared knowledge on growing organic food, 
including the local knowledge, such as farming forecasting and producing locally-
made effective microorganism products. 
  Photo  5.2.  Natural  agriculture  magazine  and  the  Media  Centre  for 
Development’s vegetable garden 
     
  Sources:  Photo  use  authorised  by  the  Media  Centre  for  Development  (left)  and 
photos owned by the researcher (middle and right)  
The MCD developed reciprocal relations among UA social enterprises. For example, 
it  needed  stories  about  UA  social  enterprises  for  its  magazine,  while  the  social 187 
 
enterprises also wanted to promote themselves. As many social enterprises did their 
business  by  opening  farming  training  courses,  the  MCD  attempted  to  make  an 
agreement with them to organise their training programme with a different focus. For 
example,  one  enterprise  focused  on  inspiring  the  new  generation,  while  another 
focused  on  setting  up  activities  for  childhood  development.  The  MCD  also 
facilitated a reciprocal exchange between members of the City Farm Association to 
seek mutual benefits. For instance, some members borrowed gardening handbooks 
and trainers from each other. Some helped each other to publicise events designed 
for different target groups. Other enterprises also sold gardening products that had 
been developed by others, such as ready-to-use soil bags.  
Moreover, the MCD worked closely with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as 
they shared the same focus and shared knowledge on sustainable agriculture. Many 
stories  of  experiences  of  projects  run  by  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation 
were documented in the MCD magazine, which contributed to predictive trust, as 
both of them had a  good  record  of  promoting  sustainable agriculture. They  also 
shared the norms that UA could contribute to the city’s food security, although the 
MCD did not focus on the role of UA towards enhancing the right to food for the 
poor and marginalised groups as the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation did. Even 
though some enterprises already knew the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation well, 
the MCD played an important role in bridging between the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation  and  other  social  enterprises.  It  also  provided  suggestions  to  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation about which social enterprises could be chosen 
to be training centres for the City Farm programme. The director of the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation mentioned this role as follows:   
“Selecting training centres was very difficult because we would never know 
who really has a ‘green heart’ and strong skills.  It was difficult as well to 
anticipate  who  could  engage  with  us  until  the  end  of  the  programme.  We 
would  also  never  know  who  could  bear  with  our  interventions,  such  as 
delivering the training programme and setting the priority of trainees. Every 
centre has its own style and we might not be able to push it in the way that fits 
into the programme. So, we started from the ones we know well and trust the 
most [which] the MCD helped a lot in screening the proper ones”(Fieldwork 188 
 
interview  with  Supa  Yaimaung,  Director  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation, 3/07/2011). 
By analysing storytelling of the MCD and other members of this policy community, 
the narrative-based diagram can be drawn as shown in Figure 5.2. According to this 
figure,  the  MCD  (located  at  the  centre)  is  close  to  other  training  centres  (the 
members of the City Farm Association) and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
as mentioned above. It is also close to the Green Market Network as they usually 
meet each other in the events related to food and green agenda organised within 
Bangkok.  The  figure  shows  that  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  is  not  at  the 
middle zone in the perspective of the MCD and other social enterprises, although 
this  organisation  is  at  the  centre  in  the  computing-based  visualisation  shown  in 
Figure 4.2. It means that how the network looks like depends on whose perspectives. 
In this case, the MCD connected with the Health Promotion Foundation by passing 
through the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation rather than worked directly with. 
Apart from that, the MCD have a connection with some DAOs as a result of their 
information exchanges. Some farming groups are connected with the MCD as well 
regarding the role of the MCD in organising mobile trainings.  
Figure 5.2 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the 
perspective of social enterprises 
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This study did not observe clear structural and instrumental powers exercised by the 
MCD.  Firstly,  it  did  not  take  much  benefit  from  existing  structures  as  social 
enterprises in the context of Thailand did not have a specifically privilege status. In 
contrast,  they  usually  did  not  earn  enough  profit  from  their  business  to  have 
economic  power,  and  their  strong  intention  to  support  social  development  was 
doubted by many NGOs, which affected their credibility. Even when they referred to 
powerful discourses such as the King’s notion of self-sufficiency, they still tried to 
make money. Secondly, specific rules could not be enforced among the enterprises 
nor  was  technical  control  possible  because  each  social  enterprise  that  the  MCD 
engaged with had its own knowledge and skills in farming. They therefore shared 
knowledge with others rather than controlling others through knowledge.  
However,  this  study  can  still  capture  the  exercise  of  communicative  power  to 
convince and persuade others through communicative strategy of this enterprise's 
leaders. The director of the MCD, who was also an editor of the magazine, was a 
well-educated middle-aged man who had a lot of knowledge about and experience 
with organic farming techniques. His role in mediating conflicts will be highlighted 
in Chapter 7. His daughter played a role as the coordinator of the MCD. She was a 
young  woman  who  was  a  new  generation  farming  practitioner.  She  was  also  a 
columnist  with  a  magazine  column  entitled  ‘City  Veggie  Garden’.  When  she 
addressed her points, she supported some scientific arguments and ignored others 
while  she  agreed  with  some  local  knowledge  that  did  not  derive  from  scientific 
methods. For example, she referred to the Buddhist principle about paying respect to 
nature as being similar to paying respect to parents, and she is one of many core 
actors who thought that the disaster was a form of punishment from a supernatural 
power.  The  media  was  drawn  to  her  because  she  was  attractive  so  she  gave 
interviews  on  many  television  programmes  and  magazines.  One  of  social 
entrepreneurs, who has contacted the MCD coordinator, said that she amazed him 
for she was part of the new generation but nevertheless decided to work on farm, 
while other young attractive people would seek other occupancies (informal chatting 
with Chookeit Goman, a social entrepreneur and farming trainer, Suwannabhumi 
training centre, 26/03/2012). She regularly expressed her emotions softly and with a 
smile. She could therefore exercise her communicative power and attire in the name 190 
 
of the MCD to ask for the cooperation of many organisations and groups, including 
other social enterprises who were members of the association.  
Regarding the centrality of the Green Market Network (GMN), this study found that 
the  centrality  called  Organic  Way  was  recognised  by  other  members  to  play  an 
active role in organising green markets and supporting events in the name of the 
GMN, such as the ‘Green Fair’, which had been organised annually since 2008. The 
group opened a green restaurant, ‘Health Me Organic Delivery’, which took a part in 
the  community-supported  agriculture  system  by  establishing  a  contract  to  get 
vegetables  directly  from  farmers  and  pre-paid  them.  The  group  developed  a 
reputation and trust among GMN members based on their past actions. One example 
is that other green restaurants and producers shared information with the group about 
markets  and  innovations  without  thinking  that  the  group  would  be  unfaithful  to 
them. It is a surprise that although the Soun Ngeaun Mema, who formed the GMN, 
had  a  better  opportunity  to  lead  the  network,  the  Organic  Way  played  more 
significant role in coordinating it in practice and became the network coordinator in 
the perception of the network members. The reason according to a member of the 
GMN was that while the Soun Ngeaun Mema did many things (businesses) and 
involved the creation of many networks, the Organic Way paid more attention to 
developing the GMN until it became its informal coordinator (Fieldwork interview 
with Sudhep Kulsri, a city farmer and a member of the GMN, 4/02/2012).  
  Photo 5.3.  Vegetable garden of the Organic Way  
   
     Source: Photo use authorised by the Organic Way 
In 2010, the group also developed a vegetable garden in an area of roughly 100m
2 
located behind the restaurant to provide supplies (see photo 5.3), in addition to the 191 
 
majority  of  the  community-supported  agriculture  system.  The  group  opened  the 
garden as a learning centre and created activities to enhance family relations and 
facilitate an environment where city children could learn about nature, food growing 
and insects. The group contacted the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation’s members 
of  staff  for  knowledge  and  skills  support  during  the  development  of  the  garden 
before the endorsement of the City Farm programme. The Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation  agreed  to  support  it  as  they  shared  the  norm  about  the  benefits  of 
creating a local food system. They developed some forms of social capital from that 
period, including shared norms, trust and shared knowledge. After the City Farm 
programme  was  endorsed  by  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation contacted the GNM and engaged their members in the City 
Farm programme through the Organic Way.  
The analysis of storytelling of the Organic Way and other members of GMN's policy 
community can draw the narrative-based diagram (see Figure 5.3). The Organic Way 
is located at the centre. It has a close relationship with the Soun Ngeaun Mema; the 
former of the GMN. They organised many GMN's events together including weekly 
green markets, which made both of them have a well-connection with the members 
of green markets. The Organic Way, however, connected in direct with community-
supported agriculture system's members (including the online group), while Soun 
Ngeaun Mema often contacted them indirectly by passing through the Organic Way. 
The  figure  also  shows  the  close  relations  between  the  Organic  Way  and  the 
Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  as  mentioned  their  story  above.  Besides,  the 
Organic Way worked in relation to MCD and other training centres engaged in the 
City Farm Association, because it also organised training programme on farming. 
Apart from that, the Working Group on Food for Change was found that it had a 
close relation with the Organic Way as well as a consequence of their information 
exchanges  regarding  the  promotion  of  the  healthy  food  consumption.  It  can  be 
noticed that the Organic Way and other members of the GMN avoided engaging 
closely with public organisations such as the Health Promotion Foundation and the 
DAOs. The leader of the Organic Way gives a reason that her group did a green 
business by linking green producers and green customers. As spending most of the 
time managing her own restaurant and keeping the producer-customer networks, she 
had not a time left for approaching anyone else. Her group can work with many non-192 
 
governmental organisations and community-based organisations as they approached 
her group actively, while the public sector was mostly passive by waiting for the 
citizens to contact them in the office (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, a 
leader of the Organic Way and the owner of the 'Health Me' restaurant, 17/02/2012).  
Figure 5.3 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the 
perspective of the members of the Green Market Network  
 
This study found that under horizontal relationships without hierarchical power of 
control, many  forms  of  social capital  supported the  Organic Way  to  exercise its 
power  over  others.  Firstly,  trust  given  by  other  members  allowed  it  to  exercise 
instrumental power by playing a key role in creating rules for green markets and the 
community-supported agriculture system and no one questioned that it could do so. 
Secondly, the Organic  Way could exercise its communicative power to persuade 
other members of the GMN to cooperate in events organised in the name of the 
network. The leader of the group was an old polite and kind-hearted middle-class 
woman. In relation to power in the socio-cultural structure, she benefited from her 
background as a retired school teacher, which is a powerful and respected status in 
the Thai context. Her background supported her voice to be heard especially when 
she talked about children.  193 
 
5.1.3. The centralities of informal labour and slum dwellers networks 
Although the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion (FLEP) worked as 
a  formal  coordinator  of  the  informal  labour  network,  the  data  derived  from 
interviews  with  the  network  members  shows  that  Keha-Tung  Songhong  home 
workers’ group was ranked in the top two list of the first five organisations and 
groups  that  they  were  closest  to  while  the  FLEP  came  later.  To  explain  this 
surprising  outcome,  the  FLEP  promoted  informal  labour  rights  for  the  whole 
country, while Keha-Tung Songhong facilitated activities organised within Bangkok. 
It therefore had more opportunities to interact with other members of the informal 
labour network in the city. In addition, there are many types of informal workers and 
they each have their specific problems and demands so the FLEP was not able to 
deal with such differences and each type usually has its own informal coordinator. 
Groups of informal workers, which later engaged with the City Farm programme, 
had in common that they had all worked in the agricultural sector at some point. 
Some had migrated from rural areas to Bangkok permanently, while the rest worked 
as seasonal labour and moved into town after the end of the crop year. The group of 
Keha-Tung Songhong home workers, including 104 members, became the natural 
leaders without having any clear structure. Almost all members of this group were 
women  (only  seven  were  men)  who  worked  as  subcontractors  for  the  garment 
industry. The key question is why the group became the centrality of the network, 
and not others. The leader of the group informed me that she and her group had an 
active role in the informal labour network’s activities since 1992, which at the time 
was called the network of homeworkers. She said with pride that she was the one 
who came up with the nickname of the network, ‘Homenet’. She reported that her 
group engaged with the network more than the FLEP, which only formed in 2003 
(Fieldwork interview with Neeramon Suttiponnapong, group’s leader of ‘Keha-Tung 
Songhong’ home workers, 12/02/12).  
Their past actions supported the group’s reputation and trust given by other groups 
of informal workers until it managed to act as an informal coordinator that collected 
and  shared  problems,  solutions,  knowledge,  events  and  updated  news  to  other 
members. One of group leaders of other informal labour networks was of the opinion 
that the group of Keha-Tung Songhong home workers usually initiated activities and 194 
 
invited her group to join. She said that it was good to see someone try to begin to do 
something and encourage other members to support it. If the group of Keha-Tung 
Songhong home workers was not active, the informal labour network might have 
existed just in its name (Fieldwork interview with Watcharaporn Uppapun, Informal 
labours  living  in  national  house  at  Chalong  krung  national  housing  community, 
Nhongjog district,  14/02/12).  In  a  similar  way,  another  group leader of informal 
labour network members mentioned that the informal labour network was fortunate 
to  have  an  active  leader  (referring  to  the  group  of  Keha-Tung  Songhong  home 
workers).  She  also  spoke  about  the  Keha-Tung  Songhong's  leader  blaming  the 
Minister from the Ministry of Labour about his ignorance of informal labour rights 
in front of him during their social movement in 2008. She told the story of the 
braveness of the Keha-Tung Songhong leader who headed the mob of people during 
mobilisations  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Kunkaew  Klaewkla,  Informal  labours 
working  at  home  (buffalo  horn  carving),  Bangcare  district,  15/02/12).  These 
opinions reflect  a recognition of the  network members and  the reputation of  the 
group of Keha-Tung Songhong for trustworthiness in leading network activities built 
from past actions.   
  Photo 5.4.  Collective garden of workers at Keha-Tung Songhong    
 
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher 
The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had known the leader of the 
group  since  they  had  joined  the  ‘Health  Promotion  for  Informal  Workers  in  the 
Agricultural  Sector’  programme  led  by  university  scholars  since  2004.  They 
developed shared norms, particularly that the right to food is a basic human right. 195 
 
The group’s leader spoke about the respect she had for the director of the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation and that the director stood for the marginalised groups. She 
said that she shared many thoughts with her, particularly concerning the right of 
informal workers to access food as a minimum level of welfare (Fieldwork interview 
with  Neeramon  Suttiponnapong,  group’s  leader  of  Keha-Tung  Songhong  home 
workers,  12/02/12).  To  link  to  the  informal  labour  network,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation connected through the Keha-Tung Songhong group together 
with other groups that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was also close with. 
The main aim of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was to promote these target 
groups to grow their own food as a form of welfare for their group members in 
vacant areas, including each member’s backyard, as illustrated in photo 5.4. The 
group’s  leader  also  said  that  her  group  gained  more  benefits  than  that  because 
gardening could help develop relationships among members and, most importantly 
for  her,  to  engage  in  collective  action,  such  as  making  agreements  and  even 
appointments for protests.  
From  the stories told by  the  Keha-Tung  Songhong  group and other members of 
informal labour network, the narrative-based diagram can be drawn as shown in 
Figure 5.4. The Keha-Tung Songhong group is located at the centre, and it has a 
close relationship with other informal labours groups. This group also has a well 
well-connection with the FLEP, who facilitates the activities organised in the name 
of the informal labour network. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation connected 
with the group in relation to a promotion of food self-production for enhancing the 
right  to  food  (and  right  to  the  city),  while  the  MCD  related  to  the  group  as  a 
consequence of its role in organizing the mobile farming training for this group. 
Besides, the group saw the Laksi DAO as the street level bureaucracy that it needs to 
connect with to ask for basic support. This study found that their support in the same 
political camp made them think positively about each other. The members of the 
group  became  the  active  political  activists  that  stood  for  the  legitimacy  of  the 
political elites that backed up the Laksi DAO. According to the figure, it can be 
noticed  that  the  connection  of  the  Keha-Tung  Songhong  group  included  some 
organisations that did not recognised as an active actor engaging in the UA policy 
network. The National Housing Authority, for example, did not involve with the City 
Farm programme, but it was recognised by the group as the supportive actor that 196 
 
helped in developing the community garden. Because, this organisation, who has an 
authority in managing the land use of the community, allowed and facilitated the 
group to use a piece of land to develop the community garden.   
Figure 5.4 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the 
perspective of the members of the informal labour network 
 
Regarding the exercise of power, the case of this group did not illustrate clearly how 
it benefited from structural power and how it exercised its instrumental power. On 
the one hand, informal workers in the Thai context were victimised by the existing 
structures rather than taking advantage of them. For example, the Thai economic 
structure benefits from cheap labour and the dark or illegal economic sectors where 
informal workers are. The existing political and policy structures tend to reproduce 
this situation rather than transform it. Informal economic sectors and workers also 
reflect the  resilient livelihood of Thai  socio-cultural structures.  For example,  the 
economic crisis in 1997 led to the surprising conclusion that the unemployment rate 
in Thailand was not high as laid-off workers turned to the informal economic sector, 
such as street vendors and second-hand trading on trucks. These economic activities 
are illegal but at that time the police pretended not to see this and allowed people to 
do  it  as  a  way  to  deal  with  the  crisis.  Everyone  knows  of  the  existence  of  the 197 
 
informal sector and its workers but like a ghost, no one sees them. On the other hand, 
the group could not exercise its instrumental power as it was not able to command, 
control or even monitor other groups. The informal labour network had a rule about 
monthly saving and the right to gain benefits from collective welfare but the Keha-
Tung  Songhong  group  did  not  create  the  rule  or  have  decision-making  power 
because it was just an informal coordinator with good connections with many other 
groups.     
However, the group exercised its communicative power through its leader, who was 
a middle-aged woman who organised many informal labour movements demanding 
labour rights and who engaged with the national political camp ‘the Red Shirts’.
1 
She  had  a  high  level  of  confidence  and  was  bravely  critical  through  her  radical 
thinking, she had a strong political position and a ‘loud’ voice. She was also often 
introduced as a key speaker in public forums, such as during protests and campaigns. 
On the one hand, exercising communicative power in this way could persuade many 
groups to join or support the group, particularly groups of informal workers. On the 
other hand, this study found that many groups, particularly those that engaged with 
the Green Market Network, tried to avoid interacting with this group. The leader was 
seen to be rude in the eyes of the middle and upper classes (interpreted from chatting 
with members of the Green Market Network). Another reason is that even if they did 
not show it explicitly, many organisations and groups that engaged in the City Farm 
programme supported the opposite side of the political spectrum, which this group 
supported explicitly. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, as it is 
related to conflicts within the policy network.  
Regarding  the  centrality  of  the  slum  dwellers  network,  the  On-nut  Sibsee  Rai 
community is analysed as having the best connections with other members of the 
network. Similar to the Keha-Tung Songhong group, outsiders generally view this 
community as a poor and marginalised group. As mentioned briefly in Section 4.4.2, 
members of this slum community, which consisted of 73 households, once lived 
under bridges located in various places in Bangkok. Almost all of them worked as 
                                                 
1 There were politicised organisations and groups who engaged strongly with the national 
political conflict and clearly supported the movements of specific political camps. Chapter 7 
details this debate. 198 
 
garbage collectors of household waste and then sell it to recycling industries. The 
leader of the community was also one of the leaders of the slum movement fighting 
for  their  housing  rights  since  the  1980s.  He  was  well-known  by  other  slum 
communities. After the establishment of this community by the government, it also 
became the first successful homeless movement. The success of this community in 
pressing its demands on the government made it a natural leader of other relevant 
movements of the poor. Apart from its reputation derived from past actions, this 
community developed trust from leading livelihood development both by showing a 
good  example  and  helping  other  communities  to  develop.  For  example,  this 
community had developed its community gardens since 2002 (see photo 5.5) and 
helped other slum communities to develop community gardens. The leader said that 
after they had their own house they then needed to have their own food.  
Besides, the community leader also helped to organise monthly meetings and was 
talkative  during  the  meetings.  Although  the  Human  Settlement  Foundation 
facilitated  the  meetings  and  other  collective  events,  the  On-nut  Sibsee  Rai 
community  still  played  a  more  inclusive  role  as  reflected  in  an  interview  with 
another slum community leader. He mentioned that he saw the Human Settlement 
Foundation as a good friend, while the On-nut Sibsee Rai community was seen as his 
cousin. The reason was that they had struggled together for more than thirty years. 
The developments of the On-nut Sibsee Rai community also inspired him and made 
him believe that people who were born poor could create a better life using their 
hands  (Fieldwork  interview  with  Jaroon  Grunsook,  community  leader  of  On-nut 
Padsibhok community, 21/03/2012).  
The community garden became a bridge linking this community to the Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation. In 2003, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation promoted 
community gardens outside Bangkok by examining how they could contribute to 
food  security  of  the  poor  communities.  The  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation 
found  that  the  practices  of  the  On-nut  Sibsee  Rai  community  could  be  a  good 
example for other poor communities. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had 
therefore  organised  a  community  garden  tour,  including  the  garden  of  this 
community in the programme of the tour. Roughly 150 poor  community leaders 
from all around the country came to visit this garden. During that event the director 199 
 
of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the community leader had a chance to 
get to know each other and develop trust. Then, in mid-2005, the Health Promotion 
Foundation  endorsed  the  Food  Security  programme  joined  by  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation and many other organisations. The Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation showed its trust in the On-nut Sibsee Rai community by proposing this 
community as the role model for the promotion of community food security. Even 
higher  levels  of  trust  were  given  to  this  community  in  2010.  The  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  had consulted with its leader to screen  groups  of  people 
living in slum communities within Bangkok to engage in the City Farm programme. 
The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation addressed her concerns about 
choosing farming groups and the importance of screening them by trusted networks:     
“By engaging a variety of farming groups with us, we hope that they will do 
what they proposed to us. We don’t want to play the role of policemen or 
judges. We really do not want to say: “Why don't you do what you promised to 
us?” We don’t want to be taking decision to get our support back. We seek 
those that have a strong motivation to work with us and want to walk in the 
same and long path together ... A set of choices, which make us the most 
confident, is the groups engaging in the networks that we’ve ever worked with 
(Fieldwork  interview  with  Supa  Yaimaung,  director  of  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). 
  Photo 5.5.  Community garden of On-nut Sibsee Rai slum community 
 
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher  200 
 
By  analysing  storytelling  of  the  the  On-nut  Sibsee  Rai  community  and  other 
members  of  the  slum  dwellers  network,  this  study  can  draw  the  narrative-based 
diagram  as  shown  in  Figure  5.5.  In  the  diagram  that  the  On-nut  Sibsee  Rai 
community is located at the centre, this community is close to other slum dwellers 
communities. The community has also a well-connection with the Human Settlement 
Foundation, who is a formal coordinator of the slum dwellers network. The figure 
shows that this community is closer to the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (an 
NGO)  rather  than  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  (a  public  organisation).  It 
avoided connecting to public organisations including the DAOs. Some organisations 
that did not engage with the UA policy network (not included in the Figure 4.2) 
played supportive role for this community. For example, the Thailand Institute of 
Packaging and Recycling Management for Sustainable Environment supported waste 
management  of  this  community  including  composting  organic  waste  for  farming 
purpose. The staff of the Community Organisations Development Institute supported 
the community by facilitating the development of the strategic community planning 
by which the community garden was merged in the plan. 
Figure 5.5 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the 
perspective of the members of the slum dwellers network  
Similar to the Keha-Tung Songhong group, this case did not illustrate clearly how it 
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members of the slum dwellers network. Communicative power is the only power that 
this  organisation  had  and  could  exercise.  The  reputation  and  trust  by  others 
supported its communicative power. The community leader, who was a middle-aged 
man, talked simply from his direct experiences by showcasing what the community 
had done. The power of his communication derived from his sincerity and his solid 
evidence.  One  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm  programme  mentioned  that,  in  her 
opinion, when he participated in any deliberative forums he addressed the voice of 
the poor (Fieldwork interview with Pui Varangkanang, coordinator of the City Farm 
programme,  21/03/2012). He reflected on  how  hard he had  tried to improve the 
quality of life for himself and other community members, which reflects existing 
injustices  and  inequalities.  Chapter  6  will  illustrate  the  communicative  power 
exercised by  this community during  the disaster.  Motivated  by  moral  obligation, 
many citizen groups, particularly the middle class groups, sacrifice their vegetables 
to  flood  victims  as  poor  people  had  sacrificed  their  own  food  for  others.  One 
coordinator of the City Farm programme called this phenomenon the ‘kindness of 
the poor given to the rich’ (Fieldwork interview with Pui Varangkanang, coordinator 
of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). 
5.2. Plural centralities and policy network decentralisation 
The  collected  stories  in  the  previous  section  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  UA 
policy network was shaped by combining various existing actor constellations, or 
policy communities, which had strong and close relations, and shared some form of 
social capital between their members. Each policy community had their centrality, 
which  had  good  connections  and  held  strong  social  capital  with  other  members. 
These  centralities  played  a  role  as  coordinators  of  their  policy  community  and 
exercised  their  power  particularly  over  other  members  of  the  same  policy 
community.  It  also  held  some  forms  of  social  capital  with  the  powerful  actors, 
particularly the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, which allowed bridging across 
policy communities to develop the policy network. There were multi-scales of social 
capital, the first is called ‘bonding’ social capital, which functioned within the policy 
communities. The second and wider scale is called ‘bridging’ social capital and was 
based on the linkages with the powerful actors that played their role at the heart of 
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These two scales of social capital activated the exercise of power in the hierarchy of 
power. The first level of the hierarchy consists of bonding power exercised between 
members of the policy community. Although the centralities did not have a higher 
status determined by a formal hierarchy or legal system, they had power derived 
from developing social capital with other members of the same policy community, as 
mentioned  in  the  previous  section.  They  also  did  not  have  a  formal  position 
legitimising  their  work  as  coordinators  of  the  policy  community,  but  they  were 
allowed  informally  to  work  as  coordinators,  which  facilitated  their  exercise  of 
power,  especially  communicative  power.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  level  or 
upper layer of the power hierarchy consists of bridging power exercised between the 
centralities  and  the  powerful  actors.  Power  between  them  was  not  equal,  for 
powerful  actors  benefitted  from  their  status  in  existing  structures  and  had 
instrumental power to control. For example, gatekeepers validated who could engage 
in the policy network and make final decisions about organising events in the name 
of the City Farm programme.  
From these characteristics of the policy network, we can conclude that power was 
not monopolised by the two powerful actors, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
There was a struggle for power between plural centralities, reflecting some degree of 
decentralisation of the UA policy network in which power was held both by the 
powerful actors in the first place and the centralities of the policy communities in the 
second place. Some degree of decentralisation of the policy network also reflects the 
procedure of engaging organisations and groups in the City Farm programme after 
the programme was endorsed by the committee of the Health Promotion Foundation, 
of  which  the  Prime  Minister  was  the  president.  The  director  of  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation explained how the procedure had started: 
“After we (the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation) agreed to play a central 
role to organise the (City Farm) programme, we began by organising a meeting 
with our ‘friends’ working with city farms. We decided to open to the public to 
submit their proposal to join the programme. Our friends stood by us,  and 
recommended capable organisations or groups that could be asked to join us 
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with  Supa  Yaimaung,  director  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation, 
3/07/2011). 
The policy communities were chosen in the first place and their centralities had a 
role  in  screening  members  that  ‘qualified’  to  be  considered  by  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  and  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  during  the  second 
phase. This procedure reflected the fact that the centralities were gaining decision-
making power of the powerful organisations through decentralisation. To legitimise 
and render the screening process of grant-recipients transparent, organisations and 
individuals who had a good reputation were invited as members of the committee. 
Their reputation was judged by their engagement with topics such as food, nutrition, 
and sustainable agriculture. Three of nine were university scholars who researched 
on relevant topics. The leader of the Working Group on Food for Change was also 
invited as she had worked as part of a think tank on local food systems for many 
years. Her group then played a role in managing the programme closely with the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. Another three members of the committee for the 
screening process were famous trainers, including the director of Media Centre for 
Development,  Prince  (from  Veggie  Prince  training  centre),  and  Chookeit  (from 
Suwannabhumi  training  centre),  whose  training  centres  later  became  part  of  the 
programme. Members of the social enterprises’ policy community were not the only 
ones to be asked to open training programmes for the City Farm programme; some 
also took part in the screening process of the recipient farming groups, as they were 
recognised by the public based on their good knowledge and farming skills in the 
city,  particularly  in  the  media  or  by  their  trainees.  The  two  final  members  and 
leaders of the committee were the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
and a representative of the Health Promotion Foundation. The study found that all 
nine  members  worked  with  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  before  the 
screening process, which means that apart from their reputation, they had developed 
the trust of the powerful actor of the policy network. Although the centralities of the 
policy  communities  were  not  members  of  the  committee,  apart  from  the  Media 
Centre for Development, they had an influence on the screening process through a 
deliberative process behind the scenes, as can be confirmed by their capacity to put 
forward members of their policy community to be grant recipients.  204 
 
After the City Farm programme launched an open call for joining proposals, there 
were 84 project submissions from 84 groups during the first year of which only 50 
were  selected.  However,  four-fifths  of  the  selected  proposals  came  from 
communities recommended by the District Administration Offices, members of the 
Green Market Network, members of the slum dwellers network, and members of the 
informal  labour  network  as  shown  in  the  table  5.1.  Moreover,  the  UA  social 
enterprises  had  been  selected  by  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  at  the 
suggestion of the Media Centre for Development to become training centres without 
the need to apply or pass through any formal and transparent selection processes.  
  Table  5.1.  Citizen  groups  whose  proposal  was  selected  and  then 
engaged with the City Farm programme in 2010/2011 
Policy communities  Number of groups 
District Administration Offices (to recommend)  13 
Informal labour network   10 
Green Market Network  9 
Slum dwellers network  7 
Others/do not direct relate to any policy communities  11 
Total  50 
 
There were two ways of organising the collective actions of the UA policy network. 
The  first  was  through  powerful  actors,  namely  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation. They initiated collective action 
and demanded the cooperation from policy communities through their centralities as 
well as opened up for other organisations and groups to join. The cooperation of the 
policy communities guaranteed that each collective action became possible, while 
the cooperation of the others was meaningful for it widened participation. Secondly, 
the  policy  communities  initiated collective  action and the powerful  actors of  the 205 
 
policy network played a role as promoters who supported other organisations and 
groups across policy communities to join. These strategies were both top-down and 
bottom-up initiatives within the hierarchy of the decentralised policy network.  
Although the vertical relations within the policy network shaped its decentralisation, 
the horizontal relations among members of each policy community and across them 
makes  this  policy  network  different  from  decentralised  bureaucratic  hierarchical 
relations.  As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  the  centralities  of  each  policy 
community coordinated other members rather than control them. Unlike the power 
of  control  of  the  upper  levels  to  the  lower  levels  of  the  same  organisational 
hierarchy, these organisations and groups did not have formal power within the flat 
relationships between its members. Instead, the power that the centralities mainly 
exercised  was  communicative  power,  as  addressed  in  Section  5.1.  While  the 
cooperation  across  decentralised  bureaucratic  hierarchies  generally  depended  on 
deals between top managers of different governmental agencies, cooperation across 
policy communities within the policy network did not depend on deals between their 
centralities in every case. This study found that there were many complex informal 
links among members of different policy communities depending on how their social 
capital had developed and shaped their relations. They connected with each other by 
developing their own informal communicative forums, not just by being coordinated 
through  their  centralities  or  the  powerful  actors.  For  example,  the  study  found 
complex  relationships,  which  are  hard  to  draw,  between  members  of  the  social 
enterprise policy community and members of the Green Market Network’s policy 
community.  They  were  middle  and  upper  class  people  who  had  many  things  in 
common. They had informal chats across policy communities through opportunities 
occurring in daily life. It was commonly found that many members of the two policy 
communities were in direct contact with members of another policy community with 
specific  requests  without  reporting  or  informing  their  centrality.  This  study  also 
found that later, some of them seemed to engage with both policy communities, 
while others seemed to move from one to the other. These changes were mainly a 
consequence  of  the  extension  of  the  community-supported  agricultural  system 
through which many social enterprises transformed themselves to be green producers 
and connected amongst themselves to meet green customers and restaurants engaged 
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degree of decentralisation of the policy network was a mix of vertical and horizontal 
relations. 
Moreover, some degree of decentralisation of the policy network does not facilitate 
static  relations  between  organisations  and  groups  within  it.  Even  the  powerful 
hegemonic actors were still often challenged. For example, this study found that 
some social enterprises often had more influence on the policy network than the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and Health Promotion Foundation. During the 
flooding,  which  will  be  highlighted  in  the  next  two  chapters,  the  Organic  Way, 
Veggie Prince and Suwannabhumi training centres, who led the policy epistemic 
(knowledge partnership), played a dominant role in guiding the policy network in 
promoting  food  innovations,  while  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  could 
merely support and the Health Promotion Foundation could not do anything even if 
it disagreed with some of their ideas. The dynamics of relations within the policy 
network also reflected the emergence of new powerful organisations and groups that 
developed  stronger  social  capital  and  subsequently  had  more  influence  on  the 
governance  of  the  policy  network.  For  example,  after  the  policy  network  had 
operated for two years, the online group, which was not a member of any policy 
community and submitted its grant proposal without any back up, developed from a 
network of friends to be a network of strangers and became a large group. It created 
and led collective actions, such as the monthly meeting ‘sharing food in the park’, 
during which each member cooked food they had grown themselves to share with 
others. During the meeting, they also shared problems, challenges, and new ideas. 
This event started  with a  meeting  of  group members who connected and shared 
stories with one another online. Then other organisations and groups engaged in the 
policy network became interested in joining until the event became one of the main 
forms of collective action in the name of the whole policy network. This event also 
helped the policy network to initiate events, consult its members, update on progress, 
publicise  forthcoming  activities,  and  transfer  information  and  knowledge  to  its 
members. Although in the end the powerful actors of the policy network took over 
the initiative from the online group, the role of this group still illustrates that power 
relations between organisations and groups engaging in the policy network was not 
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5.3. Shared rules, instrumental power, and exclusion 
Understanding  the  characterisation  of  the  policy  network  does  not  just  involve 
identifying who was included and who could exercise power, but also understanding 
who was excluded and why. This study found that although this UA policy network 
was not a closed network, some organisations and groups were welcome and others 
were excluded. By using an Ostromian lens, this study found that pre-existing shared 
rules affected the exclusion of some organisations and groups who were found, or 
even found themselves, not to fit with the rules. There were four major rules of the 
policy  network,  which  excluded  some  organisations  and  groups:  ‘must  not  seek 
profit’, ‘must not use chemicals’, ‘must not engage in mono-cropping’, and ‘must 
seek innovations’.  
Firstly,  the  ‘must  not  seek  profit’  principle  was  shared  between  the  powerful 
organisations of the policy network and the centralities of the policy communities 
that  could  exercise  instrumental  power  over  others  under  the  decentralised 
governance of the policy network. This rule prohibited the use of grants to earn 
money  apart  from  selling  surplus  products  to  sustain  their  collective  garden. 
Similarly, UA enterprises had to contribute to society while at the same time doing 
business by using financial support from the programme to organise free training for 
more and wider target groups. This rule was recognised by everyone, because it was 
set as an important condition before any of them decided to join the programme. It 
was  set  by  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  and  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation, who were legitimised to exercise this instrumental power, as the former 
was the funder and the latter was the programme manager. They enforced their role 
both during the screening process and when monitoring members’ performances.   
This  rule  enforcement  led  to  the  exclusion  of  many  organisations  and  groups 
working  on  UA  to  generate  income.  The  main  case  was  the  exclusion  of  the 
enterprise ‘Green Made’, which was an outsider that had attempted to engage with 
the City Farm programme and had not succeeded in doing so during the period of 
this study. An interview with the leader of the enterprise found that her group of 
young people developed a vegetable  garden in the inner city of  Bangkok to sell 
organic products directly to the customers. She said that her group wanted to prove 
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found that this enterprise had the capacity to do so. The enterprise developed their 
own  brand  and  initiated  a  variety  of  packaging,  promotions  and  types  of  food 
processing. Green Made also developed a niche market and adopted various market 
innovations, such as veggie-box delivery and advertised products online. The leader 
said  that  although  her  enterprise  did  not  contact  the  City  Farm  programme 
coordinators to join the programme, her enterprise often brought its products to sell 
at the events organised in the name of City Farm programme until someone she 
refused to name told her that her group was not allowed to sell any products there 
(Fieldwork interview with Khun Oue, member of staff of Green Made, 13/03/2012). 
One of the coordinators of the City Farm programme was interviewed about this but 
did  not  mention  clearly  the  Green  Made  enterprise.  Although  the  City  Farm 
programme  had  engaged  with  some  enterprises,  the  programme  expected  their 
support  to  be  for  social  purposes.  In  her  view,  the  members  of  the  city  farm 
association had social aims while doing business as they were widely referred to as 
social enterprises. They organised training for free, which poor and marginalised 
groups could access. They also spent time participating in collective events focused 
on talking and sharing knowledge, experiences and even inputs, which did not make 
money. The coordinator asked for her opinion on the social benefits derived from the 
members of the Green Market Network. She mentioned that Green Market Network 
activities supported sustainable local food systems through their weekly local green 
markets and the community-supported agricultural system (Fieldwork interview with 
Pui  Varangkanang,  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm  programme,  21/03/2012).  In 
addition,  another  coordinator  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  also 
mentioned  that  the  Green  Market  Network  contributed  to  society  by  developing 
more trustable organic food sources compared to organic food labels sold in modern 
trade  supermarkets.  She  explained  that  in  an  era  in  which  we  cannot  trust 
supermarkets as they were randomly tested to find chemical contamination in food 
packages  labelled  as  organic  food,  the  Green  Market  Network  could  provide  an 
alternative  system,  which  customers  participated  in,  guaranteeing  organic  food 
(Fieldwork  interview  with  Nardsiri  Komonpan,  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm 
programme, 21/03/2012).  209 
 
In the view of the two coordinators, although members of the city farm association 
and the Green Market Network did business, they could be included because they 
also took part in developing a better society. In contrast, Green Made was excluded 
as it could not prove that it did not just seek profits but also had social concerns. An 
interview with the leader of the enterprise found that, being engaged in full-time 
farming,  this  enterprise  was  not  available  for  collective  events,  which  did  not 
contribute much to its business. It also did not aim to organise training, unlike many 
members of the city farm association, as that was not one of its strengths. Besides, 
this enterprise was not engaged closely with the Green Market Network as it had 
developed its own markets and thought that the existing markets were located too far 
from its vegetable garden (Fieldwork interview with Khun Oue, member of staff of 
Green Made, 13/03/2012).   
Secondly, the rule prohibiting the use of chemicals led to the exclusion of some 
groups. The anti-chemical rule was developed from the common objective of the 
City Farm programme to develop an alternative, more sustainable food system. The 
reason  for  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation to endorse this programme was to fill a gap within the mainstream food 
system, which depended highly on chemical input. Data provided by the Thailand 
Foundation  for  Consumers  surveyed  during  March  to  July  2012  show  that  Q 
standard  vegetable  (passing  food  safety  standards)  sold  in  modern  trade 
supermarkets around Bangkok were contaminated by chemicals 16.8 times higher 
than the European Union (EU) standard (Thailand Foundation for Consumers, 2012). 
The EU has also rejected many kinds of exported vegetables after they were tested 
for  chemical  contamination  since  2007  (Thailand  Information  Centre  for  Civil 
Rights and Investigative Journalism, 2012). As part of the sustainable agriculture 
movement,  the  City  Farm  programme  aimed  to  support  local  organic  food 
production. At least, the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the 
leader of the Working Group on Food for Change expressed that they could not hope 
to make a change in rural agriculture as it was been shaped by the mainstream food 
system which is intensive in its chemical use, while they see hope for the urban 
sector. The word ‘sustainability’ seems ambiguous but it was a minimal requirement 
to be an organic farmer to achieve sustainable results in the eyes of rule-makers such 
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the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change.  It  became  a  clearly  stated  rule  in  the 
rationale of the programme, while every member had already asked whether it could 
share the rule before agreeing to engage with the programme in the first place (a rule 
of engagement).   
This rule, however, became a cause of exclusion of some groups practising UA. 
Because many of them emphasised productivity rather than process as they needed 
quantity rather than quality, some organisations and farming  groups thought that 
they were not so picky about organic production. They thought that to use a few 
chemicals for some processes such as the first stage was fine. Their opinion was that 
chemical contamination happened everywhere. We needed to avoid it as much as 
possible but not so much as to aim to live without it at all. They also thought that to 
clean the products before eating reduced chemical contamination in vegetables. They 
were  also  not  so  picky  about  buying  vegetables  from  markets.  This  category  of 
people  can  be  called  ‘flexible  organic’.  To  ban  non-organic  products  meant 
excluding  many  producers  who  could  not  devote  such  efforts  and  time  to  food 
growing. It also excluded customers who accepted to take the risk when they thought 
these products were more sustainably produced than in the mainstream markets.  
This study found that the exclusion happened both during the screening process by 
the  powerful  organisations  and  centralities  and  through  the  decisions  of 
organisations and groups themselves. For the latter, they either did not engage from 
the beginning or faded away from the policy network later, when they were irritated 
by such strict rules. This rule also became a barrier for lower class groups, such as 
some slum communities and informal workers, compared to middle and upper class 
groups, such as some members of the Green Market Network. The latter could afford 
to buy food but decided to grow their own to avoid chemicals and began to distrust 
organic food labels from supermarkets. In contrast, the urban poor aimed to produce 
adequate food to reduce the cost of food rather than being serious about organic 
production.  Although  the  rule  of  organic  production  had  become  more  flexible 
during  and  shortly  after  the  flooding,  as  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  7,  many 
farming groups had already missed the opportunity to gain support and other benefits 
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Thirdly, ‘must not engage in mono-cropping’ was a rule shared by members of the 
City Farm programme as a requirement to join the City Farm programme was to 
grow a variety of foods. This rule emerged from the idea of increasing biodiversity 
in the city. It also relied on a belief that eating a variety of food could guarantee 
better nutrition. To demand a non-mono-cropping strategy was therefore part of the 
challenge to mainstream agricultural production shaped by the Green Revolution. As 
raised earlier, the emergence of the UA policy network departed from the existing 
food regime. The image of mono-cropping is as an intensive form of chemical and 
commercial farming, which is unfriendly to humans, social relations and ecology. 
This rule caused the exclusion of full-time farmers on the urban fringes, particularly 
those who not only produce food for profit but also engaged in chemical mono-
cropping. They could not position themselves in the UA policy network as they still 
took part in the mainstream food regime, which in turn meant that they did not have 
a chance to get funding and other support from the City Farm programme. 
Lastly, ‘must seek innovations’ is another shared rule of the UA policy network. As 
urban geography is quite different from rural geography, the powerful organisations 
and centralities of policy communities believed that food innovations were required 
to deal with space limits. The policy network organised several events to create and 
share food innovations, such as vertical gardens, container gardens, rooftop gardens, 
energy  and water  saving  gardens, etc. Each  innovation  was  categorised in many 
ways, such as innovations for household gardening, community gardening, growing 
food in buildings, etc. Proposed innovations also included making fertilisers, enzyme 
ionic plasma, gardening, harvesting, and marketing. Many social enterprises working 
as training centres and city farm think tanks played a leading role in offering further 
innovations. The practices adopted by each farming group also became sources of 
innovation. The coordinator of the City Farm programme from the Health Promotion 
Foundation repeatedly expressed that one of the successes of the programme was its 
capacity to develop various innovations to inspire city dwellers to start growing their 
own food (Fieldwork interview with Veerapong Kreungsinyod, coordinator of City 
Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011). However, this 
rule caused the exclusion of many city farmers and gardeners who preferred and had 
developed their farms or gardens in traditional ways. Many of them proved that it is 
not always true that traditional farming cannot be applied in an urban setting. In 212 
 
other words, it is not necessary to separate rural and urban agriculture, as knowledge 
and technologies can be transferred across them. For example, Jitrutda farm located 
in the central city practised ‘rural’ farming. It became a learning centre for rural 
methods, located  in the  city. The pilot projects of the King  and  the  Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives usually operated here before extending to rural areas. 
Jitrutda farm had been developed for rural farming development for 53 years (since 
1961) but did not raise any concerns that farming in the city was different from 
farming  in  rural  areas,  requiring  specific  attention.  In  contrast,  the  farm  was 
developed  under  the  belief  that  knowledge  and  technologies  for  farming  could 
transfer whatever the location. This perspective derives from the centralisation of 
Thai bureaucracy. Institutions are centralised in Bangkok, the primate city, including 
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Cooperatives  and  its  units  for  research  and 
development. When one coordinator of the City Farm programme was asked about 
her opinion on Jitrutda farm, she said it is ‘rural farming in the city’, reflecting that 
she did not count this garden as a city farm.     
5.4. Shared norms, structural and communicative powers, and exclusion 
Shared norms excluded some groups through the structural power and the ability of 
powerful organisations to benefit from them through the exercise of communicative 
power.  In  the  case  of  exclusion  derived  from  shared  norms  and  their  power 
embedded  in  the  socio-cultural  structure,  this  study  found  that  norms  developed 
some conditions facilitating and welcoming certain organisations and groups that 
shared  such  norms,  to  engage  with  each  other.  In  contrast,  they  constructed 
constraints  excluding  other  organisations  and  groups  that  did  not  share  them.  A 
major example is the shared norm about promoting the ‘green’ agenda, which is 
based on the idea that a good environment is fundamental for better livelihoods. This 
norm is shared more strongly among middle and upper class groups, while poor and 
marginalised groups engaging with the policy network were more concerned with 
the importance of improving community ecology and reusing household waste to 
make  fertilisers.  This  study  noticed  that  many  policy  network’s  constituent 
organisations and groups, particularly members of the Green Market Network and 
social enterprises, thought that they were particularly concerned with a healthy earth 
and their own health compared to laypeople. The interviews also reflect that even the 213 
 
slum  communities  engaging  in  the  City  Farm  programme  were  proud  that  their 
communities were better than slum communities in general as they improved and 
maintained a good ecology. In other words, this norm activated the power of the 
socio-cultural structure by giving a sense that sharing made one better, while the 
people  who  adopted  the  norm  usually  blamed  others  for  not  being  similarly 
concerned. It created a sense of us and them, in which ‘us’ were privileged over 
‘them’.  
The norm that privileges green culture also excluded some farming groups from the 
policy network. For example, the slum community ‘Bang Bour’ was excluded from 
the City Farm programme as it was overlooked by powerful organisations of the 
policy  network  and  not  recommended  by  the  slum  dwellers  network.  This  slum 
community  is  located  along  the  river  and  is  breaking  the  law  as  they  were  not 
permitted to build their houses less than 100 m
2from the river. One reason that they 
were  not  recommended  to  engage  with  the  City  Farm  programme  was  that  the 
community had not proved that it would share clear green concerns, such as reusing 
local  resources  and  household  waste.  The  community  contributed  to  what  was 
considered  a ‘bad’ urban ecology, by polluting river water, being surrounded by 
dense  housing  and  rotting  waste  that  spread  a  bad  odour.  While  other  slum 
communities that were engaged in the City Farm programme were concerned about 
improving the quality of their environment, this community ignored it altogether. An 
interview with a Human Settlement Foundation member of staff showed thatone of 
the characteristics of the community was that people living there did not aim to live 
there permanently, while other slum communities aimed to protect their living space 
as  it had  been  a struggle to  gain the  permission to live there.  The ‘Bang  Bour’ 
community on the other hand, had struggled for a better life and would then move 
away, so they were not concerned with improving their community ecology, but 
rather spent time and effort on working hard for an opportunity to move away. The 
member of staff from the Human Settlement Foundation therefore argued that they 
did not have a sense of home there (Fieldwork interview with Khun Nhooy, member 
of staff of Human Settlement Foundation, 11/01/2012).  
This community showed that it was concerned with a ‘brown’ rather than ‘green’ 
agenda, which included an awareness of food security by practising UA, including 214 
 
floating vegetable gardens located in the river (see photo 5.6). Each household also 
tried to grow food in their limited space, including by developing hanging gardens, 
container gardens, and small rooftop gardens where possible. This study concludes 
that this community practised UA as a resilient livelihood enhancement strategy for 
each household because they did not have any specific patterns and did not organise 
collective action to develop collective gardens. Each household just tried to garden 
as  much  as  it  could  to  reduce  food  costs.  The  members  of  the  community  also 
practised UA as a strategy to adapt to a changing climate as the community often 
experienced floods from an increasing level of water in the river. Thus they realised 
the  significant  role  of  UA  for  food  security  during  shocks.  This  case  became  a 
critical one when the powerful organisations within the policy network, who were 
concerned with a green agenda, gave the opinion that food grown by this community 
could be contaminated, particularly the floating garden along the river, for the water 
was polluted. The Health Promotion Foundation, in particular, promoted UA as a 
strategy  for  health  promotion.  UA  was  recognised  by  the  Health  Promotion 
Foundation as an alternative source of food which can be safer than food grown from 
general mono-cropping rural agriculture. Promoting UA was therefore not just about 
encouraging people to grow any food, but specifically about creating good practices 
in communities that can be learning centres on healthy food production within the 
city. That is why the Health Promotion Foundation overlooked the ‘Bang Bour’ slum 
community. It created poorly nutritious food, which was not a good practice that 
other communities could learn from. The exclusion of ‘Bang Bour’ reflects the norm 
that  green  culture  became  the  standard  criterion  to  evaluate  appropriate  and 
inappropriate choices, although it was not a rule. This norm had the power embedded 
in the socio-cultural structure to legitimise the powerful organisations to exclude this 
community,  as  agreed  by  many  other  members  of  the  policy  network,  including 
other slum communities.   
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  Photo  5.6.  Floating  gardens  along  the  river  near  Bang  Bour  slum 
community  
   
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher  
Beyond the fact that shared norms have power within the socio-cultural structure, 
they  also  support  the  exercise  of  communicative  power,  which  can  lead  to  the 
exclusion  of  others.  This  study  could  not  find  a  clear  link  with  the  case  of  the 
exclusion of the ‘Bang Bour’ community. However, the case of the exclusion of 
agricultural input traders does reflect this. The exclusion of the input traders was not 
a  rule  but  it  was  promoted  to  members  of  the  City  Farm  programme  by  the 
coordinators of the programme, both by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and 
the Health Promotion Foundation. The promotion through communication was made 
by referring to the self-reliance norm. This norm challenges dependency on others 
rather than on ourselves. The promotion of UA in Bangkok started from the worst 
situation of the economic crisis at the time and it was introduced as a self-sufficiency 
strategy promoted by the King, as discussed in Chapter 1. The idea of UA happened 
alongside the idea of self-sufficiency from the beginning, which was reflected in 
interviews with many leaders of the policy network’s constituent organisations and 
groups,  who  argued  that  promoting  UA  by  the  policy  network  was  subsistence-
oriented.
2 
                                                 
2 It can be noticed from the interviews that many relevant people within the City Farm 
programme  rejected  the  idea  that  a  lack  of  food  could  be  fixed  by  reshaping  food 
distribution within the existing food chains and systems rather than trying to depend on 
oneself by growing one’s own food. On the other hand, they believe strongly that to enhance 
food self-reliance through UA is possible and significant. 216 
 
The ‘Do It Yourself’ proverb became a campaign of the powerful organisations, that 
had the power to convince others through its roots in the aforementioned norm. This 
norm therefore supported the exercise of communicative power. Other members of 
the  policy  network  agreed  with  low  input  methods,  reusing  local  waste  and 
materials. They also sought to produce their own inputs, such as soil and fertiliser. 
To  produce  their  own  inputs  meant  to  reduce  reliance  on  buying  them  from 
agricultural input traders. This promotion led to the exclusion of input traders who 
avoided challenging the norm and claimed their importance in the food chain as it 
related to the King speech. As a consequence, this norm created boundaries of what 
was  acceptable,  thinkable,  and  speakable.  The  exercise  of  communicative  power 
referring  to  this  norm  could  distort  communication  by  making  some  issues 
unspoken, which is also a way to exclude. Thus the UA policy network did not 
engage with any agricultural input traders, which meant that they did not have equal 
opportunities  to  gain  support  from  the  public  budget  through  the  City  Farm 
programme as many other groups in the food chain had.  
Conclusions 
This chapter examined how the policy network became shaped and characterised by 
exploring who was included and who, apart from the powerful organisations, held 
power.  This  chapter  also  examined  how  social  capital  of  the  aforementioned 
centralities  related  to  power  and  how  power  shaped  the  policy  network’s 
characteristics. The chapter discussed how the policy network was decentralised in 
some degree and period (at least during the period of this study) through the power 
exercised  by  the  centrality  of  each  policy  community.  The  focus  was  also  on 
analysing  the  exclusion  of  some  organisations  and  groups  as  a  consequence  of 
shared rules and norms, which activated various dimensions of power to include and 
exclude. 
Through  the  analysis  the  connected  arenas  of  the  role  of  social  capital  were 
addressed starting from its role in facilitating the emergence of the policy network 
and  moving  to  its  role  in  characterising  it  and  which  types  of  power  brought  it 
together.  As  analysed  in  this  chapter,  the  powerful  organisations  could  not 
monopolise power and control the policy network at the centre due to the degree of 
decentralisation of the governance system propelled by the policy network. There 217 
 
were various policy communities within the policy network who had their own aims 
and sub-norms as a result of their differences in life expectations in relation to their 
social and economic background. Cooperation problems and conflicts were present 
and embedded in the policy network characterisation in many forms and different 
degrees  of  complexity.  The  next  two  chapters  will  examine  the  main  collective 
action problems faced by the policy network and analyse how they were overcome in 
the  context  of  the  floods.  In  this  context,  the  policy  network’s  constituent 
organisations and groups had to work together and mobilise massive cooperation by 
also  including  outsiders  who  they  had  previously  excluded,  to  show  their 
collaborative capacity other than in a normal situation. Thus another two pieces of 
the jigsaw will be introduced to achieve a full picture of the role of social capital in 
the emergence, characterisation and driven of the policy network in turbulent times. 218 
 
Chapter 6 
The role of social capital in enhancing 
cooperation in times of crisis 
 
Introduction 
The policy network required cooperation to mobilise collective actions for coping 
with food-related issues during the flooding. The powerful actors and centralities of 
the policy communities within the policy network (the core actors) could not force 
other organisations and groups to work for them during such period (between mid-
November 2011 and early-January 2012). So, cooperation by each organisation and 
group  was  made  based  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Generally-speaking,  coordination 
problems,  such  as  free-riding  and  opportunism  are  found  in  policy  network 
governance (deLeon and Varda, 2009; Sorensen and Torfing, 2008). However, this 
study found that during and shortly after the flooding in Bangkok, the coordination 
problems of the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) were overcome as there 
was evidence of intensive collective action between the policy network’s members 
during this period.  
In order to examine the role of social capital in times of crisis, this chapter analyses 
how it determines the quality of the policy network in enhancing cooperation. This 
chapter argues that social capital supports the role of core actors (as facilitators) in 
making agreement on the reason to cooperate through communicative process. This 
chapter starts with the remarkable levels of cooperation between members of the 
policy  network  during  and  shortly  after  the  flooding.  The  analysis  then  turns  to 
examine  how  agreement  between  policy  network's  constituent  organisations  and 
groups  on  reasons  for  cooperation  influences  their  decision  to  cooperate.  This 
chapter discusses the contestation between different policy epistemics (knowledge 
partnerships)  that  propose  their  arguments  through  communication  to  convince 
others to agree with them and persuade others to support. The analysis examines 
how the decision of the policy network’s constituent organisations and groups to 
cooperate  was related  to  the achievement  of the core  actors that lead  the policy 
epistemic  (as  cooperative  facilitators)  in  addressing  a  better  argument  and 219 
 
establishing practical reasons. The focus of the analysis is on how different forms of 
social capital play a role in the communicative process. In doing so, communicative 
fora  are analysed by adopting rhetorical analysis (by analysing ethos, logos, and 
pathos)  to  investigate  the  role  of  core  actors  and  social  capital  held  by  them  in 
making  agreement.  To  analyse  logos,  Fischer's  logic  of  policy  deliberation  is 
integrated to understand how the practical reason and better argument are made as 
discussed in 2.4 and shown in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 6 
 
6.1. Cooperation during and shortly after the flooding 
During the flooding period, there were multiple demands for cooperation between 
the policy actors to organise collective actions, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Firstly, 
there were demands for cooperation to provide food for the most vulnerable people 
during the disaster, particularly to provide vegetables to improve nutrition. Some 
members  of  the  UA  policy  network  were  asked  to  collect  vegetables  from  their 
gardens while others were responsible for distributing them. These collective actions 
engaged a large number of actors towards working together. Secondly, there were 
demands for cooperation to provide materials (including a sprout-growing bucket, a 220 
 
mushroom-growing set, sets to grow vegetables in containers, a strainer, and a sun 
power  rice  cooking  box)  and  know-how  to  produce  emergency  food.  The social 
enterprises functioning as training centres played a key role in this type of collective 
action, while the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food 
for Change and the members of the Green Market Network supported them. Thirdly, 
cooperation was needed to develop food innovations for living with water. The food 
innovations included vertical and rooftop gardens, floating gardens, and food grown 
in containers and bags. Fourthly, mutual aid during the flooding improved the social 
safety net but also required the cooperation of many actors. These actors included 
farming groups that worked closely with the Green Market Network and were either 
producers  or  customers  engaged  in  the  community  supported  agriculture  system, 
facilitated  mainly  by  the  Green  Market  Network,  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation  and  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change.  Lastly,  many  actors 
cooperated to challenge the priorities of the government and the centralised food 
distribution of the mainstream food system. These movements engaged many actors 
who were present in various ways, for instance, by opening spaces for discussions 
and by sharing criticisms on their websites and Facebook pages.  
Shortly after the flooding, the same actors also cooperated to organise collective 
activities. There was, first of all, cooperation for collective actions to recover city 
farms of City Farm programme members. These collective actions were organised 
mainly  by  the  slum  dwellers  and  the  informal  labour  network  because  the 
community gardens that were recovered were primarily cultivated by the farming 
groups that were part of these networks. Other actors joined the events as volunteer 
workers.  These  collective  actions  were  organised,  particularly  through  an  online 
group, to build collective gardens for vulnerable groups who were not members of 
the  policy  network.  For example, they  helped  a children’s and women’s nursing 
home to build a vegetable garden with the cooperation of many members of the 
policy network over a six week period. Moreover, there were demands to cooperate 
in  collecting  and  sharing  seeds.  Such  collective  actions  were  organised  by 
encouraging  citizen  groups  affected  by  the  flooding  to  begin  their  new  growing 
season.  Last  but  not  least,  there  was  wide  cooperation  through  various  events 
organised  to  raise  awareness  about  urban  food  security,  the  right  to  food, 
environmental sustainability, and climate change adaptation. A public campaign was 221 
 
the main approach employed by the coordinators of the City Farm programme to 
raise awareness about these issues through the website and Facebook page of the 
programme, while the websites and Facebook pages of other actors were used for 
support by tagging and sharing. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Health 
Promotion Foundation, the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group 
on Food for Change played a key role as organisers of the aforementioned events 
and activities and in opening spaces for discussion and social mobilisation. 
At an interview conducted during the fieldwork, the coordinator of the City Farm 
programme  reflected  that  during  and  shortly  after  the  flooding,  many  actors 
cooperated in each event. This was remarkable in comparison to times when no such 
crisis  called  upon  the  network  members  to  be  mobilised.  During  mid-November 
2011 to early-January 2012, there were roughly 80 to 120 organisations and groups 
cooperating with the organisers of each activity (Second fieldwork interview with 
Nardsiri  Komonpan,  coordinator  of  City  Farm  programme,  21/03/2012).  This 
number shows that the majority of the policy network’s members had participated in 
the collective actions undertaken during and soon after the floods. Although most of 
them  did  not  join  every  single  activity,  the  core  actors,  particularly  the  Health 
Promotion Foundation, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Media Centre for 
Development  and  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change,  engaged  in  every 
activity,  and  they  also  played a role  in organising the majority  of the  collective 
events.  
A  particular  case  of  mobilising  support  to  produce  and  distribute  locally-made 
effective  microorganism  (EM)  balls  (see  photo  6.1)  must  be  highlighted  here.  It 
illustrates  the  remarkable  level  of  collective  action  that  succeeded  in  enhancing 
cooperation.  This  collective  action  became  a  topic  of  conversation  between 
inhabitants  of  the  town.  More  than  120  of  the  policy  network’s  constituent 
organisations and groups actively engaged in the activity and the initiative was also 
recognised,  legitimised  and  supported  by  external  organisations,  groups  and 
individuals, including the central government and the prime minister herself. The 
collective  action  aimed  to  adapt  locally-made  EM  balls,  which  derive  from 
traditional  agricultural  practices  to  improve  soil  quality,  to  produce  short-term 
vegetables as  emergency  food and  to  reduce polluted water. The EM balls were 222 
 
made and used widely, which was led by the UA policy network although there were 
some challenges from experts, including members of the policy network, particularly 
university environmental scientists who argued that more time was needed than the 
flooding period to enhance soil quality enough to grow food, and they would not 
reduce but rather, increase waste. 
  Photo 6.1. Effective microorganism balls 
    
Sources: Photo use authorised by Sudhep Kulsri and Nakorn Limpacuptathavon  
Roughly 75,000 EM balls were made and distributed to city dwellers from every 
node of the network each day. Approximately 2,000 volunteers joined daily in the 
making and allocation of the EM balls (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, 
an event organiser of the Green Market Network, the former of Organic Way and 
owner of Health-Me Organic Delivery, 17/02/2012). The media were also interested, 
broadcasting  and  reporting  this  action  in  several  opportunities.  Many  celebrities, 
including  famous  singers,  actresses  and  actors  of  well-known  television  dramas, 
publicly endorsed this initiative. When the Prime Minister visited flood victims by 
boat on 3
rd November 2011, she threw EM balls along the river to legitimise and 
validate the use of this method. The regional and local governments also widely 
supported this idea. They organised centres for EM ball making and provided staff, 
trucks and boats to allocate EM balls to city dwellers and to throw them into the 
waste water. Although the joining of these EM ball movements by laypeople outside 
the policy network may be seen as a product of remarkable advertising campaign, 
cooperation  between  policy  network's  constituent  organisations  and  groups  that 223 
 
organised  these  collective  activities  was  based  on  many  forms  of  social  capital, 
which will be discussed throughout this chapter. 
6.2.  Reciprocity  and  moral  obligation  as  linkages  between  agreement  and 
decision-making to cooperate  
The  analysis  of  this  section  focuses  the  role  of  social  capital  including  moral 
obligation and reciprocity in bridging an agreement on a reason for cooperating and 
the decision making to cooperate (from agree to take action) as highlighted in figure 
6.2. The analysis is also related to the debate between Institutional Rational Choice 
(IRC) and Communicative Action Theory (CAT) on the different assumptions about 
the nature of each policy actor: self-interest individual VS altruist. IRC assumes that 
each  actor  decides  to  cooperate  as  a  consequence  of  expectable  mutual  interests 
gaining from cooperation (reciprocity), while CAT is more sensitive to a decision to 
cooperate  as  a  result  of  moral  obligation  of  each  altruist  actor.  The  following 
discussion in this section will be based on this focus.  
Figure 6.2 Focus of the analysis of section 6.2 
By illustrating with the case of locally-made EM balls, many of the policy network’s 
members agreed with the benefits of these balls, which influenced their decision to 
cooperate. Although some agreed based on their own experiences, others agreed only 
after learning through communication with others. This was, in particular, the case 
for middle and upper class groups who were not initially familiar with EM products. 
Before analysing how so many people agreed to make and use locally-made EM 224 
 
balls (as illustrated in photo 6.2), this section explains the first critical entry point in 
which  some  forms  of  social  capital,  including  reciprocity  and  moral  obligation, 
played  a  role  in  enhancing  cooperation  by  linking  agreement  to  the  decision  to 
cooperate among policy network's constituent organisations and groups (before they 
achieved  this  by  creating  a  high  profile  orchestrated  campaign  that  welcomed 
outsiders of the network).  
  Photo 6.2.  Collective actions to make and use effective microorganism 
balls 
   
Sources:  Photos  taken  by  Sudhep  Kulsri  and  captured  from  Thai  free  television 
programme channel 3 
6.2.1. Reciprocity, agreement and the decision to cooperate 
When an organisation or group disagrees with something they tend not to cooperate. 
In contrast, when the policy network's constituent organisations and groups agree, 
they  tend  to  cooperate,  as  mentioned  by  the  coordinator  of  the  City  Farm 
programme: “We pay attention while talking. When we reach an agreement with our 
colleagues,  they  would  join  us  as  partners”  (Second  fieldwork  interview  with 
Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). However, 
this does not mean that when people agree they will always decide to cooperate. 
Agreement and cooperation relate to one another but they also need linkages. This 
study found that a reciprocal relationship between the policy network's constituent 
organisations and groups was one of possible linkages between agreement and the 
decision to cooperate as some organisations and groups had shared the benefits of 
making and using EM balls. For example, the agreement and active cooperation with 225 
 
EM ball promotion among social enterprises illustrated their consolidation in society, 
which  made  their  arguments  more  valid  and  increased  their  credibility  as  local 
practitioners or local think tanks that were be able to guide society in their area of 
expertise based on local knowledge. This image could benefit them in maintaining 
their connections, enhancing their reputation, and extending their future customers 
(including trainees). They realised that if they did not agree or take action they may 
not be able to gain mutual benefits.  
Many farming groups that were members of the policy network could also expect to 
benefit from cooperating with EM ball production as they agreed that this farming 
method would work in coping with the flooding. They could benefit mutually from 
sharing local inputs (materials) which they needed to make EM balls and then took 
some  of  these  back  to  share  the  benefits  of  the  product.  These  farming  groups 
expected that if each group agreed to make and use EM balls by deciding to make 
them  themselves  instead  of  cooperating,  each  group  may  not  have  had  adequate 
inputs, such as materials and knowledge, or sufficient products. Moreover, collective 
activities  to  make  and  use  EM  balls  organised  in  and  around  Bangkok  became 
interactive spaces for many organisations and groups where a sense of friendship 
developed.  They  could  expect  to  gain  reciprocated  benefits  from  sharing  their 
experiences and concerns, expressing their feelings and learning while joining such 
collective activities.  
  6.2.2. Moral obligation, agreement and the decision to cooperate 
Moral obligation could also be seen as a link between agreeing and the decision to 
cooperate. Many members of organisations and groups across different social classes 
could  not bear to stay  at home knowing that  many people were  affected by the 
floods. They were compelled to do something that they believed could improve the 
situation.  After  many  of  the  constituent  organisations  and  groups  of  the  policy 
network agreed on the benefits of EM balls, they decided to join collective activities 
to co-organise the making and allocation of EM balls, joined by outsiders of the 
network. The organiser of an EM ball making node informed that participants did 
not aim to make EM balls just in the quantity that they planned to take them back for 
themselves. They also helped to provide EM balls to severe flood victims in various 
places, particularly in slum communities and threw them into rivers where the water 226 
 
seemed to be terribly polluted (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, owner of 
Health-Me Organic Delivery, 17/02/2012). 
Although moral obligation is embedded in Thai culture in general and becomes a 
social expectation when the country faces crises, moral obligation between members 
of some policy communities operating within the policy network was also embedded 
in their mutual sympathy developed from their long history of fighting for a better 
life together, particularly among members of the informal labour and slum dwellers 
networks,  as  mentioned  in  Chapter  4  and  5.  The  leader  of  Clong  Hog  informal 
workers  mentioned  that  the  hospitality  between  members  of  the  informal  labour 
network was developed from learning about the struggles in each other’s lives. They 
agreed to allocate jobs in relation to the ‘needs’ of the members. Those in need may 
have had trouble to meet a forthcoming deadline for paying off informal debts or 
needed a job to support their children in their new semester at school. This was 
considered  before  the  ‘readiness’  of  members,  such  as  labours,  skill,  and  time 
(Fieldwork interview with Koraporn Krugtongkum, leader of Clong Hog informal 
workers, 19/02/2012).  
The  role  of  the  coordinators  of  the  City  Farm  programme  encouraged  moral 
obligation among policy network’s members to act as altruists, basing this belief on 
Buddhist  principles.  According  to  these,  we  are  obliged  to  eliminate  desire, 
including  greed  for  material  possessions  and  social  prestige,  focusing  instead  on 
kindness,  giving  and  mutual  aid.  This  study  found,  from  many  interviews,  that 
Buddhism affected the way of thinking of many leaders of organisations and farming 
groups. Some thought that the flood was seen as a ‘collective sin’ that everyone 
faced together and for which a collective response was needed. The sin was caused 
by human greed, which led to the destruction of nature and in turn caused disasters. 
The discourse of collective sin was also appropriated by the media to stimulate the 
moral environmental and collaborative consciousness of the people. A city farmer 
who  joined  community  supported  agriculture  system  and  ran  EM  ball  making 
activities, thought that creating collective kindness by giving to others (‘Bun’) was a 
solution that would wipe out collective sin (Fieldwork interview with Sudhep Kulsri, 
a city farmer and a member of the Green Market Network, 4/02/2012). In that sense, 
making EM balls together was to create collective kindness among organisations, 227 
 
groups, and individuals, who believed that these local farming techniques could help 
solve problems.   
Moral obligation became a convincing argument for cooperation amongst City Farm 
programme’s  members  during  the  floods  because  there  were  poor  incentives  for 
instrumental cooperation in this period as this study found from the interviews and 
focus groups. The Health Promotion Foundation, which provided financial support, 
decided not to allocate special funding for the operation of the City Farm programme 
during the crisis even though there were no other forms of financial support provided 
by other public organisations. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was the main 
organiser of the programme but could not provide or promise to provide special 
benefits in terms of money to drive cooperation within the City Farm programme in 
a crisis. As  a consequence, the engagement of the actors during this period was 
voluntary, including the making and allocation of EM balls. The opinions of a leader 
of a farming group and a member of a social enterprise reflect on this issue.  
“It was not money that motivated us to join them (other actors engaging in 
the policy network). We realise that grant support was a single subsidy. We 
had already received it so this was not a reason to get more” (Fieldwork 
interview  with  Peeraton  Seneewong,  leader  of  On-nut  Sibsee  Rai  slum 
community, 20/02/2012).  
“My learning centre received financial support from the programme counted 
as the cost per head of the trainees. During the floods, I could not organise 
any training programmes. I helped to support the people in other ways such 
as creating EM balls and allocating floating gardens. I played a role as a 
guest trainer sometimes, invited by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
and the Working Group on Food for Change. We tried to share know-how 
on  producing  emergency  food  to  enhance  self-reliance  among  the 
communities. However, organising such events needed volunteering. I spent 
my own money to support the  events, roughly  20,000  Baht”  (Fieldwork 
interview with Chookeit Goman, a social entrepreneur and farming trainer, 
Suwannabhumi training centre, 17/03/2012). 228 
 
Apart  from  the  lack  of  effective  financial  incentives,  there  were  also  no  special 
rewards and promotions. The public organisations could not expect to gain material 
benefits from cooperating with the City Farm programme and their relevant actions. 
They were expected to work during this period as they had a moral obligation to do 
so.  As  for  social  enterprises,  although  their  actions  during  the  flooding  could 
increase  their  chance  to  extend  customers,  the  majority  of  collective  events 
organised by the City Farm programme during this period, including the making of 
EM balls, advocated for the poor and marginalised people who were not their target 
and potential customers. Social enterprises did not need to cooperate by expecting to 
have the opportunity for continued City Farm programme support for the following 
year as training centres for the programme, because no one could predict whether 
there would be an extension of the programme for one more year. If the extension 
was possible, the chance of each social enterprise being included as a partner was 
high whether they cooperated during the floods or not. The reason is that there were 
so few training centres at that moment, which meant that the programme avoided 
reducing the number of existing centres. Some enterprises therefore also had a moral 
obligation to engage for collective purposes.   
From 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, it can be concluded from the findings that both reciprocity and 
moral  obligation  played  their  role  here  as  linkages  between  an  agreement  to 
cooperate and a decision making to take action by cooperating. So, articulating IRC 
and CAT perspectives on social capital help to understand the phenomena in more 
comprehensive  way  as  the  complex  real  world  has  enough  rooms  for  different 
assumptions including the contrasting ones like the assumptions behind the causes of 
cooperation:  reciprocity  VS  moral  obligation.  More  discussion  will  be  made  in 
Conclusion.   
6.3.  Social  capital,  attributes  of  the  policy  network’s  constituent  actors, 
emotional expression, and better arguments 
The analysis of this section focuses the role of an outstanding form of social capital 
in supporting attributes of the policy network’s constituent actors and their power by 
highlighting core actors (ethos). The previous two chapters already discussed on this 
aspect by addressing how many forms of social capital participated in shaping the 229 
 
status and power of core actors. This section advances that argument and continues 
from the previous section by deepening the discussion through the specific case (EM 
ball promotion). The analysis also emphasises how a clear form of social capital 
supports emotional expression of those actors (pathos) including a facilitation of a 
comfortable feeling to talk. As shown in figure 6.3, a chain of the analysis of this 
section moves from the role of social capital in supporting ethos and pathos of core 
policy actors to the influence of their ethos and pathos in making a better argument 
than other actors' arguments (to archive in convincing other members) to enhance 
cooperation through the communicative process, which in turn leads to an agreement 
on a reason to cooperate discussed in the previous section.  
Figure 6.3 Focus of the analysis of section 6.3 
 
6.3.1.  Trust,  attributes  of  the  policy  network’s  constituent  actors  and 
better arguments  
EM  balls  were  proposed  by  city  farming  trainers  engaged  in  the  city  farm 
association. They were also supported by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 
the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change,  the  Green  Market  Network,  the  slum 
dwellers  and  informal  labour  networks  and  they  were  recognised  as  local 
practitioners. These actors can be called cooperative facilitators as they played a key 
role in enhancing cooperation for mobilising collective actions regarding the EM ball 230 
 
promotion.  They  were  the  members  of  the  same  policy  epistemic  (knowledge 
partnership)  that  operated  within  the  policy  network.  This  policy  epistemic  was 
challenged  by  scientists  from  public  universities,  with  support  from  the  Health 
Promotion  Foundation  and  some  District  Administration  Offices.  They  can  be 
defined  as  another  policy  epistemic.  The  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, which were the most powerful organisations of 
the  policy  network,  maintained  different  opinions  concerning  the  promotion  of 
locally-made EM balls. On the one hand, the Health Promotion Foundation, which 
was made up of scientists with a background in nutrition, medical science and public 
health promotion, supported scientific arguments that challenged the benefits of EM 
balls. On the other hand, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation put itself forward as 
a local practitioner supporting EM balls. This organisation had worked on promoting 
sustainable agriculture by emphasising rural areas since 1998. The considered using 
locally-made EM products to improve soil quality and water treatment are one of 
many possible sustainable farming methods. Although the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation just backed up city farming trainers to promote EM balls during the 
flooding,  it  promoted  this  technique  for  more  than  a  decade.  This  traditional 
technique  was  included  in  at  least  four  books  published  by  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture  Foundation  to  promote  local  agricultural  knowledge,  including 
‘Recovering Local Wisdom to Combat the World Crisis’ (Prapun, 2001), ‘26 Lesson 
Learned  from  Sustainable  Agriculture’  (Hutanuwat,  2004),  ‘Exploring  Values  of 
Local Vegetables’ (Odompanich, 2007), and ‘Traditional Ways of Rice Growing: 
Experiences  from  the  Northeast  and  the  South’  (Pattanapanchai,  2009).  The 
interviews  with  Sustainable  Agriculture  Foundation  staff  showed  that  the 
organisation  believed  that sustainable  agriculture is rooted in  traditional ways of 
farming  that  existed  before  mass,  intensive  and  modernised  mono-crop  farming, 
which took over as a consequence of the Green Revolution. The logic of ‘returning 
to the old days’ by preserving traditional knowledge was part of the mind-set of the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. 
The speakers’ attributes affected their ability to convince and persuade others, which 
in turn supported cooperation enhancement. For example, representatives of public 
organisations believed in other representatives of public organisations rather than in 
representatives of non-governmental organisations, and this was the same when the 231 
 
actors were swapped. Moreover, the actors believed and conformed to the opinions 
of  older  rather  than  younger  speakers.  Many  men  conformed  to  the  opinions  of 
women  while many  women  conformed to those of  men. Though it  might sound 
peculiar,  attractive  singers,  drama  actors/actresses,  and  other  teenage  idols  were 
invited  to  persuade  people  to  join.  Overall,  this  technique  was  successful  and  it 
contributed to enhancing cooperation.  
More specifically in the case of promoting EM balls, the debates on the benefits of 
EM balls between different policy epistemics show that the attributes of the speakers 
affected whether their logic was convincing. In the context of Thailand, the image of 
the scientist that of an intellectual scholar who works either in the lab or in the 
library and produces knowledge that is irrelevant to the practical world, while the 
practitioner is a person who has experience and understands the real world better. 
These images were constructed throughout a long history based on the Buddhist 
principle that advocates respect for practitioners. Most Thai people would support 
the opinions of monks rather than university scholars, as their opinion is expected to 
come from what they practised rather than what they read. The story of Buddha 
himself affects the way Thai people think as he was a practitioner who realised the 
truth  by  practising  self-actualisation  (Sivaraksa,  2011,  pp.11-3).  Thai  people  are 
generally familiar with his story and his character has been socially constructed as 
the stereotype of the ‘real’ expert. Linked to this case, the interviews with the leaders 
of farming groups found that they 'distrusted' scientists and their knowledge during 
the  crisis,  while  they  'trusted'  local  practitioners  and  their  knowledge  more, 
particularly the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the leader of the 
Working Group on Food for Change and city farming trainers.  
'Trust'  in  these  local  practitioners  also  derived  from  their  significant  role  in 
organising the main events dealing with urban food shortages during the flooding, as 
mentioned  in  Chapter  1.  Their  role  was  apparent  on  the  frontline,  while  many 
organisations and groups that challenged EM balls played a role in backing up local 
practitioners active in allocating food and promoting self-grown emergency food. 
The characteristic qualities of the promoters of EM ball also affected the use of this 
farming technique as agreed by many organisations, groups, and individuals, both 
included in and excluded from the policy network.  232 
 
The claims about the benefits of EM balls might not be correct, but many members 
of the City Farm programme decided to cooperate with making and using EM balls 
as a consequence of their belief in the qualities of local practitioners rather than the 
academic opinion of scientists, as raised in short interviews with some members: 
“They (local practitioners advocating EM balls) have worked on this (an 
EM  ball)  for  a  long  time.  I  think  they  know  about  it  and  most 
importantly, they tried to do something to make the situation better. I 
joined them because I also wanted to make things better and I trust their 
way  of  improving  the  situation  in  the  city”  (Short  interview  with  a 
coordinator of ‘City Farms, City Friends’ online group, 11/12/2011). 
“What  did  scientists  try  to  do?  I  don't  know  their  aim.  People  did  it 
(making  and  using  EM  balls)  and  were  happy  with  it.  They  blamed 
people in the way that we increased waste and had done a stupid thing” 
(Short  interview  with  a  committee  of  Rungchareun  community, 
11/12/2011). 
Furthermore,  the  clear  position  of  the  director  of  the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
Foundation and the leader of the Working Group on Food for Change in supporting 
the making and use of EM balls also affected the decision of other organisations and 
groups to support this method. The reason is that these two people were respected by 
leaders  of  other  organisations  and  groups,  particularly  those  in  the  non-public 
sectors. Normally, these organisation and group leaders tended to agree with the two 
leaders, regardless of what they proposed. According to a city farm trainer, the two 
leaders (and the director of the Media Centre for Development) were recognised as 
‘elders of the field’ and became ‘idols’ for many other people (Chatting with Nakorn 
Limpacuptathavon, city farm trainer and a social entrepreneur, 13/03/2012).   
6.3.2. Shared norms, emotional expression and better arguments 
The importance of emotional expressions contributed to raising an idea to be heard 
and to create shared feelings. Emotional expression can have more influence than 
reasons  in  many  cases  in  the  context  of  Thai  society.  The  emotionally  sensitive 
image of Thai people has partly developed from media culture. It was found that 
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where people express their strong, shared feelings easily, as part of a sensitive story. 
The local practitioners were outstanding in expressing their emotions to persuade lay 
people to agree and join them. They also built strong shared feelings among many 
people who wanted to go out and do something for others by joining the collective 
making of EM balls. In building such feelings to mobilise cooperation, the policy 
epistemic led by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and city farming trainers 
constructed and communicated on a worst-case scenario from which they deducted 
the necessity of consolidation. The discourses of food insecurity, the right to food 
and climate  change mitigation activated the communicative power to build these 
shared feelings.  
Although the promotion of EM balls for soil quality improvement to produce short-
term vegetables and waste water treatment could not contribute to food security, the 
right to food and climate change mitigation, this policy epistemic tried to link them 
to make people feel that EM balls were really important. This study analyses that 'to 
judge that the enhancement of food security, the right to food and climate change 
mitigation  is  essential  for  Thai  society'  become  a  'norm'  shared  among  policy 
network's  constituent  organisations  and  groups.  To  link  to  this  norm  through 
communicative  strategies  can  emotionally  stimulate  the  awareness  of  many 
organisations and groups on how bad the situation was. The link between EM ball 
promotion  and  food  security  firstly  addressed  the  worst-case  scenario  of  food 
insecurity (Khad-Kham-Mon-Kung-Tang-Aharn) to scale up the way in which food 
shortages were understood as a risk for the entire society, and all members were 
responsible to deal with it together. Food shortages during the disaster were often 
raised as a problem for the whole of society not just the victims.  
The Thai proverb which was often referred to is that “the values of money and gold 
are constructed, while food is real”. The problem of food shortages was described as 
the tragedy of the commons. The following statement on the City Farm programme 
Facebook page on 27 November 2011 and again on 13 January 2012 supports this 
claim:  “Come  out  of  your  home  and  office!  We  all  are  threatened  by  food 
insecurity”.  The picture  of  the  flood  destroying a  large paddy field was used  to 
supplement the statement. It became known later that this statement and the picture 
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massive  support  for  multi-actions  about  the  food  agenda  during  the  crisis.  The 
statement tried to scale up the food problems so that they were not merely viewed as 
the problem of the flood victims by referring to the notion of food (in)security. There 
were a total 1,247 ‘likes’ and 14 shares of the post observed on 14 January 2012. 
The logic behind this notion is that although their houses and offices did not flood, 
they could not just stay at home and watch TV. They had to decide to go out and 
help others who were faced with the terrible floods because if they ignored it food 
insecurity would also threaten them in the end. To help others could also be a way 
for them to protect themselves and to provide EM balls would be the obvious choice.  
The  right  to  food  (Sitthi-Tang-Aharn)  was  used  to  stimulate  the  emotional 
sensitiveness of the people by building a feeling that they should not bear to see 
hungry people who should have the right to access food. The sense of this notion 
might not exactly be the same as in the Western context. As this notion is closely 
related to the notion of food sovereignty, which Thai people were not very familiar 
with and few city dwellers fought for land reform or democratic control of food. 
Using this notion during the Bangkok flooding referred to the right of the vulnerable 
to  access  food.  It  was  also  used  to  build  the  sense  that  some  people  had  been 
excluded and suffered from the unjust government priorities and food aid systems, 
including children, the elderly, the disabled, patients, slum dwellers and peri-urban 
farmers. As EM balls were promoted to be provided for the vulnerable groups, this 
promotion came along with the right to food campaign, which aimed to handle the 
unjust  regimes  and  systems  by  awakening  people’s  concerns  through  the 
reconstruction of the terrible stories of sufferers. As the director of the Working 
Group on Food for Change put it in an interview with a newspaper: 
Many  vulnerable  groups  were  neglected  by  the  mainstream  aid  system. 
They should have the right to food. We should do something to take care of 
them especially rather than put our hope in the existing generalised food 
allocation. ... There are many things we could do to fill the gap. To raise 
their voices to be heard by the government is one choice and to support 
them by ourselves as much as we can is another one. Of course, we’ll do 
both  and  hope  any  of  you’ll  do  the  same  (Kingkorn  Narintarakul  Na 235 
 
Ayuthaya, leader of the Working Group on Food for Change, Interview in 
Matichon newspaper, ‘Where is food?’, 16/12/2011, p.6). 
Apart  from  food  security  and  the  right  to  food,  the  policy  epistemic  led  by  the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and city farming trainers also linked EM ball 
promotion  to  climate  change  mitigation  for  emotional  purposes.  The  notion  of 
climate  change  (Kan-Pleaun-Plang-Tang-Phumi-Akard)  was  usually  referred  to 
strategically.  The  notion  of  climate  change  was  mentioned  by  158  out  of  161 
interviewees although this does not mean that the three people were not concerned 
about  it.
1 Climate  change  mitigation  and  adaptation  became  a  shared  concern  of 
many actors engaging in the UA policy network. Many actions were supported if 
they could be linked to this notion. Most of the actors recognised the importance of 
climate  change  but  few  had  the  clear  aim  to  push  UA  development  to  achieve 
climate change adaptation in practice as they realised that it would be hard. As a 
result, this notion is a discourse which sounded good but was avoided in practice. 
Connected to the case of EM ball promotion, the notion of climate change mitigation 
was used to make people understand how significant the problems were and how 
important EM balls could be. Nevertheless, it can in fact be challenged that flood 
victims needed food provided from the outside rather than waiting for food that they 
could grow themselves. 
Many  organisations,  groups  and  individuals,  whether  they  were  included  in  the 
policy  network  or  not,  agreed  with  the  contribution  of  EM  balls  because  of  its 
connection to other significant aims as argued by the policy epistemic led by city 
farming trainers. The making and provision of EM balls became collective events 
organised in the name of the City Farm programme. Then these events were scaled 
up from local policy interventions to the national policy level as national policy 
makers supported the EM balls. Although national policy makers were not sure that 
EM balls would deliver an effective outcome they realised that this method could 
deliver a beautiful process as it could create feelings of unity and solidarity. So, such 
                                                 
1 Regarding ‘resilience’, Thai people were not familiar with this notion specifically. It could 
be noticed that they understood ‘climate change mitigation and adaptation’ and use its Thai 
term  (Prub-Teuw-To-Kan-Pleaun-Plang-Tang-Phumi-Akard)  in  covering  many  other 
notions, including ‘resilience’. By using Thai term, people mean to try to live as a part of the 
nature. When the nature changes, therefore, they also need to change to still be a part of it.  236 
 
emotional feelings could also support an argument for promoting EM balls to be the 
better argument that could bring about the preferable course of action.  
On the other hand, the language of science and the scientific styles of the anti-EM 
ball groups did not contribute to the agreement of the organisations, groups and 
individuals  involved  in  the  collective  events.  By  ignoring  the  importance  of 
emotional  expression  in  convincing  people,  the  scientists  working  for  public 
universities,  supported  by  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  and  some  District 
Administration Offices, presented their arguments in an academic way and used a lot 
of technical terms. For example, the professor of environmental engineering from the 
most famous university of Thailand explained how 'Lactic Acid' made by 'Aerobic' 
and  ‘Anaerobic’  bacteria  in  EM  product  work.  He  referred  to  'Cellulase', 
'Trichoderma', 'Penicillium spp.', 'BOD', 'pH', 'Eutropidication' etc. Aside from that, 
they did not try to mobilise social support. While local practitioners, particularly the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation staffs and city farm trainers gained significant 
social support as they organised a participatory process by mobilising a variety of 
collective  actions,  these  scientists  were  mainly  concerned  about  presenting  solid 
results derived from valid methods or reliable sources. Overlooking the significance 
of emotion, scientists said a lot of sensitive things which created negative feelings. 
For example, a scientist said that “you (EM balls supporters) are not only not solving 
the  problem,  you  also  damage  this  city”,  and  “we  need  to  drive  our  society  by 
knowledge  not  by  belief”  (An  opinion  given  by  the  environmental  engineering, 
professor  of  Chulalongkorn  University,  panel  discussion  at  Malinon  Building, 
7/11/11). These sentences made EM ball supporters angry as they thought they were 
blamed for doing a stupid thing. A local practitioner responded that: “they not only 
do not help to row the boat, but they also lay their feet to the lake to make the rowing 
more difficult” (An opinion given by C. G., the city farm trainer, panel discussion at 
the  Nation,  8/11/11).  There  was  a  war  of  words  among  the  different  policy 
epistemics operating within the policy network before spreading out during the first 
three weeks of the flooding.  
To convince and persuade others to cooperate also resulted from expressing strong 
aims through intensive and serious discussion by some city farming trainers. They 
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some organisations and groups agreed with promoting EM balls although they did 
not totally believe that this farming technique could work. They decided to cooperate 
with the collective activities organised for EM balls as they understood the strong 
intentions of the city farming trainers, whom they respected and they did not want to 
break their hearts.  
6.4. Shared knowledge and norms, rationalities, and practical reasons 
Moving from ethos and pathos, this section discusses the logos: logic, reason or 
rationality in wider sense. As shown in figure 6.4, the analysis focuses the role of 
outstanding forms of social capital in affecting rationalities of core actors that are 
addressed through communicative process for proposing practical reasons to back up 
why other actors should cooperate. The practical reasons discussed in this section 
and  better  arguments  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  are  analysed  that  they 
support  one  another  in  building  agreements.  Frank  Fischer's  logic  of  policy 
deliberation explained in section 2.4 is employed to frame an analysis here. Different 
focuses of IRC and CAT on rationality are also articulated and recognised in this 
section.  
Figure 6.4 Focus of the analysis of section 6.4 
 
To  illustrate  through  the  case  of  EM  balls,  this  case  brings  about  a  surprising 
conclusion because in the promotion of EM balls local knowledge was legitimised 
over the expert knowledge which challenged the EM balls. The different reasons 238 
 
provided by the policy epistemics which combined powerful actors of the policy 
network,  the  centralities  of  policy  communities  and  general  members  were 
considered in light of their logic of deliberation at four different levels as proposed 
by Fischer shown in figure 6.4.  
6.4.1.  Knowledge,  rationalities  and  claim  making  through  empirical 
evidence and relevance to the context  
The  policy  epistemic  led  by  university  scholars  and  supported  by  the  Health 
Promotion Foundation succeeded in verifying their argument by providing strong 
generalised  scientific  evidence  with  reference  to  international  experiences  and 
research  (the  first  level  of  Fischer’s  logic  of  policy  deliberation).  For  example, 
Japan’s experience during the flooding following the tsunami disaster in March 2011 
was  referred  to.  Whereas  the Japanese  used  EM  balls  in  a  normal  situation,  the 
Japanese government did not use EM balls to deal with wastewater and the food 
crisis  (An  opinion  given  by  the  environmental  engineering,  professor  of 
Chulalongkorn  University,  panel  discussion  at  Malinon  Building,  7/11/11). 
Experimental  results  published  in  many  credible  international  journals  were  also 
cited. The scientists presented relevant findings of laboratory studies to argue that it 
takes time for EM balls to improve soil and these farming techniques can instead 
increase waste. Another policy epistemic led by local practitioners (particularly the 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and city farming trainers) proposed EM balls 
because  they  believed  that  the  balls  should  work  as  they  had  experienced  their 
success before. They normally use EM products to grow food on their farm and for 
water  treatment  in  their  house.  Therefore,  they  just  assumed  without  empirical 
evidence that they should work in a flood context. 
However, the policy epistemic led by the scientists failed to place their argument in 
the relevant context (the second level of Fischer’s logic of policy deliberation) while 
the local policy epistemic could do so. The local practitioners could show that many 
laypeople themselves had experience with locally-made EM balls. They critiqued the 
scientific evidence by arguing that this evidence derived from other contexts which 
might not be relevant in this context: “this is Thailand, not Japan”. The evidence 
provided mainly referred to the feelings of the users, which were subjective. The 
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the EM product was always good. The discourse about the usefulness of locally-
made EM balls in the context of Thai society has been produced and reproduced 
throughout the country’s agricultural history until it became embedded in the belief 
system as valuable local knowledge. Many people, particularly in rural areas, usually 
practise it at a household scale without asking questions. Proposing that the EM ball 
was  useful  convinced  others  because  it  was  based  on  their  previous  direct 
experiences  or  even  their  common  sense,  which  does  not  have  to  be  proven 
scientifically. As a flood victim mentioned:  
We know it works. We can see many clear changes. We could grow basil. 
The water is cleaner. Scholars (scientists) should come and see what we 
do  rather  than  to  say  something  they’ve  really  never  done  (Fieldwork 
interview with Neeramon Suttiponnapong, community leader, Keha-Tung 
Songhong working at home community, 12/02/12). 
Apart from the failure to situate the argument in the context, scientific knowledge 
was categorised as Western knowledge, which faced a legitimacy crisis during the 
disaster because this knowledge was blamed as a cause or for its failure to deal with 
the crisis. For example, people blamed experts for failing to predict and control the 
flood.  In  the  case  of  agriculture,  many  people  blamed  Western  knowledge  for 
shaping the priority regime which meant that commercial and industrial areas were 
protected  first  while  farming  areas  turned  into  floodways,  which  contributed  to 
severe food shortages. The distrust of Western knowledge partly brought about a 
distrust  of  scientific  arguments  such  as  the  challenges  against  the  EM  balls. 
Consequently, the crisis of experts and their technical rationality opened a window 
of opportunity for local knowledge and its cultural rationality.  
A  legitimacy  crisis  of  Western  knowledge  often  takes  place  during  a  context  of 
wider crisis. Common to many previous crises is the loss of the credibility of modern 
knowledge. The reason is that Bangkok has been modernised through a dependency 
on Western knowledge. The city has also been shaped and controlled by a highly 
educated  governor  together  with  hegemonic  technocrats,  so  external  and  modern 
knowledge was blamed when the city mechanisms failed to function. At the same 
time, history could show that the local knowledge preference discourse had become 
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memories of the old days and the recovery of traditional wisdom embedded in Thai 
agricultural culture, which also sheds light on the debate about EM balls. 
6.4.2.  Shared  norms  and  their  entry  points  in  deliberative  process  of 
claim making 
Shared  forms  of  knowledge  as  forms  of  social  capital  played  a  crucial  role  in 
providing  reasons  during  the  deliberative  process.  The  knowledge  shared  among 
members  of  each  policy  epistemic  shaped  their  logic  and  helped  to  design  their 
arguments, particularly at the first two levels of Fischer’s logic of deliberation. An 
explanation for this is that these two levels of logic are based on an empirical and 
contextual analysis of claim making, which are legitimised by knowledge claims. 
Moving on to the third level, shared norms were also important in justifying practical 
reasons. The policy epistemic led by university scholars supported by the Health 
Promotion  Foundation failed when they  claimed the instrumental implications of 
their argument for the social system as a whole (the third level of Fischer’s logic of 
policy  deliberation)  while  the  local  practitioners’  policy  epistemic  succeeded  in 
doing so. The promotion of locally-made EM balls among local people to enhance 
their climate  change adaptive capacity works well with the shared norm of self-
reliance among many of the policy network’s constituent actors. This norm turned 
the reason to promote EM balls into a practical reason, which fitted with the King’s 
idea about sustainable development as included in the existing Thai political and 
social  systems.  The  norm  of  self-reliance  has  been  promoted  strongly  since  the 
previous  economic  crisis  of  1997  and  has  been  included  in  many  development 
policies  and  plans.  To  enhance  people’s  self-reliance  has  become  a  policy  and 
planning  norm,  including  in  the  City  Farm  programme.  Besides,  the  Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation as a powerful organisation within the policy network which 
supported EM balls had focused on promoting self-reliance for many  years. The 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation published two relevant books about this topic, 
namely  ‘Self-reliance  in  Practice’  (Rotjanapriwong,  2008)  and  ‘Recovering  Our 
Land: a Revolution of Community, Agriculture and the Self-sufficiency Economy’ 
(Working Group on Recovering Our Land, 2007).   
Other  than  a  failure  to  link  the  argument  to  an  existing  functional  system,  the 
scientists’ policy epistemic had two main flaws. Firstly, one of them said that to use 241 
 
chemical fertiliser allows people to grow emergency food by themselves. This point 
was  reasonable  in  the  sense  that  organic  methods  could  be  ignored  when  large 
quantities of food were needed as a trade-off between the quantity and quality of 
food. However, to promote chemical use was what the Thai public sector usually 
implicitly  did  but  never  explicitly.  To  propose  chemical  use  explicitly  was  also 
unacceptable and created negative feelings among the members of the City Farm 
programme. The second mistake was to argue that a lack of food could be fixed by 
reshaping the food distribution system and the existing food chains rather than to 
attempting to depend on growing one’s own food. Although this might be true, many 
of the policy network’s actors disagreed with what they thought the scientists argued, 
which was that food self-reliance was insufficient and that practice of self-reliance 
strategies  were  insignificant.  A  survey  conducted  by  the  Division  of  Public 
Cleansing and Public Park, Laksi District Administration Office (2012) shows that 
70%  of  households  in  the  housing  areas  within  Laksi  district  had  a  backyard 
vegetable garden. Although the volume of food production in the inner city and the 
number of city dwellers involved and benefiting from it was not clear, the practice 
had spread quickly for over a decade. Farming group members of the City Farm 
programme had themselves experienced the capacity of food grown in the city to 
enhance city dwellers’ livelihoods. All interviewees pointed out that they found that 
city farming had improved their life in many ways. When asked about the volume of 
production,  many  of  them  said  that  the  products  determined  their  consumption 
behaviour. Someone said that when thinking what to eat that day, she walked into 
the  garden.  When  basil  was  growing,  she  cooked  fried  chicken  with  basil. 
Sometimes if she had a lot of products, she ate and shared more. When there was 
little, her family ate and shared less. When there was nothing, she waited to share 
with the neighbours (she ended her talk by laughing). This can explain why many 
organisations and groups both inside and outside the UA policy network disagreed 
with the comment that food self-reliance is impossible.   
According to the fourth level of Fischer’s logic of policy deliberation, the analysis 
focuses on the relevance of the argument to the ideological principles that justify the 
societal system. This study found that the policy epistemic led by scientists also 
failed to link their argument to the ideological principles that justify the societal 
system. To promote local knowledge is also to promote a sense of Thai-ness (the 242 
 
Thai  way  of  life).  The  discourse  of  Thai-ness  is  an  interactive  discourse,  which 
frames the way people propose ‘sounds good’ statements when they make a claim. 
Such discourses did not really exist but shaped the socio-cultural structure at the time 
(it might even have taken place in the past). It is hard for anyone to disagree with 
this discourse even if they might think it does not make sense. For example, to use 
locally-made EM balls to solve problems during a period of crisis was to confirm 
that ancestor knowledge as part of the Thai heritage could still work and be the pride 
of  the  country,  which  helped  Thai  people  escape  from  the  crisis.  To  mobilise 
massive numbers of people to make  and allocate EM balls  collaboratively  could 
contribute to the image of the beautiful mind of the Thai people who were pleased to 
help other people as they could not bear to see them facing difficult times.  
  Photo 6.3.  EM balls and their contribution to the ‘good society’? 
     
  Source: Photo use authorised by Sudhep Kulsri 
To join the making and allocation of EM balls also reflects a strong sense of unity, 
kindness, power of the people, and solidarity within Thai society. There are many 
Thai  traditional  proverbs  that  recall  these  meanings.  For  example,  “Thai  people 
should have a helping mind (‘Jit A-Sa’)”; “Happiness derives from giving”; “If we 
don’t help each other,  no one will help us”; and  “Thai people are  kindness and 
sacrifice”. These proverbs were used to imply that you must be that way if you want 
to be Thai. These senses represent a ‘good society’ which Thai people in general 
dream of (see photo 6.3). Such dreams are influenced by spiritual considerations of 
the Buddhist scenario of the good society in which people develop moral obligation 
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reciprocal relations and the norm of promoting social cohesion shared among many 
of the policy network’s constituent organisations and groups.  
Conclusions 
This study found that enhancement of cooperation is a consequence of an agreement 
based on a better argument and more practical basis proposed by the core actors that 
lead the policy epistemic (as cooperative facilitators). Although the members of the 
UA policy network agreed with the reasons for cooperation, this did not mean that 
everyone decided to cooperate. Moral obligation and reciprocity as forms of social 
capital became linkages between the agreement and the decision to cooperate. For 
example, after the policy network’s members agreed with the prospect of using EM 
balls  to  improve  soil  quality  to  grow  short-term  vegetables  and  to  reduce  water 
pollution, those who decided to cooperate were the ones who felt morally obliged 
and had a reciprocal relationship with others. 
This  chapter  illustrates  the  ‘unforced  force’  of  the  better  argument  argued  by 
Habermas (1996, p.305) that comes about as the result of a communicative process. 
When  communication  took  place,  the  status  and  power  of  the  cooperative 
facilitators,  their  achievement  in  proposing  practical  reasons  and  emotional 
expression, affected their ability to persuade and convince others to reach agreement. 
Social  capital  including  trust  and  shared  norms  were  found  supporting  the 
aforementioned  status,  power  and  emotional  expression  of  those  cooperative 
facilitators.  To  understand  the  logic,  each  actor’s  reasons  were  challenged  by 
empirical evidence, its relevance to the context, its relationship to social norms, and 
its contribution to a sense of the ‘good’ society. IRC’s instrumental rationality could 
help to explain the first two levels but was limited in its explanation of the other two 
levels because instrumental rationality is not sensitive enough to understand existing 
social  norms  and  socio-ideological  expectations  of  the  good  society.  CAT’s 
communicative  rationality  opens  the  door to other types of  rationality  which  are 
more sensitive to explanations of how reasons fit into norms and contribute to a 
sense of the good society.  
Shared  forms  of  knowledge  as  a  form  of  social  capital  also  affect  the  logic  of 
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the way reasons are provided at various stages of claiming evidence and contextual 
relevance. Shared local knowledge fitted well with social norms and ideologies as it 
was more sensitive to the socio-cultural context. Shared norms of the majority of the 
policy network acted as another form of social capital and also affected reasons as 
they departed from the norms of society as a whole, and could promote a sense of the 
‘good society’.   
Moving on from cooperation enhancement, the next chapter turns to an analysis of 
conflict resolution by arguing that conflicts might also emerge under cooperation, 
and the role of social capital at the different entry points of the deliberative process is 
also significant in handling conflicts, particularly in supporting the role of mediators. 
The stories provided in the next chapter will be another arena to understand the role 
of social capital in governing the UA policy network. 245 
 
Chapter 7 
The role of social capital in dealing with  
conflicts in times of crisis 
 
Introduction 
Whilst good cooperation among the policy network’s constituent organisations and 
groups was clearly present during flooding, many conflicts were also visible during 
the period. As mentioned in 2.4, to adopt institutional rational choice (IRC) and 
communicative  action  theory  (CAT)  perspectives  on  conflicts  help  to  frame  an 
analysis of this study. On the one hand, IRC focuses interest-based conflicts. On the 
other hand, CAT seeks to understand conflicts beyond self-interest accounts, which 
may arise from having different ideas (perceptional conflicts). Apart from that, these 
two  theories  also  help  to  frame  different  approaches  in  handling  conflicts.  IRC 
focuses  more  on  making  agreements  by  creating  shared  rule(s)  (seeking  for 
‘instrument’ to regulate conflicts), while CAT recognises agreement in the form of 
the  deal  based  consensus.  CAT  also  analyses  the  development  of  mutual 
understanding as the way to cope with conflicts. So, IRC and CAT focus on different 
points in understanding conflicts, and to articulate them helps to frame conflicts and 
the way to handle them in a wider sense – to understand conflicts by analysing both 
self-interest  accounts  and  beyond,  and  to  analyse  conflict  resolution  by 
understanding  both  the  making  of  agreements  and  the  development  of  mutual 
understanding.  
The  shared  view  of  both  theories  is  that  they  mention  the  importance  of 
communication  in  handling  conflicts,  and  this  shared  view  becomes  the  starting 
point for this study to highlight communicative process in coping with conflicts. In 
relation to the facilitation of effective communication, the two theories also mention 
the  role  of  mediators,  who  take  part  in  ‘bridging’  social  capital  with  many 
conflicting stakeholders. In more specific terms, they are representatives of reputable 
and trusted organisations or groups that can make many others feel comfortable to 
express their views,  and they might share rules, norms or knowledge with those 
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Departing  from  the  above  IRC  and  CAT  perspectives  on  conflicts,  this  chapter 
examines how conflicts during the flooding were handled through the building of 
agreements  and  mutual  understanding,  and  the  role  of  different  forms  of  social 
capital  in  supporting  the  effective  role  of  mediators  in  handling  conflicts  by 
facilitating  communicative  process,  where  agreement  and  mutual  understanding 
could be made. As shown in figure 7.1, the main argument of this chapter is that 
social capital supports the role of core actors (as mediators) in making agreement 
and developing mutual understanding for handling conflicts through communicative 
process. Regarding analytical framework, this chapter also analyses communicative 
fora by adopting rhetorical analysis (by analysing ethos, logos, and pathos) as the 
same as the previous chapter to investigate the communicative quality of mediator(s) 
and the effect of social capital held by her/them in supporting such quality.  
Figure 7.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 7 
 
In addressing all of the above, this chapter begins by discussing conflicts during and 
shortly after the flooding. This first section starts by addressing persisting conflicts 
with  surround  of  the  policy  network  on  urban  agriculture  (UA).  Such  conflicts 
become part of the nature of the policy network and remain prevalent in the network 247 
 
structure.  Moving  on,  the  section  addresses  the  conflicts  that  could  be  handled 
during and shortly after flooding, which were about different concerns in relation to 
organic food production including the promotion of chemical use in the first stage of 
food growing before avoiding it in the further stages, and a support of hydroponics. 
The analysis considers that each conflict was possibly based upon distribution of 
benefits and clashes between different opinions.   
The rest of the chapter discusses the different forms of social capital of the mediator 
and their roles in facilitating the resolution of conflicts through building agreements 
and  mutual  understanding.  Section  7.2  analyses  how  the  mediator  becomes 
acceptable to conflicting stakeholders by considering the role of reputation and trust 
given by the stakeholders in supporting the mediator’s credibility (ethos). Section 7.3 
discusses  how  the  mediator  can  raise  ‘loud’  voices  (to  be  paid  attention  by 
conflicting  stakeholders)  by  considering  the  role  of  shared  rules,  norms  and 
knowledge  with  those  stakeholders  in  supporting  the  mediator’s  reason  and 
emotional  expression  (logos  and  pathos).  The  last  section,  then,  analyses  the 
complementary  function  of  the  mediator  and  core  conflicting  stakeholders  in 
building agreement and mutual understanding through communication. The organic 
farming practices during and shortly after the flood will be analysed as the case 
study.    
7.1. Conflicts during and shortly after the flooding 
Many  conflicts  among  the  policy network’s constituent organisations and groups 
were apparent during and shortly after flooding in Bangkok. Some conflicts persist 
with the existence of the policy network. As mentioned in the introduction, these 
conflicts are embedded in the network structure and can be seen as part of the nature 
of  the  policy  network.  Conflicts  initially  arose  from  different  expectations.  For 
example, state and non-state actors had different expectations because the former 
demanded  quantitative  performance  while  the  latter  focused  on  qualitative 
indicators.  The  former,  including  the  Health  Promotion  Foundation  (HPF)  and 
District Administration Offices (DAOs), also focused on urban dwellers in general 
without any scope for specific target groups. The HPF and DAOs were strict about 
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the fiscal year. If not all of the money was spent before the end of the fiscal year, 
they claimed the rest back. The latter groups, including the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation (SAF), the Working Group on Food for Change, the Media Centre for 
Development, the City Farm Association, the Green Market Network, slum dwellers 
and informal labour networks, preferred to push quality aspects of development - 
such as strengthening the support to the urban poor and the marginalised rather than 
to create solutions with quantitative outputs which determined programme success. 
They also demanded a reduction of paperwork, longer-term support and to reserve 
some money for more sustainable support after the end of the fiscal year, such as the 
implementation of a rotating savings fund to develop low interest loans specifically 
for inner city farming.  
Other conflicts were based on different expectations between the HPF as the funder 
and  several  non-state  actors  as  grant  recipients.  For  example,  the  HPF  provided 
funding to social enterprises to organise training programmes by counting the cost 
per head in comparison to other existing training programmes. The HPF expected 
free  training  based  on  the  funding  and  standardisation  of  the  programmes.  The 
training centres expected to receive funding at a proper rate to develop a sustainable 
social  enterprise.  The  social  enterprises  preferred  to  collect  a  training  fee  and 
demanded the freedom to set and run their training programme themselves. Such 
conflicts based on expectations are summarised in figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2. Different expectations about the role of others  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflicts on different expectations can be called 'fruitful conflicts' as mentioned by 
Wagenaar  (2014,  pp.232-6),  because  they  can  be  made  productive  by  raising 
awareness of interdependencies among different actors. Although different coalitions 
expected differently from each other and were not satisfied with the responses of 
their expectations, they still kept relationships as they reminded themselves during 
being frustrated that they needed to work together to achieve their goals. This study 
also analyses that conflicts on different expectations are based on both policy actors 
defending their self-interest and beyond. On the one hand, expectation of conflicting 
stakeholders derived from expected benefits each one could gain. For example, the 
HPF aimed to show quantitative (concrete) performance to the central government to 
be recognised as the successful public organisation, which would impact whether or 
not they receive fiscal allocation by the central government in the future. Social 
enterprises expected a benefit from public grants provided to support their training 
courses  and  a  chance  to  extend  their  customers.  In  the  similar  way,  Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and farming groups expected to gain a long-
term funding support from the government through the HPF. On the other hand, 
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these  conflicts  were  also  based  upon  different  perceptions  and  developmental 
approaches that are beyond interest-based accounts. For example, the SAF and other 
NGOs expected to strengthen support to the poor and marginalised to respond to 
their ideology. In contrast, the HPF concerned of the equal chance of every group 
living in the city to get the support.    
Secondly,  another  conflict  was  about  contrasting  knowledge,  i.e.  the  conflict 
between  scientific  and  local  knowledge.  Debates  on  the  benefits  of  effective 
microorganism (EM) balls adapted from local farming knowledge to improve soil 
quality lead to debates on growing short-term vegetables and reducing wastewater. 
These  debates  did  not  only  enhance  cooperation;  at  times  they  brought  about 
conflicts  between  some  policy  actors,  particularly  between  farming  trainers 
supported by the SAF and scientists backed up by the HPF. Scientists challenged the 
use of EM balls to improve soil quality, claiming that they did not necessarily reduce 
waste but may increase it, as discussed in the previous chapter. This conflict was 
based  on  interest  accounts  and  beyond.  On  the  one  hand,  EM  ball  supporters, 
particularly the training centres, benefited from promoting this local knowledge as 
they  included  the  making  and  using  of  EM  products  in  their  training  courses. 
Promoting EM balls can therefore be seen as a strategy to seek for future customers 
and keep a reputation as the trainers in many training centres. On the other hand, the 
conflict can be interpreted as a result of different beliefs developed from various 
experiences between scientists and local practitioners (as discussed in the previous 
chapter). Although the conflict on EM ball promotion took place in the specific time 
and faded away later (after flooding), this conflict based on contrasting knowledge 
illustrates  that  conflicting  knowledge  between  the  policy  network’s  constituent 
organisations and groups is in the nature of the policy network as there is not a 
hegemonic knowledge that can always drive the network.   
The  last  conflict  embedded  in  network  structure  (as  a  part  of  its  nature)  is  the 
engagement with the national political conflict of the policy network’s constituent 
organisations and groups. Since the UA policy network was launched until the time 
of  writing,  Thailand  still  experienced  extreme  political  polarisation.  The  conflict 
developed from the fact that many of the policy network’s constituent organisations 
and  groups  took  part  in  different  national  political  camps;  ‘yellow’  versus  ‘red’ 251 
 
shirts.
1 This  conflict  spread  from  national  politics  to  every  unit  in  Thai  society, 
departing  from  regions  to  local  communities,  from  organisations  to  groups  of 
friends, and from schools to families. The widening of the conflict also affected the 
UA  policy  network  in  Bangkok.  Many  actors  engaged  in  political  movements 
organised by representatives of the shirt colour that they stood for. According to 
voting patterns for different parties in Bangkok's political geography in recent years, 
the number of people who were opposed to the central government (yellow camp) 
was higher than the number of supporters (red camp). More specifically, 44.37% of 
Bangkok dwellers supported the opposition to the central government election in 
2011  while  40.72%  supported  the  current  government.  In  addition,  45.41%  and 
46.26%  supported  the  current  Bangkok  governor  who  was  in  opposition  to  the 
government,  elected  in  2009  and  2013  respectively,  while  29.72%  and  39.68% 
supported the candidate of the government party (Election Commission of Thailand, 
2013). Similarly, the interviews and observations of political viewpoints of the actors 
engaged in the policy network showed that the majority did not support the national 
government. More specifically, most middle and upper class inhabitants of Bangkok, 
who later became engaged in the UA policy network as the majority, supported the 
yellow shirt movement. The slum dwellers network, the informal labour network, 
many poor communities and some critical middle class groups formed the minority 
supporting the red shirt movements (see photo 7.1 as an example from Chalong 
Krung (left) and Nuggeela (right) national housing communities).  
 
                                                 
1 To provide a simple and synthetic account, the fight between the two camps was generally 
radical and has a long bitter history of loss and death. The conflict is about all the main 
political  institutions,  including  the  legitimacy  of  the  government  (executive  power), 
parliament and the judiciary. There was also a conflict between the formal and informal 
power structures in the form of social movements. The clash between the old and new power 
elites emerged at the heart of this political conflict. The new elites represent a modernised 
power held by the elected neo-liberal government which is led by a rich businessman since 
2001. The elected government won the election by selling populist policies and shaping 
financial politics. They claim their legitimacy in the name of modern democracy. After the 
coup d’état in 2006, they also claimed to support justice and fairness, as a result of which 
this neo-liberal camp later became merged with many socialist ideas. This camp is known as 
the red shirts. On the other hand, the old power elites claim their legitimacy by promoting 
morality-led politics, while they blame financial politics and a corrupt government. The old 
elites are led by the monarchy, the military, and the Democrat party (conservative party). 
This camp is known as the yellow shirts. For the details see McCargo, 2005, pp. 499–519; 
Montesano, 2014.  252 
 
  Photo 7.1. The spread of the national political conflict to the garden 
   
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher  
This study argues that the possible causes of the conflict are based on both interest 
account and beyond. On the one hand, the slum dweller network, informal labour 
network and  poor  communities supported the  red shirt  government  because they 
benefited  from  governmental  populist  policies,  such  as  security  housing  for  the 
urban poor (Baan Mun Kong), the community fund (Gong Tun Moo Baan), the local 
product  support  and  the  minimum  wage  guarantee  policies  (for  details  see 
Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004). The middle and higher classes in Bangkok supported 
the  yellow  politicians  because  they  expected  to  gain  benefits  they  had  gained 
previously when this conservative camp was in power, such as the improvement of 
urban life. For Bangkok development, for example, the preference to support the 
yellow  politicians  was  clear  as  the  majority  elected  the  representatives  of  this 
political camp to be the Bangkok governors since 2004 (continue for 10 years up 
until the  time of writing this  research  report). The support for different  political 
camps therefore relates to different benefits gained from them. On the other hand, 
the conflict also developed from different perceptions based on weighing between 
democracy, social justice and corruptions. The yellow shirt supporters believed that 
they were fighting with corruption, while the red shirt supporters believed that they 
were fighting with democracy and social justice (Pongsawat, 2007). The clash of 
these different perceptions is beyond self-interest.   253 
 
This conflict  between the  viewpoints of  different actors on  politics was ongoing 
during  and  shortly  after  the  flooding.  If  any  policy  network's  constituent 
organisations  and  groups  knew  that  other  policy  network's  members  stood  for  a 
different camp, they discarded them. The conflict within the policy network about 
the national political conflict was present in the way that the actors supporting the 
yellow shirts attempted to critique the government that was backed up by the red 
shirts about flooding control and food aid, while actors supporting the red shirt camp 
attempted to protect their government. For example, this study noticed that most 
policy  network’s  constituent  organisations  and  groups  that  were  the  yellow  shirt 
supporters joined the panel to criticise the draft of the National Flood Management 
Plan  organised  by  the  Working  Group  on  Food  for  Change  at  ‘Shai-noi’  in  28 
February 2012. 
This study found that national politics also directly affected city farm projects. At 
Nuggeela national housing community, the community garden had been developed 
led by community committees with the support of the City Farm programme since 
2010 in the firebreak block (see photo 7.1 on the right). The vegetable garden was 
then replaced with cement by Sapan Soong DAO in June 2012. The interview of the 
leaders  found  that  the  reason  behind  the  replacement  is  that  the  ‘yellow  shirt 
supporting leaders’ usually organised meeting at the garden and mobilise political 
movements in that space, which the ‘red shirt supporting DAO’ decided to replace 
with  cement.  The  DAO  argued  that  this  was  motivated  by  a  complaint  from  a 
neighbour who found a snake in his/her house, which it was assumed came from the 
garden (Fieldwork interview with Benjawan Komkid and Tanut Pumprech, leaders 
of  Nuggeela  national  housing  community,  24/06/12).  However,  the  informal 
workers’ leader at Keha-Tung Songhong as the red shirt supporters (as mentioned in 
5.1.3) gained support from the red shirt supporting DAO, despite also developing a 
vegetable garden in the firebreak block. The DAO brought the backhoe loader to the 
land and helped to clear and proud the land for preparing soil to develop a garden 
(Fieldwork  interview  with  Neeramon  Suttiponnapong,  community  leader,  ‘Keha-
Tung Songhong’ working at home community, 12/02/12). 
The effects of this political conflict to the policy network have never solved and 
become  a part  of  the nature of the  policy network (and  could be  said that such 254 
 
conflict is embedded in the Thai society as a whole). This study analyses that the 
different political camps constructed an operational toleration zone in the everyday 
practices. They tried to live with the conflict that they could not solve. The policy 
network  therefore  was  governed  by  not  just  recognising  differences,  but  rather 
recognising the existence of conflicts. Wagenaar (2014, p.247) calls such kind of 
relations by the term 'agonistic networked governance'. What each organisation and 
group tried to do in order to work together was to depoliticise the issues of food, 
greening the city and climate change, to avoid colour politics. The director of the 
Media Centre for Development, for instance, gave the opinion that no matter the 
colour each member supported, everyone needs to eat, breathe fresh air and respond 
to extreme climate events. He said that when he met and worked on the food agenda, 
he attempted to turn it into an exemption boundary, where he could talk about it as 
an irrelevant issue to current political debates (Fieldwork interview with Komsun 
Hutapate,  the  director  of  media  centre  for  development,  14/01/12).  Although 
developmental approaches and criticisms of each organisation and group could still 
represent  what  side  they  advocated,  many  of  them  attempted  to  depoliticise  the 
debate through the assumption that such ‘common’ concerns are politically neutral, 
to avoid political conflicts and facilitate a comfortable feeling about working with 
each other.  
Apart from aforementioned conflicts embedded in network structure, which became 
a part of the network’s nature, there was also another conflict that could be handled 
during and shortly after flooding, which will be highlighted in this chapter. Such 
conflict  based  on  different  degrees  of  acceptable  practices,  defined  as  organic, 
between organisations and groups that supported ‘Growing out of Disaster’ (GOD) 
led by the Chookeit city farming training centre (also known as ‘Suwannabhumi’ 
centre) and the Laksi DAO and that agreed with the another side called ‘Hard-Core 
Organic’  (HCO)  led  by  the  Prince  city  farming  training  centre  (also  known  as 
‘Veggie Prince’), the Green Market Network, and the Working Group on Food for 
Change. Both sides agreed that promoting organic food growing is their mission, but 
the GOD proposed that during and shortly after the disaster, food productivity is 
more  important  for  enhancing  self-reliance.  So,  the  GOD  promoted  ‘soft-core’ 
organic by being flexible with its principles, including the promotion of hydroponics 
and the use of chemical fertilisers for particular purposes such as in the first stage of 255 
 
producing food to increase the possibility of the plants to grow and stimulate them to 
grow faster. The HCO could not accept such practices as organic, and this side was 
backed up by the HPF and the SAF, who were the City Farm programme managers. 
The conflict was present in the way that each side critiqued and discredited the other 
side. They also blamed each other in public and thus did not work together. There 
particularly was conflict between the Chookiet and Prince city farming centres that 
led the GOD and HCO coalitions. In the specific case of hydroponic farming, after 
the SAF director announced that she disagreed with the promotion and practices of 
hydroponic farming, the ‘pro’ hydroponics were upset and frustrated. They ignored 
her opinion and still keep practiced and promoted hydroponics, which made the SAF 
director disappointed.  
In order to understand causes of the conflict, this study argues that, on the one hand, 
the conflict related to organic practices was based on interest account of training 
centres  to  propose  their  customers  (trainees)  the  effective  ways  to  succeed  in 
producing food by themselves in the times of crisis. Part-time farmers and flood 
victims  also  found  that  they  benefited  from  producing  enough  food  in  the  short 
period of time during flooding (details will be provided in 7.4). On the other hand, 
this conflict was developed from the different understanding and acceptability on 
degree of food safety, which are beyond interest account.            
This conflict was present during and shortly after flooding between late-2011 and 
early-2012, when various kinds of food innovations were promoted for city dwellers, 
including not-so-organic methods such as hydroponics. The conflict occurred during 
the debates on whether such methods should be promoted or not. The rest of the 
chapter will discuss how this conflict was handled. The next section focuses the role 
of reputation and trust as forms of social capital in supporting the mediator to be 
accepted by conflicting stakeholders.  
7.2. To be the acceptable mediator: the role of reputation and trust given by 
conflicting stakeholders in supporting the mediator’s ethos  
The analysis of this section focuses the role of some outstanding forms of social 
capital  in  supporting  ethos  of  the  mediator  as  highlighted  in  figure  7.3.  By 
illustrating with the case of the conflict based on different degrees of acceptable 256 
 
practices defined as organic, the mediator was not the most powerful organisations: 
the  SAF  and  the  HPF,  as  they  had  taken  side  in  the  conflict.  They  gave  their 
opinions, which supported the arguments of the HCO. The annual report of the City 
Farm programme (2010-2011) reports that the director of the HPF gave a speech 
during the orientation of the programme for its members in 2010 stating that: “one of 
our objectives, which should be the most important objective of city farm promotion, 
is  to  promote  a  better  health  of  city  dwellers.  The  promotion  of  organic  food 
production (Pug Plod Sarn) should, therefore, be our first priority.” This statement is 
not a surprise as health promotion (the organisation’s name) is the main mission of 
the HPF. For the SAF, the director said during a field visit aimed towards providing 
food, materials and know-how for producing emergency food at Tung Song Hong 
(20 December 2011) that: “…we will not only have food to eat, but our food will be 
also organic (Plod-Sarn).” On that day, she also made a clear statement that she 
disagreed  with  using  chemical  fertilizers  at  the  first  stage  of  food  growing  and 
promoting hydroponics. These two programme managers could not be trusted by the 
organisations  and  groups  that  supported  the  GOD  to  mediate  in  seeking  for  the 
compromise of this conflict. A lack of trust of those organisations and groups can be 
reflected from their refusal to open their mind to talk about this conflict with these 
two programme managers. They ignored these two organisations’ statements and 
kept promoting and practicing what they believed was not wrong. 
Figure 7.3 Focus of the analysis of section 7.2 
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Instead, this study found that the Media Centre for Development (MCD) had tried to 
cope with this conflict and this organisation had been accepted to play a role in 
negotiating  the  conflicts  between  conflicting  stakeholders.  From  my  observation 
throughout  the  period  of  my  fieldwork,  the  director  of  MCD  had  raised  the 
conflicting  issue  to  talk  and  had  facilitated  four  clear  panels.  Firstly,  the  MCD 
director raised the need to discuss the shared rule on organic food production and 
promotion,  which  lacked  details  and  led  to  different  interpretations  during  the 
meeting for sharing experiences and developing food innovations for living with 
water  at  the  SAF  office  on  24
th  December  2011.  Secondly,  during  the  seed 
exchanges and public showcases and seminar organised at Tung Song Hong on 29
th 
January  2012,  the  MCD  director  played  a  role  in  questioning  whether  being 
‘organic’ mattered for enhancing food security during disasters. The third one took 
place during the Working Group on Food For Change in cooperation with the ‘City 
Farm,  City  Friends’  online  group  organised  monthly  meeting  called  ‘Eating  and 
Sharing in the Garden’ (Gin-Khaw-Nai-Soun). It allowed the collecting of lessons 
learned from the floods on 5 February 2012 at the Bangkok ‘Bhudha’ garden. The 
director  of  the  MCD  again  raised  the  issue  on  organic  and  safety  foods  and 
facilitated the discussion. Finally, the most specific panel for discussing the issue of 
organic food practices and promotion in the crisis was organised by the MCD itself 
on the 16
th of March 2012 and was assisted by the training centres working under the 
City Farm programme, including the ones that led the GOD and the HCO. Details of 
the panel discussions and the role of the MCD representative as a mediator will be 
analysed in 7.4.  
As discussed about the MCD in 5.1.2, this organisation was a centrality of training 
centres  (social  enterprises).  Some  of  its  members  became  leaders  of  conflicting 
stakeholders  (for  both  sides).  The  reputation  of  the  MCD  among  conflicting 
stakeholders and the amount of trust given to it in relation to organic food practices 
and  promotion  were  developed  from  the  organisational  experiences.  This 
organisation published a magazine entitled ‘Natural Agriculture’, which was known 
as the important source to learn organic and safety food practices and promotion. 
This magazine also won  the prize of the best  media on the field of natural and 
sustainable agriculture in Thailand, also called the Green Grove Award, in 2008. For 
the  director  of  the  MCD  was  respected  by  the  main  conflicting  stakeholders, 258 
 
including  the  Chookiet  and  Prince  city  farming  centres,  the  Laksi  DAO,  the 
members of the Green Market Network, the Working Group on Food For Change, as 
he was the editor of a this magazine and the elder of the field. During the informal 
chat, the Prince city farming trainer called the director of the MCD the ‘farming 
philosopher’.    
Unlike the SAF and the HPF, the MCD did not have any official mandate or direct 
power to control the resources and rules of the City Farm programme. Its reputation 
among farming groups that took part in the conflict and trust given by them were 
developed from the past actions of the MCD in organising mobile training courses 
for members of farming groups engaging in the City Farm programme at their place 
(see  photo  7.2).  The  mobile  training  supported  the  MCD  to  be  well-known  by 
farming groups as it provided a chance for the MCD and farming groups to exchange 
and  reflect  on  problems,  limitations  and  demands  for  a  further  support.  As  the 
mobile training course paid attention on organic practices, the MCD could develop 
its reputation and trust in relation to its expertise in organic farming among farming 
groups. Although the SAF employed a similar method by organising a farm visit to 
every farming group, the SAF could not develop reputation and trust specific to its 
expertise in organic methods in the same as the MCD, for the SAF was open to visits 
but did not offer any training.  
  Photo  7.2.  Mobile  training  provided  by  the  Media  Centre  for 
Development  
   
  Source: Photo use authorised by the City Farm programme’s coordinator  259 
 
Furthermore,  the  MCD  usually  joined  the  monthly  meeting  called  ‘Eating  and 
Sharing in the Garden’, which is a main public sphere created by the Working Group 
on Food for Change in cooperation with the online group for discussing any current 
issues  between  members  of  the  City  farm  programme.  This  event  supported  a 
development of relationships between participants, including the MCD. From my 
observation by joining the event twice, the MCD played an active role for it raised 
an issue during the meeting and acted as the facilitator. Later, some discussions were 
reported  in  the  Natural  Agriculture  Magazine.  The  MCD  staff  also  often  shared 
knowledge  and  information  to  other  participants,  particularly  in  relation  to 
sustainable agricultural methods and innovations. The leader of the Working Group 
on Food for Change gave her opinion to the researcher that the MCD was recognised 
as the ‘think tank’ of the City Farm programme. 
The  MCD  also  developed  trust  from  conflicting  stakeholders  and  other  policy 
network’s constituent organisations and groups by acting politically neutral. In order 
to take a depoliticised role, the MCD avoided making political criticisms to either 
the  red  or  yellow  shirt  camps.  The  MCD  did  not  even  critique  governmental 
agricultural  policies  that  supported  unsustainable  agriculture,  such  as  Green 
Revolution policy mentioned in Chapter 1. From the interview with the director, the 
organisation paid attention to promote laypeople to transform themselves regardless 
of whether the social, economic and political structures were. The MCD director 
believed  that  everyone  can  make  life  better  without  any  help  from  the  outside 
(included policy and politics). He also said that to depend on others would never be 
sustainable.  Life  in  other  people’s  hands  is  hopeless  (Fieldwork  interview  with 
Komsun Hutapate, the director of the MCD, 14/01/12). In the time of the smouldered 
political conflict, this study argues that to act as being politically neutral as the MCD 
did  also  supported  trust  in  this  organisation  to  mediate  the  conflict  between 
organisations  and  groups  that  also  took  part  in  the  national  political  conflict  as 
discussed in 7.1.  
From  the  above  analysis,  reputation  and  trust  given  by  conflicting  stakeholders 
supported  creditability  (ethos)  of  this  organisation.  In  other  words,  those 
stakeholders paid respect to the reputable and trustable organisation, and accepted it 260 
 
to act as the mediator to cope with the conflict. The next section will analyse why 
this organisation can be paid attention while acting as the mediator.  
7.3. To be paid attention: the role of shared rules, norms and knowledge in 
supporting the mediator’s logos and pathos  
Moving from an analysis of the reason that the MCD was accepted to be mediator, 
this section analyses the reason that it was paid attention through the analysis of its 
logos and pathos as highlighted in figure 7.4. In more specific, this section analyses 
why voices of the MCD were loud when led the discussion on organic practices and 
promotion aiming to handle the conflict. From at least four panels mentioned in 7.2, 
the  conflicting  stakeholders  listened  to  the  director  of  the  MCD  and  wanted  to 
respond to. The MCD later succeeded in leading the deliberation and facilitated the 
building of agreement and mutual understanding, which will discuss in 7.4. At the 
stage of gaining attention, this study analyses that reason and emotional expression 
of the MCD supported its role as mediator in raising a voice that was worth hearing 
for the conflicting stakeholders as the audiences and discussants. This study argues 
that  by  sharing  rules,  norms  and  knowledge  with  the  conflicting  stakeholders 
supported an address of reason and emotional expression of the MCD. 
Figure 7.4 Focus of the analysis of section 7.3 
 
To begin with, the MCD shared the rule of engagement with other members of the 
City Farm programme that they must promote and grow organic food. This rule was 261 
 
known and agreed on by all members from the first time they decided to engage with 
the programme. Despite the fact that it was not clear how ‘organic’ was defined, 
which was at the source of disagreements, the rule was a basis for developing mutual 
understanding on where the conflict departed from and how to frame the discussion 
without crossing the boundary of legitimising the support for chemical farming. This 
rule therefore became a base of reference that was realised between the mediator and 
conflicting stakeholders. From my own interpretation as the observer, the director of 
the MCD benefited from sharing the rule by giving the sense that ‘he understands 
what happens here’ and ‘he knows what each other feels and is frustrated with’.      
The issue raised by the MCD director about the need to discuss this shared rule 
during  the  meeting  at  the  SAF  office  on  24  December  2011  can  show  his 
understanding  of  the  background  and  cause  of  this  conflict,  and  that  there  were 
different  degrees  of  acceptable  practices  defined  as  organic  by  which  everyone 
claimed that they were not wrong and blamed the other side. The SAF also knew this 
problem,  but  responded  to  it  (at  Tung  Song  Hong  on  20  December  2011)  by 
mentioning that the rule was to produce organic food (Aharn Plod Sarn), and by 
using chemical fertilizers at the first stage of food growing and hydroponics they 
would be rendered not ‘organic’ (Plod Sarn). By saying so, the SAF interpreted the 
rule in the same way as the HCO coalition and became a part of this conflict. In 
contrast, the MCD director approached this problem by pointing out that the problem 
was that the rule was not clear and without details of how organic should be defined. 
The gap of the rule for discussion is what might be accepted as ‘organic’ in the 
context of Bangkok food production during and shortly after flooding.  
Regarding norms that the MCD shared with the conflicting stakeholders, the first one 
is the norm that to propose chemical use explicitly was unacceptable and created 
negative feelings (as discussed in 6.4.2). Even though to talk about chemical farming 
was not prohibited by any rules, the City Farm programme’s members could realise 
by  themselves  that  even  bringing  it  to  the  table  would  render  the  audiences 
unsatisfied. The leader of the Working Group on Food for Change mentioned that to 
practice chemical farming is what many people do, but they will never hear from 
them to say that it is good (Fieldwork interview with Kingkorn Narintarakul Na 
Ayuthaya, leader of the working group on food for change, 18/03/2012). Like the 
above shared rule, this norm framed the scope of the discussion to not cross the 262 
 
boundary of what can be understood as ‘non-chemical farming’. This norm gave the 
MCD  director  the  confidence  to  propose  solutions  based  on  his  knowledge  and 
experiences  of  organic  farming.  Besides,  this  norm  also  helped  to  regulate  each 
stakeholder to self-censor in proposing a clear non-organic method.          
Another supportive norm can be called the ‘green’ norm which involves caring about 
the  earth,  a  concern  about  food  security  and  protection  of  the  right  to  food,  all 
culminating in the dream of creating a sustainable local food system and an aim to 
enhance  climate  change  adaptive  capacity.  Any  members  of  the  City  Farm 
programme can assume that the other members have decided to engage with the 
programme as they share these same visions (in some degrees), and that serves to 
build a sense of family and community. The MCD benefited from sharing green 
norms  with  the  conflicting  stakeholders  by  calling  the  City  Farm  programme’s 
members the ‘green family’ (Krob Kreau Kheauw). The word ‘family’ is a powerful 
word in Thai culture. A sense of being the family member is that there are mutual 
interdependencies. This word built the feeling that as members of the house they 
should try to maintain reciprocal relationships with one another. So, by proposing 
that conflicting stakeholders were members of the green family the MCD director 
could demand them to try to compromise. According to the opinion of the Prince 
City  Farming  trainer,  if  members  of  the  City  Farm  programme  were  the  family 
members, the MCD director would be the elder of the house.  
Moving on, sources of knowledge from the MCD supported the credibility of its 
voices  to  be  worth  hearing  by  the  conflicting  stakeholders.  This  organisation 
published  a  magazine  on  farming  techniques  collected  from  both  innovations 
developed  by  agricultural  scientists  from  university  research  units  and  local 
knowledge proposed by practitioners. As such, the MCD director was familiar with 
various forms of knowledge and could speak both the language of the practitioners 
and was informed in relation to technical terms. He also opened his mind to learn 
from various claims and tried to fulfil the role of knowledge linker. This study found 
that  the  MCD  director  could  understand  the  point  of  view  of  each  conflicting 
stakeholder which claimed their knowledge in paradox to one another, because the 
MCD shared knowledge across the different sides of the conflict. In relation to that, 
this study can capture four sets of bridging knowledge of the MCD which influenced 263 
 
its role in the conflict resolution process through a building of agreement and mutual 
understanding.  
Firstly, organic food and safety food are not the same. The MCD director understood 
that HCO supporters also understood about this, but it is also important to consider 
the way in which the word ‘organic’ is used in Thai society that the HCO supporters 
might not consider. In Thai, ‘Plod Sarn’ can also refer to safety food. This puzzle 
became a cause of different interpretations of the rule as discussed in 7.2. In the view 
point of the director of the MCD, the majority of organisations and farming groups 
engaging in the City Farm programme understood that the main aim of promoting 
city farm initiatives in Bangkok was to promote safety food (rather than organic in 
its  universal  principles  and requirements). The  use of the word ‘organic’ by the 
directors of the HPF and the SAF was not clear at the beginning. This study also 
found that the City Farm programme’s coordinator had also misused the concept in 
its specific context by using this term as she was talking about safety food. For 
example,  she  announced  when  providing  know-how  knowledge  for  producing 
emergency food at Tung Song Hong (on 20 December 2011) that the flood victims 
could produce organic short-lived vegetables to consume by themselves, even she 
knew that in fact the quality of water could produce merely the safety food and 
nothing more. Both knowledge on the principles of organic food and knowledge of 
the contextual implications of the word ‘organic’ helped the MCD director to bridge 
the gap that led to the conflict, which will be discussed in 7.4.     
Secondly, the MCD has the knowledge about relations between chemical fertilizers 
and productivity, which shares with the knowledge claimed by the GOD supporters. 
The using of chemical fertilizers at the first stage of food growing can motivate the 
plants  to  grow  up  faster  and  in  higher  numbers.  The  contamination  would  be 
minimal, if chemical products are not used in the next stages especially for two 
weeks before harvesting. Such contamination can be also reduced by cleaning with 
clean water or vegetable cleaning products. So, by doing this, we can also have ‘Pug 
Plod Sarn’ in the meaning of the safety food. This knowledge, in face, also shared 
by some HCO supporters including the SAF and the Working Group on Food for 
Change,  but  they  ignored  it.  For  example,  they  knew  that  the  Pinchareaun 
community  garden,  which  was  the  main  food  source  providing  vegetables  for 264 
 
community  members  during  flooding  (success  in  term  of  productivity)  used 
chemical fertilizers at the first stage (see photo 7.3). However, this knowledge can 
also support the role of the MCD in linking the two sides together, which will be 
analysed in 7.4.  
Photo 7.3. Using chemical fertilizers at the first stage and productivity at 
Pinchareaun community garden  
   
Source: Photos owned by the researcher  
Thirdly, the MCD shared with the HCO supporters the knowledge that hydroponics 
depend on Urea and distract people from the earth (soil). However, the MCD can see 
the possibility that hydroponics could be developed to be a viable organic farming 
method by replacing Urea with effective microorganism (EM), and this solution can 
be brought to create the agreement about the allowance to support hydroponics but 
under the condition that the use of EM is needed to replace the use of Urea, which 
will  be  explained  more  in  7.4.  To  support  this  claim,  the  director  of  the  MCD 
illustrated the experiment of Tangclay School, which succeeded to use EM instead of 
Urea (see photo 7.4).   
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  Photo  7.4.  The  experiment  of  Tangclay  School  in  using  effective 
microorganism instead of Urea in growing hydroponic vegetables    
   
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher   
Lastly,  the  MCD  shared  knowledge  with  the  conflicting  stakeholders  that  100% 
organic food production is impossible in non-organic environments as food will be 
contaminated by toxins in water, air and soils. This concern was raised by the MCD 
director during his discussion on 5 February 2012 in the monthly meeting known as 
‘Eating and Sharing in the Garden’ at the Bangkok ‘Bhudha’ garden. By raising this 
knowledge, he could ask for the understanding of the HCO supporters in considering 
that any core actors should not be too hard on farming groups. In relation to his 
discussion, this study analyses that he could convince many key supporters of both 
sides including representatives of the SAF, the Chookeit city farming training centre, 
the Laksi DAO, the Prince city farming training centre, the Green Market Network 
and the Working Group on Food for Change. The reason for this argument is that 
those organisations and groups knew that a lot of farming groups grew their food 
without using chemical fertilizers but in non-organic environments, such as the On-
nut Hoksibhok community garden located at the old landfill site, the community 
garden along railway lanes at Bangkok Noi (bad water quality and facing burning oil 
smoke), and the TPI workers garden in the cement company site (see photo 7.5)
2. 
 
 
                                                 
2 These cases are different from the case of Bang Bour mentioned in Chapter 5 in the way 
that people here tried to produce organic food. 266 
 
  Photo 7.5. Organic food productions in non-organic environments 
   
On-nut Hoksibhok community garden located at the old landfill site 
   
  Community garden along railway lanes at Bangkok Noi 
   
  TPI workers garden in the cement company site 
Source: Photos owned by the researcher 
All in all, this section analyses forms of social capital holding by the MCD and their 
role in facilitating the success of organising panels by bringing stakeholders to the 
table for deliberation and in supporting the role of the MCD director as the mediator 267 
 
particularly by promoting his voices to be worth hearing. The next section will push 
further  to  understand  how  agreement  and  mutual  understanding  could  be  built 
through  communicative  process  by  which  the  reputable  and  trustworthy 
organisational  leader  who  shared  rules,  norms  and  knowledge  with  conflicting 
stakeholders (the MCD director) played a role in mediating the deliberation process.   
7.4.  The  mediator,  communication  and  conflict  resolution  through  building 
agreement and mutual understanding  
Figure 7.5 shows the focus of this section in which the analysis comes to the end by 
explaining the process of conflict resolution through a building of agreements and a 
development of mutual understanding led by the mediator. How the MCD director 
mediated the forums anticipated by the conflicting stakeholders is the central of the 
analysis.  In  overview,  this  study  found  that  the  MCD  director  played  two  key 
mediator’s  roles  in  facilitating  communicative  forums  (apart  from  to  bring 
stakeholders  in  the  table)  including  to  stimulate  and  allow  stakeholders  to  talk 
without interventions and to seek for the compromise solution by bridging ideas 
proposed by different sides and developing the recognition of the differences. 
Figure 7.5 Focus of the analysis of section 7.4 
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7.4.1. The role of the mediator in stimulating and allowing stakeholders 
to talk 
The  observations  of  four  communicative  forums  (see  examples  from  photo  7.6) 
found that the MCD director played a role in stimulating and allowing stakeholders 
to talk without interventions. For example, during the lessons learned discussion on 
16 March 2012, leaders of the GOD and the HCO had a chance to express what they 
thought and to contest their knowledge and experiences. This forum was the most 
intensive compared to the other three forums that I had observed. The key debates 
were among the Chookiet city farming trainer, the Laksi DAO’s trainer, the Prince 
city farming trainer and the director of the SAF. To begin with, Chookiet discussed 
that he prioritised food self-reliance in the first instance during the disaster, but it did 
not mean that he ignored ‘organic’ food promotion (what he really means is ‘safety’ 
food). As it was the lessons learned, he claimed that the success of integrating food 
self-production in livelihood strategies of many poor communities during flooding is 
based on the mixing use of organic and chemical methods. He called that mixing as 
farming according to one’s means (Kaset Bab Tam Mee Tam Geud). He said what 
the HCO coalition had advocated during the period is to promote flood victims to try 
to grow their own food by using any possible materials they had and under any 
limitations they faced. He gave an example that Chalong Krung community proved 
that they could have lived with the flood-water for more than two months depending 
on their self-produced food and fishing. He stated that the fact is that this community 
had used a combination of EM, compost, compressed chemical fertilizer tablets and 
polluted  water.  The  key  point  is  that  he  disclosed  his  interpretation  of  organic 
practices by saying that organic food production should mean to produce food by 
being harmonious with the nature. It should mean that when nature changes, we 
would adapt to it as one. Like Chalong Krung community’s members, they grew 
food  with  materials  they  had  in  their  hands  from  the  natural  conditions  (e.g. 
insanitary water and soil, toxic contaminated containers).  
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Photo  7.6.  Communicative  forums  that  included  the  discussion  on 
organic practices and promotion   
   
    Source: Photos owned by the researcher 
The argument of Chookiet was supported by the Laksi DAO trainer’s opinion. She 
mentioned, many times in many places including at this meeting, that using some 
chemical fertilisers was necessary when vegetables were not strong enough to grow, 
to encourage new growers. After vegetables were strong enough, changing to use 
organic  fertilizers  could  also  deliver  ‘organic’  food  at  the  end  particularly  when 
avoiding chemicals for few last weeks before harvesting (actually, she referred to 
safety food). Furthermore, she argued that using organic methods by refusing to use 
any chemicals might fail, especially at the first stage when plants are weak. This in 
turn, she argued, affected many new growers, who would stop growing food under 
the feeling that they could not achieve this so they might go back to buying food as 
usual. She thought that, shortly after flooding, to encourage people to start growing 
their own food was the most important goal. Then to adjust their practices to non-use 
of chemicals was the next step.  
In response to Chookiet and the Laksi DAO trainer’s talks, Prince said that organic 
food growing should not have any exception, but it would be an acceptable course of 
action  to  try  to  grow  organic  food  in  non-organic  environments  as  at  least  the 
growers could show their organic heart (Houjai Intree). The unacceptable cases were 
to use chemical fertilizers whatever the stage of food growing. They should be proud 
to be organic producers and to consume self-organic products. It is hard, but they 
need to be strong. He continued to give his opinion that, for the trainers, everyone 270 
 
should  be  reminded  that  they  grow  new  seeds  (to  train  new  generation  of  food 
growers), which will be the new hope. Trainers should encourage new food growers 
to transform themselves. Nobody says it is easy to produce organic food, but they 
will realise its value. Before addressing his opinion in this forum, the Prince city 
farming trainer had mentioned the similar idea during the seed exchanges, public 
showcases and seminar organised at Tung Song Hong on 29 January 2012. At that 
time, he also illustrated the success case called Go Green project at Tarareanake 
Condomenium, where high income dwellers could produce organic vegetables (in 
every process of the production) in the rooftop of their condominium and gained 
enough products to consume during flooding period. Another case is the Slow Life 
hotel,  where  self-organic  food  growing  can  fulfil  the  supply  chain  that  was 
interrupted  during  the  flood.  The  hotel  still  opened  and  provided  food  to  its 
customers and staff (see photo 7.7). He concluded his talk that the flood revealed the 
failure  of  the  mainstream  chemical  based  food  production  and  consumption  in 
Thailand as this system collapsed in the time of the crisis. In contrast, small scale 
organic  farming  could  reveal  its  power  to  save  groups  of  people,  which  were 
scattered in many corners of the city. These small groups of active city dwellers and 
enterprises formed themselves like a rhizome that could pop up anywhere.      
  Photo  7.7.  Rooftop  organic  gardens  at  Tarareanake  Go  Green 
Condomenium and the Slow Life hotel that feed dwellers during flooding 
   
  Sources: Photo owned by the researcher (left) and photo use authorised by the Slow 
Life hotel (right) 271 
 
As for the discussion on hydroponic farming, the SAF director was very active in 
giving her opinion during the lessons learned discussion on 16 March 2012, because 
she thought it was a serious problem that shortly after flooding, the number of the 
hydroponic supporters was higher than that of the ‘contra’ hydroponic coalition, and 
there was a wider practice of the hydroponic method. So, some training centres and 
farming groups did not really care about what she had said. She repeated many times 
that in many other cases like Genetically Modified Food (GMO), hydroponic food is 
not  natural  as  the  product  does  not  grow  from  the  soil.  This  point  is  hard  to 
challenge, but it depends on an openness of each person to accept food innovations 
that create new experiences and new ways to define and understand nature. Another 
point raised by her many times was that the hydroponic farming involved chemical 
contamination (Urea).  
Before discussing in this forum, the SAF director was not as aware as others of the 
‘pro’ hydroponics arguments. Chookiet gave his opinion as to why her opposition 
avoided  discussing  this  issue  with  her  that  because  she  was  too  clear  about  her 
opinions on this issue so that no one wanted to argue with her (Chookeit Goman, a 
social entrepreneur and farming trainer, Suwannabhumi training centre, 17/03/12). 
So, the MCD director took part in the struggle for this issue to be discussed face-to-
face. The  clear challenge was made  by Chonlada Shourwong, one of trainers of 
hydroponic methods from Islam Wittayalai. She gave her opinion against the SAF 
director that if the programme aims to support city dwellers to grow their food, 
hydroponic farming can be one of the best choices. The hydroponic method is easy 
and fits with an urban lifestyle. It is a choice for some people who do not have soil 
and even do not want to touch it to avoid dirt. The products, of course, are safer than 
buying vegetables from markets. Chonlada also mentioned that, actually, it is the 
peoples’ choice to accept its quality or not. If  the programme still tries to build 
constraints rather than support it, how could they extend a number of city dwellers 
engaged in city farms?  
Apart from the reason provided by Chonlada, Chookiet added that many new city 
dwellers wanted to learn about farming in that period. Hydroponics could avoid the 
effects of the flood as it was not set on the ground. This method also fits with the 
nature of the city, as it is hard to find good quality soil and vacant spaces, when there 272 
 
are a lot of buildings. The hydroponic method might be the easiest way to grow food 
in  the  city  for  new  growers  as  many  enterprises  sell  ready-for-use  hydroponic 
equipment that is easy for anyone to set up to produce food by themselves.  
The director of the MCD did not agree with everyone and with every argument but 
he  attempted  to  let  them  explain  and  express  their  opinion  by  not  allowing 
interruptions.  The  director  attempted  to  share  emotions  about  all  concerns.  He 
challenged sometimes but as a critical friend who wanted more explanation rather 
than  as  the  opposition  who  wanted  to  discredit  its  enemy.  For  example,  after 
Chookiet gave his opinion about his  interpretation of what should  be defined as 
organic, the director of the MCD said that Chookiet raised an important point about 
the need to distinguish among ‘organic’, ‘safety’ (Plod Pai) and ‘natural’ (Tum Ma 
shad) food production. In saying so, he both challenged Chookiet’s understanding 
and pushed forward a further discussion. After Prince addressed that city dwellers 
should be proud to be organic producers and to consume self-organic products even 
it is hard, the MCD director raised a short statement. He said that to be proud to be 
organic is essential, but how to produce enough food (food productivity) is also a 
critical point. Such a statement motivates us to think about a bridging of different 
priorities between the GOD and HCO coalitions.       
7.4.2. The role of the mediator in seeking for the compromise solution  
Not  only  stimulating  and  allowing  conflicting  stakeholders  to  talk  without 
interventions, the MCD director also took part in seeking out a compromise solution 
by bridging ideas proposed by different sides and developing the recognition of the 
differences.  The  first  clear  aim  observed  by  this  study  was  during  the  monthly 
meeting called ‘Eating and Sharing in the Garden’ on 5 February 2012. The MCD 
director asked participants to draw or write anything down on one big piece of paper 
about what they  expected from eating a meal (see photo 7.8). Participants could 
express what they thought at the same time of learning from what others thought. 
This tool proved to be an engine to bridge the different types thinking of different 
stakeholders.  Someone  wrote  down  that  he/she  wanted  to  feel  safe  from  toxins, 
growth accelerators, preservatives, carcinogens and large food corporations. Another 
one  wanted  good  health,  to  be  free  from  chemicals  and  to  be  environmentally 
friendly. Some others pointed to food from the fair food chain (e.g. fair price and 273 
 
without monopoly), quality food, fresh food, sustainability and even self-cooking 
with care. In relation to this activity, the MCD director pointed out that although it 
was  merely  an  exercise  (not  a  survey)  and  could  not  bring  about  any  specific 
conclusions, these opinions reflect that there were different thoughts, expectations 
and  interpretations  of  good  food,  and  that  all  of  these  should  be  respected  and 
recognised.  In  the same  way, different practices and promotion on non-chemical 
farming should also be respected and recognised, whatever it really is in boundary of 
the organic discourse.  
  Photo  7.8.  To  draw  or  write  anything  down about  expectations  from 
eating a meal 
      
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher  
The MCD director also mediated the conflict by bringing to light the shared norm of 
living and working together as members of the same ‘green’ family. He mentioned 
that everyone present aimed for the development of a green and sustainable city. 
Everyone also shared a vision to improve the food system. A sense of family was 
also fostered through calling each other nicknames beginning with ‘sister’, ‘brother’, 
‘uncle’ or ‘aunt’ (called before name). In relation to that, the MCD director was 
called ‘uncle’ which represents his status as the elder of the family. My observation 
of their interactions found that this norm affected their ‘pathos’, making them more 
soft and  compromising. All coordinators of the City Farm programme have also 
played an important role in creating this sense of the same family since the launching 
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was not typical of the usual address in Thai society, which dictates that an address 
should start with ‘khun’, which means Mr./ Mrs./ Ms.  
Having shared knowledge across conflicting stakeholders and contextual knowledge 
about farming groups in Bangkok supported the MCD director in his task of bridging 
knowledge  of  those  stakeholders  and  proposing  compromise  solutions.  He 
mentioned that organic food and safety food are not the same, and actually many 
stakeholders referred to safety rather than organic. The MCD director commented 
that many farming groups understood that safety food is the same as organic food. 
They interpreted (from the rule of engagement) that to produce safety food as much 
as they can is acceptable by the rule. So, members of the City farm programme 
should  discuss  and  create  a  clearer  agreed  rule  that  could  be  started  with  the 
discussion among core organisations and groups participating that day.  
The MCD director proposed that if chemicals would be permitted in any processes, 
any trainers and farming groups should make clear that they are promoting or trying 
to grow safety food. They must provide information or realise by themselves that 
chemicals are prohibited at least two weeks before harvesting and that it should not 
be called organic food. He gave an opinion that many poor communities focused on 
food self-reliance rather than healthy food. So, to expect them to grow real organic 
food might be too hard on them. To push them to produce a safety food should be 
more  proper.  To  promote  organic  farming  should  be  a  choice  that  depends  on 
capacity,  environment and  willingness.  Farming groups  that  are willing to do so 
should  be  supported  and  promoted,  while  some  groups  that  are  not  ready  for  it 
should be encouraged but not forced.      
This study noticed that this idea of the MCD director as mediator could be agreeable 
among the conflicting stakeholders. The SAF director partly agreed, and discussed 
that  to  produce  safety  food  rather  than  real  organic  food  was  satisfactory,  but 
chemical fertilizers should not be promoted at all. She could understand and will not 
blame anyone that would promote and practise it, but she stated that her organisation 
would  not  do so. She said, it made  sense to  think  that way but the SAF would 
continue to warn the public about the effects of chemicals. Prince agreed with the 
SAF  director  by  mentioning  that  his  training  centre  would  not  promote  any 275 
 
chemicals, but  would understand that it  is a  choice for others. Chookiet tried to 
compromise  by  proposing  that  they  could  make  a  deal  that  would  allow  use  of 
chemical fertilizers (mostly referred to using compressed fertilizer tablets for mixing 
with soil) if they were for motivating new coming part-time gardeners to grow food 
only at this time (shortly after the flood) to respond to massive demand on training as 
an effect of the flood, but trainers should stop promoting any chemical uses after this 
period. He said that in this period city dwellers still needed encouragement. They 
wanted to realise that they could produce their own food. So, at this time trainers 
might be expected to help them avoiding a failure at the first time. He trusted that 
every trainer would try to recommend using chemical products only when absolutely 
necessary.   
This study analyses that although the SAF and the Prince city farming centre did not 
agree  with  Chookeit,  they  knew  that  his  statement  was  right.  In  particular,  they 
would know that some community gardens failed at the beginning in trying to grow 
real organic food, and then they gave up such as ‘Kaset OK’, ‘Suntiwana’ and ‘Four 
Season Hotel’ (see photo 7.9). These three organic vegetable gardens were initiated 
by new growers. They all learned how to grow food from the Prince city farming 
training  centre  and  they  adopted  organic  farming  methods  but  did  not  use  any 
chemicals. These three projects were funded by the City Farm programme. All of 
them later discontinued the project and gave money back to the programme. So, both 
the SAF and the Prince city farming training centre learned that to encourage city 
dwellers to grow their food, they might need to be flexible. In relation to that, it may 
just be the case that organic farming needs time before it will succeed, and be able to 
provide in any future times of crisis.  
In the end, the discussion about whether using some chemical fertilisers (particularly 
when vegetables are not strong), should be allowed to encourage new growers was 
resolved  by  making  a  deal  which  promised  that  mixing  use  of  chemicals  with 
organics would be allowed just shortly after flooding. Trainers would also promote 
cleaning before eating. Besides, in the long term they would aim to enhance people 
understanding on the difference between ‘safety’ and ‘organic’ foods. 
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Photo 7.9. Discontinued organic food growing projects  
   
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher 
Moving on, the MCD director also took part in handling the conflict on hydroponic 
farming. After letting the discussion come to the point that every side had revealed 
their  reason  that  backed  up  their  opinions,  the  MCD  director  proposed  that 
hydroponic farming can be organic, if EM is used instead of Urea. The MCD also 
explained that this was possible based on the positive results of the experiment by 
Tangclay School. Although the SAF director did not argue that, she raised the issue 
that hydroponic farming distracts humans from nature. One aim of promoting food 
growing in the city was to link city dwellers to nature. She gave an example that the 
new generation living in the big city did not have many chances to touch soil and to 
learn how new life could be born from it.  
The  MCD  director  responded  by  saying  that  the  City  Farm  programme  should 
promote a variety of food production methods. Each method has some dimensions to 
learn. Children could not learn about soil from hydroponics, but they could learn 
from traditional farming. In contrast, they could learn about food innovation for the 
future by which traditional farming could not provide. So, instead of prohibition, the 
programme  should  give  various  chances  for  various  kinds  of  learning.  Chookeit 
added that it was not fair to prohibit hydroponic farming by saying that it is not 
natural as its instruments are made from polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and it produces 
food from synthetic substance instead of soil. He raised a question why floating 
gardens made by foam were promoted? He said, they were not so different from one 
another. By saying that, Chookeit referred to many floating garden projects that the 277 
 
SAF and the City Farm programme had supported throughout the last two months 
(before the discussion on 16 March 2012). The Saladin floating garden (see photo 
7.10), for example, was made from foam, because the community did not have any 
weeds. Finally, the discussion on hydroponic farming came to the conclusion that 
core conflicting stakeholders agreed to deal with the conflict by creating new agreed 
rules that if the hydroponic method was promoted by anyone, the supporters would 
have to promote the use of EM instead of Urea.  
  Photo 7.10. The Saladin floating garden made with foam 
   
  Source: Photos owned by the researcher   
From above, this section illustrates how the conflict surrounding different types of 
acceptable  organic  practices  can  be  handled  by  making  a  deal  in  which  each 
stakeholder promises to compromise and follow agreed solutions (a mixing use of 
organics and chemicals at the minimum) and by developing a new rule agreed by 
conflicting stakeholders (to replace Urea with EM in growing hydroponic food). For 
the conflicting issue without consensus, this section analyses that the conflict can 
also be handled through a development of mutual understanding (to accept versus to 
reject  a  use  of  compressed  fertilizer  tablets).  In  relation  to  that,  agreement  and 
mutual understanding were built through communicative process where the MCD 
director mediated the discussions. Although to reach a mutual understanding is a 
long and complicated process that is hard to indicate, this study illustrates how the 
MCD could contribute to it by facilitating friendly and sound argumentation. This 
study can reflect from observation that the core conflicting stakeholders can accept 278 
 
and  live  with  expressed  differences  of  opinion.  They  seemed  to  acknowledge, 
recognise and respect each argument. 
Conclusions 
This chapter brings IRC and CAT perspectives on conflicts to discuss through the 
case of conflicts within the Bangkok’s UA policy network in times of crisis. The 
chapter analyses that conflicts were developed from both interest-based account and 
beyond  (e.g.  different  ideas).  Some  conflicts  persisted  with  the  existence  of  the 
policy network by being embedded in the network structure. Some of them were 
fruitful conflicts that raised awareness of interdependencies among different actors 
by reminding conflicting stakeholders that they needed to work together to achieve 
their goals. Different coalitions also needed to construct an operational toleration 
zone in the everyday practices for living with conflicts. The agonistic policy network 
therefore was governed by recognising the existence of conflicts.  
Regarding  conflicts  that  can  be  handled,  building  either  agreement  or  mutual 
understanding was a solution by which conflict mediation through communicative 
process required the mediator who held social capital with conflicting stakeholders. 
This chapter analyses that agreement can be presented both in the form of a new rule 
agreed by conflicting stakeholders and in the form of a deal and a promise. So, this 
chapter shows that to articulate IRC and CAT perspective on conflicts helps to frame 
conflicts  and  analyse  the  way  to  handle  them.  From  the  first  chapter  until  this 
conclusion, multi-arenas of the role of social capital were addressed, moving from 
how  it  facilitates  the  policy  network’s  emergence,  shaping  the  network 
characteristics, to helping to enhance cooperation and support conflict resolution. 279 
 
Conclusions 
This study linked the study of social capital in policy networks by examining the role 
of different forms of social capital (including reputation, reciprocity, trust, moral 
obligation  as  well  as  shared  rules,  norms,  and  knowledge)  in  facilitating  the 
emergence  and  characterisation  of  policy  networks.  It  also  examined  how  these 
forms of social capital affect the way in which policy networks enhance cooperation 
and solves conflicts. The policy network on urban agriculture (UA) in Bangkok was 
chosen as the case-study, because of an awareness of the existence forms of social 
capital. By conducting the fieldwork during and shortly after the flooding, this study 
shone light on the role of social capital in governing the policy network in the time 
of crisis.  
In order to frame the analysis of the case study, Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) 
and Communicative Action Theory (CAT) were adopted as they have a capacity to 
explain the role of social capital in governing policy networks. Both theories focus 
on understanding cooperation and conflicts and recognise various forms of social 
capital,  including  their  role  in  supporting  the  quality  of  the  policy  network  in 
handling issues linked to processes of collective action. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
these two theories are developed from different assumptions on social capital (based 
on rational versus normative commitments) and assumptions about cooperation and 
conflicts within policy networks (based on self-interest account and beyond). The 
articulation by recognising the differences of these two theories relied on integrated 
instrumental, communicative and structural power analysis (Lukes, 2005), rhetorical 
analysis (Gottweis, 2007; Martin, 2014) and Fischer’s logic of deliberation (Fischer, 
2003,  1995).  The  next  section  will  discuss  the  way  in  which  articulating  and 
contrasting these two theories supports analytical insights for this study (through 
theoretical contributions). By adopting two theories that have different assumptions, 
the challenge was to aim for a methodological approach that compromises between 
IRC’s  methodological  individualism  and  CAT’s  interpretive  methodology.  This 
research therefore collected data by adopting shared methods used by IRC and CAT 
scholars, including a review of the grey literature, semi-structured interviews and 
observations, but it also required specific methods such as the collecting of relational 280 
 
data  to develop  policy  network  diagrams as the starting  point to make a further 
analysis to investigate each form of social capital embedded in the policy network.   
This study started with analysing how the operation of the UA policy network in 
Bangkok could enhance the adaptive capacity of the city to respond to food shortage 
during an extreme climate event, as explained in Chapter 1. The finding indicated 
that this operation can only contribute on a small scale by supporting less than 5% of 
total victims.  The study  analysed the  limitation of  the scheme promoting UA  in 
Bangkok,  by  highlighting  the  tendency  of  government  priorities  to  support  the 
industrial food system, and the bias of the central government in allowing areas of 
food-production to be flooded while industrial and commercial areas were protected. 
Then, the focus moved on to analyse the policy network that promoted UA and 
particularly the way in which it emerged, characterised, enhanced cooperation and 
handled with conflicts. The role of different forms of social capital were highlighted 
and discussed in Chapters 4-7. Although the contribution of the UA promotion in 
food aid during the flooding in Bangkok was not remarkable, this study pointed the 
importance of learning from the governance model, which can be conceptualised as 
the collaborative policy network governance.   
The  study  found  the  interrelation  of  social  capital,  power  relations  and  policy 
network  emergence  as  analysed  in  Chapter  4.  The  social  capital  of  powerful 
organisations can activate their power; for example, by supporting the acceptance of 
the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to play the important role in the programme 
and  legitimising  the  exercise  of  instrumental  power;  such  as  setting  rules  of 
engagement. Many forms of social capital; such as reputation and trust, can also 
support the exercise of communicative power by supporting certain organisations to 
have a loud voice and make others feel comfortable to talk with.  
Another  finding  of  this  study  is  that  although  powerful  organisations  played  a 
significant role in shaping the UA policy network, other organisations and groups 
also affected the network characterisation, as discussed in Chapter 5. They had a 
strong  social  capital,  particularly  bonding  social  capital,  within  their  policy 
communities, which supported their exercise of power and their centrality in each 
policy  community.  The  powerful  organisations  (the  Sustainable  Agriculture 
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control  the  policy  network  from  the  centre;  rather  the  policy  network  had  some 
degree of decentralisation by which the policy communities’ centralities could also 
exercise  power.  Each  policy  community  within  the  policy  network  had  different 
backgrounds,  foci,  resources  and  expectations  under  this  form  of  decentralised 
governance, which characterised the diversity of the network by which there were 
hidden cooperation problems and conflicts. Within this characterisation of the policy 
network, some organisations and groups were excluded, as a consequence of their 
alienation from existing shared rules and norms. 
Moving  on  from  the  role  of  social  capital  in  facilitating  the  emergence  and 
characterisation of the policy network, this study examined the role of social capital 
in enhancing cooperation in the context of risks and uncertainty during a disaster 
(Chapter 6). In this context constituent organisations and groups within the policy 
network had to work together and mobilised for cooperation. The study found that 
cooperation can be enhanced by developing an agreement derived from finding a 
better argument and practical reasons to make a decision to cooperate. After each 
organisation  and  group  agreed  to  cooperate,  reciprocity  and  moral  obligation 
determined whether each of them decided to cooperate or not, because to cooperate 
is to invest time and effort. While some organisations and groups, such as social 
enterprises (city farming training centres) could expect to gain reciprocate benefits 
(e.g. to promote their reputation for future customers), the others who decided to 
cooperate were obliged by morality (helping mind) even if they expected no returns. 
The  process  of  reaching  a  better  argument  and  a  practical  reason  was 
communicative. Each one learned and shared knowledge, experiences, information 
and opinions regarding advantages and disadvantages of what they planned to do 
(e.g.  to  promote  effective  microorganism  balls).  Different  policy  epistemics 
(knowledge partners) contested by attempting to convince other organisations and 
groups, which in turn affected their decision whether to cooperate or not. Attributes 
of  organisations  and  groups,  their  logic  and  emotional  expressions  were  key 
components affecting their ability to persuade others and to reach an agreement in a 
communicative forum. The study found that trust supported attributes of the actors 
who succeeded in making a better argument and worked as cooperative facilitators, 
while shared norms supported their success in emotionally stimulating an awareness 
of other actors in the significance of cooperation.  282 
 
Regarding reasons provided by those cooperative facilitators were justified using 
empirical evidence, its relevance to the context, its fit with social norms, and its 
contribution  to  what  was  considered  a  ‘good’  society.  Scientific  knowledge  and 
instrumental  rationality  were  less  sensitive  than  local  knowledge  and  cultural 
rationality to social norms and ideological expectations of the good society  (e.g. 
expectations on being a self-reliant society and fostering mutual aid between Thai 
people).  For  example,  knowledge  on  making  and  using  locally-made  effective 
microorganism balls supported a recall of the Thai traditional wisdoms to enhance 
self-reliance.  The  study  found  that  knowledge  and  norms  shared  among  many 
organisations and groups as forms of social capital supported this process of reason 
claiming to find a better argument and reach a practical agreement.  
Last  but  not  least,  the  aforementioned  forms  of  social  capital  also  supported 
mediators to facilitate communicative processes to handle conflicts. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, the reputable and trusted organisational leader (the director of the Media 
Centre  for  Development),  who  shared  rules,  norms  and  knowledge  with  the 
conflicting  stakeholders,  was  accepted  to  mediate  the  conflict  developed  from 
different  degrees  of  acceptable  practices  defined  as  organic  (by  which  the 
programme managers also took part in that conflict) and could raise voices worth 
hearing (e.g. to propose a plausible compromising solution). This study found that 
the role of reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders to the mediator 
supported his or her ethos (e.g. to have a creditability to be accepted to play the role). 
On the other hand, the role of rules, norms and knowledge shared by the mediator 
with the conflicting stakeholders supported the mediator’s logos and pathos (e.g. to 
be paid attention when gave a reason and expressed an emotion).  
To sum up, this study found that many forms of social capital functioned in various 
entry points in supporting policy network emergence, characterisation and quality in 
handling cooperation and conflicts. The findings confirm some arguments made at 
the beginning including (1) the role of shared knowledge and norms in supporting 
logos of core actors particular for convincing others to agree to cooperate, (2) the 
role of shared rules and norms in affecting policy network inclusion and exclusion, 
and  (3)  the  role  of  moral  obligation  and  reciprocity  in  linking  agreement  to  the 
reason to cooperate and the decision to cooperate. Regarding additional findings, this 283 
 
study  found  that  trust,  reputation,  shared  rules,  norms  and  knowledge  supported 
ethos  of  the  powerful  organisations  in  exercising  their  power  in  formulating  the 
policy  network.  It  was  also  found  that  aforementioned  forms  of  social  capital 
supported ethos and the exercise of power of the centralities of policy communities 
in struggling for power decentralising and being included. Besides, trust was found 
supporting the ethos of the cooperative facilitators who succeeded in making a better 
argument. Shared norms, on the other hand, were found supporting the success of 
those cooperative facilitators in expressing their emotion (pathos) to stimulate others 
to  realise  that  they  should  cooperate.  Apart  from  that,  in  handling  conflicts 
reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders were found supporting ethos of 
the conflicting mediator by making it be accepted to mediate the conflict, while 
shared rules, norms and knowledge supported its logos and pathos by facilitating that 
mediator to be paid attention and to propose a plausible compromising solution. So, 
at  this  stage,  this  study  can  identify  specifically  which  forms  of  social  capital 
functioned in which entry points and in what way. The figure Concl-1 summarises 
key findings of this study. It can be noticed that this version is more complete than 
the ones that are developed from literature review proposed in the beginning stage 
(see figure 2.2 and 2.3 shown in section 2.4).  
FigureConcl-1  The  role of  various forms of social  capital in different 
entry points summarised from findings of this study  284 
 
This study addresses multi-arenas of the role of social capital, how it facilitated the 
emergence  of  the  policy  network,  shaped  the  character  of  the  network,  helped 
enhance cooperation and supported conflict resolution in turbulent times. Adopting 
IRC  and  CAT  as  a  theoretical  framework  allowed  this  study  to  analyse  through 
comprehensive perspectives especially in three domains. Firstly, this study analysed 
social capital though both rational and normative dimensions of the commitment 
highlighted  differently  by  the  two  theories.  Secondly,  this  study  analysed 
cooperation and conflicts on the basis of both self-interest account (e.g. cooperation 
by expecting benefits and conflicts of interests) and ideas (e.g. cooperation after 
agreeing  with the  reason  to cooperate and  conflicts  developed  from perceptional 
clashes). Lastly, this study analysed the role of social capital in governing the policy 
network  through  an  analysis  of  power  relations  including  instrumental, 
communicative and structural power. These domains link to contributions of this 
research that will be discussed next. 
I Articulating institutional rational choice and communicative action theory by 
recognising their contrasting assumptions: Theoretical contributions  
Although both IRC and CAT seek to understand collaborative governance, IRC and 
CAT scholars communicate insufficiently with one another. IRC is well-framed by 
Ostrom  and  her  followers  in  the  Bloomington  School  of  Policy  Analysis.  They 
analyse  the  extent  of  self-interest  of  individual  behaviour  in  cooperating  for 
collective actions. CAT works are rarely cited by IRC scholars. One work that can 
be found cited is Ostrom’s Understanding Institutional Diversity published in 2005, 
which CAT scholars were mentioned in just a few words at the footnote of the book. 
Another work that might be counted is developed by Heath (2003). He refers to 
Habermas in attempting to simplify his arguments by rational choice theory without 
recognising their different epistemological assumptions. For example, Heath argues 
that Habermas' communicative action is actually another aspect of making rational 
choice. On the other hand, CAT is developed from Habermas’s arguments with a 
mixing  to  other  post-positivist  epistemological  approaches  as  mentioned  in 
Introduction  and  Chapter  2.  CAT  scholars  not  only  ignore  IRC  works,  but  also 
critique IRC scholars for their account of behavioural analysis being motivated by 
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actions in the complex world. A few works, by Innes and Booher (2010, 2003) and 
one by Healey (2006) refer shortly to Ostrom, but in a note indicating that her work 
is a sound attempt to understand social capital and collective action. Healey also 
mentioned about New Institutionalism which IRC departs from, but she makes clear 
that  she  means  social  constructivist  institutionalism,  not  IRC.  During  a  personal 
discussion with a key CAT scholar during a conference, it was mentioned that the 
reason why IRC scholars are often ignored was because their causal models and 
tendency  to  reinforce  an  argument  simply  by  using  more  case-studies  was  not 
engaging enough. Nevertheless, I did not intend to say that their work should be 
overlooked completely. Hence, this study played a vital role in bringing IRC and 
CAT scholars together to communicate about the same issues.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the two theories developed from different ontological, 
epistemological  and  methodological  propositions  so  they  are  based  on  different 
assumptions (see 2.1). Thus the main theoretical contributions of this study are to 
illustrate the benefits of adopting contrasting theories in the same project but without 
merging these contrasting perspectives but rather by focusing on how these different 
arguments support the study in different ways. This study shows that by using IRC 
and CAT for their own merits rather than merging them can support the development 
of  a  comprehensive  analytical  framework.  Doing  this  also  contributes  to  an 
understanding of the debates between them, particularly the analysis of collaborative 
governance based on mainstream rational models on the one hand and based on 
dialogue and interpretation on the other. 
Articulating  these  two  perspectives  while  still  contrasting  their  assumptions  is 
possible by starting with an identification of some elements that they share. This 
study recognises that these two theories underline key aspects of many forms of 
social capital, focusing on how networks work through organising collective action, 
and  recognise  the  importance  of  communication  and  the  role  of  facilitators/ 
mediators  in  enhancing  cooperation  and  solving  conflicts.  It  found  that  the 
integration of social capital analysis, network  analysis, power analysis, rhetorical 
analysis and Fischer's logic of deliberation make the possible articulation of these 
two theories by recognising their different perspectives that can both complement 
and  challenge  each  other  (see  Table  2.1  shown  in  Chapter  2).  This  synthesised 286 
 
analytical framework maintains the (ontological and epistemological) debates of the 
two theories, including their conceptualisation of social capital that relates to their 
sensitivity  to  rational  and  normative  commitments,  their  claims  on  causes  of 
cooperation problems and conflicts that relate to their perspectives about nature of 
the policy actors, and their analysis on the role of social capital in governing policy 
networks that relates to their perspectives on rationality and power. The sub-sections 
will discuss analytical insights and constraints of this articulation in each specific 
point.  
I.I Understanding social capital by differentiating rational and normative 
commitments  
This study found the  value of differentiating between  forms of  social  capital by 
putting them in the line where a rational account of the relationships and a normative 
one are at different ends of the line (as shown in Figure Intro-1). This idea derives 
from Warren (1999) to distinguish the different focuses of IRC and CAT. So, this 
study articulates IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital by still being able to 
analyse  their  contrasting  ideas.  In  short,  IRC  is  more  sensitive  to  rational 
commitment  of  relationships  (concrete  string  attached  relationships)  such  as  the 
relationships based on shared rules, a reputation for trustworthiness, predictive trust 
and reciprocity to secure benefits from relationships. In contrast, CAT scholars argue 
that commitment is sometime beyond self-interest account such as altruistic feelings 
and the intention to share ideas, so CAT opens the room for analysing normative 
commitment  (more  abstract  string  attached  relationships)  to  seek  mutual 
understanding and agreement, such as altruistic trust, moral obligation and shared 
norms (as discussed in details in Chapter 2).  
In situating them along a long line with two different ends, this study found the 
advantages of using different focuses on social capital, for it allowed this study to 
analyse  the  case-study  more  comprehensively  rather  than  relying  on  one  camp 
(either rational commitment or normative one). At the same time, it was recognised 
that contesting the ideas between the two theories raised interesting questions and 
was therefore an integral part of the discussion. For example, by analysing both 
reciprocity  and  moral  obligation,  this  study  opens  the  room  for  understanding 
different motivations that glue relationships. On the one hand, this study does not 287 
 
romanticise reality or claim that close relationships among some policy network's 
organisations  and  groups  (e.g.  city  farming  training  centres)  necessarily  created 
reciprocal relationships developed from mutual benefits. Relationships were shaped 
by a degree of expectations from individuals from keeping a good relationship with 
others. On the other hand, this study recognised that morality obliged some of them 
to work together for solving the public problems such as food shortage and polluted 
water in the time of the crisis. As raised by an interviewee during the flooding, she 
forgot how much she spent that day, but what she could remember until this day is 
how much she is happy to share. This opinion shows that there were some people 
who thought about “all of us” before “me”. They could share sadness with other 
people who faced effects that they did not face. They were also pleased to provide 
their own resources without any expected returns. This altruistic action based on 
giving  without  receiving  can  be  explained  better  through  the  power  of  moral 
obligation rather than reciprocate exchange. So, to bring these two contrasting forms 
of social capital together is to compare two contesting assumptions, which provide 
alternative  ways  of  understanding  different  objects  at  a  specific  time  and  to 
supplement each other.  
Another advantage of relying on the different conceptualisations of social capital of 
the  two  theories  is  that  the  concept  of  social  capital  is  not  simplified  as  being 
composed of coherent components, as many previous social capital studies do (e.g. 
Deth, 2010, pp.150-76; Office for National Statistics, 2002; Statistics New Zealand, 
2002).  This  study  did  not  engage  with  the  concept  by  assuming  that  it  can  be 
classified by many measurable indicators and each score from those measurements 
can be compounded to measure the holistic degree of strong or weak social capital. 
In contrast, this study benefitted from analysing social capital as a contested concept 
that can be conceptualised differently. This allowed the study to avoid analysing 
social capital as a composite variable, but instead, to analyse each form as it could 
make an effect by itself and play a role in either supporting or obstructing other 
forms. For example, this study analysed that shared norms and knowledge supported 
each  other  to  facilitate  the  core  organisations  of  the  policy  network  to  create  a 
stronger  argument  and  propose  practical  reasons,  which  in  turn  succeeded  in 
persuading other organisations and groups to agree with the reason for cooperation, 
as discussed in Chapter 6. Reputation and trust in the organisation also supported 288 
 
each  other,  in  order  to  make  that  organisation  accepted  by  the  conflicting 
stakeholders in mediating the conflict, as discussed in Chapter 7. In contrast, shared 
rules can obstruct some organisations and groups that shared knowledge in making 
changes, such as the rule of organic practices and promotion constrained the using of 
knowledge on hydroponic farming.  
However, the disadvantage of attempting to classify each form of social capital in 
either rational or normative commitments is that some forms are difficult to define 
and therefore hard to ‘place’ on the line. For instance, the situation of shared forms 
of knowledge on the line depends on the kind of knowledge. The analysis of shared 
knowledge as a form of social capital for this study was influenced by the study of 
Pennington and Rydin (1999), who worked together even though they were engaged 
in different approaches (Pennington's works engaged more with IRC, while Rydin's 
works  are  adopted  many  CAT  ideas).  Their  study  contests  shared  scientific  and 
economic knowledge (which are fit into a classification as rational commitment) and 
local knowledge (which is rather fit into normative commitment). This study agrees 
with them that shared forms of knowledge should be placed in the middle of the line 
(see Figure Intro-1), but noted that types of knowledge were defined by their rational 
or normative orientation.  
Although including knowledge in studying social capital makes the classification of 
different  forms  of  social  capital  through  rational  and  normative  commitments 
puzzling, this study benefited from analysing shared knowledge as the capital of the 
policy epistemic (knowledge partnership). Situating shared forms of knowledge in 
the social capital literature can advance social capital studies by introducing this 
notion in epistemological debates. For example, understanding the clash of local and 
expert knowledge as the capitals of different knowledge partnerships is to understand 
multiple epistemologies. In modern society, it appears that Western knowledge has 
become shared knowledge of all societies in the world. This study challenges this by 
arguing that it is also possible that local knowledge as a form of social capital in a 
specific society shows its power as a resource to cope with problems in that society. 
To capture shared knowledge of each society as part of its social capital, it should 
not  be  assumed  that  Western  knowledge  is  only  one  form  of  knowledge  shared 
among  many,  particularly  when  studying  social  capital  in  the  global  South.  The 289 
 
capacity of local knowledge to take over expert knowledge in developing countries 
such as Thailand tends to increase in the era of post-modernisation. The recovery of 
local  traditional  knowledge  is  a  strategy  for  localisation  to  fight  against  the 
hegemony of Western knowledge and its role in modernisation. Apart from effective 
microorganism ball promotion, this study also illustrates the demand for re-using 
traditional wisdom of collecting  and  sharing seeds to avoid  buying hybrid  seeds 
developed  and  controlled  by  monopoly  food  corporations  (Chapter  1).  The 
coexistence of the modern, post-modern and pre-modern in developing countries is a 
central challenge of the era in which we live.  
I.II Understanding cooperation and conflicts within policy networks by 
considering both self-interest account and beyond  
This study shows that articulating IRC and CAT perspectives on cooperation and 
conflicts helps to frame and analyse the way to handle them. As discussed in Chapter 
2,  IRC  analyses  cooperation  problems  as  a  result  of  self-interest  behaviour  and 
understands conflicts by focussing interest-based conflicts. On the other hand, CAT 
seeks  to  understand  cooperation  and  conflicts  beyond  self-interest  account,  for 
example by analysing that insufficient cooperation is a consequence of disagreement 
on the reason for cooperation, and conflicts are developed from having different 
ideas and arguing in favour or against each other (perceptional conflicts). Forester 
(2009) calls such kind of conflicts as ‘value-based disputes’ which explains conflicts 
derived from value differences. In conceptualising cooperation and conflicts in this 
way,  the  analytical  framework  was  analytically  productive  in  the  way  that 
contrasting  assumptions  was  considered.  In  other  words,  this  study  attempted  to 
understand both the ‘consumer in the market’ and a ‘citizen in politics’ mentioned by 
Steiner (2012, pp.88-103). In the case of cooperation in the making and using of 
effective  microorganism  balls,  this  study  analysed  why  policy  network's 
organisations and groups decided to cooperate for mutual benefits expected in return 
of taking part and for altruism (helping mind). In the case of analysing conflicts, it 
seems that every conflict that was examined (see 7.1) had developed from both self-
interest  account  and  beyond.  For  example,  conflicts  developed  from  different 
expectations  between  policy  actors  were  formed  based  both  on  expectations  of 
specific benefits that could be gained and expectations on developmental goals that 290 
 
affected the shape and form of society that each one dreamed to. In doing so, this 
study  was  neither  too  optimistic  (e.g.  no  one  was  selfish/  everyone  was  moral 
conscious) or pessimistic (everyone was selfish/ no one is morally conscious).   
By  engaging  in  specific  arguments,  this  study  provides  an  analytical  insight  by 
considering  different  ways  of  framing  cooperation  enhancement.  The  analysis 
focused both on the role of regulations and incentives that affected decision-making 
to  cooperate  argued  by  IRC  scholars  and  the  role  of  persuasion  to  enhance 
cooperation by making others agree with the reason for cooperation argued by CAT 
scholars.  The  analysis  in  Chapter  5  illustrates  this  articulation  by  showing  that 
regulations,  incentives  and  persuasion  affected  decision  making  to  cooperate  for 
different organisations and groups at the time of the analysis. This study also took 
benefit from seeking for the co-function of two arguments by scoping their roles in 
communicative process where referring to regulations and incentives became another 
way to making a claim for persuasion.  
Another specific argument engaged by this study is the different claims about how to 
deal with conflict, including by coming to an agreement and by developing mutual 
understanding. Agreement building is important in handling conflicts for both IRC 
and CAT. IRC focuses agreement in the form of a new rule agreed by conflicting 
stakeholders, while CAT seeks for consensus in the form of a deal and a promise. 
IRC  does  extensively  deal  with  mutual  understanding,  while  CAT  recognises 
conflict-resolution  through  a  building  of  mutual  understanding  as  discussed  in 
Chapter  2  (2.3).  To  engage  with  their  arguments,  the  study  took  advantage  of 
considering more than one possible option for handling conflicts. In particular, the 
analysis can be framed to understand conflict-resolution through the consideration of 
agreed rules development, a making of the deal and promise, and the building of 
mutual understanding.  
I.III Understanding the role of social capital in governing policy networks 
through an analysis of power relations 
This  study  proposes  a  productive  way  to  link  social  capital  to  policy  network 
governance through an analysis of power relations. While some previous studies 
attempt to treat social capital as if it were politically neutral (Fine, 2001, p.199), this 291 
 
study put power in the centre of analysis. The advantage of doing so is that the 
analysis goes further than to claim that social capital glues plural actors together as a 
network (Lin, 2010, 2001) by providing an understanding how social capital could 
do so through the lens of power analysis. By analysing power relations, this study 
can  bridge  relations  between  social  capital,  network  emergence,  network 
characterisation,  cooperation  enhancement  and  conflict-resolution  within  policy 
networks.  IRC  and  CAT  help  to  frame  not  only  social  capital,  cooperation  and 
conflicts, but also the analysis of power relations. IRC focuses more on instrumental 
power (e.g. incentives and regulations), while CAT highlights communicative power 
(e.g.  convincing  and  persuasion)  and  recognises  structural  power  (e.g.  power 
embedded in political-bureaucratic and socio-cultural structures). So, the analytical 
insight  that  can  be  provided  by  adopting  these  theories  is  that  structural, 
communicative and instrumental power were used as angles from which to analyse 
how the policy network emerged and how it took shape as well as to understand how 
cooperation could be enhanced and conflicts could be solved by which social capital 
played a role in activating power (e.g. unequal social capital affected the imbalance 
of power).  
In other words, an analysis of power is a bridge that links an analysis of social 
capital to an analysis of policy network governance. For example, this study found 
that shared rules as a form of social capital supported instrumental power of the 
powerful organisations. This is because shared rules allowed for the mobilisation of 
collective actions of the policy network, including rules of engagement shared and 
agreed  by  all  members.  In  contrast,  shared  norms  and  knowledge  supported 
structural and communicative power of organisations by convincing and persuading 
others  to  cooperate.  For  example,  a  norm  for  respect  to  the  elderly  and  shared 
knowledge on effective use of some techniques supported the argument made by the 
elder  who  shared  that  knowledge  to  be  the  most  agreeable.  This  case  study 
(presented in Chapter 6) reflects the power that Habermas (1996, p.305) calls the 
unforced force of the better argument (power to convince others by good arguments). 
This study also found that trust and reputation supported the structural power of the 
mediator  (power  of  social  status)  in  facilitating  conflict-resolution  by  relying  on 
acceptability and legitimacy. Besides, shared rules, norms and knowledge supported 
communicative power of the effective mediator in proposing a compromise solution. 292 
 
All in all, this study found that to engage in power analysis is the productive way to 
understand the role of social capital in governing policy networks by exploring the 
‘secret of its success’. In other words, although most scholars support the role of 
social capital in supporting network governance, there were few clear explanations 
or examples of how social capital could do this. The advantage of this analysis is to 
build a better understanding of how each specific form of social capital can activate 
power to govern policy networks.  
However, there is a criticism of this analytical approach that treats each type of 
power as being relative. By considering different types of power, the analysis did not 
judge type of power was most impacting. Instead, the analysis captured the role of 
different types of power at different entry points and in relation to different forms of 
social capital. While presenting this argument in a conference at Wageningen (in 
July 2014), one of comments I received was that Thailand is very centralised and 
faces social and economic inequality, so structural conditions could be powerful and 
to analyse other faces of power might be meaningless. The research argued that even 
if it was hard at points to challenge the power embedded in Thai ruling structures, 
UA policy network members found room to exert instrumental and communicative 
power at different scales, settings and times, in particular when city food and green 
issues in Bangkok were depoliticised and members of the policy network became an 
important  channel  to  open  a  public  sphere  t  o  engage  lay  people  in  ongoing 
discussions.  
II Limitations of the research 
This  study  acknowledges  that  to  analyse  the  social  capital  of  organisations  and 
groups through data  and  opinions  provided by their  leaders  might not reflect all 
aspects  of  their  social  capital.  The  study  also  assumed  that  their  leader's  social 
capital  could  represent  that  of  the  whole  organisation  and  group.  Chapter  7,  for 
example, analysed the role of the director of one organisation by mixing both his 
own  social  capital  and  the  social  capital  of  his  organisation.  This  study 
acknowledges that in doing so, it might not be always possible to attribute such 
claims to the so-called  'institutional capital' (Innes and Booher, 2003; Wagenaar, 
2011), but instead this should be differentiated as institutional leaders' capital. This 
limitation has emerged from the actual conditions framing this research that there 293 
 
were many policy network's constituent organisations and groups, which make it 
hard to collect data from every members of each organisation and group to analyse 
their collective social capital in particular by conducting the fieldwork during the 
flooding.  However,  to  reduce  this  weakness,  two  and  more  representatives  were 
interviewed for each organisation and group to recheck each collective profile. 
This study also acknowledges that trust was analysed as an asset that leads to closer 
relations  and  supports  cooperation,  which  might  not  necessary  be  this  way.  As 
argued by Field (2003), trust among strangers is possible, and many relationships 
can operate perfectly well with a minimum of trust, including those which rest on 
habit or institutional sanctions rather than on reflexive choices. Wagenaar (2014, 
pp.232-6) also analyses that mutual distrust can enhance cooperation (and support 
uninvited participation) as distrustful organisations, groups, individuals would not 
like to allow others that they distrust solely taking actions without monitoring by 
them and giving their hands. To think about the case of cooperation in the event 
called  'seed exchange' reminds me that some slum communities did not join the 
event, arguing that they trusted other slum communities to bring some for them. In 
contrast, members of the online group came to join and argued that they could not 
ask anyone to bring seeds for them (no one could be trusted) and they wanted to get 
closer to others (loose relationships could also promote cooperation). Apart from 
that, as pointed by Forester (2013, 2009) distrust between conflicting stakeholders 
makes  the  role  of  the  mediator  become  important  as  it  acts  'in-between'  those 
distrusting stakeholders. It can be implied that if conflicting stakeholders trust each 
other which is assumed by this study that it should be positive, mediation led by the 
mediator discussed in this report (particular in Chapter 7) might be not required and 
the whole story might be changed. It should therefore be noted as a limitation that 
these aspects  were  perhaps  not given enough  attention as a  result on  employing 
many forms of social capital.  
Moreover, another limitation of this study includes somehow the scope adopted for 
the analysis of collective action problems. This study acknowledges that apart from 
cooperation  and  conflicts,  there  might  be  other  problems  faced  by  the  policy 
network, such as corruptions and continuity. This limitation has emerged from the 
actual conditions that this study noticed that these two problems were clearly present 294 
 
and there were many cases that they were handled, which could be learned from. 
Furthermore, this study understands cooperation less as a personal motivation apart 
from linking it to social capital, rules, incentives and persuasion. As noted by Rydin 
and  Pennington  (2000),  sometimes  the  decision  to  cooperate  is  the  result  of 
enjoyment.  Some  people  cooperate  because  of  their  interest  in  the  content  of 
undertaking  an  activity.  Others  may  aim  to  achieve  their  self-actualisation  or  to 
realise a value in themselves, which is another inner motivation apart from a sense of 
collectivity. In the case of understanding conflicts, this study pays less attention to 
tensions, which can be defined as another soft-conflict. This study also presumes that 
conflicts would be handled through a building of an agreement. However, as argued 
by  Forrester  (2013,  p.299),  mediators  do  not  make  agreements  any  more  than 
midwives make babies. He analyses that they are not parents. They are the catalysts 
and the coaches and the enablers who help to develop a practical choice that satisfies 
stakeholders, which does not mean an agreement. Apart from that, this study ignores 
structural conflicts such as class and gender conflicts. These limitations are a result 
of  the  aim  to  frame  the  study  by  adopted  meso-level  theories,  which  focus  on 
analysing  interactions  in  collective  action  rather  than  personal  motivation  and 
structural constraints.  
Furthermore, to touch lightly issues directly related to food and disaster is another 
limitation of this study. This study acknowledges that there was much more that 
could have been explored in relation to the role of urban agriculture in responding to 
food  shortage  during  the  disaster  that  requires  the  analytical  insights  (e.g.  urban 
agriculture  and  food security, food sovereignty, resilience to climate change  and 
urban  environmental  justice  etc.).  This  limitation  has  emerged  from  the  actual 
conditions that the researcher analyses the case study that it could reflect much more 
in  its  governance  aspect.  I  was  amazed  by  the  strong  cooperation  of  the  policy 
network's members and their capacity in handling with conflicts rather than their 
contributions to food shortage as the research found that they could provide food, 
materials and know-how for less than 5% of the total amount of the victims (as 
mentioned  in  Chapter  1).  This  limitation  is  also  related  to  my  background  as  a 
lecturer in policy, planning and governance, who graduated from the department of 
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In addition, this study acknowledges that it cannot claim that the analysis is fit well 
in solely understanding disaster governance. Although the setting of this study is the 
context of emergency and shock, it did not compare between the situations before 
and during the disaster. For example, to find that not only instrumental power and 
rationality (state mechanisms like inflexible rational bureaucratic systems under the 
influence of managerialism and the idea of new public management) should be taken 
into  account  as  communicative  power  and  rationality  are  also  required  for 
understanding  governance  in  the  context  of  crisis.  Without  comparison  between 
regular conditions and crisis scenarios, this study could not claim that this finding 
would  solely  apply  for  understanding  risk  and  resilient  governance  as  normal 
mechanisms  might  be  equally  dysfunctional  under  non-crisis  scenarios.  As  a 
consequence, what this study can say concerns what happened under scenarios of 
high uncertainty, where it was more difficult to enforce formal procedures and this in 
turn opened the room to challenge and reshape such procedures by recognising the 
role of communication in governing collective action. This study can also say that a 
distrust of information analysed and provided by the state and a failure of the state to 
predict  the  events  became  reasons  for  challenging  existing  mechanisms  of 
instrumental  power  and  rationality  in  risky  and  uncertain  situations.  People 
deliberate with one another more intensively than in a normal situation to reduce 
panic and to seek trustable information and agreeable solutions. Everyone wants to 
hear and share to achieve what they think might be the most reasonable or even 
practical. In this way, they deliver communicative rationality as a result of finding a 
better  argument  and  a  practical  reason.  A  clear  example  of  the  power  of 
communication and an effect of communicative rationality is the case of effective 
microorganism (EM) balls promotion presented in Chapter 6. This case demonstrates 
that although using local-made EM balls for soil improvement and waste treatment 
during  flooding  are  nonsensical  from  the  perspective  of  a  scientific  mindset, 
communication among different people legitimised the use of EM balls. The EM 
balls  could  be  a  practical  effect  of  applying  reason  by  people  who  aim  to  do 
something valuable to improve the existing situation. They thought that applying this 
local knowledge was practical at a household scale as it depends on local materials 
and simple technology, which everyone could do. This example also demonstrates 
how  communicative  action  works  in  concrete  ways,  particularly  illustrating  the 
power of persuasion or convincing to affect a decision. At this stage, the study can 296 
 
claim  that  communicative  power  and  rationality  affects  decision  making  in 
governing  risk  and  resilient  livelihoods  no  less  than  scientific  and  economic 
rationality, although this study could not say that it would not happen during the pre-
crisis.  
Last but not least, this study accepts that one important limitation of this study is the 
position of me as the researcher, which affected the interpretation of the data as the 
perspectives  of  the  researcher  and  the  key  informants  were  often  assimilated  as 
discussed  in  Chapter  3  (such  as  the  way  to  define  urban  agriculture  and  to 
understand right to food). This limitation is a result of my decision making to do a 
research that was relevant to previous experiences, which brought me to study this 
topic and field. This limitation may be relatively serious given that some research 
paradigms require that the researcher be an outsider, who has not engaged and took 
part with the case study. However, I decided to reveal myself instead of keeping it as 
a secret as many researchers usually do. I believes that many participatory action 
researches  and  interpretive  studies  would  face  with  the  same  problem  as  the 
researchers  could  make  a  subjective  judgement  about  the  research  finding,  but 
nowadays these approaches are more recognised and respected.   
III Orientations for future research   
Beyond resolving and crossing over the limitations of this study as discussed above, 
future research can also consider other issues. To begin with, using social capital 
might help solve not only collective action problems but also other problems such as 
economic recession, social welfare and political contradictions. Social capital is not a 
static asset but has its own dynamics similar to other kinds of capital but opposite to 
the way proposed by Coleman (cited in Warren, 1999, pp.208-48): the more social 
capital is used the more it grows. Although this study reflects on some dynamics of 
social capital such as the stronger social capital of an online group, the period from 
the emergence of the policy network to the end of the disaster is too short to address 
clear changes in social capital. Future research could design a study to examine the 
dynamics of social capital by researching over a longer period.  
Moreover, this study sees the potential for future research to focus specifically in 
studying the role of local knowledge. This study put some intention to do so, but 297 
 
from conceptualising knowledge as one form of social capital among many other 
forms, this  study did  not  discuss much more in this specific aspect, such as the 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting local traditional knowledge for solving 
modern problems. For example, this study discussed the role of shared knowledge on 
making and using locally-made EM balls in supporting an agreement to cooperate 
for making and using them, but did not assess their effectiveness to enhance soil 
quality and reduce polluted water as claimed by local practitioners. The future study 
should  frame  to  understand  both  how  local  knowledge  could  be  recognised  in 
making policy and whether local knowledge is effective or not.  
Furthermore, this study reflects on the fact that norms can activate power embedded 
in socio-cultural structures in a context where shared norms are strong. This study 
illustrates the importance of this relationship through the case of norm judging: to 
promote  subsistence-oriented  UA  has  notable  benefits  while  promoting  market-
oriented  UA  does  not.  This  norm  works  well  with  the  King’s  speech  on  self-
sufficiency, which is powerful in Thai socio-cultural structures. There is no public 
space  for  discussion  the  negative  side  of  his  speech.  His  ideas  have  become 
hegemonic and no one can re-examine them through a deliberative process. When 
someone links the norm of subsistence-oriented UA to the King’s speech, that norm 
can activate structural power to legitimate the exercise of their instrumental power 
and  to  support  their  communicative  power  by  persuading  and  negotiating.  This 
analysis is a good starting point for the future research to dig deeper into the analysis 
of  the  effect  of  shared  norms  in  distorting  the  communication  particularly  by 
studying  the  developing  countries  where  norms  are  embedded  in  socio-cultural 
structures and legitimise power in the structures.  
In addition, by framing moral obligation as a form of social capital, this study also 
reflects  the  influence  of  religion  in  analysing  collaborative  policy  network 
governance.  As  Thailand  is  a  strong  Buddhist  society,  religion  affects  moral 
obligations  of  the  people  examined  during  crises.  Buddhism  emphasises  that  all 
sentient beings share humanity and are interdependent. Once they have understood 
their own feelings and are reliant on themselves, they should try to understand the 
feelings of others, support and help each other. In contrast, people should realise that 
by taking advantage of others is sin (‘Bab’). A finding presented in Chapter 6, for 298 
 
example, is that moral obligation links an agreement to cooperate to the decision to 
do so. The Buddhist notion heard a lot during the crisis is the notion of ‘helping 
mind’ (Metra-Garuna). Powerful organisations often attempt to stimulate the moral 
consciousness of the people through Buddhist principles; for example, to give is to 
do goodness (Bun) by destroying greed (Lopa). These principles become axioms and 
influence the way many Thai people think in their everyday life. In dealing with 
conflicts, Buddhism also support non-violent actions (Ahingsa), and emphasises the 
importance of deliberation. In referring to Buddhism, however, this study analyses 
the impacts of its principles as people’s perceptions about good society rather than 
shared social norms. Buddhism guides Thai people to seek a better life rather than 
succeeding in shaping people to become a ‘good’ person as the Buddha aims to be. 
In doing so, this analysis may benefit as an example for further studies that plan to 
understand a context in which religion is very strong. However, this analysis should 
be just a starting point. Future research should seek for a potential of religion in not 
only  awakening  moral  obligation,  but  also  in  shaping  public  spheres  where 
communication takes place. Habermas's works in the last decade also pays attention 
to the role of religion in this area (Calhoun, Mendieta and VanAntwerpen, 2013; 
Mendieta and VanAntwerpen, 2011). He discusses the role of secular knowledge 
embedded  in  religion  in  communicative  process  (Habermas  et.  al.,  2010),  which 
could be a potential research topic. The future research may explore advantages of 
recognising secular knowledge in deliberation by also examining Dryzek’s argument 
that  religious  fundamentalism  is  one  of  unfavourable  conditions  for  deliberation 
(Dryzek, 2009, pp.1394-9).   
Besides, future research needs to investigate the influence of bureaucratic systems in 
policy network governance. As argued by Davies (2011, p.70) and Scharpf (cited in 
Sorensen and Torfing, 2008, p.170), policy networks are a medium of social control 
that are formed in the shadow of hierarchy. This study provides some reflections on 
this  by  mentioning  an  effect  of  structural  power  bases  on  political-bureaucratic 
traditions  in  the  policy  network  governance,  such  as  the  role  of  bureaucratic 
regulations  on  public  funding  management  or  the  bureaucratic  language  used  in 
shaping the way in which the policy network operated. However, this issue requires 
a more critical analytical framework, which the framework adopted by this study 
could  not  provide.  For  example,  by  adopting  Gramscian  approach,  Davies  (ibid) 299 
 
analyses networks as the tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, 
which operate under the hegemonic role of the state. They are shaped and reshaped 
by  strategic  interventions  of  government  officials  at  different  levels.  This  study 
realises that such arguments have the potential to contribute a critical reflection, but 
by adopting IRC and CAT this study focuses on interactions between plural actors 
by  highlighting  their  collective  actions  rather  than  analysing  under  which 
circumstances  they  operated.  This  issue  is  a  challenge  for  future  research, 
particularly in framing to study the same case, but different timeframe such as after 
the coup on May 2014 (under military government).   
Last but not least, to assess the extent to which the promotion of UA may be an 
effective strategy for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is another 
avenue that this study also touches upon, but requires more analytical insights. This 
area was also highlighted by the Resource Centres on Urban Agriculture and Food 
Security (RUAF), as argued in many articles, including my input into the Urban 
Agriculture  Magazine  (volume  27)  entitled  ‘Promoting  UA  as  a  climate  change 
adaptation and disaster risk reduction strategy’. This focus is also promoted by the 
Transition  Town  movement  around  the  world,  which  puts  UA  as  an  essential 
component for adapting to peak oil and climate change (Hopkins, 2013, 2008). What 
this study can do is to illustrate that under certain disaster conditions more horizontal 
or less hierarchical relations within the policy network might be activated, while 
many previous studies capture the promotion of UA through a vertical approach, 
either  through  top-down  or  bottom-up  structural  arrangements.  So,  this  study 
illustrates the promotion of UA through the collaboration of a constellation of actors 
(similar  to  what  Mougeot  (2005)  and  Prain  (2006)  called  ‘stakeholders’ 
participation’). Unfortunately, this study paid more attention on how they organised 
their collective actions and handled their own problems including cooperation and 
conflicts, rather than examine how their collective actions enhance climate change 
adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction.  This  study  provided  some  notices  that 
promoting UA can be a way to respond to food shortages and the right to food of the 
most  vulnerable  groups  through  pro-poor  collective  action  governed  by  UA 
stakeholders during an  extreme climate event,  but could  not say  more about  the 
actual potential without comparison between different settings where intervention 300 
 
took place and did not. So, future research should design a comparative research in 
this area to make an argument clearer than this study could do.  
With modesty, I am confident that the case of the policy network on UA in Bangkok 
proved to be an interesting one to open some fruitful routes to understand social 
capital and network governance. To my knowledge no works have examined the role 
of social capital in governing policy networks on UA in times of crisis let alone how 
this operates for Bangkok. This thesis hopefully provided some challenging thoughts 
on how to define social capital, cooperation, conflicts and power by articulating IRC 
and  CAT  while  still  contrasting  their  assumptions.  To  marry  IRC  and  CAT  (as 
macro-level theories) to the policy network approach (as a meso-level theory) helps 
to enhance explanatory power of policy networks. This study illustrates that in doing 
so  we  can  understand  how  the  actors  in  a  policy  network  actually  interact, 
collaborate  and  resolve  conflicts,  while  most  policy  network  literature  does  not 
across the boundaries of the explanation on the qualities of the actors, the conditions 
that bound them, typologies of policy networks, and their links to policy outcomes. 
This study provides that social capital is an answer how the actors in the network 
who share it are able to do all these things. In relation to that, the study proves that to 
marry  with  IRC  and  CAT  makes  it  possible  to  bridge  social  capital  to  policy 
networks as they help to analyse the way social capital affects the emergence and 
characterisation of a policy network. They also help to analyse the way it enhances 
cooperation and contributes to resolving conflict in policy networks. By articulating 
IRC and CAT for organising the vast material on social capital, both rational and 
normative commitments are brought to capture forms of social capital. They help to 
analyse deeper how social capital is the “glue” that binds the network and affects its 
durability and persistence. The study offers an analytical insight that the actors are 
committed to be part of a policy network as a consequence of their shared rules, 
norms  and  knowledge.  Reciprocal  relationships,  moral  obligation,  reputation  and 
trust each other also affect their decision to commit to the network. Besides, their 
cooperation and conflicts can be based on both personal utility maximisation guided 
by  rules  and  incentives  and  shared  communal  norms,  perspectives,  habits  and 
communication patterns that are wider than individual interests.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: List of key events to be observed 
-  A field visit organised by the City Farm Programme to provide food, 
materials and knowledge (know-how) for producing emergency food to the 
flood victims at ‘Tung Song Hong’ 
-  A meeting for sharing experiences and developing food innovations for 
living with water at the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (SAF)’s office 
-  A collective activity to adopt farming method to create an effective 
microorganism ball for enhancing soil quality and reducing waste water at 
‘Health-me Organic Delivery, Rathaburana’ 
-  A mutual aid by helping to recover a farm of the members at ‘Saymai’slum 
-  An exhibition of city farm under the project organised by the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration  called ‘Recovering Bangkok’at Laksi 
-  A building of floating garden at ‘Saladin’community, ‘Mahasawat river’ 
-  A seed exchange and public showcases and seminar organised at ‘Tung Song 
Hong’ 
-  A seed exchange organised at ‘Shai-noi’ 
-  A seed exchange organised at ‘Salaya’ 
-  A city farm tour at ‘Onnut’slum 
-  Exhibitions of city farm in ‘Green Fair’week at Chulalongkorn University 
(2012) and Sirikrit Centre (2013) 
-  A meeting of training centres working under the City Farm programme at the 
SAF office  
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-  Public meetings for sharing experiences and food organised at the Bangkok 
‘Bhudha’garden (‘Eating and sharing in the garden/ Kin-Khaw-Nai-Soun’) 
(twice) 
-  City farm public campaign, showcases and seminar at the Bangkok 
‘Bhudha’garden (2012 and 2013) 
-  A making of the rooftop garden at the office building of the Health 
Promotion Foundation (HPF) 
 
The following events organized by policy communities within the policy network 
were also observed.  
-  A meeting and a mutual aid among the members of the slum dwellers 
network during floods at Onnut Sibsee Rai community 
-  Mutual aids among the members of the informal labour network during the 
flood at Tungsonghong Samsoonkog and Samsongsoon national housing 
communities 
-  A mutual aid of consumers to producers, who were affected by the floods and 
joined community supported agricultural system (CSA) organised by the 
Green Market Network (GMN)  
-  A special green markets selling not-so-good products affected by flooding 
organised by the GMN 
-  Sharing online (via Facebook page) and during monthly event called ‘Eating 
and sharing in the park’, where the online friends (members of ‘City farms, 
City friends’) come to share food and experiences  
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Appendix B: Sets of questions for the interview
1 
Set A: For the interviews of key staffs of the HPF, regional and local governments 
who supported the City Farm programme, and NGOs and CBOs who collaboratively 
manage the programme (led by the SAF) 
Part 1: Information of the interview 
1.1. Date:   
1.2. Started at:    
1.3. Finished at: 
1.4. Observations: 
Part 2: Information of the interviewee 
2.1. Name of the interviewee: 
2.2. Organisation:  
2.3. Address: 
2.4. Telephone/ fax: 
2.5. Gender: 
2.6. Age:   
2.7. Position: 
2.8. Professional background:  
2.9. Since when do you work here?  
 
 
                                                 
1 Before the sets of questions for formal interview was designed, the informal interviews 
with coordinators of City Farm programme had been conducted many times to scope a 
boundary  of  key  actors  which  must  be  included  and  framing/  mapping  the  actors 
constellations (for understanding sub-sectoral networks/ policy communities).  
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Part 3: Profile of the organisation/organisational unit for whom the interviewee 
works 
3.1. What does your organisation (department/ office/ unit/ foundation/ centre/ 
association) mainly do? (Missions/ work tasks) 
3.2. What is the specific remit/focus of your organisation? Why? 
3.3. How many members? Who are they? 
Part4: An emergence and characterisation of the urban agriculture’s policy 
network in Bangkok
2 
4.1. How has your organisation engaged with the City Farm programme?  
4.2. How would you define the position and main role of your organisation in the 
City Farm programme especially during and shortly after the flood? 
4.3. How can your organisation intervene the decision making of other actors who 
take part in the City Farm programme (e.g. to control them to follow the rules, to 
guide their practices in the way you want, and to push an idea)?  
4.4. Who could intervene the decision making of your organisation? And how? 
Part 5: Social capital 
5.1. Please rating degree of closeness between your organisation and the following 
organisations/ groups (giving the interviewee a sheet of name list) 
  1) Knowing each other (e.g. ever met, ever chatted) 
2) Contacting each other (e.g. develop and keep connection by calling, 
emailing/ sending letter or sharing after met) 
3) Working with each other sometime (e.g. ever joined or joining the same 
project, but seldom coordinate with each other by less than one a month) 
                                                 
2The  UA  policy  network  in  Bangkok  are  scoped  here  as  actions  active  both  under  the 
umbrella of the City Farm programme and supporting on that programme since 2010 until 
early 2012 (when fieldwork was ended).  
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4) Working closely with each other (e.g. ever joined or joining the same 
project, and need to coordinate with each other in regular basis by one a month or 
more) 
5.2. Do you think are there any other organisations/ groups missing from the list. If 
so, who should be added? (Snow ball) 
5.3. With what organisations and/or groups whom take actions both under the 
umbrella of the City Farm programme and supporting on that programme have you 
been working closely with especially during and shortly after the floods? (Ranking 
the top five) Why? (Tell me a story of the relation)
3 
5.4. Do you recall any specific events in which members of your organisation work 
collectively with those organisations and/or groups?   
5.5. After work together, do you think your relations with others whom you worked 
with are changed? If so, are the relations closer or looser? When and why? 
Part 6: Experiences on urban agriculture and opinion about urban agriculture 
contribution 
6.1. How is urban agriculture important? 
6.2. What should be concerned in practicing urban agriculture? (Including principles 
and constrains) 
6.3. Please talk about the role of the City Farm programme during and shortly after 
the floods. 
Part 7: Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution during and after the 
floods 
7.1. What did you work with other organisations and groups in running or supporting 
the City Farm programme during and shortly after the floods? How?  
7.2. What were the problems of working with other organisations and groups your 
organisation faced during and after the floods? 
                                                 
3 To capture forms of social capital  
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7.3. How about cooperation problems? And how about conflicts? 
7.4. How did your organisation enhance cooperation? Did it work?  
7.5. When your organisation communicated with other organisations and groups, in 
regularly who was sent to communicate?  
7.6. In relation to previous question, what were status and character of that person? 
What logic-evidence was used to support? How to sale an idea/ information/ 
knowledge? 
7.7. Did the rule enforcement and incentives could help to enhance cooperation? If 
so, how? 
7.8. Did the agreement could help to enhance cooperation? If so, how? 
7.9. Concerning conflicts, how did your organisation deal with them? Did it work? 
7.10. Did regulations help to solve them? If so, how? 
7.11. How about talking/ negotiation? Did it help? If so, how? 
7.12. Were there any mediators? If yes, did the mediator (s) support conflict 
resolution? And how? 
Part 8: Others/ open questions in relation to collective actions during and after 
the floods 
8.1. Could you please talk a bit about other organisations and groups especially the 
role of your closely related colleagues and your expectations on them on what they 
should better do?  
8.3. In specific, what do you think the central government should better do? 
8.4. Is there anything else you want to raise?  
------------------ 
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Set B: For the interviews of the leaders of 41 farming groups who lunched their 
project under the umbrella of the City Farm programme
4 
Part 1: Information of the interview 
1.1. Date:   
1.2. Started at:    
1.3. Finished at: 
1.4. Observations (included community settlement, location of the garden, a variety 
of food etc.): 
Part 2: Information of the interviewee 
2.1. Name of the interviewee: 
2.2. Group’s name:  
2.3. Address: 
2.4. Telephone/ fax: 
2.5. Gender: 
2.6. Age:   
2.7. Position: 
2.8. Professional background:  
2.9. Career: 
2.10. Income (average) per month:   
2.11. Since when do you become a member of the group?  
 
                                                 
4 The interviews conducting for farming groups were mainly group interviews by which 
some parts related to individual information were asked personally.   
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Part 3: Profile of the group for whom the interviewee works 
3.1. What does your group do? 
3.2. When does it start? 
3.3. What is the specific remit/focus of your group? Why? 
3.4. How had your group been formed? 
3.5. How does your group work? 
3.6. How many members? Who are they?  
Part4: An emergence and characterisation of urban agriculture’s policy 
networks in Bangkok  
4.1. How has your group engaged with the City Farm programme?  
4.2. How would you define the position and main role of your group in the City 
Farm programme especially during and shortly after the floods? 
4.3. Could you name the organisation (s) or group (s) working related to the City 
Farm programme in which most of organisations and groups are involved with? 
What are their roles? 
4.4. How do they influence the decision making of your group?  
4.5. If your group need to depend on them in any reasons, why?      
Part 5: Social capital 
5.1. Please rating degree of closeness between your group and the following 
organisations/ groups (giving the interviewee a sheet of name list) 
  1) Knowing each other (e.g. ever met, ever chatted) 
2) Contacting each other (e.g. to develop and keep connection by calling, 
emailing/ sending letter or sharing after met) 
3) Working with each other sometime (e.g. ever joined or joining the same 
project, but seldom coordinate with each other by less than one a month)  
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4) Working closely with each other (e.g. ever joined or joining the same 
project, and need to coordinate with each other in regular basis by one a month or 
more) 
5.2. Do you think are there any other organisations/ groups missing from the list. If 
so, who should be added? 
5.3. With what organisations and/or groups whom take actions both under the 
umbrella of and supporting on the City Farm programme have you been working 
closely with especially during and shortly after the floods? (Ranking the top five) 
Why? (Tell me a story of the relation)  
5.4. Do you recall any specific events in which members of your group work 
collectively with those organisations and/or groups?   
5.5. After work together, do you think your relations with others whom you worked 
with are changed? If so, are the relations closer or looser? When and why? 
5.6. Do you always work with the same organisations and groups? If yes, why? If no 
(there are other new organisations or groups working with you), will you continue 
working with the new one, or plan to extend to work with the other new 
organisations and groups? 
Part 6: Experiences on urban agriculture and opinion about urban agriculture 
contribution 
6.1. How is urban agriculture important? 
6.2. What should be concerned in practicing urban agriculture? (Including principles 
and constrains) 
6.3. Please talk about the role of the City Farm programme during and shortly after 
the floods. 
6.4. Who did take benefits from what your group took action in relation to food 
agenda during and after the floods? 
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Part 7: Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution during and after the 
floods 
7.1. What did you work with other organisations and groups in running or supporting 
the CFP during and shortly after the floods? How?  
7.2. What were the problems of working with other organisations and groups your 
organisation faced during and after the floods? 
7.3. How about cooperation problems? And how about conflicts? 
7.4. Did your group take part in enhancing cooperation? If so, how? And did it 
work?  
7.5. When your group communicated with other organisations and groups, in 
regularly who was sent to communicate?  
7.6. In relation to previous question, what were status and character of that person? 
What logic-evidence was used to support? How to sale an idea/ information/ 
knowledge? 
7.7. To enhance cooperation by the core organisations, what were status and 
characters of speakers? What kind of reason/evidence/support was given? How did 
they try to convince? In your view, did it work or not?  
7.8. Did the rule enforcement and incentives affect your decision to take part with 
events organised by the City Farm programme? If so, how? 
7.9. Did the agreement affect your decision to take part with events organised by the 
City Farm programme? If so, how? 
7.10. Did your group take part in handling conflicts? If so, how? And did it work? 
7.11. Did regulations help to solve them? If so, how? 
7.12. How about talking/ negotiation? Did it help? If so, how? 
7.13. Were there any mediators? If yes, did the mediator (s) support conflict 
resolution? And how?  
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Part 8: Others/ open questions in relation to collective actions during and after 
the floods 
8.1. Could you please talk a bit about other organisations and groups especially the 
role of your closely related colleagues and your expectations on them on what they 
should better do?  
8.3. In specific, what do you think the central government should better do? 
8.4. Is there anything else you want to raise?  
---------------- 
Set C: For the interviews of the leaders of farming groups who did not engage with 
the City Farm programme 
Part 1: Information of the interview 
1.1. Date:   
1.2. Started at:    
1.3. Finished at: 
1.4. Observations: 
Part 2: Information of the interviewee 
2.1. Name of the interviewee: 
2.2. Group’s name:  
2.3. Address: 
2.4. Telephone/ fax: 
2.5. Gender: 
2.6. Age:   
2.7. Position: 
2.8. Professional background:   
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2.9. Career: 
2.10. Income (average) per month:   
2.11. Since when do you become a member of the group?  
Part 3: Profile of the group for whom the interviewee works 
3.1. What does your group do? 
3.2. When does it start? 
3.3. What is the specific remit/focus of your group? Why? (Except for slum 
community) 
3.4. How had your group been formed? 
3.5. How does your group work? 
3.6. How many members? Who are they?  
Part 4: Social capital and the reasons to do not engage with the City Farm 
programme 
4.1. Are there any organisations and/or groups who take actions either under the 
umbrella of the City Farm programme or supporting on the programme that your 
group familiar with? If yes, how close? (Please provide the story of the relationship)  
4.2. Why don’t you engage with the City Farm programme?  
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Appendix C: Issues prepared for organising focus groups  
I The first focus group 
1. Perspectives on the overview of the supports on UA in Bangkok 
2. What we did and what we did not 
3. Who we worked with and who we still did not 
8. Our strengths 
9. Our weaknesses 
10. Our opportunities 
11. Our threats  
 
II The second focus group 
 
1. Thai food regime 
2. Food system in Bangkok (production, distribution and consumption)  
3. Food security and its problems in Bangkok  
4. Right to food and its problems in Bangkok 
5. Climate change adaptive capacity on food of Bangkok habitants 
6. Our roles in responding to food security, right to food and climate change 
adaptation 
 
III The third focus group (the special one organised in 2013)
5 
 
1. What were the main problems of cooperation during and shortly after flooding? 
2. How could we enhance cooperation? 
3. What were the main conflicts during and shortly after flooding? 
4. How could we handle such conflicts? 
5. Why someone has been excluded? 
6. Open for relevant issues raised by participants   
                                                 
5 These issues had ever raised during one by one interview. At the first place, I tried to avoid 
asking them during previous focus groups. I considered that they might be sensitive issues 
and many people might feel uncomfortable to discuss about them, if they were raised in the 
face of others (including someone they avoid cooperate with or even have a conflict with). 
But, after I have become close with many core actors (roughly a year after the floods), I 
decided to organise this special focus group to ask these key issues in front of stakeholders.     
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IV List of NGOs and social enterprises joined the first focus group  
 
-Mrs. S.Y., the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation   
-Miss. N. K., the coordinator of the City Farm programme 
-Miss. P.V. N., the coordinator of the City Farm programme 
-Miss. K. W., the coordinator of the City Farm programme (coordinating training 
centres)  
-Mrs. K. F., the coordinator of the City Farm programme (account auditing) 
-Mr. N. L., the member of the City farm Association and urban agriculture 
practitioners 
-Ms. V. K., the member of the City Farm programme monitoring and evaluation 
team   
-Miss.T. K., the member of the City Farm programme monitoring and evaluation 
team 
 
V List of NGOs and social enterprises joined the second focus group 
 
-Mrs. S.Y., the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation   
-Miss. N. K., the coordinator of the City Farm programme 
-Miss. P. V. N., the coordinator of the City Farm programme 
-Miss. K. W., the coordinator of the City Farm programme (training centres)  
-Miss. K. S., the staff of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation 
-Mr. N. L., the member of the City farm Association and trainer  
-Mr. C. G., the member of the City farm Association and trainer 
-Ms. K. M., the staff of the Organic Way, Green Market Network 
-Mr. K. H., the director of the Media Centre for Development and trainer  
-Miss. K. G. H., the staff of the Media Centre for Development and trainer 
-Miss. K.’s friend, the staff of the Media Centre for Development and trainer  
-Mr. K. K., the trainer from the ‘Slow Life’hotel’s training centre 
-Ms. K. O., the owner of the Sai Jai Healthy Food restaurant’s training centre 
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VI List of NGOs and social enterprises joined the third focus group 
 
-Mrs. S. Y., the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation   
-Miss. N. K., the coordinator of the City Farm programme 
-Miss. P. V. N., the coordinator of the City Farm programme 
-Miss. K. P., the staff of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation   
-Mr. N. L., the member of the City farm Association and trainer  
-Mr. C. G., the member of the City farm Association and trainer 
-Ms. K. M., the staff of the Organic Way, Green Market Network 
-Miss. K. G. H., the staff of the Media Centre for Development and trainer 
-Ms. P. P., the group’s leader of the Organic Way 
-Mr. S. T., the group’s leader of the ‘City farms, City friends’ online group 
-Ms. K. C., the member of the ‘City farms, City friends’ 
-Ms. S. S., the member of the ‘City farms, City friends’ 
-Ms. K. T., the staff of the Working Group on Food for Change 
-Ms. W. S., the staff of the Soun Ngeaun Mema, Green Market Network 
-Mr. S. Y., the staff of the Media Centre for Development 
-Ms. P. T., the doctor (a specialist in eco-therapy)   
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Appendix D: Name lists of informants and their organisation/ group 
I List of public agencies, NGOs, and social enterprises working related to the City 
Farm programme which were interviewed  
 
Organisational unit/ organisation  Informants 
National Health Promotion Foundation  -Mr. V. K., senior officer 
-Miss K. P., coordinator of City 
Farm programme 
Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
-Mr. N. L., head of farmer support 
and development unit  
-Ms. J. J., senior officer 
Department of City Planning, Bangkok  
Metropolitan Administration 
-Ms. U. P., director 
-Mr. K. P., urban planner  
Department of Environment,Bangkok  
Metropolitan Administration 
-Ms. K. P., officer   
Food Sanitation Division, Department of 
Health, Bangkok  Metropolitan 
Administration 
-Ms. B., senior officer 
-Ms. S. T., senior officer  
Laksi District Administration  -Ms. A. K., director 
-Ms. J. T., head of the unit 
-Miss K. M., urban agriculture 
practitioner and trainer   
Klongteuy District Administration  -Ms. V. C. 
-Ms. C. K. 
Prawaet District Administration  -Mr. S. C., director 
-Mr. P. K., developer 
Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University  -Associate Professor P. S. 
Faculty of Environment and Resource 
Studies, Mahidon University  
Associate Professor Dr. R. C. 
Associate Professor Dr. S. S. 
Dr. W. W.  
Nutrition Institute, Mahidon University  Ms. S. C. 
Ms. P. T.  
340 
Organisational unit/ organisation  Informants 
Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, 
Thammasart University  
Dr. A. S. 
Policy and Planning Programme, 
Mahasarakham University  
Ms. W. K. 
Miss. T. K. 
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation   -Ms. S. Y., director  
-Ms. U. Y., senior staff  
-Ms. N. K., coordinator of City 
Farm programme (public 
campaign)  
-Ms. P.(V.) N., coordinator of City 
Farm programme (citizen groups 
facilitator and monitor) 
-Ms. K. W., coordinator of City 
Farm programme (training centres)  
-Ms. K. F., coordinator of City 
Farm programme (accounting) 
Working Group on Food for Change  -Ms. K. N. A., director  
-Ms. K. T., staff  
-Ms. K. K., staff  
Green Market Network   -Ms. W. S., staff  
-Mr. S. K., member and city farmer 
Media Centre for Development   -Mr. K. H., director and urban 
agriculture trainer  
-Ms. K. G. H., coordinator and 
urban agriculture trainer  
-Mr. S.Y., staff 
City farm association (Association of social 
enterprises) 
-Mr. N. L., urban agriculture 
practitioner and trainer 
-Mr. C. G., urban agriculture 
practitioner and trainer  
Human Settlement Foundation   Ms. K. N. 
Foundation for Labour and Employment 
Promotion 
Ms. K. M.  
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Organisational unit/ organisation  Informants 
‘Slow Life’hotel’s training centre  -Ms. W. L. 
-Mr. K. K. 
Sai Jai Healthy Food restaurant’s training 
centre 
Ms. K. O., owner and trainer 
Islam Wittayalai  Ms. C. S. 
 
II List of selected farming groups 
 
group  Informants 
1.Homelesses living in public house for 
homeless (SuwidWatnhoocentre),  district 
-Mr. V. N., group’s leader 
-Mr. V. T. 
-Ms. K. G. 
2.Slum dwellers at Onnut Hoksibhok 
community, Prawaet district 
Mr. J. G., community leader 
Mr. P. W., community committee  
3.Slum dwellers at Poonshup community, 
Saymai district 
Ms. V. T., cooperative leader 
Mr. L. B., committee 
4.Slum dwellers at Onnut Sibsee Rai 
community, Prawaet district 
 
-Mr. P. S., community leader 
-Ms. B. S., community committee 
-Ms. P. J., community committee 
-Mr. K. S., community committee  
5. Informal labours at Keha Tung Songhong 
306 national housing community, Laksi 
district  
-Ms. N. S., group’s leader 
-Ms U. N., member 
6. Community committee and community 
members at Keha Tung Songhong 
Samsongsoon national housing community, 
Laksi district  
-Mr. C. R., community group’s 
leader 
-Ms. K. T., community committee  
7. Informal labour namely 'Solidarity group' 
at Bangbon district  
-Mr. M. G., group’s leader  
-Ms. B. M., key staff 
8.Community committee and community 
members at Pradittorakarn, Jatujak district  
-Mr. S. D., community leader 
-Mr. L. W., community committee  
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group  Informants 
9.Staffs of All seasons hotel, Payathai district 
 
-Ms. P. C., human resource 
manager 
-Mr. P. K., key staff   
-Mr. K. S., key staff   
10.Staffs of the library at 
RatchaputChankasem university, Ladpraw 
district 
 
-Dr. K.Y. 
-Ms. U. T.  
-Ms. R. S. 
11.Soo Development office of Dusitsoo, 
Dusit district 
-Mr. K. S. 
-Mr. C. S. 
12.Munks, teachers, hospital staffs and 
community members at Ratchabopit temple, 
Pranakorn district 
-Monk P. W.  
-Ms. S. H. 
13.Munks and school members at 
WatThammamongkon school, Prakanong 
district 
-Monk P. W. 
-Ms. K. K. 
14.Community committee and community 
members at Saymai national housing for low 
income people, Saymai district 
-Mr. R. D. leader  
-Ms. R., community committee 
 
15. Restaurant staffs and blue collar workers 
namely 'Down to earth/ Organic way', 
Rathaburana district 
-Ms. P. P., group’s leader 
-Mr. N. P., key staff 
-Ms. K. M. 
16.Community committee and community 
members at Soun-oiy community, Klongteuy 
district 
-Mr. S. N. leader 
-Ms. P. P., committee  
-Ms. N. N., committee 
-Ms. S. T.,  committee 
17. Community committee and community 
members at Bankleuy community, Klongteuy 
district 
-Ms. S. T.  
-Ms. M. A. 
-Ms. J. S.   
18. A group of friends namely 'self-
sufficiency group' at Seunloeung district 
-Ms. D. B.  
-Mr. S. W. 
19. Informal labours living in national house 
at Chalongkrung national housing 
community, Nhongjog district 
-Ms. W. U., group leader  
-Ms. A. K.  
-Ms. U. W.  
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group  Informants 
20. Community committee and community 
members at Pawana community, Jatujak 
district 
-Ms. S. K., community leader  
-Ms. B. S.   
21. Community committee and community 
members at Rungchareun community, 
Jatujak district 
-Mr. C. U., leader 
-Ms. C.’s wife, committee 
-Ms. K. P P 
-MS. K. S.   
22. Community members at Cho-rungreung 6 
community, Bangbeautong district 
-Mr. N. L. 
-Ms. P. R.  
23. School committee and teachers at Mabon 
muslim community, Praweat district 
-Mr. F. M. 
-Mr. N. U. 
-Mr. S. N. 
-Mr. M. M.  
24.Community committee and community 
members at Saladin community, 
Bhudhamongkol district 
 
-Mr. U. S. 
-Ms. A. S.  
-Ms. P. P. 
-Mr. N. S. 
25. Director and staffs of Immigrant Youth 
Foundation, Bangbon district 
-Mr. C. P. 
-Ms. S. I. 
-Mr. P. P. 
26. Staffs of Pakkred Home for Boys, 
Pakkred district 
-Ms. P. K. 
-Mr. P. T. 
-Mr. S. N. 
27. Teachers and members of Invention club 
at Watshongthom school, Prapradang district 
-Ms. C. S. 
-Ms. J. K. 
-Ms. S. J. 
28. Teachers and students at 
Tangklaymuslim school, Praweat district 
 
 
-Mr. S. U. 
-Ms. S. S. 
-Ms. R. K. 
-Ms. B. L.  
-Mr. P. T. 
29. Condominium development committee of 
Tarareaun-age condominium, 
Wangtonglhang district 
-Mrs. R. C. 
-Miss. W. B. 
-Mr. P. B. 
-Miss B. I. 
-Mr. C. S.  
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group  Informants 
30. Company staffs of Double I studio, 
Bangkhuntheaun district 
-Mrs. A. L. 
-Ms. M. S.   
31. Youth volunteers (young social activists) 
working for Youth Asian Network, 
Houykhang district 
-Mrs. N. S. 
-Miss. J. S. 
-Miss. T. T. 
32. Community committee and community 
members at Jorakhe-khobmuslim 
community, Praweat district 
-Mr. H. M. 
-Miss. R. M. 
-Mr. K. S. 
33. Community committee and community 
members at 'Nuggeela' national housing 
community, Sapansoong district  
-Mrs. B. K.  
-Mr. T. P. 
-Mrs. S. S. 
-Mrs. S. P. 
34. Community committee and community 
members at Pinjareaun, Donmaung district  
   
-Mr. S. P. 
-Mr. S. K. 
-Mr. N. K. 
-Mr. S. S. 
-Miss. S. P. 
35. Community committee, local fireman and 
local policeman at Jareaunnakorn 66 
community, Thonburee district  
-Mr. G. S. 
-Mr. P. M. 
36. Staffs of plastic factory namely 'Joyfull', 
Bangbon district  
-Mr. P. E. 
-Ms. C. N. 
-Ms. S. S. 
37. Informal labours working at home 
(buffalo horn carving), Bangcare district 
-Ms. K. K. 
-Ms. W. S. 
38. A woman group at Clonghog community, 
Clongloung district 
-Ms. M. Y. 
-Ms. P. S. 
39. Members of online social networks 
namely ‘Growing Food for Urban Dwellers’/ 
‘City farms, City friends’ 
-Mr. S. T.  
-Ms. K. C. 
-Ms. S. S. 
-Ms. K. C. 
40. Green architect and friends at Pluspar 
community, Maung district –Patumtanee 
-Ms. P. J.   
-Ms. P. F. 
41. ‘Fang Sawan’collective group, Bangbon 
district 
-Mr. P. K., urban agriculture 
practitioner and trainer 
-Mr. S. P.   
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III List of organisation and groups found as the centralities of policy communities, 
who were re-interviewed (deeper) 
 
group  Informants 
1. Media Centre for Development   -Mr. K. H., director and urban 
agriculture trainer  
-Ms. K. G. H., coordinator and 
urban agriculture trainer  
-Mr. S. Y., staff 
-Ms. M. A., Columnist of the 
Natural Agriculture Magazine   
2. Organic way, Rathaburana district   -Ms. P. P. 
-Ms. K. M. 
-Mr. K. D.  
3. Slum dwellers at OnnutSibsee Rai 
community, Prawaet district 
-Mr. P. S. 
-Ms. B. S. 
-Ms. P. J.  
4. Informal labours at Keha Tung Songhong 
306 national housing community, Laksi 
district 
-Ms. N. S. 
-Mr. S. N. 
-Mr. C. R. 
-Ms. K. T. 
 
IV Two selected farming groups as other sub-case studies which did not engage with 
the City Farm programme (the outsiders) 
group  Informants 
1. Bangbuew slum dwellers community, 
Bangkhaen district  
-Mr. K. D. 
-Mrs. K. S. 
2. Green Made, Say Mai district  -Ms. K. O.  
 
Note: The total number of people which I interacted with is more than 180, but the 
persons who had been interviewed formally by me are 161 in which some of them 
were interviewed twice and more. In case of coordinators of the City Farm 
programme, they were met with me more than 30 times. 